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2In memory of my mother, Elly Eleni
3“H neianeXeuGepcoTiK  ^eAAnvutfi loropia elvcu ouoiaonKd laxopla to>v  6^vcov encppdaeajv”
‘The post independence history of Greece is fundamentally 
a history of foreign interventions”
K. Simopoulos 
zevoKpaila, MiaeXAnviO]j6<; kcu YnoxdAfiia 
Foreign imposition, Mishellinism and Subjugation
(Athens, 1990)
The thesis aspires to challenge the dogma that 
all of Greece’s misfortunes and problems are 
due to: The Foreign Factor’.
Euaia
1. On page 195 reference 21 the number 10,000,000 should read 100,000,000 and the number 5,000,000 
should be 5,000,000,000.
2. The last paragraph of page 284 should be placed on page 285 under the title: b. The Advance and 
Temporary Loan Furnished by The Foundation Co.
3. Page 286 line 17 should read: stumbling block was that the British Treasury had either just enforced or 
was about to impose an embargo that precluded the...
4. Page 364, reference 9 is incomplete. Add the sentence: For the fact that according to certain sources, 
the net population increase after the refugee influx was only 13%, see reference 8 on page 94.
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Abstract
The Greek State and the International Financial Community, 
1922-1932: Demystifying the Foreign Factor
Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at 
the London School of Economics and Political Science
In the decade between the Asia Minor debacle of 1922 and the foreign loan 
default of 1932, the Greek State formed tight links with the international capital 
market.
This thesis examines the foreign loans raised. It investigates: the negotiations 
involved; the institutional framework through which these loans were provided; how 
they were used; and how they enhanced foreign tutelage over Greece.
Book I explores the loans issued under the auspices of the Legue of Nations. 
It analyses how the League tackled the Refugee problem and uncovers how the 
stabilization plan was devised. It demonstrates the manner in which the League, the 
Bank of England and the British Treasury co-operated as regards Greece; and how 
these institutions withheld foreign finance (e.g. via embargoes) to force Greece to 
attain political stability and curb military expenditure. Book I also focuses on the 
divergent economic philosophy of the Greek authorities vis-a-vis the League and the 
Bank of England. Moreover, it brings to the surface the underlying antagonism 
between the International Financial Commission and the League of Nations. In 
addition, the parameters, other than the world economic crisis, that contributed to the 
demise of free convertibility in Greece are delineated. Finally, the stabilization 
experiment of the twenties is placed in a comparative perspective.
Book II discusses foreign capital inflow outside ‘formal’ international control. 
This category of loans financed the development of infrastructure by foreign firms 
through ‘agency’ contracts. The terms and how the projects were carried out is 
investigated. The momentum attained in public works prior to stabilization and why it 
was not maintained during the gold exchange standard system is delineated. The 
growing dependence of the State on Hambros and the intimate relationship this 
merchant bank enjoyed with Greece’s supervisors and the National Bank of Greece is 
brought into relief.
Finally, an important issue analysed throughout the thesis is the internal 
weakness of the Greek state.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1
The Object of Inquiry, Hypotheses and Methodology
1.1. The Object of Inquiry
This thesis analyses the relationship of the Greek state with the international capital market * 
in the decade between the Asia Minor debacle of 1922 and the default of 1932.1 It investigates 
the origins and impact of foreign portfolio investment*; the negotiations surrounding foreign loans 
and the purposes for which they were raised; the projects assigned to foreign contractors**; the 
resulting foreign tutelage over economic policy and in particular the influence of Britain; the rise 
and collapse of the interwar gold standard in Greece. The analysis will consider the expectations 
of the Greek state and foreign creditors and will demonstrate that the flow of foreign capital was 
plagued with a number of problems.
The thesis examines the loans raised by the government and not public bodies in general. The latter 
category was insignificant, amounting to a mere £2,650,000.
Foreign direct investments in the public sector are not examined in the thesis. Such investments were 
few. The one large F.D.I. was an Anglo-Hellenic joint venture for the electrification of Athens and it has been 
covered in detail in the bibliography. (See Book II, Introduction).
17
1.2. Methodology
1.2.1. The thesis in relation to current trends in the international literature on capital 
movements
The thesis was initially conceived within the standard liberal framework of international 
financial relations. But, once the material was collected and the writing began, it became 
increasingly evident that the nature of the quantitative data and the complexities of the interwar 
period would not allow an analysis based exclusively on capital movements. As a result, in 
addition to outlining the quantity, origins, distribution, and functions of foreign capital flows, the 
thesis has explored the politics of international finance and embraces the theories of public policy 
analysis. The research shows that the Greek experience complies with the following five 
arguments made within the International Political Economy literature.2
First, that "No process, policy, or event is unquestionably accepted as either purely 
economic or political or, for that matter, as purely international or domestic."3 As seen in this 
thesis, international finance hinged on political considerations. Embargoes and the threat of more 
embargoes were used for political and strategic considerations for a large part of the twenties. In 
addition, the international capital market and foreign actors triggered domestic crises in Greece. It 
was also the case that internal political factors had negative repercussions regarding the flow, 
composition and absorption of foreign finance.4
Second, the balance of power between states has not been "merely a relationship 
between state-machineries, because the internal actors within any given state regularly acted 
beyond their own boundaries either directly or via alliances with actors elsewhere."5 As seen in 
^the thesis, the National Bank of Greece had tighter links, with and a fuller knowledge of, the 
, international financial community than the state Treasury. As a result, the Bank often in 
conjunction with Hambros took initiatives without consulting the government.
Third, dependence is primarily a function of the lack of internal strength and coherence of 
the state. Or put otherwise, the state is externally weak because it is internally weak -external 
weakness being a reflection of internal weakness. The Greek state lacked the power, stability and 
. unity to conceive and implement a consistent strategy regarding foreign capital inflows. The 
disarticulate nature of the state is also manifested in the unwillingness of the political leadership to
18
take advantage of sound advise offered by a small yet 'enlightened* cadre of technocrats, based ? 
mainly at the ministry of communications.
Fourth, the bargaining position of the state is weak when new overseas investments are 
being negotiated, particularly if the area in which investment is to be undertaken is one of high 
priority for the government and the national private and public savings rate is low. All the above 
factors were present in the Greek case.6
Fifth, the cultural variable plays an important role in explaining international economic 
relations.7 Indeed, the thesis sheds light on the disjuncture in logic between Greek officials and 
foreign bankers and entrepreneurs. There was a mismatch in terms of economic philosophy 
which led to an ideological clash on a number of issues such as: the optimum size and 
composition of state expenditures; the purpose, nature and expectations of currency 
stabilization; the role of investments in public utilities; the relationship of government and 
business.
Seen from another angle the thesis is a case study in international business history so far as 
it offers a micro-study of the behaviour of one firm, Hambros. As such it contributes to the growing 
body of research devoted to the activities of merchant banks abroad.8 In addition, the thesis 
confirms that the attitude of multinational firms towards Greece was typical for a peripheral country 
which was considered a potentially high risk. The combination of political instability and the small 
, size of the Greek market made it necessary for Hambros and the multinational contractors to 
cooperate with locals.9
Thus, the dissertation is not of one single perspective. It mingles the empiricist British 
historical tradition with the international political economy perspective and new research in the 
history of merchant banks and multinationals. Before moving on let it be noted here, that during 
the 1980's revision i*5V work on the history of international finance has downplayed the 
contribution of foreign capital to the pre 20th century economic development of the U.S.A., 
Western Europe, Russia, Austria, Spain, Japan and Latin America.10 My analysis has taken into 
consideration the arguments of the 'revisionists'. However, because a comprehensive study of 
the role of foreign capital in interwar Greece had never been attempted prior to the writing of this
19
thesis, every effort has been made neither to overestimate nor to underestimate the power of 
foreign finance.
1.2.2. Historiography and the thesis
Given the Greek fascination about the interplay between money and power and the 
ongoing debate about the role of the foreign factor* it is surprising that up to now there has been 
no serious or comprehensive analysis of the history of foreign finance and control. In the 
historiography of the interwar period two simplistic and antithetical arguments have been stated. 
The newer downplays the importance of foreign capital. Namely, it contends that the contribution 
of overseas capital to Greek economic development was negligible because direct investments 
were limited and the inflow of loan capital was counterbalanced by an outflow for servicing the 
foreign debt.12 Thus, by concentrating solely on the 'aggregate quantitative dimensions' of 
financial flows this approach overlooks the significance of foreign capital in certain key areas of the 
economy (e.g. infrastructure development) and the institutional modernization of the public 
sector.
On the other hand, the older Marxist literature, and the Greek dependency 'school* of the 
seventies -which drew its analysis from the work Gunder Frank- attribute Greece's socio-economic 
backwardness solely to the foreign factor*.13 This approach suffers from two basic handicaps. It 
fails to analyse the foreign factor* and does not examine the endogenous parameters responsible 
for the dependent formation of Greece within the context of interwar Europe.14 This thesis 
describes the foreign factor and demystifies the debate about it. The existing bibliography has 
not documented in detail the origins and functions of foreign finance. Neither has it explored the 
intricate interrelationship between the national and international capital markets nor fully 
elaborated the nexus of interests involving foreign firms, international bodies, the Greek state and 
other domestic actors. This dissertation will correct these shortcomings. The pattern of foreign 
capital flows is researched in depth. The inner conflicts between the two basic agents of foreign 
control: the League of Nations and the International Financial Commission and the alliances which 
rival foreign business interests made with antagonistic domestic economic interests are revealed. 
The internal blockages (for example the cultural variable) which impeded the smooth flow of
20
foreign funds and their maximum utilization are exposed. This work redresses the imbalance in 
the international literature of the interwar world economy. Existing scholarship, tends to 
overemphasize the significance of the big events (e.g. the Wall street crash of 1929 and the 
international crisis of 1931). These events do not tell the whole story. If we assume that 
international events are everything our perception of dependence is flawed. A main contribution 
of the thesis is that it exposes the fact that even if the big disrupting international events did not 
occur Greece would not have been in a position to draw substantially larger foreign capital flows. 
Moreover, it should be underlined that Greek and foreign institutions operated with the 
information at their disposal. If we employ the benefit of hindsight and do not consider the nature 
of that information and these expectations, we fail to understand the nature of Greek 
dependence.
In sum, this dissertation attempts to offer a novel interpretation of foreign capital inflow. The 
assumption made is that the dynamics of external finance and tutelage as it was played out in the 
Greek context was a versatile and complex process with politico-economic characteristics and 
repercussions. The analysis eliminates the following four prevailing and persistent myths that 
have been cultivated in Greece regarding foreign dependence:
i) High rates of interest made industrial countries eager to invest in Greece.15 This was simply 
not true. On the contrary, the Greek government throughout the decade under study had 
difficulties raising capital inspite its willingness to accept 'onerous' terms. It should be 
remarked that the International Financial Commission (which had been established back in 
1898) and Greece's(othei7supervisors disapproved of a heavy foreign borrowing policy.
ii) Greece paid a high price for foreign portfolio investment. However, in view of the
* prolonged default, the long-term gains for the creditors were more fictional than real.
iii) It has been argued that the Greek state was was externally weak whereas internally it was a 
strong institution. We do not accept this dichotomy. As mentioned above the state 
suffered from internal weaknesses although it was relatively large and dominant (an 
independent bourgeoisie class had never been formed as in the west)16.
iv) It has been asserted that the state was a passive pawn in the hands of the foreign factor*. 
However, although the state was weak the evidence at hand does not support such an 
assertion! Throughout the text these and other distortions are exposed.
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In terms of layout the thesis is separated in two 'Books' which are relatively self-contained. 
Book I explores why and how Greece's official supervisors -the League of Nations, the 
International Financial Commission, the Bank of England and the British Treasury- forced' Greece 
. to stabilize. The reasons for the delay in stabilization are scrutinized. The conflicts of interest 
among the domestic and foreign actors are underscored. The First Refugee Loan raised under 
the auspices of the League of Nations and the application of the League stabilization plan occupy 
central stage. Book I is a preamble to Book II in that it provides the institutional and policy 
background against which foreign flows for 'productive investments' occurred. The centerpiece 
to Book II is how the international capital markets reacted -or more pointedly failed to react- to 
stabilization. Seen from another perspective, it concentrates on the interplay of market forces 
regarding foreign portfolio investment which materialized outside the framework of 'formal' 
international control. The loans raised were almost exclusively for infrastructure building. Thus, 
the protagonists are the men of business: the bankers and the contractors.
How are the two 'Books' related? The common threads running throughout the thesis are 
the growing presence of Hambros in Greece, the antagonisms amongst the players involved in 
the process of foreign finance, and the 'endogenous' parameters that made it difficult for Greece 
to apply 'Western models' and maximize its access to the international capital market. Thus, it is 
that the two Books form a comprehensive whole. Moreover, it should be noted that if the themes 
pertaining to Book I only had been explored, it would have created the impression that the game 
of foreign finance was dictated exclusively by foreign supervision. This was far from the case. If 
on the contrary only Book II had been written the full extent of the tight links between foreign 
control and the flow of capital would have been lost. The sources used in the thesis are 
discussed separately in the introductions to each book.
1.3. Dramatis Personae
Chart 1 below depicts three sets of international and domestic actors involved in the story of 
foreign finance and control. On the international scene there were: First, the private business 
interests- the individual financiers and contractors. Most were familiar players in the game of 
international banking, namely Hambros, Seligman, The National City Bank, Speyers & Co.,
22
Kreuger & Toll, The Foundation Co., and Ulen & Co. Secondly, the British supervisors, the Bank 
of England and the British Treasury. Finally, there were the League of Nations and the 
International Financial Commission (I.F.C.). These were the formal supervisors of Greece. The 
League and the I.F.C. were able to determine the extent to which the state would be allowed to 
tap the international capital market.
Chart 1
The Actors
I. In the International Terrain
Private business interests: Hambros Bank, continental bankers unrelated to Hambros, 
continental bankers affiliated with Hambros, American bankers affiliated with Hambros, and 
multinational contracting firms.
International supervisors: The International Financial Commission, The League of 
Nations Financial Committee, Refugee Settlement Commission.
British supervisors: The Bank of England and the Treasury.
II. In Greece
The decision makers: The Prime Minister and the ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Communications, and Finance.
Banking Intermediaries: The National Bank of Greece; the Bank of Athens; the Bank 
of Greece.
Local pressure groups demanding fa ir treatment fo r Greece: The National 
Assembly; the bureaucrats at the ministry of communications
Two banks played a leading role in the foreign financing of Greece: Hambros and the 
National Bank of Greece. This was no accident. The National Bank of Greece was the Greek 
state's 'intermediary' with the international capital market for all public flotations. Greece's foreign 
creditors and supervisors negotiated with the Bank because it was strong and enjoyed a 
remarkable degree of autonomy.17
For their part, Hambros, had a longstanding financial interest in Greece ever since acting as 
the personal banker of King George in 1864. Hambros participated in most Greek foreign loan 
flotations and in 1887 it set up with French interests the Societe de Regie which undertook the 
collection of the revenues of the state monopolies.18 In addition, during the period studied the 
Hambros family had close connections with the Bank of England and Montagu Norman. Charles 
Hambro was a member of the Court of the Bank of England (1928-1963), and served as an 
executive director (1931-1933).19
23
The international supervisors, the I.F.C. and the Financial Committee of the League of 
Nations, were supranational only in name. (For a description of the creation and the functions of 
the I.F.C. see the introduction to Book I). As will be shown, the policy of the I.F.C. was basically 
dictated by the British Treasury. Evidence also confirms that the Bank of England had a strong 
influence on the Financial Committee of the League. The conflict of interest between these two 
organs of control reflected in many ways clashes between the British Treasury and the Bank of 
England. Although these two institutions cooperated closely, their primary concerns in foreign 
economic affairs were not identical. The former was interested in ensuring that Greece would 
settle its war debt, fulfill its financial obligations towards the bondholders of bans supervised by 
the I.F.C. and to protect citizens of Britain, Italy and France from 'high-handed' acts of the Greek 
government, such as the land expropriation scheme and the forced loans of 1922 and 1926. In 
contrast, the League was called upon to play a wider role. Apart from undertaking the task of 
settling the refugees, it kept a strict eye over military expenditure and masterminded the 
stabilization of the drachma within the framework of the gold exchange standard system. 
Interesting conflict emerged. For example, the large reserves that the I.F.C. held abroad and the 
manner in which it administered government revenues under its supervision were viewed by the 
* League as obstructing efforts to create a modern institutional framework for the Greek financial 
system. This conflict between the two agencies of control has been overlooked in the existing 
literature, possibly for the reason that they were both dominated by the British.
Three final comments regarding the actors. First, it certainly is the case that at the time both 
in Greece and in the international setting, personalities molded institutions and not vice versa. In 
this context, Montagu Norman, Sir Otto Niemeyer, Alexandros Diomedes stand out. Second, the 
'policy' of the Greek state towards the inflow of foreign capital was in the last analysis determined 
^ • by politicians, not by the state bureaucrats nor domestic bankers (e.g. the N.B.G. or the Bank of 
Greece). Third, it was by a by a twist of irony that Hambros a banker who had become identified 
with the monarchy was to reach the peak of its power in Greece during the twenties when Greece 
was a Republic!
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Chapter 2
The Political Economy of Interwar Greece
2.1. The Economic and Political Environment
The available statistical data for the interwar economy are at times inaccurate and in large 
measure discontinuous.1 Caution has to be exercised when interpreting the material. It is not 
therefore possible to present a quantitatively precise picture of the economic situation as it 
evolved during the period of study. From the pieces of the scattered -and not often incompatible 
data a blurred picture appears. In the twenties, the rate of economic growth was low both in 
absolute terms and compared to the preceding and following decades.(Table 1) 1926 was a year 
of negative growth and real G.N.P. fell "considerably during 1929 and 1931".2 Nevertheless, the 
impact of the world crisis on the economic activity of the country was less acute than in the 
industrialised countries.3 (See Tables 2 and 3)
Table 1
Average Annual Growth Rate of the G.N.P.
1910-1920* 9.5%
1920-1930 1.3%
1930-1940 3.4%
*The data after 1920 are expressed on a constant price basis although it is not explicitly stated in the 
original source.
Source: A.F.Freris. The Greek Economy in the Twentieth Century. (London, 1986), p.103.
Greece remained predominantly a backward agricultural country.4 Agriculture continued to 
be burdened with excessive land fragmentation, the absence of mechanisation, the 
preponderance of dry farming, the limited use of fertilizers and the poor quality of soil.5 Yields 
were low for cereals as well as for export staples.6 What change occurred was largely related to 
diversification brought about by the refugees.7 The number of industrial plants doubled and the 
horsepower levels more than tripled.8 However, as was the case with agriculture, fragmentation of 
production remained excessive. According to the Census of 1930, 92% of the industrial 
establishments employed less than 6 workers.9 The sectoral breakdown of industry did not
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change and heavy industry remained practically non-existent.10 The traditional sectors of textiles, 
food processing, chemicals and tanning retained their predominant position and accounted for 
about 80% of total industrial output in 1922 and 70% in 1932.11
Table 2
Index of Economic Activity (1928=100)
Year Industrial Output Agricultural Output
1922 70.5
1923 62.7
1924 80.7
1925 88.8
1926 84.5
1927 94.4
1928 100 100
1929 101.7 96.9
1930 105.2 100
1931 108.8 95
1932 102.6 132
Source: A-F.Freris. The Greek Economy in the Twentieth Century. (London, 1986), p.90.
Table 3
General Index of Economic Activity in Greece 1925-1934 
(1928=100)
1925 99.1
1926 93.2
1927 98.6
1928 100
1929 ^♦103.5
1930 99.9
1931 95.3
1932 91.5
Source: K.Kostis, The Banks and the Crisis (Athens, 1986), p.121. Figures on economic activity prior to 
• 1925 do not exist. However, from the work of Colin Clark it is confirmed that the National income was during 
the twenties growing at a ’good rate' until 1927. See: P.Dertilis, The Economic Issue. (Athens, 1951), p.24.
There was disarray in the realm of public finance prior to the stabilization programme of 
1927-1928. The state budget was permanently in deficit. The government tackled this structural 
disequilibrium by resorting to the expediencies of extraordinary taxation, forced borrowing (in 
1922 and 1926), and printing new notes.12 The increase in the circulation of money was lower 
• than the rise in the cost of living. The latter (i.e. depreciation), was in return far lower than the
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devaluation in the external value of the drachma. (See Appendix 2) Following stabilization the 
situation improved as up to 1931 the state followed a policy of sound finance.
Greece was an open economy. The total value of exports and imports accounted on 
average for 38% of G.N.P. Throughout the period there was a balance of trade deficit.13 Hence 
the importance of borrowing. (See Table 4 below). Dependence on raw materials and staple food 
items was extensive. Industry imported 87% of its fuel requirements,14 and although 2/3 of the 
cultivated land was devoted to cereal production more than half of the country's needs in cereals 
were satisfied through imports.15
Table 4
Exports and Imports E xports
Year as a % of as a % of
Gross National Product the Value o f Imports
1922*
1923 - 79
1924 35 42
1925" 30 4145
48
51
1926*
1927 421928 41 511929
1930 4538
52
571931
1932 3329
48
58
‘The years 1922,1925 and 1926 are not included in the Table as estimates of the G.N.P. for these years are 
not available.
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1929. (Athens, 1930), pp.129,198; 
G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1939. (Athens, 1940), Part II, pp.15,199. Also, B.R. 
Mitchell, European Historical Statistics 1750-1975. (London, second edition, 1981), p.822. Also, A.F. 
Freris, The Greek economy in the Twentieth Century. (London, 1986), p.107.
Greek trade was highly concentrated, both sectorally and geographically. Three items 
(tobacco, currants and olive oil) made up 70% of total exports.16 As Table 5 demonstrates, four 
countries, (Britain, the U.S.A., Germany, Italy) absorbed 75% of the country's exports and 
accounted for more than 40% of imports. In particular trade dependence on Britain was notable. 
She absorbed approximately 2/3 of the country's second most important exportable good, 
currants,17 and furnished 60-80% of Greece's coal imports.18 What is more, Britain was Greece's
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major supplier of manufactured goods. The 1926 trade treaty granted British goods virtually free' 
access to the Greek market.19
In sum, the Greek economy during the twenties remained backward and an insignificant 
player in the international economy, accounting for a mere 0.3% of world trade.20 In a lopsided 
external position, she was a market of minor importance for Britain and the U.S.A., her two major 
trading partners and sources of supply of capital.21
Table 5
Trade Flows (% of Total Value)
E x p o r t s
C ountry 1914 1922 1928 1931 1 9 3 3
Britain 25 23 13 15 19
U.S.A. 16 32 20 17 12
Germany 6 26 26 14 18
Italy 14 10 16 17 14
I m p o r t s
C ountry 1914 1922 1928 1931 1 93 3
Britain 20 14 14 13 14
U.S.A. 7 21 16 9 6
Germany 9 6 9 11 10
Italy 7 9 5 6 6
Data do not exist for all the years. There is not information for 1932, thus for the end year of our study we 
have cited 1931 and 1933.
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1929. (Athens, 1930), pp.203-204; 
also, G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1938. (Athens, 1939), pp.42-43; and also 
Ministers des Affaires Etrangeres, La Grece Actuelle. (Athens, 1933), pp.183-184.
From a political perspective, the decade under study was rich in events. In the spring of 
1924 the country was declared a republic and in the summer of 1925 general Theodore Pangalos 
usurped power with the 'silent’ assent of the National Assembly. Up to the downfall of Pangalos in 
the summer of 1926, the military played a prominent role in politics and inspite of the Asia Minor 
debacle, irredentist aspirations were a constant undercurrent. There was a high frequency of 
government changes (eight different governments held office between the autumn of 1922 and 
August 1926 and there were 13 different cabinets).22 (See below Table 6) Intense division
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('dihasmos') between pro-Venizelists and monarchists did not allow for the formation of cabinets 
with a strong electoral base.
Table 6
Governments and (Prime Ministers): 1922-1932
M onarchy
November 14 1922 - January 11 1924 (Colonel S.Gonatas)
January 11 1924 - February 6 1924 (E.Venizelos)
February 6 1924 - March 121924 (G.Kafandaris)
R epub lic
March 12 1924 - July 251924 (A.Papanastassiou)
July 25 1924 - October 7 1924 (Th.Sofoulis)
October 7 1924 - June 26 1925 (A.Michalakopoulos)
June 26 1925 - July 19 1926 (General Th. Pangalos)
July 19 1926 - August 261926 (A. Eftaxias)
August 26 1926 - December 41926 (G.Kondylis)
December 4 1926 - July 4 1928 (A.Zaimis)
July 4 1928 - May 26 1932 (E.Venizelos)
May 26 1932 - June 5 1932 (A.Papanastassiou)
June 51932 - September 27 1932 (E.Venizelos)
* Compiled from: A.Provatas. Political history of Greece 1821-1980. (Athens, 1980), pp.439-500.
These were years of international isolation. Britain disapproved of the abolition of the 
monarchy and together with the League was heavily critical of the government's rearmament 
programme and military aspirations. Politics influenced the flow of foreign capital. Prior to 
stabilization, Greece suffered two major financial embargoes which were designed to influence 
internal politics. (For the first see, introduction to Book I and the First Refugee Loan and for the 
second see the chapter on the British war debt.). It is apparent that had Greece adjusted rapidly to 
the post WWI international scene the embargoes would not have been imposed. However, it can 
also be argued that the embargoes worked at cross purposes and strengthened the country's 
underlying trend towards political destabilization.23
Greece became a sad example of missed opportunities. It remained an outcast in the 
international community as late as December 1926 (at which point a coalition government was 
established).24 It was then at long last, that the Hellenic Republic appeared to adjust to the 
postwar world order as three difficult issues were resolved: i) military influences in politics were
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curbed,25 ii) war debt agreements were signed with three ex-Allies, iii) the drachma was stabilized 
and integrated into the gold exchange system 26 However, the coalition government which had 
resolved these problems rapidly disintegrated. In August 1927, the Populist party withdrew its 
support from the coalition, disagreeing fundamentally with the stabilization programme. (See: 
Book I, Section III, Phase Two, Chapter 1) Then, in February 1928 the Republican Union retired 
because it disapproved of the government's handling of the national road project. (See Book II, 
Section II, Chapter One) The coalition government suffered its final blow in late May 1928, as a 
result of Eleftherios Venizelos' open attack against its handling of French war debt and the 
compensation of the National Bank of Greece for the removal of the note issue privilege.27 (See 
Book I, Section III, Phase Two, Chapter Two and Phase Three) Venizelos' Liberal Alliance party 
came into office with an overwhelming majority in July 1928. As was the case with the coalition, 
Venizelos accepted the 'postwar dogma' propagated by the League of Nations. However, he 
differed from the coalition in that a centerpiece of his four year government involved 
. strengthening Greek ties with her neighbours and lessening financial dependence on Britain. 
This last goal in combination with his flirtation with American capital, his limited understanding of 
how the international capital market operated and the principles of central banking, made his stay 
in office a difficult time.28
2.2. Foreign Portfolio Investment in Relation to the Total Foreign Debt and Domestic 
Borrowing
In the decade between the Asia Minor debacle of 192229 and the foreign loan default of 
1932, the government borrowed £83,098,000 abroad.30 By the standards of the day this was a 
large figure. 31 It was equivalent to 73% of G.N.P 32 A little over half of the new borrowing 
debt,(i.e. £43,797,000) consisted of financial obligations directly related to Greece's war effort, 
namely the Balkan wars (1912-1913), WWI (1914-1918), and the Asia Minor Campaign (1919- 
1922). It was made up of diverse elements such as obligations to the ex-Allies and the purchase 
of the Salonika Monastir railways for strategic reasons 33 (See below Table 7) The remainder,
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Table 7
Foreign Obligations of the Government and Foreign Borrowing
(1922-1932)
Year
G e n e r a l  O b l i g a t i o n s L o a n s
Title Amount
(£)
Title
Nominal
Amount
(£>
laaue
Price
Nominal
Intereat
Rate
(% )
1922
1923 •Canadian War DeptW Agreement 
•Penalty for military transgression paid to 
Italy under the orders of the League of 
Nations
1,700,000
500,000
1924 •Participation of Greece in the Ottoman 
Dept 10,049,775
•First Refugee Loan 
(December 1924) 12,300,000 88 7
1925 •Penalty for military transgression paid to 
Bulgaria under the orders of the League 
of Nations 45,000
•Athens Water Loan (April 1925) 
•Belgian Railway Loan 
(August 1925)
2,100,000
4,300,000
85
92
8
8
1926 •Swedish Match Loan 1,000,000 94 8.5
1927 •British War Dept Agreement 
•U.S.A. War Dept Agreement^ 
•Purchase of the Salonica Monastir 
Rails(3)
•Compensation to Turkish Nationals for 
properties left behind in Greece
23,500,000
4,201,237
600,000
500,000
1928 •Stabilization Loan (March 1928) 
•First Public Works Loan 
(December 1928)
7,500,000
4,000,000
86
84
6
6
1929
1930 •French War Dept*4* Agreement 1,164,683 •U.S. Government Refugee Loan 
(April 1930)
•Swedish School Loan 
(July 1930)
2,500,000
1,000,000
100
84
4
6
1931 •Compensation to Bulgarian Nationals for 
the properties left behind in Greece 1,537,205
•Second Public Works Loan 
(May 1931) 4,600,000 6
1932
Total 43,797,900 39,300,000
^This debt represented the conversion of a short term loan concluded for the provision of wheat during the war to 
a long term debt.
^$20,330,000.
3|n 1927 the Greek state purchased from French interest the company of Salonika-Monastir railways and 
undertook the responsibility for the repayment of the remaining amount of the 3% loan the company had 
contracted in 1893. This amounted to 15,000,000 gold francs (i.e. approximately £600,000).
4Fr. Francs 144,144,512.
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.).Economic Yearbook of Greece 1932. (Athens, 1933), pp.493-528.
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about £39,300,000 consisted of nine loans which with one minor exception were of a productive 
nature and arose from the government's aim to modernize the economic infrastructure and 
expand productive capacity. The country was capital 'hungry'. The capital/land and capital/labour 
ratios had always been low, but they had become ever more so as a result of historical 'accident'. 
Following the Balkan wars, the area of the country had nearly doubled but with the refugee influx 
' of 1922 there was a sudden net population increase of 20%.34 These events triggered 
unprecedented borrowing for productive purposes and widened the scope for government 
economic initiative.35
Table 8
Internal-External Borrowing 1922-1932 
(in £ sterling)
Year Internal Loans External Loans
1922 9,429,429 •
1923 667,868 -
1924 2,660,735 12,300,000
1925 2,126,477 6,400,000
1926 14,325,057 1,000,000
1927 2,170,963 -
1928 6,704,210 11,500,000
1929 2,719,999 -
1930 693,332 3,500,000
1931 864,511 -
1932 211,461 4,600,000
Tota l 42,574,042 39,300,000
Compiled from: G.Haritakis, (ed). Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1932. (Athens, 1932), pp.494-581.
Could the state have financed these new activities from the domestic capital market? 
Apparently the limited scope of the latter did not allow much room for internal borrowing. Of the 
£42,574,000 borrowed from domestic sources between 1922 and 1932 about 34% was secured 
through the unpopular device of forced loans 36 Interestingly, internal borrowing was mostly for 
social welfare, e.g., refugees, and war victims absorbed about 77% of the amount raised, and only 
2% were used for public productive investments. Contemporaries assumed that the flow of 
foreign capital would be more than ample to fund the more ambitious developmental projects 
undertaken by various administrations during the period. One cannot help asking if a substitution
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effect was at work. Namely, whether overseas borrowing displaced -crowded out- local saving; 
instead of widening the amount available for productive investment.37 It can be argued that had 
foreign funds not been available, the interwar state would not have engaged in 'extensive' 
expenditure of a social welfare character.
2.3. Basic Features of Foreign Portfolio Investment
All of the foreign loans raised by the government except one - the Swedish School loan- 
were not 'pure' capital transfers. They were either managed by the League of Nations or they 
were tied loans managed by foreign business interests. (See below, Chart 1) Greece was not an 
usual case. As has been noted recently in the international literature, a large part of foreign 
portfolio investment was not simply "pure capital transfers, strictly for financial returns" but was 
vested with the type of external control associated with foreign direct investments.38 Regarding 
the allocation of the funds it is notable that 41% of the capital raised was spent on public works, 
39% was used for refugee settlement, 18% for stabilization, and only 2% was wasted on current 
consumption.
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Chart 1
Main Loans and the Conditions under which they were Issued
I. Direct Government Loans:
i. U.S.A. Refugee Loan (1929): The proceeds were handled by the League 
appointed R.S.C.
II. Loans Raised on the International Capital Market
i. Private Loans:
a. Athens Water Loan (1925): The creditors were granted a 27 year 
concession for the management of the 
Athens water system.
b. Belgian Railway Loan (1925): This was a tied loan. The proceeds were 
spent on materials chosen by the creditor.
c. Swedish Match Loan (1926): In return for this loan the state ceded the 
match monopoly of Greece for 28 years.
d. Swedish School Loan (1930): Issued without conditions.
III. Loans Raised on the International Capital Market through Public Flotation
i. League of Nations Loans:
a. First Refugee Loan (1924): Its proceeds were handled directly by the 
League appointed R.S.C. Also, it involved 
League supervision of Greek public finances.
b. Stabilization Loan (1928): A tied loan raised for implementing a League 
stabilization programme. League supervision 
of Greek public finance became tight.
ii. Loans Raised without the Supervision of the League of Nations:
a. First Public Works Loan (1928): A tied loan raised for specific projects.
b. Second Public Works Loan 
(1931)
A tied loan raised for specific projects.
2.3.1. Net value of the capital flow
As already indicated, the total nominal value of the nine foreign loans raised during the 
decade 1922-1932 was approximately £39,300,000. However, due to the low issue prices the 
total real value of these loans amounted to only £34,200,000. But the net flow of foreign capital 
into Greece was even lower, it was a little over £30,000,000, as three of the foreign' loans were 
partially issued in Greece. Nevertheless, even this 'diminished' figure was significant for the small 
Greek economy. As indicated in Table 9, on average the 'net' inflow of foreign capital represented 
14% of state expenditures and covered 24% of the trade gap.
Due to the absence of data on the balance of payments before 1928 it is not possible to 
measure accurately on a year to year basis the real contribution of foreign finance to the external 
accounts. (For the balance of payments from 1929 onwards see Appendix 3, Table 1).
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Table 9
0 Nominal value of the government foreign loans (1922-1932) £41,000,000
II) Net value of the government foreign loans (1922-1932) £36,100,000
IIO Average annual net foreign capital inflow (1922-1932) £ 3,200,000
IV) III as a % of the average annual state expenditure (1922-1932) 14
V) III as a % of the average annual exports (1922-1932) 21.5
VI) III as a % of the average annual remittances (1922-1932) 48
VII) III as a % of the average annual trade gap (1922-1932) 24
Compiled from: the data presented in the following Tables in Appendix 1: 1,2a and 2b; Also, G.Haritakis 
(ed), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1932. (Athens, 1933), pp.493-528.
2.3.2. Geographical origins
Foreign capital was highly concentrated in origin. Of the seven foreign markets that raised 
loan capital for the Greek government three (Switzerland, Italy, and Holland), supplied less than 
one tenth of the total nominal amount. (See Table 10 below) Whereas, the contribution of Britain 
alone stood at 40%, even though for half of the decade the City of London had closed its doors to 
the Greek government.39 Second in importance came the U.S.A., a newcomer in the Greek loan 
arena. It must be underlined that France up to WWI had been a major creditor. However, in the 
twenties France lost interest in Greece -presumably because Greece did not fit in with her novel 
Central European and Balkan policy- and thus abstained completely from issuing Greek 
government bonds.40
Table 10
Distribution of Foreign Loan Capital Raised by the Government 
According to Country of Origin (1922-1932)
Britain 40 %
U.S.A. 25 %
Greece 10.5 %
Belgium 10 %
Sweden 6.5 %
Switzerland 2.5 %
Italy 1.7 %
Holland 0.7 %
Compiled from: G. Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1932. (Athens, 1933), pp.549-585.
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Not all foreign bonds were floated abroad. Foreign institutions were often unwilling to 
arrange loans for the Greek government without the participation of local financial interests. Thus 
for three loans (the First Refugee Loan of 1924, the Athens Water Loan of 1925, and the First 
Public Works Loan of 1928) part of the capital was raised in Greece through the National Bank of 
Greece and the Bank of Athens. Both banks had close ties with foreign capital,41 and in total, 
they placed 10% of these loans. In addition a large part of foreign bond issues overseas were 
purchased by Greeks. In 1933, it was estimated that over half of the government long-term 
foreign debt was held by Greek citizens at home and abroad 42 Thus, it is the case that Greece 
conforms with the observation made by D.C.M. Platt that often foreign capital flows were not 
exclusively of foreign origin 43
2.3.3 Institutional morphology
The bulk of foreign ban capital was supplied through the market. Only in one instance -the 
U.S.A. Refugee Government Loan of 1929- were funds furnished by the Treasury of a foreign 
government. This direct inter-governmental grant was the most advantageous loan of the period. 
It was issued at par and it had the lowest rate of interest. The three most expensive bans (i.e. the 
Athens Water Loan of 1925, The Belgian Railway Loan of 1925, and the Swedish Match Loan of 
1926) were placed privately on the international market and shared several characteristics. First, 
they were of non-British origin. Second, with the exception the Athens Water Loan, the funds 
were provided by firms whose main activities lay outside finance. Finally, all were issued at times 
when the city of London would not lend to the Greek government. (See Table 11).
Table 11
Terms Posed by Foreign Creditors According to Type of Loan (1922-1932)
Type of Loan Issue Price Interest Rate Redemption Reriod
Direct government bans 100 4.5% 22,5 years
Privately placed bans 89 8.5% 23 years
League of Nations bans 87 6.<T% 40 years
Non League publicly issued bans 86 %5% 30,5 years
Same source as Table 8.
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Table 12
The Channels of Supply of the International Capital Market (in million £)
Formal Control Informal Control |
Public Flotations PublicFlotations
Private I 
Loans
Hambros
Associates of Hambros 
Unrelated to Hambros 
N.B.G.
Bank of Athens
£10,9 
£ 6,5 
0
£ 2,5 
0
£6
£1,6
0
£1
0
0
0
£7,3
0
£1,06
Total £19,9 £8,6 £8,4
Overseas loans offered for public subscription were cheaper than the private loans. They 
accounted for approximately three quarters of foreign borrowing. This type of capital inflow was 
highly concentrated in structure. A single merchant bank, Hambros, issued around 60%. The 
government came to depend directly and nearly exclusively on Hambros for the flotation of public 
bonds abroad. Dependence ran both ways. According to Hambros the flotation of Greek 
government loans during the twenties became one of its major and most lucrative activities.44
Public flotations issued under the auspices of the League of Nations (i.e. the First Refugee 
Loan of 1924, and the Stabilization Loan of 1928) had a comparatively low real rate of interest. 
However, from the perspective of the government, they suffered from two major drawbacks. Their 
proceeds were managed by the League and the public policy of the Greek government came 
under close scrutiny by the Financial Committee of the League.
In closing the description of the framework through which foreign portfolio investment 
* entered the public sector it must be underlined that the Greek state desired throughout the 
period to escape from British financial 'hegemony' and to develop stronger ties with American 
capital. But, this did not prove possible. Greece stabilized in 1928 and "From the latter part of 
1927 the American investor lost his taste for foreign bonds, preferring the more exciting 
possibilities of a rising market in American equities"45 Furthermore, the intimate relationship 
which Hambros enjoyed with the British establishment and the National Bank of Greece did not 
allow much room for new 'independent' entrants. In the end, although the U.S.A. supplied 25% 
of foreign loan capital it was merely a passive participant in the syndicated loans raised by 
Hambros.
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In sum, public flotations accounted for 74% of the funds raised. The greater part of this 
figure passed through British hands.46 Finally, it should be underlined that over half of the loan 
capital was provided under the auspices of the League of Nations and the guarantee of the I.F.C. 
(See Table 12).
2.4. How Typical a Case was Greece in the Context of the Interwar World Economy?
By 1932 Greece was a heavily indebted country. The total foreign debt stood at 
£125,000,000 and it was equivalent to the highest figure the G.N.P. attained at any time in the 
interwar period!47 (See Tables 4 and 4a in Appendix 1 for the breakdown of the total foreign debt 
in 1932). The annual service of the foreign debt absorbed a little over 9% of the National Income. 
An indirect index of the 'openess' of the Greek economy is that for its Balkan neighbours the 
respective figures were significantly lower. For example, for Yugoslavia it was 1.7%, and for 
Bulgaria 3%.48
Greece was an exception in that she did not raise bans for re-armament. Moreover, the 
League loans did not bring back fugitive capital as was the case for example with Austria and 
Hungary 49 Nor did stabilization enhance the flow of new foreign funds or emigrant remittances. 
(For emigrant remittances see Table 2a in Appendix 1). Also, foreign direct investments between 
1922 and 1932 represented only 11% of the total capital inflow whereas at the time foreign direct 
investments in the international economy represented at least a quarter of total capital 
movements.50 However, in one respect Greece was a typical European borrower: the 
reconstruction of the twenties depended heavily on foreign finance.51
In this introduction to the thesis we have set the political and economic background and 
outlined the origins, dimensions and of Greece. It shows that throughout the period Greece was a 
weak player in the international capital market,* foreign portfolio investment was vested with 
extensive foreign control and that foreign finance, inspite its large volume and 'productive' 
orientation did not solve the country's chronic structural imbalances and instigate an industrial 
revolution.
*For the credit rating of Greece according to the League of Nations see Book I, Section III, Phase Two, 
Chapter 3, Table 3. From this Table it construes that in terms of the real rate of interest charged the First 
Refugee Loan of 1924 occupied the 6th position and the Stabilization Loan of 1928 the 1st position among 
the eight League loans raised during the twenties.
40
References
1. For example we have no G.N.P. estimates prior to 1927. For a detailed discussion of the difficulties
that exist with the available data see Freris, op.cit., pp.102-113. For an account of the development of 
the National statistical services, see: M. Houliarakis, "lOTopiKfj rr\q Kpaiutfjc iTcmanKfjq ev
EAA6611821-1971” (Historical development of state statistics in Greece 1821-1971) in the National 
Centre of Social Studies (ed.), Itq u o tik q I M cA & tqi 1821-1971. H iTcmqnKrt k q t6 tq  150 6m un6 tnc 
naAivevnoiac me EXX65oc (Statistical Studies 1821-1971. Statistics during the 150 years from the 
regeneration of Greece), (Athens, 1972), pp.41-65.
2. For the fall in G.N.P., see: Freris, op.cit., pp.111,113.
3. In 1932 the level of industrial output was higher than in 1929. Infact, Greek industry suffered less 
compared also to other peripheral economies such as Hungary, Rumania, Poland and 
Checkoslovakia. Source: K.Kostis, Oi Todncfcc kcu n Koton 1929-1932 (The Banks and the Crisis 
1929-1932), (Athens. 1986), p.22.
4. For the preponderant position of agriculture (it made up for 36% of the National Product in 1924 and 
38% in 1934), see: Freris, op.cit., p. 107.
5. The use of fertilizers was very low: 3,3 kilograms per stremma* compared to 9,9 for Italy and 17,6 for 
Germany. Economic Survey of Greece for 1929, p.50. For a well-rounded presentation of the 
problems of Greek agriculture during the interwar years, see: C.Evelpides, H rccoovta me EAA65oc * 
(The Agriculture of Greece), (Athens, 1944). Also, A.Bernaris, H AtdoBocooie k q i q i nooon68eiai 
hoooaopovite rpq EAAgvuq'iq OiKovoutac. (The Structure and the Corrective Adjustment Efforts of 
the Greek Economy), (Athens, 1933), pp.68-73. Also, A.D.Sideris, H I"Eorovucrt noAmxrt me EXA65oc 
KQTd mv AtiEaoav EKaTovrasTtav 1833-1933. (The Agricultural Policy of Greece during the last 100 
Years 1833-1933), (Athens, 1935).
6. For example, Greece had the lowest cereal yield in the Balkans. The yield per stremma of olive oil, 
which was a basic exportable was 15 kilos for Greece and 18.6 kilos for Spain. Source: G. Haritakis 
(ed.), OiKoyopixri EncTTptq tt^  EAA65oc 1929 (Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1929), (Athens, 
1930) p.93.
7. For the contribution of the refugees to Greek agriculture, see: D.Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange * 
of Minorities and its Impact upon Greece. (Paris, 1962). Also, G.Lampsidis, H AvdnmEtc me 
AvooTutfjc OiKovoutac. (The Development of the Agricultural Economy), in OtKovopiKdq TaxuSpdpoq, 
April 26 1973, pp.51-55. Also, A.LAegides. H EAA6c ycopIc  t o u c  no6q<Puvec (Greece Without the 
Refugees), (Athens, 1934).
8. Supreme Economic Council, H EAAnvixfi O iko vq u Iq  k q t6 mv AidoKCia to u  1939. (The Greek 
Economy during 1939), (Athens,1940). The interwar years, see: M.Dritsa, BiopnxQvta ko i Todnefec 
omv EAA65q to u  McoonoXfcuou (Industry and Banks in Interwar Greece), (Athens, 1990).
9. G.Anastassopoulos, loroofa -me EXXnvucric BiounYovtac 1885-1940 (History of Greek Industry 1885- 
1940), Vol.lll, (1923-1940), pp.1259-1267, (Athens, 1947).
10. For example, the first company for the production of iron and steel sheets and tinplates was 
established in 1939. Source: Great Britain Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division, A Handbook of 
Greece. (London, 1941), Vd.2., p.130.
11. For the sectoral distribution of industry, see: G.Haritakis (ed.), OiKovouiKfi Endnote me EXXdSoc 
1938. (Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1938), (Athens, 1939), p.283.
12. For the forced loans of 1922 and 1926, see: Bank of Greece, Ta nomia nsvfivTa Xo6via me 
Toan&nc me EXX65oc 1928-1978. (TheFirst Fifty Years of the Bank of Greece 1928-1978), (Athens, 
1978), pp.33-34.
13. This deficit persisted inspite of the new tariff introduced m the early twenties. For the new tariff and 
the reactions against its imposition, see: Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1929, pp.210-215. Indeed 
importing merchants were at the time ”a considerable and powerful proportion of Greek commercial 
interests”. Source: H.M.SO, Department of Overseas Trade, (R.F.H.. Duke), Report on the Industrial 
and Economic Situation in Greece for the years 1923 and 1924. (London, 1925),pp.14-15.
14. For fuel imports and the structural trade imbalance, see: I.Pepelasis, Agricultural Policy in Greece, 
1923-1936, (M.Sc. Thesis 1976), p.7.
15. For the fact that 70% of the land was devoted to cereals, see: Economic Yearbook of Greece for 
1929. p.47.
16. These figures are based on estimations for 1928.
17. F0371/9888/C 19814/19, Annual Report for 1924.
*1 stremma is equal to a quarter of an acre.
41
18. Britain was Greece's major supplier of coal. It supplied 60-80% of the total amount of coal imported. 
Source: HMSO, Department of Overseas Trade, (R.M.A. Turner), Report on the Industrial and 
Economic Situation in Greece. Mav31st 1927, (London, 1927), pp.29,63.
19. For the new Anglo-Hellenic Commercial Treaty signed by Pangalos in July 1926, see: Bloudanis, * 
op.cit., pp.84-87.
20. Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1929, p.196, gives for the first half of the decade the figure of 
0.35%. For 1913 the figure given is 0.2%. Because a new study, for 1913 quotes 0.14% it is likely 
that the Yearbook figure for the twenties is slightly exaggerated. See: P.E.Petrakis and H.Panorios, 
"Economic Fluctuations in Greece: 1844-1913", J.E.E.H., Vol.21, Number 1, spring 1992, p.34.
21. For Greece's share in world trade and the figures for Britain, see: The Secretary of the Share and 
Loan Department, The Stock Exchange Official Intelligence, editions for 1924,1928,1931. For the 
fact that in the mid twenties for the U.S.A. exports and imports to Greece were about 0.5% of her total 
exports and imports, see: L/N/S119/Article 16, Economic Sanctions, memorandum prepared by Sir 
Arthur Salter titled: The Graeco-Bulgarian incident 'sanctions'”, October 1925.
22. For the definition of political instability as the existence of more than one government every three or 
four years, see: A.J.Kondonassis, A.G.Malliaris, N.S.Robinson, "Political Instability and Economic 
Development: an Economic History Case Study of Greece 1948-1966”, J.E.E.H., Vol.12, Number.2, 
fall 1983, pp.351-62. The Pangalos dictatorship was essentially overthrown on August 26, 1926, 
although Pangalos had stepped down and placed A.Eftaxias as a puppet Prime Minister on July 19, 
1926. Source: A.Provatas. lloAmKfi loroota me EAA65oc 1821-1980. Nouo8ctik6koi Ekte Accrued 
Idjuaia. (Political History of Greece 1821-1980. Legal and Administrative Bodies), (Athens, 1980), 
p.426.
• 23. The relationship between foreign finance and political instability has not been extensively explored in
the case of Greece. However, for the complicated relationship between political instability and 
economic development and the difficulty in establishing mono-causal relationship between these two 
variables, see: Th.Lianos, "Political Stability and Economic Development: the Case of Greece, 1948- 
1966", J.E.E.H., Vol. 15, Number.3, Winter 1986, pp.617-619.
> 24. The coalition was brought into power by the elections of December 1926. These were the first 
elections to be held in Greece since 1921. The coalition was made up of four parties: the United 
Liberals, the Republican Union, the Populist, and the Free opinion party. The the populace continued 
to be divided between Venizelists, and anti Venizelists. But, in each camp, it was the moderate 
parties that had received the overwhelming support of the voters. "Among the Venizelists the radical 
Republican Union had won only 17 seats, while in the opposite camp the moderate Free opinion party 
of Metaxas, which had accepted the republican constitution as a basis for political life, now held ~ 
almost as many seats as the Populist party which threatened to reopen the constitutional issue.”. 
Source: J.Campbell & P.Sherrard, Modem Greece. (London, 1968), pp.135-136.
25. The word permanently is in inverted comments for the reason that in the spring of 1936 a new 
dictatorship was established under loannis Metaxas. For the role of the military in Greek politics 
during the period, see: Th. Veremis, Ol Encppdosiq tou iTParou QTpv EXXqviKri rioAmKp 1916-1936. 
(The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics 1916-1936), (Athens, 1977), p. 189.
26. One more welcome development was the new constitution which was voted on June 3,1927. It was 
not noted for its originality. However, it was more progressive, and suffered from less technical 
weaknesses than the previous three constitutions of Greece (i.e. those of 1844,1864, and 1911). For 
details see: History of the Greek Nation. Vol.lE, pp.306-307; also, A.Svolos, The new Constitution and 
the foundations of Government, Athens, 1928, (in Greek); also, S.Markezinis, noAinKri loroota me 
NecoTfeoac EAAdSoc: H luvYoovn EAAdc (Political History of Modern Greece: Contemporary 
Greece), (Athens, 1978), Vol.3, pp.152-155.
27. Kafandaris had taken over the leadership of the liberal party after Venizelos had withdrawn into self 
exile in 1925. Source: History of the Greek Nation. Vol.lE. pp.304-305.
* 28. Venizelos came into office with a landslide victory (the liberals won 61% of the votes, and were
awarded 89% of the seats in the National Assembly). He ruled the country with an iron hand. See: 
G.Daphnes, H EAAdc MexaEO Auo floAfemov 1923-1940. (Greece Between Two Wars 1923-1940), 
(Athens, 2nd Edition, 1974), Vol.A, pp.394-398. Also, see: J.Campbell & P.Sherrard, op.cit., p.137. For 
Venizelos' foreign policy, see: K.Svolopoulos, H EAApviKri EEcotcqiki^  no Amiri) 1900-1945. (Greek 
Foreign Policy 1900-1945), (Athens, 1992), pp.211-228.
29. Let us remind the reader that 1922 is considered the opening date of the Greek interwar period.
30. If we take into consideration not only the loans raised by the government but also the sums raised by 
various 'public' bodies abroad (i.e. the loans of the National Mortgage Bank, the Greek electric 
railways and the ports of Candia and Pireaus), the total amount of debt accrued by the state in the 
wide sense was slightly higher. Namely, it was £85,650,000 and not £82,600,000 as stated above. 
For a brief account of the long-run pattern of development Greece's public foreign debt, see: 
A.Agiopetritis, To ESwrepiKd Armdoia Adveia and t r\q Enavaordoeax; tou 1821 M£xpi Ifipepov", 
(The Greek public foreign loans from the Revolution of 1821 up to Today"), in the National Center of 
Social Studies (ed.), op.cit. (Athens, 1972), pp.292-348.
42
31. On the basis of one source's estimate of the foreign debt in 1924 it is possible to extrapolate that in 
1922 the country's public foreign debt inclusive of the inter-Allied war debts was £58,000,000. On the 
basis of this figure it is possible to extrapolate that the foreign public debt in 1922-exclusive of the 
war obligations amounted at most to £20,000,000.Sources: P.Freme, Greek Government Loans some 
Facts and Figures. (London, 1924), p.6. This is a pamphlet which was circulated upon the occasion of 
the flotation of the First Refugee Loan of 1924. Also, N.BIoudanis, Dependence et I' Imperialisms - 1' 
Importance des Relations Economiques Analo-Greaues entre 1918-1940. (Fribourg, 1989), pp.84- 
87,112.
32. This figure has been based on the average for G.N.P. for 1927-1932. Accurate data on the G.N.P. do 
not exist for the twenties. For estimates of the size of the National Income during the interwar years, 
see: A.F.Freris, op.cit, p.105. Also, B.G./TA, Document 26/5.
33. The penalties imposed by the League of Nations for transgressions made during the twenties were 
also war related in a wide sense as they expressed Greece's failure to drop irredentism. See Table 7 
above.
34. According to the census of 1907 the area of the country was 63,211 square kilometres whereas 
according to the census of 1920 it was 130,199 square kilometers. Source: Economic Yearbook of 
Greece for 1929. p.6.
35. During the 19th century the government resorted to the international capital market for revenue and 
military loans on the whole. It defaulted three times: in 1827,1843 and 1893. There was productive 
borrowing during the Trikoupis years in the 1880's but it was much more limited in extent.
36. The magnitude of internal borrowing is exemplified by the fact that in the beginning of 1922 the 
internal foreign debt amounted to roughly £20,000,000.
• 37. AFishlow "Foreign Loans, Debt and Economic Development in the 19th and 20th Centuries” in H.Van
der Wee and E.Aerts (eds.), Debates and Controversies in Economic History. (Leuven, 1990), p.121.
• 38. For the recent 'discovery' of the international literature that foreign portfolio investment has
historically usually entailed elements of 'direct' investment, and for the quotation in the text, see: 
M.Wilkins, "Modem European Economic History and the Multinationals”, J.E.E.H., Vol.6, Number 3, 
winter 1977, pp.585-586. Also, see: P.S.Svedberg, "The portfolio-direct composition of private foreign 
investment in 1914 revisited", Economic Journal, December 1978, pp.763-777. Also, M.Wilkins, The 
free-standing company, 1870-1914: an important type of British foreign direct investment", E.H.R., 
2nd series, XLI, 2(1988), pp.259-282.
» 39. During the twenties two embargoes had been imposed. The first (1920-1923) was related to Britain's
disapproval towards political events in Greece, and the second (1925-1927) was placed in order to ' 
force Greece to settle its war debt towards Britain and work towards stabilization. New York also 
followed suit with these two embargoes.
40. For the 12 foreign loans raised by the government between 1879-1914 only in two cases -the loans of 
1889 and 1890- did French capital not participate. Foreign investments were not so important for 
France after WWI. However, after de jure stabilization in 1928 and up to 1933, new French issues on 
foreign account amounted to nearly 9,000 million francs. Presumably French foreign loans were at 
the time basically motivated by political considerations. It has been argued that France lost interest 
in Greece because of its Central European and Balkan policy which entailed tight relations with 
Yugoslavia. Relations between Greece and Yugoslavia in the twenties were troubled and France 
showed its Indifference' towards Greece by pressuring her to give in to Yugoslavian demands. See: 
R.I.I.A., The Problem of International Investment. (London, 1937), pp.213,217-218. Also, History of the 
Greek Nation. Vol.lE, p.286 and Svolopoulos, op.dt., p.207.
41. The National Bank in total issued 75% of the foreign loan capital raised for the Greek government at 
home. Source: Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1932. pp.549-585.
• 42. The League of Nations, Financial Committee Extra Session held in London, June 6-14th 1933, Report
to the Council on Greece. For the fact that an issue of a loan in London did not necessarily imply mat 
it was taken by British investors, see S.Chapman, The Rise of Merchant Banking. (London, 1984), 
p. 176.
43. Platt, (1984) op.cit. pp 1 -4.
' 44. B.Bramsen, and K.Wain, The Hambros 1799-1979. (London, 1979), pp.272-281,378-379.
45. R.I.IA, (1937), op.dt., p.10.
46. The participation of British capital in the ,W«L foreign debt of Greece in 1932 was £60,000,000 and it 
represented 48.8% of the Fetal foreign debt of Greece. In 1914 it was £15,600.000 and it 
represented 46% of the total foreign debt. Source: Bloudanis, op.cit., pp.146,112. For Greece's 
importance to Britain the following should be noted: in 1930, British portfolio investment in Europe 
represented £120,000,000. Greece between 1922-1932 absorbed 13,3%, i.e. £16,000,000. Thus, 
Greece was relatively important for Britain as a receiver of loans within the European context. But it 
should be underlined that in 1930 (which was the peak year in the worlds international investment in 
the interwar years, only 8% of British overseas investment was tied in Europe. Source: ASalter, 
Foreign Investment. Essays in International Finance, no. 12, (Princeton University, 1951), p.18.
43
47. This figure includes the public and private foreign debt. The significance of this figure is highlighted 
by the fact that in the eighties -although Greece has been suffering from a high external debt- it has 
not surpassed 47% of the G.D.P. Source: O.E.C.D., Economic Surveys. Greece 1989/1990. (Paris, 
1990), pp.71,103 and Basic statistics: international comparisons at the end of the booklet. Also, it 
should be noted that in terms of international comparisons, in a list of 26 countries made by the R.I.IA  
(on the basis of data for 1930 regarding the per capita foreign debt) Greece held together with Austria 
the 12th position. Its per capita foreign debt was estimated at £18. At the top of this list was New 
Zealand with £128 and the bottom was China with £1,5. Source: R.I.IA, (1937), op.dt., p.223.
48. In 1932, the per capita foreign public debt was $43,07 for Greece, $27 for Yugoslavia and $18,8 for 
Bulgaria. Source: History of the Greek Nation, p.337. For more details see: P.Rediades, EkOc o ic  ent 
to u  rioounoAoviouoCi to u  Eto u c  1932-1933. (Report on the Budget 1932-1933), (Athens, 1933).
49. For the fact that the League loans in Austria and Hungary brought back fugitive capital, see: Salter, 
op.dt. Indeed, capital flight was pronounced in Greece. In 1927 it was reported according to one 
source that "the value of Greek deposits in the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland and the United 
States of America at £400 million and $2,000 million" Though these figures were probably 
exaggerated, nevertheless they give us a rough idea of the extent of capital flight. Source: 
FO371/12924/C780/132/19, Annual Report on Greece for 1927. See also, H.A. Hill, The Economy of 
Greece (report prepared for the coordinating committee of American Agencies in Greece), (New York, 
1943), Part I, pp.42-43.
• 50. J.H.Dunning, Studies in International Investment. (London, 1970), chapter 1.
51. For this and the fact that the capital imported was not directly directed towards increasing the
export-earning capacity of Greece (although loans for roads and agriculture could have raised export 
production), see: I.T. Berend and G.Ranki, Economic Development in East-Central Europe in the 19th 
and 20th Centuries. (New York, 1974).
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BOOK I
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND FOREIGN INSTITUTIONAL 'TUTELAGE'
INTRODUCTION
1. The Themes and the Sources
1.1. The Themes
The interaction between money and power occupies center stage in Book I. The money 
was furnished for the settlement of the refugees and stabilization. The power was exercised by 
two international institutions, the League of Nations and the International Financial Commission, 
which were strongly influenced by the Bank of England and the British Treasury respectively. 
Section I presents the conditions under which the League of Nations financed and implemented 
a Greek refugee settlement plan. Emphasis is placed on the limited options facing the Greek state 
and the extent to which the Bank of England and the League used finance as a tool of political 
coercion. The financial and political causes of Greece's estrangement vis a vis its supervisors and 
the City of London during 1925-1926 are discussed in Section II. Section III examines the origins 
and application of the League stabilization plan. While the importance of the international 
dimension (i.e. the world crisis of 1931 and Greece's chronic negative trade balance) is not 
disputed, it is argued that institutional and structural flaws played a prominent role in the collapse 
of free convertibility. The failure of stabilization to trigger foreign financial flows for industry is also 
portrayed. Finally, in the Conclusion to Book I, the League stabilization plan is explored from a 
comparative perspective.
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Throughout Book I, particular emphasis is given to the varied and complex mosaic of 
Greece's relations with Britain. The conclusion reached is that although there was no explicit 
strategy of political and economic subjugation, once Greece approached the League of Nations 
, for financial assistance, the Bank of England and the British Treasury exploited the situation in 
order to impose on the Greek government the principles of 'sound finance' and extract political 
and financial concessions to this end. The power which London exerted over Athens was a 
combination of coercion and 'willing' consent. Britain exercised coercion through the two 
embargoes it actually imposed in the twenties coupled with the threat of others. Clearly, these 
threats were of significance because Greece wished to borrow and Britain was able to lend. As for 
consent, it existed to the extent that Greece applied the League stabilization plan (i.e. it balanced 
the budget, cut military expenditure, enforced a banking reform, joined the gold standard 
exchange system and accepted foreign supervision over the country's public finances). Above all 
Greece 'acknowledged the validity' of British 'leadership' in the hope that a massive flow of capital 
would ensue.1 Let it be underlined that although Greece may have not been compelled to adopt 
the League plan, there was little alternative to 'consent' for during the twenties default was * 
unthinkable. It is also apparent that in monetary affairs there was a manifestation of 'structural' 
power. When Britain departed from the gold standard in September 1931 havoc was created in 
the Greek business community as in the recent decades all serious transactions had been 
conducted in pound sterling. A final comment regarding the nature of Greece's dependence on 
Britain: it is often argued that in the twenties political considerations played an important part in 
the loans raised in Britain for European countries.2 In the Greek case it appears that it was not the 
loans, but the temporary withholding of them, that was prompted by Britain's desire to influence 
the internal political affairs of Greece.
Related themes explored in Book I include: i) French aversion to League loans and 'British 
expansionism'. Although it was no longer interested in Greece as an area of investment, French 
policy regarding Greece was to exploit its position on the I.F.C. and the Paris Agreement of 1918 
in order to settle old accounts (i.e. the war and Ottoman debts), ii) The underlying antagonism 
between the International Financial Commission and the League of Nations, iii) The ambiguous 
attitude of Greece towards its supervisors, at one moment proposing the enhancement of
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tutelage (as in the Refugee Loan) and at another seeking to escape, iv) The lack of a precise 
government strategy. The Greek government attempted to secure a large inflow of foreign funds 
while concurrently adopting an ultranationalist stance on the issue of the war debt, v) The 
dilemma confronting Greece and foreign supervisors regarding legitimate needs in armaments 
and social welfare expenditure, vi) The diverging economic philosophy of the Greek authorities 
vis a vis the country's financial supervisors. Standard economic theory suggests that "When 
countries suffer an external shock such as World War I or the Great Depression, [or it may be 
added, a massive influx of refugees] restoration of macroeconomic equilibrium can be expedited 
by a depreciation which raises prices and profitability and redeploys resources faster than is 
possible through adjustments in the entire spectrum of domestic prices and costs."3 However, in 
the interwar years exchange rate flexibility and depreciation were viewed by British policymakers 
as an anathema and not as a stimulus of recovery and economic development. This created a 
problem as in Greece there was a total absence of a 'British academic tradition'. Those prominent 
Greek academics, bankers and politicians who had studied abroad were educated in Germany or 
France and became imbued with what was at the time called the 'banking school principle'. This 
continental tradition held that an expansion in the volume of business and bank deposits should 
be followed by an expansion in monetary circulation. Its principal consideration was not the 
intrinsic value of money as a store of value but that the supply of money should suffice for the 
needs of commerce. On the other hand, the country's supervisors were avid advocates of the 
'currency' school which placed emphasis on stability. Namely, it propounded that the prime 
consideration regarding the expansion of the note issue should be safety and not elasticity. An 
interesting "unbalanced situation developed whereby Greece was tightly linked to Britain 
politically and economically but in the realm of economic thought there was no corresponding 
connection."4
In sum, clashes between Greek institutions and the tools of foreign control reflect vital 
differences in intellectual make-up. The details of the thesis will provide interesting information for 
those who study intellectual history and the dissemination of ideas.
Book I of the thesis provides the first integrated analysis of these themes. Hitherto, the 
literature of the interwar period has dealt only with four issues. Namely, the negotiations for the
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First Refugee Loan, the contribution of the refugees and the League inspired settlement scheme 
to the economy of Greece, banking reform and the war debts. Only the second topic has been 
analysed thoroughly. Regarding the other three, most texts rely on a narrow range of sources and 
fail to take into account the wider framework of foreign finance and control.
1.2. The Sources
The archival material covering the League of Nations financial involvement in Greece is 
abundant in volume and variety. It documents the whole story from the preparatory phase of the 
refugee settlement loan (i.e. 1922) to the demise of gold exchange standard system in 
September 1931. This material exists in several international, state, bank and personal archives, 
all of which have been consulted. Namely, the League of Nations Archive at the United Nations in 
Geneva, Foreign Office Documents at the Public Records Office and the Bank of England Archive 
in London (this is the first thesis to draw upon this material), the U.S.A. Department of State 
Records in Washington, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Historical Archive, the National Bank 
of Greece (hereafter N.B.G.) Historical Archive., theTsouderos Archive at the Bank of Greece and 
the Venizelos Archive at the Benaki Museum in Athens. The Hambros Archive at Guildhall was 
also consulted but it has very little on Greece for this period, practically all documents that exist are 
pre WWI. According to the officials of Hambros the records on Greece were deposited outside 
London during World War II and did not escape bombardment. In addition, Book I draws on 
printed primary material (such as the press, parliamentary debates, and contemporaneous 
secondary material) and recent studies on the interwar economy.
2. The Legacy of Foreign Control
2.1. The 19th Century Legacy
In 1897 Greece was defeated in a thirty day war with Turkey.5 A £T4,000,000 indemnity 
was demanded by the Porte, but the country was not in a position to pay. The six mediating 
European Powers Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria and Russia conducted an investigation 
and decided to place Greek finances under international supervision.6 Thus, in 1898, they set up 
the International Commission of Control. One year later it was renamed the International Financial
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Commission (hereafter I.F.C.) because of the negative connotations the word 'control' carried. 
Nevertheless, the Greeks have always referred to the institution as The Control” .7
The I.F.C. was assigned three functions. First, it was in charge of handling the proceeds of 
the 150,000,000 francs loan raised in 1898 under the guarantee of Britain, France and Russia, for 
the purpose of indemnifying the Porte, covering the Greek fiscal deficit of 1897 and converting 
the floating debt.8 Second, 51% of the foreign debt was placed under its authority. (See below 
Table 1a). The revenues allocated to it were the sait, petrol, matches, playing cards, cigarette 
paper and Naxos emery monopolies, taxes on tobacco, stamp duties and import duties applied at 
the Port of Pireaus. This was no small affair: the total income of the I.F.C. during its first year of 
operation amounted to about 35% of the ordinary receipts of the state. Its position of influence is 
also demonstrated by the fact that it was given a power of veto over modifications in the laws and 
regulations affecting the assigned revenues, with the exception of custom duties.9
Third, the I.F.C was to supervise Greek monetary policy. The ultimate aim being to restore 
the drachma to its pre-war gold parity- by 1898 it had depreciated by 33%.10 In 1877 Greece had 
abandoned a bimetallic standard and adopted a system of inconvertible currency. The 
Commission, through the 'Law of Control of 1898', was vested with the power to reduce the 
existing level of monetary circulation and block further issues of banknotes.11 Until 1910 when 
the drachma was restored to its gold parity, it destroyed annually 2,000,000 drs. in notes from the 
surpluses of the assigned revenues.12
In addition to these functions, the I.F.C. subsequently guaranteed the service of 75% of 
the foreign loan capital raised from 1898 to 1922.13 (Table 1b) To 'enable' the I.F.C. to supervise 
these new loans, additional revenues were placed at its disposal. These were, the surtax on 
tobacco, and custom receipts at Laurium, Corfu, Patras, Volos, Salonika, and Kavalla.14
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Table 1a
Loans Placed Under the Control of the I.F.C. at the Time of its Establishment
(in francs)
Loan Title Nominal Amount
The Guaranteed 5% Loan of 1833
The 5% 1881 Loan
The 5% 1884 Loan
The 4% 1887 Monopolies Loan
The 4% 1889 Rentes Loan
The 5% 1890 Piraeus Larissa Rail Loan
The 5% 1893 Funding loan
The 3% 1893 Salonika Constantinople Railway Loan
The 2.5% 1898 Guaranteed Loan
60,000,000
120,000,000
100,000,000
135.000.000
155.000.000 
60,000,000
9,739,000
160.000.000 
150,000,000
Total 889,739,000*
*The total value of the loans placed under the control of the I.F.C. was equal to 51% of the foreign loan 
capital raised by the state prior to 1893.
Table 1b
Loans Placed Under the Control of the I.F.C. Since 1898 and Prior to 1922
(in francs)
The 4% Railway Loan of 1902 
The 5% Loan of 1914
56,250,000 1 
335,074,000 |
Total 391,324,000“ |
‘The total value of these loans was equal to 75% of the foreign loan capital raised by the state between 1889 
and 1922.
Both Tables compiled from: D.Stephanides, Foreign capital inflow and its economic and political 
consequences. (Salonika, 1930), pp.179-183,200-205.
Assisting the government to raise new loans, the I.F.C. increased its presence in Greek 
affairs. However, this was far from being its major objective. The Commission defined its primary 
raison d'etre as being the maximization of its income in order that it be in a position to redeem at an 
early date the loans under its supervision. Two prerequisites were necessary for the I.F.C. to 
maximize its income. First, for the yield of the revenues under its authority to increase as far as 
possible. This it achieved by introducing administrative reforms. Second, for the drachma to 
appreciate.15 Through these two means, the surplus revenues accruing to the I.F.C. grew. (By 
surplus revenues is meant the amount that remained from the assigned revenues after provision 
was made for the service of the debt.) According to the treaty, the surplus revenues were
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distributed as follows: 18% was to be deducted to cover I.F.C. administrative costs. Of the 
remainder, 40% was to be returned to the government and 60% retained by the I.F.C. The latter 
used half of this income on the sinking fund of the bans under its control and the half for paying to 
the bondholders a rate of interest higher than that specified upon the coupons of the 'old' gob 
loans.16
The I.F.C. was able to operate from day one and throughout the years under a high margin 
of safety. (Table 2). As a result it enjoyed ample surplus revenues. Notably, in 1899 its income 
amounted to 48,000,000 drs. while the debt charge was 34,000,000 drs.17
Table 2
Year
(I)
I.F.C. lncome(1) 
(In £)
(II)
Debt charge 
(In £)
(I) as a % of (II)
1898(2) 48,000,000 34,000,000 71
1918 3,489,020 2,149,190 61.5
1920 5,797,942 2,818,771 49
1922 2,589,028 2,818,771 58
(1)This figure has been estimated after deducting the costs and profits accruing to the company that was 
placed in charge of collecting the revenues.
(2)The figures of (I) and (II) for 1898 only, are given in drs.
Compiled from: Athens Stock Exchange, Stock Exchange Yearbook for 1932. (Athens, 1933), pp.52-53; 
Also, M.F.A./H.A.: 1923/L.N/D/2: File 42: memorandum titled: "The economic situation of Greece".
Given the nature of the relationship between the I.F.C. and the Greek government, conflict 
was surprisingly muted. The government was remarkably less antagonistic in reality than its public 
position indicated. But, the I.F.C. never became popular and criticism of it was vocal. It stood as a 
symbol of Greece’s military humiliation by the Turks in 1897 and a constant reminder of the 
politico- economic dependence of the country.18 Its principal critics commented most 
unfavourably on the restrictive monetary policy instigated by the I.F.C. between 1898 and 1910. 
It was argued that this deflation negatively influenced the rate of economic growth and the general 
performance of the Greek economy.19
In 1921, supervision became less international. The Powers represented on the I.F.C. 
were reduced to three as Russia, Austria and Germany withdrew. From then on, I.F.C. policy was
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literally controlled by Britain which by this time held the largest percentage of the Greek foreign 
debt.20 One final comment in the way of comparison, for Greece was not unique in experiencing 
'international' supervision. The foreign control established over Greece was heavier than the 
Ottoman Public Debt Administration which was set up in 1881 21 No rescheduling agreement 
was made for the existing debt and although at the time 17% of the foreign debt was in Greek 
hands no Greek representative was appointed on the I.F.C.22
2.2. The 20th Century Legacy and 'Destabilization'
During the four years prior to the opening of the period under study, Greece experienced a 
'new' type of foreign intervention. This was the use of economic coercion by the Allies in order to 
influence political and military developments in Greece.23 There were two seminal events. The 
Paris Agreement of February 10 1918 and the financial embargo imposed in November 1920. 
Greece joined WWI late because of domestic politics. It declared war on the Central Powers in 
June 1917. However, full participation in the war was only secured in February 1918 with the 
signing of the so called Paris Agreement by which the Allies agreed to provide Greece with food 
supplies and military equipment24 Moreover, the government would have the right to draw
850,000,000 French francs (i.e. roughly £34,000,000) from the Treasuries of Britain, France and 
the U.S.A 25 For the duration of the war the government would be allowed to draw drafts only if 
balances of the Greek Treasury and the N.B.G. held abroad fell below the sum of 100 million gold 
drs. However, six months after the declaration of peace the government would have unlimited 
access to these credits.
Issued at 100% and bearing interest at only 5%, this arrangement was one of the cheapest 
loans the Greek government had contracted up to that point.26 Moreover, no specific 
government revenues were attached to the loan 27 Had this loan been provided in full, it would 
have been the largest loan to be concluded by the Greek government prior to WWII and would 
have entailed a doubling of the country's foreign public debt28 However, neither was the case. 
As a result of the financial embargo imposed in November 1920, only 28% of the promised 
amount was actually granted. (See Table 3 below).
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Table 3
C ountry
(1)
Book Credits 
P rom ised
(II)
Book Credits 
Drawn
------------------------ - -----
(II) as a % of (1)
Britain £ 12,000,000 £ 6,500,000 54%
France 300,000,000 francs - 0%
U.S.A. $ 50,000,000 $15,000,000 30%
Tota l 850,000,000 francs 236,000,000 francs 28% |
Source: For the actual drafts drawn from the U.S.A. and British Treasuries and for the fact that no French 
drafts were made because the French had requested that the Greeks abstain for the time being so as to 
protect the Franc.., see: N.B.G./H.A.: X Loans, A' Public Loans, File 129, titled: Recognition by the allied 
governments of the 750,000,000 franc loan and the additional 100,000,000 fr. of 1918 (1918*1921): note 
prepared by concerning the 1918 Paris Agreement, December 1920. Also, EAeuOepov Bfyia, June 3 1926.
An important repercussion of this 'stunted' loan was that Greek ability to raise capital on the 
international capital market was limited. In addition, the three Powers were given a 'novel' form of 
supervising Greece. Clause 4 of the Paris Agreement stipulated that until the redemption of the 
war credits in full "no new security could be used for an external loan without the assent of the 
Governments of the U.S.A., France and Great Britain."29 This clause was not prompted by a 
desire to enslave Greece financially on a permanent basis. If anything, the Allies were interested 
in being repaid as soon as possible. However, the result hightened anti-Allied sentiment in that 
prior to 1928 every time the government wanted to raise a foreign loan it was under the obligation 
to ask the permission of the three Powers. (Britain in 1927 upon signing a war debt agreement 
with Greece waived its right to veto new foreign loans of the Greek government and the U.S.A. 
followed in 1928.)30
The story of the post- November 1920 financial embargo was as follows: King Constantine 
had kept Greece 'officially* neutral in WWI. However, in June 1917 Venizelos with the help of the 
Allied naval blockade forced the 'pro-German' King to hand the ihro/ie to his second son 
Alexander who was considered acceptable to the British.31 Alexander suddenly died on October 
12 1920 and the Populist party that won the elections of November 1 1920 was intent on 
orchestrating the return of Constantine. In mid November 1920 the governments of Britain, 
France and Italy, announced that in the event of Constantine's return to the throne 32 they would 
cut off all financial assistance to Greece and would no longer consider themselves bound by the 
Treaty of Sevres. (This Treaty had been favourable to Greece regarding its presence in Asia 
Minor.)33 The Populists ignored the allied threat and a plebiscite was held on November 22,
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which was overwhelmingly in favour of Constantine. Three days later Britain, France and Italy 
declared that they could no longer continue granting financial assistance to Greece. The U.S.A. 
joined this financial embargo.34
Credits that had not already been drawn by the government under the Paris Agreement 
were blocked. (See again Table 3 above) This move had negative repercussions on monetary 
stability. The National Bank of Greece, being under the impression that the Allies after the war 
would provide no less than the 850,000,000 francs, wrote this sum in their accounts and during 
1918 and 1919 issued against it the equivalent amount in drachmae-i.e. 825,000,000 drs.35 As a 
result, the total money supply of Greece almost doubted within the span of one year. This sudden 
increase in circulation would have been of a temporary nature had the embargo of November 
1920 not occurred. For, according to the Paris Agreement, every time the N.B.G. drew a draft 
from the Treasuries of the U.S.A., Britain and France, the equivalent amount in drachmae would 
be withdrawn from circulation. That is, by the time Greece had drawn the full 825,000,000 drs. 
issued for its war needs, her circulation would have decreased by this same amount.
In reality, however, the monetary circulation of Greece remained permanently 'inflated* 
because of the financial blockade. The N.B.G. succeeded in making drafts on only 28% of the
850,000,000 francs loan. Thus, only 231,000,000 drs. (out of a total of 825,000,000 drs. issued) 
were withdrawn from circulation. This was the first time since the imposition of international 
financial control in 1898 that Greece had deviated from the principle of having its banknotes 
covered almost completely by gold or foreign reserves. Whereas in December 1919 the metallic 
reserve (plus other cash items and balances abroad) as a percentage of the notes in circulation 
fluctuated between 87 and 101% , approximately one year after the imposition of the embargo it 
* stood at 12%! (See Table 4 below) It is ironic that France and Britain as members of the I.F.C. had 
since 1898 forced the Greek government to pursue a restrictive monetary policy.
Following the imposition of the embargo, the monetary policy of the government changed 
dramatically. The N.B.G. no longer adhered to the Law of Control of 1898. It began -without 
asking for the permission of the I.F.C.- to print great quantities of uncovered notes to meet the 
needs of the Greek government in connection with the Asia Minor military campaign 36 As a 
consequence the position of the I.F.C. as supervisor over Greek monetary policy was 
undermined. Between 1920 and 1922, the cost of living index doubled (see Table 5) and the
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drachma lost 4/5 of its exchange value. (For the collapse in the exchange see Book I, Section III, 
Phase One).
Table 4
Metallic Reserve, Other Cash Items and Balances Abroad Disposable 
as a % of Notes in Circulation
December 1913 111%
June 1917 95%
1919 87-101%
December 1920 22%
December 1921 12%
April 1922 18%
End December 1923 9%
Compiled from: D.Nikoletopoulos and P.Anagnostopoulos, The Banknotes of Greece from 1828 until the 
Present Dav. (Athens, 1979), p.103. Also, L.N.A./Sir Arthur Salter's Papers: S114/Documents re loan 
request from Greece, document titled: 'Memorandum on Greek Economic and Financial Position', May 22 
1923.
Table 5
Cost of Living Index 1914=100
1914 100
1917 266
1918 372
1919 322
1920 351
1921 393
1922 632
1923 1,213
1924 1,271
1925 1,455
1926 1,673
1927 1,843
1928 1,929
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1929. (Athens, 1930), p.32.
In retrospect, it can be argued that had the Paris credits been granted in full and had the 
inflow of foreign capital in general not been arrested as a result of the financial embargo it is 
unlikely that Athens would have resorted to the printing machine.37 The contemporary economic 
literature in Greece held the blockade as a scapegoat for all of the economic ills plaguing public 
finance during the early twenties.38
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Three final comments. First, although Greece's formal supervisors admitted that the fall of 
the exchange value of the drachma was linked to the financial boycott imposed in November 
1920,39 this did not prevent them from attacking the government's unorthodox monetary policy. 
Second, with the Imposition of the financial embargo it became for all practical purposes 
impossible for Greece to raise a loan in the City, France or the U.S.A.40 King Constantine was 
eventually forced to abdicate in September 1922-not by the ex-Allies, but by the anti-monarchic 
military committee which seized power immediately after the Asia Minor debacle. Nevertheless, 
the embargo was not lifted prior to December 1924 because Britain wanted to pressure the 
revolutionary government from abolishing the monarchy and retaining territorial claims in Asia 
Minor. Third, the end result of clause 4 of the Paris Agreement and the embargo was to enhance 
the perennial anti-western sentiments among the population. Among Greeks of all political colour 
there was a feeling that Greece had been betrayed by her friends and deserted midway through 
the Asia Minor campaign. This bitterness remained alive during the interwar period.
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August 1922:
January 1923:
February 1923:
March, June 1923: 
July 24, 1923: 
September 1923:
November 1923: 
December 1924:
January 1925:
February 1925:
March 1925: 
Spring 1925:
July 1925:
August 1925:
September 1925:
October 1925: 
December 1925:
January 1926: 
March 1926:
June 1926:
June 1926:
July 1926: 
December 6, 1926:
Chronological Summary of Book I
The Greek army is ousted from Asia Minor by the troops of Kemal. 
Approximately 1,267,000 refugees flee into Greece. The net population 
increase is 13%.
The government tries on its own and without success to raise loan in the City 
for the refugees.
Greece makes a formal request to the League of Nations for an international 
loan of £10,000,000 (net) to be raised for the settlement of the refugees.
Greece tries on its own to raise a loan in France for the refugees.
Greece signs a Peace Treaty with Turkey.
Greece signs with the League of Nations a Protocol in Geneva which provides 
for the immediate creation of a Refugee Settlement Commission and the 
eventual flotation of a £6,000,000 (net) loan.
The League appointed Refugee Settlement Commission is established.
The £12,300,000 (nominal value) First Refugee Loan is floated under the 
auspices of the League of Nations.
The British government reverts to the pre world war I practice of assigning a 
special representative (Roussin) to sit on the I.F.C.
The N.B.G. requests permission from the I.F.C. to increase the supply of notes 
by 600,000,000 drs.
The N.B.G. prints 400,000,000 inspite of I.F.C. disapproval.
The government opens a legal battle against the R.S.C.
Roussin prepares a study in which he argues that it is possible for the 
drachma to be stabilized at the rate of 300 drs. to the £ sterling.
The N.B.G. approaches Hambros and the Bank of England and proposes to 
raise on the open market a £5,000,000 supplementary refugee loan.
The London Times under the instigation of Roussin writes an article wherein 
the continuous depreciation of the drachma is attributed to the credit policy 
pursued by the N.B.G. An intense debate is fired off in Greece.
A military episode occurs along the Graeco-Bulgarian frontiers. Greece 
Invades' Bulgarian territory and the The League of Nations intervenes.
The R.S.C. sounds out the League of Nations regarding the possibility of a 
new loan for £4,000,000. Concurrently Pangalos, the Greek dictator, tries to 
raise a domestic refugee loan which would not place its funds under the R.S.C.
Pangalos tries to raise on the open market a £10,000,000 foreign loan to be 
spent on the refugees without League supervision.
Roussin proposes that stabilization is feasible if: i) the N.B.G. set up an 
emission caisse to be placed under the control of the I.F.C., and ii) the Bank of 
England reinforce the reserves of the N.B.G. through the provision of credits. 
Suggested rate of stabilization : 275 drs. to the £ sterling. The government 
rejects the idea of an I.F.C. supervised stabilization plan, and the Bank of 
England stalls in responding.
The Bank of England proposes to the Greek government that if Greece settled 
its war debt it would be willing to open a credit of £ 2-3,000,000 for the purpose 
of stabilizing the drachma.
The Financial Committee meets and makes a preliminary examination of 
Greek finances regarding the possibility of a combined stabilization refugee 
loan.
Greece concludes a £1,000,000 loan in Sweden purportedly for the refugees. 
In return for this sum the match monopoly is ceded to Swedish interests.
Coalition government is formed.
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January 27, 1927:
January - March 1927:
April 6, 1927:
May 1927:
June 1, 1927:
June 8-14, 1927:
June 14, 1927: 
July-September 1927:
August 17, 1927:
August 25, 1927:
September 15, 1927:
September 22, 1927:
October 28, 1927:
November 25, 1927:
December 6, 1927: 
December 8, 1927:
January 31, 1928:
May 12, 1928
May 14, 1928:
January 1932:
February 1932:
March 15, 1932:
March 29, 1932:
April 11, 1932:
April 14, 1932:
The Committee of Economic Experts set up in December by the coalition for 
the purpose of proposing measures for the improvements of the country's 
finances presents its report to the ministry of finance.
Diomedes visits London and requests from the Bank of England that it grant 
credits for the stabilization of the drachma.
Greek war debt agreement signed with Britain.
The secretariat of the League of Nations send experts to Athens to carry out 
an investigation concerning the state of Greek finances.
The National Assembly votes tax increases proposed by Kafandaris.
The Financial Committee of the League occupies itself with the subject of 
Greek finances within the context of the flotation of a supplementary Greek 
refugee loan.
The Financial Committee leaves the way open for the government to make an 
application for a reconstruction cum supplementary refugee loan.
The Bank of England, The Financial Committee of the League and the National 
Bank of Greece work out the details with respect to the creation of an 
independent Central Bank.
The populist party withdraws its support of the coalition government 
disagreeing with the removal of the issuing privilege from the National Bank of 
Greece.
The National Assembly votes in favour of the governments economic policy 
program. It gives permission to the government to sign a Stabilization Protocol 
with the League of Nations.
The Geneva Protocol for the stabilization of the drachma, and the flotation of a 
reconstruction loan is signed.
The General Assembly of the League of Nations votes - approves the Geneva 
Protocol.
The National Bank of Greece signs a contract with the government wherein it 
agrees to resign from its issuing privilege.
The Geneva Protocol is ratified in the Greek National Assembly. (See laws: 
3423, and 3424).
The government signs a war debt agreement with the U.SA.
The governments of Greece and France sign an agreement for the solution of 
the war debt issue by international arbitration.
The £9,000,000 Stabilization Loan is floated.
Legal decree is issued which specifies the drachma's consistency in gold. 
The drachma is tied to the pound and the parity rate is specified at £1-375 drs.
The Bank of Greece begins to operate.
The government asks from the Financial Committee and the British 
government that they arrange for: i) the provision of a £12,500,000 loan so 
that the public works may continue; and ii) the suspension of the amortization
Cayments on the foreign and internal floating debt for a period of five years, enizelos visits Rome, London, and Paris in an effort to raise this loan.
The Financial Committee sends a research committee to Greece.
The party leaders meet and decide that Greece should remain on the gold 
standard.
The Financial Committee submits a report to the Council of the League, and 
proposes that a $10,000,000 be raised and that Greece be allowed to suspend 
part of the service of its loans.
The Council discusses Greece's requests
The Council declares that it rejects all Greek requests except the suspension 
of amortization payments.
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April 25, 1932: The government presents to the National Assembly a law proposal for the
departure from the gold standard.
April 26, 1932: The National Assembly votes law 5422 whereby Greece departs from the gold
exchange standard.
May 5, 1932: Law 5456 is put into practice, and Greece suspends for an indefinite period
the service of the internal and external loans of the Greek state.
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SECTION I
REFUGEES, FINANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1922-1924):
THE FIRST REFUGEE LOAN*
1. Introduction
1.1. The First Refugee Loan and Foreign Finance
The first foreign ban raised by the government after World War I was the Refugee Loan of 
1924.1 Its significance for the small Greek economy can hardly be exaggerated. At 112,300,000 
it was the largest loan of the interwar years and was equivalent to over half of the annual 
government expenditure in the early twenties.2 At a stroke the annual service of the public 
foreign debt increased by 40%. (See Table 1)
With this ban a new phase opened for Greece. The League of Nations appeared on the 
scene and the share of government revenues under the control of the I.F.C. almost doubled. 
Furthermore, Hambros an old player in the Greek financial arena saw its position enhanced and 
the Bank of England began to establish itself as the formulator of Greek monetary policy.
• A short version of this chapter has appeared in I. Pepelasis Minoglou, "Of AianpaYfdOTeuaetq yia to  
npocKpuyiKd Adveio' (Negotiations for the Refugee Loan) in Th. Veremis - G.Goulimi, (eds.), EAeuBfeoioc 
BeviESAoc Kofvrnvta - OiKovouta - noArruqft Zmv Enoyrt Tou (Eleftherios Venizelos Society - Economy - 
Politics During his Time), (Athens, 1989).
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Table 1
Comparative Magnitude of the First Refugee Loan in Terms of 
the Contemporaneous Greek Economic Activity
Nominal value of loan: £12,300,000
Annual Exports (1922-1924): £15,533,333
Annual emigrant remittances (1922-1924): £ 6,733,333
Annual Government expenditure (1922-1924): £19,760,000
Annual Service of foreign debt for 1922: £ 2,300,000
Annual Service of the First Refugee Loan: £ 922,612
Compiled from: G. Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1929. (Athens,1930), pp.199,274-275. 
Also, Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1939. (Athens, 1940), pp.203-204. Also, N.B.G/H.A, X Loans, A' 
Public Loans, Refugee Loan: Prospectus, titled: "Greek Government 7% Refugee Loan of 1924".
The existing literature has concentrated upon the direct economic impact of the League 
inspired Refugee settlement scheme on the agricultural development of Greece.3 Surprisingly, 
the unique circumstances under which the loan was raised have received scant attention. The 
questions of why and how the League entered Greece have been dealt with in a superficial 
manner. Perhaps the complexity of the politico-economic data are responsible for this oversight.
In the contemporary literature, the League was presented as a cynical institution bent on 
subjugating Greece to its whims. Recent research has been of an apologetic-revisionist nature 
« and has presented the League as a benevolent international organization eager to hand out 
assistance to a weak Greece.4 The truth is far more complicated. Contemporaries were too 
emotionally involved to see the situation objectively. Later scholarship is methodologically flawed: 
the rich archival sources have been consulted in a partial manner and the significance of foreign 
imposition and political factors have been downplayed.
This thesis analyses the loan from a comprehensive (and hence new) perspective. It is 
based on new archival sources (The Bank of England Archive, the Tsouderos Archive at the Bank 
of Greece, the Diomedes Archive at the N.B.G., The Foreign Office 371 series). Moreover, for the 
first time this loan is examined, not as an isolated instance of foreign capital penetration, but within 
the general framework of Greek government foreign borrowing and the other League of Nations 
loans. This new data supports several distinct arguments: First, that the League of Nations was 
not the international - supernational - body that it was supposed to be. The evidence indicates 
. that its role in Greece was heavily compromised by the British financial establishment (i.e. the Bank <•
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of England and the Treasury). The 1924 Refugee Loan was a highly political affair. Britain used its 
power to withhold funds in order to obstruct the government from abolishing the monarchy and 
pursuing a policy of rearmament.
Second, the League was brought into Greece reluctantly. It is notable that the Greek 
government would have prefered to raise funds on its own account and resorted to the 
international organization only as a last resort. Equally significant, the documents show that the 
League was not eager to get involved in Greece. There is no evidence for a premeditated policy 
of subjection. However, once it decided to implement a Greek scheme, the League required that 
Greece should conform with the new postwar financial and security order. In pressing for the 
'respect of the peace treaties' Sir Arthur Salter expected that the Greek government would come 
to rely for the country's military security on the Covenant of the League of Nations instead of 
rearmament.5
Third, at this juncture the Bank of England adopted a dual role. It emerged simultaneously 
as an active formulator and a passive reflector of British hegemony in Greece. On the one hand it 
sought to integrate the National Bank of Greece and the drachma into the international banking 
and financial network based on the gold exchange standard directed from Threadneedle street. 
On the other, it rendered services to private British entrepreneurial interests whilst also serving as 
a spokesman for the British government regarding issues of a poltical and strategic nature with 
respect to Greece. However, there was not one monolithic British approach: the Treasury may 
have held identical opinions with the Bank of England, but apparently the £oar4e*Trp4€.did not 
agree with either.
Fourth, though it has been argued that the proceeds of the loan were handled by an 
independent body because the Greek state lacked the organizational capacity to carry out a 
settlement scheme, it is apparent that the most important reason for this arrangement was that the 
League of Nations, the Bank of England, the underwriters and subscribors to the loan wanted to 
ensure that the government would not divert the funds to military purposes.
Nevertheless it must be noted that the Refugee Loan set a pattern regarding the behaviour 
of the government for the twenties. Namely, it began for the first time to resort to the international 
* financial community consistently for productive purposes and not to finance wars or budget
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deficits. These views and the arguments that follow differ substantially from hypotheses 
advanced in the traditional and revisionist literature.
Table 2
Nominal Value of the Loans Raised and the Funds Spent 
from the Budget for the Refugees: 1922-1932
The Budget £ 6,734,428
Internal Loans* £21,649,422
External Loans £15.400,000
Total £43,783,850
•The internal bans raised went almost exclusively for the comperv sation of the refugees. Only 1.5% went 
for productive purposes (in this case meaning housing).
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1932. (Athens, 1933), pp.494-581.
1.2. The Problem Posed
The economic and human dimensions of the circumstances under which, in August 1922, 
the Asia Minor campaign ended and the refugees fled into Greece has been described in detail.6 
Greece, a war exhausted country of some 5,000,000 inhabitants, in total had by December 1924, 
received 1,266,849 refugees of whom 860,000 were in a state of dire poverty.7 Around 900,000 
had arrived prior to January 1923 at which point in time an agreement was signed between Turkey 
and Greece for the forced exchange of populations.8 Apart from humanitarian relief, a general 
plan of settlement was imperative in order to integrate into the socio-economic life of mainland 
Greece the refugees who on the whole, prior to being uprooted, had been affluent city 
merchants, artisans and professionals. The Greek state was overwhelmed. It lacked both the 
funds and the administrative machinery necessary to face this challenge . In September 1922 a 
group of radical officers under the instigation of Colonel Nicolaos Plastiras overthrew the 
government. The pro-German King Constantine was blamed for Greece's defeat. He was driven 
into exile and forced to abdicate in favour of his son Prince George. In November 1922, six of the 
ex-Kings close associates were executed. In protest to this act Britain immediately recalled her
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minister from Athens. A deep and mutual mistrust set in between the revolutionary government 
and Britain.9
The former strongly believed that the Greek army had not been defeated in Asia Minor but 
had been betrayed by the allies. Whereas Britain was pert \/bed as a matter of principle by the 
revolution's unconstitutional character and its twin goals which were the abolition of the monarchy 
and rearmament. Regarding the second objective it should be noted that the leaders of the 
revolution were not unreasonable considering that the country had suffered great military losses 
during its ten year war effort in the Balkans and Asia Minor. It was also threatened by a much 
stronger Yugoslavia, a hostile Bulgaria and a Turkey that was expanding its navy. However, it is 
equally clear that the revolutionary and subsequent governments harboured irridentism and had 
not come to terms with the Asia Minor defeat.10 Thus, the issue of what Greece's legitimate 
defence requirements were, became a thorny question which poisoned the relations between 
Britain and Greece for a number of years.
Under the circumstances, the financial embargo that the ex-allies had imposed on Greece in 
November 1920 was extended after 1922. As a result, from November 1920 to December 1924 
Greece remained financially and politically isolated. It was in this negative climate that the 
government searched for international funds in order to provide for the refugees. Therefore it is 
not suprising that this loan was associated with issues of a political nature.
1.3. Conflicts Among the International and Domestic Actors
The major international actors involved in the negotiations of this loan were Montagu 
Norman (Bank of England), Sir Arthur Salter Dr. Fridtjof Nansen and Colonel Procter (League of 
Nations), Hans Morgenthau (president of the R.S.C.). On the Greek side those in charge were 
Alexandras Diomedes (National Bank of Greece), and the politician Andreas Michalakopoulos. 
Conflicts developed not only between the international and the domestic players but also within 
each of the two factions.
Regarding relations amongst the foreign groups, what is of special interest is the antithesis 
that developed between Hans Morgenthau and the British. An American, h^e r^n thau  had 
been appointed as head of the R.S.C. in recognition of the role of the American Philanthropic
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Societies in the immediate relief of the refugees. He was resented by the British Legation in 
Athens and Norman because he was getting ail the credit for the refugee scheme from the 
Greeks. Ironically, what was in fact 'British money' spent by the R.S.C. came to be called the 
'Morgenthau fund' (See below 4.) Morgenthau's popularity was largely related to the fact that he 
was "on the best of terms with the members of the revolutionary government", favoured the 
establishment of the republic, and was openly critical towards the British government in 
connection to its stance on foreign policy issues towards Greece.11 (See below 2. for the 
position of British towards the revolutionary government).
Salter and Norman were the antithesis of Morganthau and the differences between them 
aptly reflected the positions held in the Greek arena by the U.S.A. and Britain. The former 
because of its political background and being a newcomer had nothing to loose by allying itself 
with the ascending forces of social change. However, the latter as a result of long established 
politico-economic ties with Greece was basically interested in protecting the monarchy and
o<\
enhancing its dominance in Greece. The conflict played out a personal level between 
Morgenthau and the British officials In a way can be seen as an introductory phase in the 
'economic warfare' that was to flare up in Greece during the twenties between the two Powers in 
the struggle for public works concessions.
Moving onto the domestic setting it is clear that there was no unanimity within the inner 
quarters of the state. Two lines of thought were manifest. On the one hand, were the realists (i.e. 
the N.B.G. and the politician Michalakopoulos) who were more familiar with the language of 
international finance. On the other hand, was Stylianos Gonatas the leader of the revolution, and 
the ministry of finance who were more nationalistic and less familiar with the world outside Greece. 
In addition, that Greek government was in a weak position. What was for the state a matter of 
national survival was for Britain and the world financial community a minor transaction.
2 . The First Attempts of the Greek Government to Raise Loan Capital for the
Refugees
Following the Asia Minor debacle, the League of Nations through its High Commission for 
the Russian refugees at Instabul assisted in the evacuation of the Greek refugees from Turkey.12
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Also, it helped the Greek government to administer relief, together with the American Red Cross, 
the Near East Relief Organization, the All-British Appeal, and the Save the Children Fund. 
Financially, the heaviest burden was carried by the American Red Cross which from October 1922 
to June 1923 fed daily more than 500,000 refugees.13
As for the government, it was spending £300,000 monthly on relief. This was a heavy 
burden considering that in 1922 total government expenditures amounted to only £1,600,000 a 
month.14 In January 1923, the government discontinued its bread ration and the two drachmas 
(296,7 drachmae to the £sterling) daily allowance granted to those refugees in need. In addition, 
the government asked the governor of the National Bank of Greece, Alexandras Diomedes to 
arrange for a public flotation in the City of London. This attempt to raise a loan, which has been 
totally neglected by other scholars, shows that the government did not rush to the League for 
funds and prefered to raise a loan on its own account.
Hambros, Morgan and Westminster were contacted by Diomedes. All three, who were 
familiar players in the Greek field, refused to help. However, an English group of financiers close 
to the British Treasury agreed to raise £5,000,000. This was an expensive proposition. These 
bankers -whose names are not mentioned in the archives- demanded a 10% commission, an 
issue price of 70 and a 6% nominal rate of interest.15 In addition, they also wanted the British 
government to guarantee the prompt service of the loan. The Treasury for its part declared that it 
would be willing to act in the capacity of guarantor under the conditions that the loan be spent 
exclusively on the refugees and that Greece withdraw her claim to the £5,000,000 credits Britain 
had promised Greece under the 1918 Paris Agreement. Clearly, the Treasury mistakenly thought 
that the Greek government was desperate for funds and would renounce its right to these 
credits.16 But the government turned down the offer. It was not willing foresake the 'rights' of the 
state to the British credits in return for a loan that would have a real value of only £3,500,000. 
Moreover, the government was under the impression that if Greece accepted the British proposal, 
a bad precedent would be set for France and the U.S.A., who also owed Greece more than 
£15,000,000 according to the Paris Agreement of 1918.17
This was not the best of times for the government to go loan hunting. Officially Greece was 
still at war and the revolutionary committee had failed to secure recognition. Reflecting the poor
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credit rating of Greece abroad, Greek bonds in London had fallen markedly during 1921 and
1922. These were years of crisis for the international capital market, but Greek securities were hit 
more severely than those of the stronger countries such as Britain and Belgium. Before 1921 the 
market value of Greek securities had been comparable to the market price of British consols. But, 
whereas the latter fell to £45, the price of Greek bonds quoted on the London stock exchange fell 
to £20.18 (For prices of Greek bonds see below Table 3).
Dismayed by this first attempt to raise a loan in the City, the government turned at once to 
the League. At the end of January 1923, Venizelos and Michalakopoulos (two prominent 
politicians close to the revolution but at the same time respected abroad) were sent to Geneva to 
discuss with the General Secretary of the League of Nations, Sir Eric Drummond, the proposal 
originally advanced by the High Commissioner for Russian refugees at Istanbul, in November 
1922.19 This was that the more powerful members of the League of Nations give their guarantee 
to the government for a large international loan. Austria had already floated a loan under similar 
terms. But Drummond made It absolutely clear that the League could not repeat the Austrian 
formula' as Greece was not on the verge of economic, social and political collapse.20 Niemeyer 
seconded Drummond. A few days later he wrote: "There is no question of a loan by the League 
or by the British Government to Greece. Whether Greece raises a loan it will depend entirely on 
her international credit..."21
The absense of a support within the higher echelons of the League of Nations forced the 
government to go ahead with Drummond's subsequent suggestion that it aquire from the 
Financial Committee a formal statement that the guarantees offered were sufficient for the 
flotation of a loan. The logic behind such a move being to make it easier for the government to 
raise an international loan in Britain and the U.S.A. It was in this frame of mind that in February
1923, Michalakopoulos made an official request to the Council for an international loan of 
£10,000,000 to be raised with the 'moral support' of the League. In order to resolve fears in 
certain of the circles of the League that the government wanted to use the loan as a cover to 
finance its irridentist aspirations, Michalakopoulos suggested that the proceeds of the loan be 
handled by an autonomous organization that would administer funds to settle the reffugees.
72
Apparently, this proposal was made without discussing it in advance with the colonels who 
headed the government. This was to create problems.22
The Council ordered the preparation of a financial and technical report on the feasibility of a 
Greek scheme 23 But, the government was in a hurry and one month later, in March 1923, 
Michalakopoulos searched out the possibility of raising a £10,000,000 loan for the refugees in 
France without the involwnent of the League of Nations. As in London two months earlier, the 
discussions bore no results. The French bankers demanded a commission of 10%, and a 
guarantee that most of the loan would be spent in France. However, the real stumbling block was 
the requirement that Greece first hold elections and provide a detailed plan for the settlement of 
the refugees. The revolutionary government was not in a position to satisfy these conditions 24 
But this did not inhibit the colonels making another approach to France in June 1923 25 Thus, for 
a period of six months, from January to June 1923, the Greek government tried to establish an 
alternative to a League loan. The government seemed to be playing a double game: pretending 
to want a League loan while striving for a better alternative. (It would be interesting to find out 
whether the other countries that raised League loans went through such phases). Another 
feature of this six month period was the lack of a united front within the state administration. 
Dissent was expressed on two issues. First, presuming that there were financiers eager to invest 
in Greece, the head of the government, the radical colonel Stylianos Gonatas, and the minister of 
Finance argued that the loan should amount to £15-20,000,000. This would provide for the 
settlement of the refugees, the consolidation of the floating debt, and cover expenditure on new 
public works.26 Secondly, they argued that the creation of an autonomous organization for the 
settlement of the refugees would undermine the sovereignty of the state. When 
Michalakopoulos had put forward this propdition to the League in February, the Greek ministry of 
Foreign Affairs had been informed in advance and had raised no objection. Apparently, however 
it did not notify the revolutionary committee. Interestingly, Michalakopoulos ignored the 
complaints of the revolutionary committee when the latter was eventually appraised of his 
actions.27 The regime was recently installed and confusion was to be expected. Nevertheless, 
the incident demonstrates the inability of the revolutionary government to coordinate its 
activities.28
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Table 3
Market Prices of Greek Government £100 in the City: 1920-1924
Loan Title 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924
5% 1881 37 33 20 26,5 43
lowest 
highest 
5% 1884
59 47 41 49 57,5
lowest 37 33 20 25,5 44
highest 
4% 1887
59 46,5 40,5 49 57,7
lowest 30 30,25 20 23 37
highest 
4% 1889
50 39 39 46 48,25
lowest 31 27 14 20 35
highest 
5% 1890
51 38 35,5 41 45,7
lowest 38 33 21.5 24 46
highest 
4% 1902
56 45,5 41 45,5 57
lowest 33 32,5 30 28,5 36
highest 
5% 1907
57,5 39 40,25 43,5 56,7
lowest 42 25 27 56
highest 
4% 1910
48 50,5 57 73,5
lowest 28 28 16 20,4 34
highest 
5% 1914
47 34 37 37 54,5
lowest 37 33 20,25 32 45
highest 67 44 48,25 55 66
Source: Secretary of the Share and Loan Department, The Stock Exchange Official Intelligence 1921-1927. 
(London, 1928).
The inability to arrange for a loan began to have negative repercussions. At the end of 
June 1923 it became obvious that time was running out. The two major voluntary organizations - 
the American Red Cross and the Near East Relief- ended relief operations. The U.S. government 
let it be known that had the League devised by this point a serious settlement scheme, the 
American Red Cross would not have withdrawn altogether but under the circumstances it feared 
that the refugee problem would drag on for years.29
The Americans proved overpessimistic. The Council of the League in its Session of July 
finally discussed the subject of a Greek loan. The Financial Committee by this time had finally
oF
managed to prepare a report inspite its initial difficulties in collecting data on the Greek public debt 
and budget.30 League experts exposed in detail the weak position and structural imbalances 
of the Greek economy and state finances.31 (See Tables 4 and 5 below) Not surprisingly the 
Council declared that for Greece to float a loan it would be necessary to curtail state expenditure 
and curb the printing of money. In addition, the army would have to be demobilized and a Peace
74
Treaty with Turkey would have to be signed. The last two prerequisites were related to the real 
fear that Greece might resume hostilities. At the end of May rumours were spreading abroad that 
final preparations for an offensive were being made in Greece.32
Table 4
External and Internal Structural Imbalances: 1920-1924
Year
Exports as % 
of Imports
Ordinary Revenues 
as % of Budget 
Expenditure
War Ministries 
as % of Budget 
Expenditure
1920 31.5 37 53
1921 53.5 34 59
1922 78.5 49 57
1923 42 66 40
1924 40 84 33
Table 5
Financial Indicators: 1920-1924
Year Exchange Value 
Drachmae to £
Circulation 
of Banknotes*
Cost of Living 
Index 1914=100
1920 34,25 1,508,366 351
1921 70,90 2,161,183 393
1922 166,50 3,149,446 632
1923 296,67 4,681,200 1,213
1924 247,35 4,865,924 1,271
• in drs.
Both Tables compiled from: G. Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1929. (Athens, 1930), 
pp.32,199,275. Also, G. Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook for 1930. (Athens, 1931), p.251. Also, X. 
Zolotas, Monetary and Currency phenomena in Greece 1910-1927. Vol. A, Athens 1928, p.225.
A resolution was passed by the Council on July 4 1923. It stated that Greece could raise a 
loan but no definitive date was set. In addition, although it was recognized that "a suitable refugee 
scheme needed £10,000,000" and that "the securities of the Greek government were amply 
sufficient", the Council recommended that the loan should not exceed £6,000,000. Two reasons 
were given. Firstly, because it feared that political turmoil might eventually depress the level of the 
government receipts pledged as security. Secondly, it did not believe that the international 
capital market would be able to absorb a large Greek loan.33 The weakest point of the resolution
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in the eyes of the government and the public at large was that a League appointed Commission 
would handle the proceeds of the loan. The Council maintained that such a measure was 
necessary in order to assure the international community that funds furnished would not be 
diverted to military purchases. However, in Greece this move was interpreted as an act of 
economic aggression.34 Twenty days after the Council's resolution (i.e. on July 241923), Greece 
signed a Peace Treaty with Turkey. This prompted the League officials to give their moral support 
for a loan. At the end of July 1923 the governor of the National Bank of Greece, under 
government orders, visited Norman in London in the hope that it would be possible to arrange for 
an immediate flotation of a Refugee Loan in the City. However, the reception Diomedes recieved 
was cool. Norman was not impressed with the fact that Greece had signed a Peace Treaty. (At this 
point Greece and Britain had still not resumed diplomatic relations).35 Norman scotched the idea 
that a loan might be floated in the near future. He made it clear that apart from the preconditions 
set by the League (i.e. the signing of a Peace Treaty, demobilization and monetary cum fiscal 
restraint), it would be necessary for "a constitutional and recognized government to have 
established itself in the confidence of the Greek people and of foreign nations"36 Effectively, 
the final word for the ban lay not with the League of Nations, nor with the private banking sector of 
the City, but with Norman. However, the governor of the Bank of England did not completely 
close the door to Greece. In order to enable the League to begin a settlement scheme he agreed 
to provide an advance. (See below 4.)
3 . The September 1923 Geneva Protocol
From the outset, the League of Nations had specified that it could not commit itself to a 
major scheme in Greece if the Lausanne Conference was not concluded. (A major reason being 
that the lands on which Greece was going to settle the refugees would be offered as guarantee 
for a loan and the government would need to obtain a firm title to it.)37 As already mentioned, on 
July 24 1923 the Conference ended with the signing of a Peace Treaty between Greece and 
Turkey thereby removing an important technical obstacle. Throughout the summer of 1923 
League officials worked hard preparing the legal framework for the financing and the creation of 
the autonomous body that would undertake the settlement of the refugees. During the 
September session of the Council, a Protocol was passed relating to the eventual issue of a
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£6,000,000 loan and the immediate establishment of the Refugee Settlement Commission 
(R.S.C.) under the strict supervision of the Council.38
The Protocol precluded the possibility of an immediate flotation on the grounds that 
political conditions in Greece "had not become sufficiently stable". The obligations that the 
government would have to undertake in order to secure the 'moral support' of the League were 
outlined in detail. These terms were identical to those set in July by the Finance Committee, 
namely that:
D Greek banks would be obliged to subscribe to at least i1,000,000 of the loan (i.e. the net 
inflow of foreign capital would be at best £5,000,000).
II) The I.F.C. was to be placed in charge of the service of the loan.39
III) The League enlarged the orbit of the I.F.C in order to ensure that the Government would
not have access to the international capital market in future for the purpose of rearamament. 
Namely, it stipulated that if the Greek government intended to pledge state revenues for a 
foreign loan for any reasons other than carrying out Greece's obligations stemming from the 
Treaties of Peace or for improving the financial condition of the country, it would be obliged 
to seek the consent of the I.F.C.
IV) The government would immediately attempt to balance the budget.
By imposing the last two terms, the League hoped that the government would be forced to
curtail its irridentist aspirations, balance the budget and achieve monetary stabilization. A stable 
exchange rate for the drachma not only secured that the service of the foreign loans would be 
prompt but also contributed to the effort of the League of Nations and the Bank of England to 
'stabilize' the international financial system. This Protocol was amended in September 1924.40 
(For details see below 5.)
4 . The Bank o f England Advances
Three £1,000,000 advances were provided by the Bank of England and the N.B.G. to 
enable the R.S.C. to start work 13 months before the flotation of the First Refugee Loan. These 
advances carried interest at 5% and were granted exclusively in pound sterling.41 The third and 
last advance is of limited interest. It was granted solely by the National Bank of Greece. Although
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it may have made the government more dependent on the bank, it was a straightforward 
commercial banking transaction that did not interfere with the political or financial affairs of the 
state.42 However, the opposite was the case with the first two advances which were granted 
jointly by the Bank of England and the National Bank of Greece. In these two instances there was 
overt political and financial intervention in the affairs of the state by the Bank of England. The 
National Bank of Greece was merely a passive partner forced to participate in these two ventures 
by the Bank of England because the latter did not want to carry alone the risk of lending money to 
the Greek government.
The initiative for the first advance was taken by Norman on July 28 1923. On that date, he 
informed Diomedes that in order to allow the refugee settlement plan to be put into effect by the 
League without delay, the Bank of England would be willing to furnish a short term advance of 
£1,000,000. Norman made it clear that the provision of this credit would be contingent upon the 
creation by the League of an autonomous body that would undertake the settlement of the 
refugees.
In the absence of any other viable alternative, the Greek minister of Foreign Affairs on 
August 4 1923 advised Diomedes to accept without objection Norman's offer. At this juncture, 
the governor of the Bank of England took advantage of the weak financial position of the 
government in order to pursue issues of a wider significance. Norman began by requiring the 
government to work towards political and military stabilization. The government was asked to 
assure the Bank of England formally that it would immediately demobilize the whole army and that 
arrangements would be made to hold proper elections in the autumn. Apparently, the Lausanne 
Treaty was not seen by the British as an adequate assurance that Greece would keep peace as 
long as the army was mobilized. Furthermore, during the currency of the advance Athens was 
asked by Norman not to contract any additional external obligation. This condition aimed at 
preventing a grand rearmament programme and so precipitating the depreciation of the 
drachma. 43
More specifically in order to avert further depreciation of the drachma the Bank of England 
specified that no new bank notes should be printed by the Greek Treasury. A final issue of
750,000,000 drs. was permitted only under the condition that the International Financial
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Commission would give its consent. With this last stipulation the Bank of England aimed 
simultaneously at reestablishing the authority of the Commission over Greek monetary affairs. As 
indicated above since November 1920 the government had refused to ask for I.F.C. permission 
prior to new note issues.
Table 6
Advances Provided to the R.S.C.
First advance November 1923
Bank of England £ 750,000 
National Bank of Greece £ 250,000 
Total £ 1 ,000 ,000
Second advance May 1924
Bank of England £ 750,000 
National Bank of Greece £ 250,000 
Total £ 1 ,000 ,000
Third advance June 1924 National Bank of Greece £ 1,000,000
This confirms again that Norman's goal was to coax the Greek bank of issue (i.e the National 
Bank of Greece) to accept principles propounded in London for the post-War financial 
reconstruction of Europe. For this reason the N.B.G. was asked to accept the principle of 
cooperation with other central banks.44 Moreover, Norman wanted to ensure that the Bank of 
England would not make a financial loss on the deal. In an ironic way, Greece was called to accept 
onerous terms and foreign interference in its affairs in return for receiving money that essentially 
was hers. The Greek government had for years held a gold deposit at the Bank of England valued 
at £2,000,000. In addition, 300,000 unissued bonds of the 5% loan of 1914 were handed over 
to the Bank of England as security for the advance. These bonds had a face value of £6,000,000 
and an estimated market value of approximately E3.000.000.45
During the first days of November 1923 the creation of the R.S.C. was formally announced 
and the National Bank of Greece deposited its quota for the advance. Moreover, the 
demobilization of the army, which incidentally had begun on July 29 -i.e. the day after Norman 
posed the terms for the advance- was almost finished.46 However, although these preconditions 
were satisfied, the advance was withheld. The putch^ of October 21 and the ensuing dismissal of
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1,284 promonarchist officers from the army by the revolutionary committee was widely interpreted 
as an indication that the country was nowhere near to attaining political normalization.47 Norman 
did not openly refer to the political factor. Instead, he declared that the £1,000,000 credit would 
not be released because he had information that Greece was planning to resort to external 
finance to fund purchases of battleships from French and German shipyards. He claimed that 
such an action would constitute a breach of contract.48
Diomedes tried to reassure Norman by explaining that the information which had come to 
his attention concerned rumours put out by agents of a French and German shipyard that had 
received orders from Greece for the construction of battleships before World war I. Diomedes was 
correct in pointing out that the government was not interested in this 'obsolete' prewar order. 
However, it was planning to embark on a five year comprehensive naval rehauling programme (to 
begin in January 1924) which was to include the building of sixteen submarines, ten destroyers 
and one battleship. Unquestionably, this scheme was large considering that at the moment the 
country's navy consisted only of four old destroyers and one old battleship, but was 
commensurate with Greek defence requirements.49
The government had already started to make contacts regarding this programme and was 
discussing the possibility of placing orders for submarines in France. Apparently, the French 
government had offered to release the blocked credits of the Paris Agreement of February 1918 
in order to secure orders for all sixteen submarines. This move on the part of the French infuriated 
Niemeyer and Foreign Office officials because the 1918 Paris Agreement expressly stated that 
book credits could run for only three years after the end of hostilities and that they could be spent 
only "with the consent and under the direction" of the three allies.50
This episode highlights the inter-British conflicts. Apparently, the Admiralty and the Board 
of Trade (which was keen on finding ways to combat unemployment at home) wanted British firms 
to secure a contract not only for the repairs but also the rest of the naval programme.51 But, the 
British Treasury and Foreign Office wanted to induce Greece to abandon its ambitious naval 
programme regardless of whether British firms would be involved. As Niemeyer put it bluntly: 
"The Greek scheme for the construction of armaments will close the door on Refugee Loans"52
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Eventually, the Board of Trade view was later espoused by the Foreign Office also - but only after 
the government agreed to prune the programme down to the mere essentials, (see below, p. 82)
The Bank of England was assumed to be independent vis a vis the British government. But 
one cannot fail to ask if in this instance Norman acted as a 'spokesman' of the Foreign Office. For 
he released the advance immediately upon receiving from the minister of Finance a formal 
statement to the effect that Greece had every intention to remain at peace, all military 
expenditures would be met from ordinary revenues and would concern reequipment and repairs 
but not rearmament. It was specified that Greece at the moment would merely repair its four naval 
destroyers and that White and Vickers would undertake this task.53 Interestingly, the timing of the 
advance suggests that other factors were also at work. Namely, the revolutionary government on 
November 21 announced that elections for the National Assembly would be held on December 
16 1924. This decision was welcomed by the British as they were naive in hoping that once 
Greece returned to parliamentary rule the debate over the abolition of the monarchy would 
subside. Perhaps one can make the hypothesis that the threat of not providing the advance 
influenced -albeit marginally- the government in taking this decision to hold elections.
At 5% the interest rate charged for this first advance was comparatively low. At the time, the 
average for the official discount rate was 7.5% in Greece and 4% in England.54 Nevertheless, in 
Greece the terms were considered "so onerous as to rob the Bank of England's deed half of its 
merit"55 With this advance, the R.S.C. began operations immediately. The Greeks kept their 
word and elections were held as planned in December 1923. But, contrary to the expectation of 
the British, the issue of the monarchy flared up instead of dying out. A few days after the 
revolutionary committee transferred power to an elected National Assembly, King George 
"accepted the advise of Gonatas that he should travel abroad until the future of the monarchy was 
decided." As no party 'commanded a majority' in Parliament a renewed period of instability 
appeared to be on the horizon 56 The first Premier to be appointed by the National Assembly was 
Venizelos. Although in weak health, from the British point of view he was considered a stabilizing 
factor in the Greek politics because he was against a policy of heavy rearmament and was not a 
staunch antimonarchist. The establishment of a legitimate government led to a complete 
restoration of diplomatic relations with Britain 57
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A few days after Venizelos stepped into office in January 1924, Diomedes asked Norman if 
it would be possible to reopen negotiations for the Refugee Loan. The governor of the Bank of 
England again refused to go ahead stressing political rather than economic or financial factors. He 
expressed concern about the future of the monarchy in Greece and stated that it would be 
necessary first, that "some permanent political settlement of the domestic affairs of Greece" take 
place. Other obstacles to the flotation of a loan as perceived by Norman were the problems 
between Greek and Muslim refugees and the unsettled situation in Central Europe.58
In the meanwhile, the R.S.C. was spending its funds at a fast pace. Thus, about two 
months later, in early March 1924, Morgenthau, the president of the R.S.C. suggested to Norman 
that a second advance should be granted.59 By this point of time the situation in Greece on the 
financial front had improved. The external value of the drachma had begun to appear more 
settled.60 Nevertheless, inspite these improvements, Morgenthau had to go through substantial 
armtwisting in order to convince Norman that a second advance would be a 'sound investment of 
British funds'. The political concurrence was unfortunate. The British government were unhappy 
because the radical politician Alexandros Papanastassiou who had just become Prime Minister 
was contemplating to have the establishment of the Republic officially announced by the National 
Assembly prior to the holding of a plebiscite.61 Indeed, the prospects for a second advance 
seemed to vanish as on March 25 -the National holiday of independence- the National Assembly 
formally declared Greece a Republic. What is more, Papanastassiou wanted to undermine the 
autonomy of the R.S.C.62
The plebiscite held on April 13 1924 was a turning point. The result was 69.95% in favour 
of the establishment of a Republic. Though this was not exactly a landslide victory for the 
anti monarchists, the Republic was an irreversible fact.63 In view of this development, the British 
realized that there were limits to their 'political control' over Greece. Norman could no longer 
withhold the granting of a second advance. In early May the League had decided to go ahead 
definitely with the flotation of the loan in October or November if the political and economic 
situation did not in the meanwhile deteriorate.64 In addition, by this point the financial indicators 
had shown signs of steady improvement on a number of fronts: the external value of the drachma 
had steadily risen, the National Bank had managed within a few weeks to roughly double its
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foreign exchange and gold reserve, and there were signs that there might even be a surplus in 
the budget for the current fiscal year.65
But, as was the case with the first advance, Norman continued to be suspicious regarding 
the ulterior motives of the Greeks. Thus, in May 1924 before releasing these new funds, he 
required from the government a formal declaration to the effect that all Greek political parties had 
accepted as a matter of principle the autonomy of the R.S.C., that the money received from the 
Bank of England would in no manner contribute directly or indirectly to increased military 
expenditure, that the Peace Treaties would be respected, and that a strictly defensive military 
strategy would be followed.66
With one exception the financial terms posed for the second advance were identical with 
those of the first. The Bank of England, in an attempt to display a more compromising attitude 
towards Greece's demands for reequipment, relaxed the restrictions posed on the government 
concerning foreign borrowing. The government was allowed -during the term of the advance- to 
make orders for military reequipment from abroad (presumably Britain) on condition that they 
were absolutely necessary for the upkeep of the Greek army and navy, that they would be paid 
for out of the ordinary receipts of the Greek Treasury and that no state revenues would be 
pledged.67
It should be noted that a new attitude towards the ordering of new military equipment was 
adopted also by the Foreign Office. In part this was because it feared that if it remained adamant 
Greece would be totally exposed vis a vis a fastly growing Turkish navy. More importantly, by this 
point the Foreign Office had aligned itself with the Board of Trade view that it was in the British 
national interest to secure as many military orders as possible.68 In April 1924, the Greek 
government had ordered two submarines from the French firm Schneider. In the tender held it 
construed that the British were uncompetitive -Schneider undertook the order at £368,000. This 
was 30% below the lowest price offered by British competitions.69 Thus, the Foreign Office 
decided to attain by fiat' what the market had failed to establish through the interplay of the price 
mechanism. Prior to the granting of the second advance, the Greek m inister of 
Foreign Affairs, was pressed by the Foreign Office to  recommend to  the Greek 
m ilitary that all further naval contracts should be offered to British companies.70
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5 . Amendments to the September 1923 Geneva Protocol
When in May 1924, the Greek government was informed of the League's decision to float a 
loan, it asked the Council to amend the Geneva Protocol and the organic statutes of the R.S.C. 
The proposed alterations aimed to:
i) allow the real value of the loan to be increased from £6,000,000 to £10,000,000
ii) permit the government to raise loans for public works in the future;
iii) facilitate the procedure of settling refugees;
iv) enlarge the board of the R.S.C. from four to six members, to include two government
ministers and
v) widen the scope of the R.S.C. so as to involve it in the state directed land reform 
programme and indemnification scheme.
In July the Council met and accepted the first three amendments.(See below Table 7) 
However, it turned down the last two proposed changes. The League did not want the R.S.C. to 
get involved in land reform and matters of indemnification. These issues were complicated and 
according to the League opened ground for conflicts with the government. Moreover, the 
League of Nations feared that if it undertook joint activities with the state, and if more Greek 
Members were brought onto the Commission, it would undermine the autonomy of the R.S.C. It 
was no secret that the government had recently been pressed hard by fifty five refugee deputies 
"to obtain control of the funds at the disposal of the R.S.C."71
Given the 'hostile' environment under which the R.S.C. was labouring, the Council went 
one step further. In order to preclude the possibility that Greece might dissolve the Commission it 
required the government to place at the disposal of the R.S.C. the funds necessary to enable it to 
carry out its work until the international loan was issued and to guarantee the entire ban. Hence 
the R.S.C. would remain whether or not a League loan was issued. This was the first project of the 
kind to be undertaken by the League of Nations and as a result it was anxious to complete 
successfully its mission in Greece.
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Table 7
Modifications to the September 1923 Geneva Protocol 
Technical Modifications fo r the Speeding up o f the Pace of Settlement
i. The Greek government was allowed to hand over land to the R.S.C. without necessarily 
providing a clear title to the land beforehand so that refugee settlers could attain de jure 
ownership.
ii. The R.S.C. was given the freedom to engage in work that was not in itself of a directly 
productive character (such as to build houses or schools).
Financial M odifications
i. The government was allowed to secure new foreign loans on its share of surplus 
revenues without asking for the consent of the I.F.C. under the condition that these loans 
would be raised for productive purposes or for carrying out its obligations under the 
Peace Treaties (meaning the prompt repayment of the Greek share in the Ottoman 
debt).1
ii. The maximum value of the loan was raised from 16,000,000 to (10,000,000. In order to 
accommodate the increase in the size of the loan the government agreed to include in the 
revenues assigned for security,2 the tobacco and stamp duties in the new provinces of 
Greece,3 and the duty on alcohol in the whole of Greece. It also agreed to increase the 
participation of the Greek banks in the flotation of the loan from 16% of the nominal 
amount to 25%.4
1 According to the 1923 Protocol I.F.C. permission was not necessary for bans destined for the purpose of 
meeting its external obligations or of obtaining loans destined exclusively to improve the financial positbn of 
Greece.
2The securities granted under the 1923 Geneva Protocol were: 1) A first charge on the income of the R.S.C. 
and the 1,250,000 acres the government had undertaken to provide to the R.S.C. for the settlement of the 
refugees. This land was estimated in 1924 to have a value of £13,000,000. (Unfortunately, other later 
estimations are not available). 2) A first charge on the salt, match, playing cards and cigarette paper 
monopolies of new Greece, plus the customs of the Chania, Candia, Samos, Chios, Mitylene, and Syra 
Ports. And, 3) A first charge on any surplus revenues which accrued to the I.F.C. after deduction of the 
amounts required for the service of all the National bans that had been assigned up to then to the I.F.C.
3Greece's new provinces were: The northern part of Epirus,Macedonia, Thrace, and Crete. With the 
exception of Thrace which was annexed under the treaties of Sevres and Neuilly in 1919, the other areas 
were annexed in the 1912-1913 the Balkan wars. Source: D.G.Koussoulas, Modern Greece Profile of a 
Nation. (New York, 1974), p.102.
4The Financial Committee had wanted the participation of the Greek banks to be at least 30% because it 
feared that the German League loan that was to be issued in October would make it difficult to place more 
than 70% on the international capital market. B.G./T.A.: Document 18/3 Tsouderos to Ministry of Finance 
August 1924; and Document 18/1 Diomedes to Ministry of Finance August 5 1924.
Compiled from: B.G./T.A., Document 18/56: Annex to the Report of the Financial Committee on the 
Modifications to the Protocol of September 29th, 1923 Relating to the Settlement of Greek Refugees, 
Articles I and II in the Protocol and Articles XII and XV in the Statutes. For the financial alterations see: 
Articles IV, V, and VI in the Protocol.
Modifications to the Geneva Protocol and the Organic Statutes of the R.S.C. were 
incorporated during the fifth Assembly of the Council in September 1924. The new Protocol was 
also more specific about the timing of the loan, stating that due the "the improvement in the 
stability of Greek political conditions; the improved economic position; and the maintenance of a 
steady value of the Greek currency" the time had arrived to place the refugee settlement scheme 
"upon a definite financial basis by the issue of a long-term ban".72
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6 . Preparations for the Loan
Preparations for flotation had begun in May 1924, when Norman 'forced' the Greek 
government to accept that the British tranche would be assigned to Hambros. Hambros was 
closely connected with Norman, had a lengthy presence in Greece, and viewed the First Refugee 
Loan as an opportunity to strengthen its position there.73 The total nominal issue of 
£12,300,000 was divided amongst Hambros (who took £7,500,000) the National Bank of Greece 
(£2,500,000) and Speyer & Co. ($10,000,000 or £2,300,000).
Flotation conditions pertaining to the Greek tranche aptly reflect the undisputed leadership 
of the N.B.G. in the Greek banking system.74 It underwrote almost 60% of the tranche. At the 
same time, it organized 14 other banks to tender for the loan.(See below Table 8) Regarding the 
American tranche, Hambros first contacted Guaranty Trust Co. However negotiations floundered. 
Guaranty was not interested in taking more than £2,500,000 and requested a 30 year redemption 
period plus an underwriting guarantee by the Bank of England for the U.S. tranche. Next 
Hambros approached Speyer and Co., who only agreed to participate after what were described 
as difficult negotiations 75
Norman had originally favoured a more international flotation. He envisaged a multinational 
syndicate headed by Hambros. Norman's interest in the affair is manifested in the support he 
gave to Gordon Leith in negotiations with the American underwriters and in other contacts he 
made, unsuccessfully pressing the French and Italian ministers of Finance to arrange for portions 
of the loan to be placed in their countries 76 The French most probably refused because they 
were anti-League of Nations. They feared an enhancement of British financial imperialism in 
Greece. The Italians abstained because of an earlier misunderstanding with France regarding the 
participation of Italian nationals in a recent French issue of Treasury bonds. The government of 
Italy put out a circular which had unintentionally created the impression that it wanted to debar 
Italian nationals from subscribing to French flotations.77
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Table 8
Syndicate Set Up by N.B.G. for the Underwriting of the Greek Tranche
N.B.G. £1,455,000
Bank of Athens £ 250,000
Anatolian Bank £ 150,000
Commercial Bank of Greece £ 150.000
Greek Bank of Values £ 100,000
Ionian Bank £ 50,000
Bank of Thessaly £ 50,000
Central Bank of Greece £ 50,000
Bank of Greek Commercial Credit £ 50,000
Popular Bank £ 40,000
Bank of Industry £ 40,000
Bank of National Economy £ 35,000
General Bank of Greece £ 30,000
Bank of Chios £ 25,000
American Express Company £ 25,000
Total of banks other than N.B.G. £1,045,000
GRAND TOTAL £2,500,000
Compiled from: N.B.G./H.A., X Loans, A' Public loans, File 147, titled: Public loans 1924, document titled: 
7% National Refugee Loan of 1924 (£12.300.000)-Greek Tranche.
Table 9
Government Loans Issued Under the Auspices of the League of Nations 
During the Years 1922-1924 and the German Dawes Loan of 1924
Year C ountry Issue Prices* Nominal Real R edem ption
1922 Austria 80% 6 % 8.95% 20 years
1924 Hungary 88% 7.5% 9.25% 20 years
1924 Germany 92% 7 % 7.60% 25 years
1924 Greece 88% 7 % 8.25% 40 years
•By issue price we mean the price at which bonds were offered to the public, and not the net produce of 
these loans. The expenses for these flotations (e.g. Bank commissions and stamp duty) are not taken into 
consideration.
Source: N.B.G./H.A.: Public loans, File 145: Diomedes to National Bank, November 11 1924.
Table 10
Nominal rate of interest of the First Refugee Loan: 7 %
Real rate of interest of the First Refugee Loan: 7.9 %•
Discount rate in Greece during 1924: 7.5 %
Discount rate in Britain in 1924: 4 %
Average real interest rate of foreign (nonCommonwealth)
Government flotations in the City during 1924: 7.5 %
Real rate of interest of the 1902 Greek Railway Loan: 5 %
Real rate of interest of the 1907 National Defence Loan: 5.5 %
Real rate of interest of the 1910 Loan: 4.7 %
Real rate of interest of 1914 Loan: 5.7 %
•If the commissions and stamp duty are taken into account the real rate of interest was 8,7%. (That is the 
bank commissions, stamp dues have not been deducted).
Compiled from: D. Stephanides, Foreign capital inflow and its economic and political consequences. 
(Salonika, 1930), pp.201-205. Also, A. Angelopoulos, "The fiscal consequences of Greece's foreign 
borrowing", in Social and Public Economics Review, 1934, pp. 159-201.
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The nominal rate of interest of the First Refugee Loan was 7%; bonds were offered to the 
public at 88%. However, the net yield was 81% for the sterling issue and 80% for the dollar issue. 
So, it was more economical for Greece to float bonds in London. (Thus the £12,300,000 loan 
yielded a little under £10,000,000.)78 At 8.7% the real rate of interest was comparable with that 
charged for other League loans issued between 1922 and 1924.(See above Table 9) 
Nevertheless, it was high in relation to the contemporary discount banking rate and interest 
charged for other foreign loans floated in the City during 1924 or previous loans contracted by 
Greece. (With reference to this last point it should be noted that conditions were different after 
WWI).(See above Table 10). Regarding the redemption period, at forty years it was the longest for 
a League loan.79 However, the bankers made provision for an accumulative sinking fund of 1/27. 
per annum. It was also specified that 75% of the monies paid by the refugees to the R.S.C. in 
return for the land handed to them would go towards covering the exceptional amortization of the 
loan. It was expected that these payments "would be so substantial that the ban might be repaid 
in less than half of the prescribed forty-year period."80 This was an unrealistic claim.
In terms of foreign dependence, the loan increased the influence of the I.F.C. over Greek 
public finance. Whereas in 1921 government revenues falling under the control of the I.F.C. 
represented only 27% of the total ordinary revenues of the government, in 1925 they amounted 
to 44%.81 Finally, it must be noted that the unissued bonds that had been lodged at the Bank of 
England as security for the two advances furnished prior to the flotation of the loan were not 
'returned' to the government. The Bank of England continued to hold them until January 1 1926 
as the League and the Bank wanted to prevent the Greek government placing them on the 
market immediately after the issue of the First Refugee Loan. It was feared that such a move 
would be detrimental for the stability of the drachma and the interests of the holders of Greek 
government bonds in general.82
7 . Last Minute Problems
While the preparations for the loan seemed to be running smoothly there was an 
unexpected development. In late September 1924, Norman suddenly announced to Diomedes 
that a £10,000,000 loan would be too heavy a burden for the "weak" Greek economy. Indeed, 
he even expressed doubts as it could be floated at all. Diomedes was astounded. If anything the
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financial situation of the country had improved since May 1924. Apparently, the governor of the 
Bank of England had no intention to cancel the loan. Instead, it seems that he wished to force the 
Greek government to 'cooperate' more readily on an issue of importance to private British 
interests. Norman linked the flotation of the loan directly to the ability of the government to solve 
its long standing differences with the largest British enterprise in Greece, the Lake Copais 
company. Reportedly the firm had suffered substantial losses.83 In mid November 1924, Norman 
wrote to Diomedes: "My information as to the arrangement with lake Copais Company which has 
been proposed in Athens leads me to suppose that a further delay of at least three months will be 
necessary. I fear that in that event, the eventual issue of a Greek loan becomes far less certain 
than we all hoped".84 In raising the problem of the Copais company at this juncture, Norman was 
obviously accepting to press the Greek government to reach a settlement favourable to the British 
economy. It was a typical example of financial imperialism. Once again Norman intervened in 
Greece's internal affairs in his capacity of 'ambassador at large' for British interests. The Foreign 
Office had already made repeated official representations to the government and had dictated to 
Salter that the Lake Copais dispute would have to be settled before the loan was floated.85 
Moreover, Hambros also intervened unofficially as it had a stake in this British firm.86 The 
government finally yielded and in the beginning of December 1924 a bill was passed for 
arbitration. This benefited the Lake Copais company for the result of the arbitration satisfied most 
of its claims 87
In addition, the Foreign Office succeeded in settling two more outstanding issues prior to 
the flotation of the loan. First, the Greek government 'promised' to assign the Athens 
electrification concession to a consortium headed by Power and Traction which was part of the * 
Whitehall Security Corporation which served as the economic intelligence unit of the Foreign 
Office. Second, the government agreed to compensate the British railway in the Smyrna- 
Kambassa area for services rendered during the Greek occupation of Asia Minor.88
8 . The French Blackmail
Yet another example of the dependent status of Greece is the fact that in total four 
countries (the U.S.A., Britain, France and Italy) were vested with the power to cancel Greek 
government flotations. (See Book I, Introduction, part 2) 89 However, in the case of the First
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Refugee Loan only France attempted to exploit this position to its advantage. The story was as 
follows. At the end of 1923 France proposed that the I.F.C. should only agree to supervise the 
loan on condition that existing bond holders should be compensated for the post 1920 
depreciation in the drachma. The French were obliged to drop this idea because the British 
Treasury objected, although it agreed in principle that pressure would have to be put on the 
Greeks to stop them ignoring the Commission and inflating the currency.90 The French then 
raised another issue. They demanded that the amortization of the Ottoman debt be given 
precedence over the service of the First Refugee Loan.91 The British informed the French that 
their claim was unwarranted for Greece's exact share in the Ottoman debt had not yet been clearly 
defined and the margin of surplus revenues that would remain after the payment of the service of 
the First Refugee Loan was substantial92 The French gave in and shortly after the signing of the 
amendments to the Geneva Protocol in September 1924, the countries represented on the I.F.C. 
signed a declaration authorising the Commission to supervise the loan.93
French attempts to block the loan, their refusal to participate in the flotation and further 
antagonisms to the 1928 League Stabilization Loan, enhances the argument that in the twenties 
they were no longer interested in Greece as a sphere of economic activity and that they resented 
the expanding financial influence of the British via the League of Nations.
9 . Flotation and Aftermath
The London flotation occurred between December 8 and 10 1924. To the surprise of all, 
especially Norman, the loan was subscribed 21 times over.94 This was an impressive feat 
considering that in October 1924 the German £12,000,000 reparation (Dawes) loan had been 
covered 'only' 13 times 95 Apparently, a large number of 'refugee' bonds issued by Hambros was 
taken up by the wealthy expatriate Greek community established in London.96 The loan could 
hardly have been issued under more favourable terms for Greece. Hambros were so pleased that 
they offered to float in London the quota of the loan assigned to the N.B.G.97 Success was due 
not only to the advantageous terms of issue but also to the active press campaign and market 
manipulation of old Greek bonds in the City during November.98 Indeed, as a result of this 
intervention, the bonds of the 1910 loan rose temporarily from a market price of £47,5 to about 
£50 and those of the 1914 loan from £61 to £65.99
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The Greek flotation went ahead as planned on December 15 and was covered 4 1/2 
times.100 This also came as a surprise because the governor of the National Bank had previously 
expressed grave doubts about the ability of the Athens market to absorb the issue. The Greek 
tranche was offered for subscription in Athens and made available to the economically dynamic 
Greek community of Egypt.101 In the U.S.A. it was the first Greek loan offered for public 
subscription and was also oversubscribed.102 The success of the flotation was interpreted by the 
Greek authorities as a sign that the loan would be followed by an easy flow of foreign and 
particularly British capital.103 But, this was not to be, by early 1925 the City developed qualms 
about the extent to which Greece was on the right path financially and politically.
Moving to the subject of how the League refugee scheme was viewed in the National 
Assembly, it should be noted that it was discussed in ten sessions between February 1924 and 
November 1924. The autonomous character of the R.S.C. and the 'onerous' terms of the loan 
were criticized.104 Nevertheless, Parliament promptly ratified the Geneva Protocol without 
amendments, while the loan contract was ratified by presidential decree in May 1925 some five 
months after the flotation of the loan. Normally loan contracts were ratified by the National 
Assembly prior to flotation. The local press was divided in its appraisal of the scheme. Alongside 
the eulogies,105 stern criticism was made. It was insinuated that the government had 'secretly1 
promised Hambros first preference on all future issues. Resentment was also expressed about 
the fact that the stranglehold of the I.F.C. over government revenues was extended with the 
ban.106
In 1924 the terms of the loan may have looked onerous but in retrospect they offered little 
security. In 1932 the state defaulted and for thirty years the service of the loan was suspended. 
So much for the solid guarantees (the land, I.F.C. supervision and pledged state revenues). To 
this day the loan has not been redeemed. Ironically, in the contract it had been specified that the 
government, if it so wished, could have redeemed the loan after May 1 1936. However, even if 
the state had not defaulted in 1932 on its external obligations, an early redemption would have 
been precluded for the reason that the refugees refused to pay their dues arguing that the state 
had a moral obligation to cover in full the cost of re-settlement.107
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ra p e  r y  '£9* >« 3 Tpaxafjj Tea 'EAAoAet br 'A9yxa*s, a o r  bxsAeyyx rev Kapaerax.
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axexeAa* 4a p a'poa aew H p c*^ ry*xav  Aaxtfax 77* 192k A t *  r tx r  ep*areaoAA**x, rax Napx- 
Oartxav Atarayparaa aa* n x  dedaapaiaex raax araarepaa p aepaxaeop aaaax alody da axdeAam 
rya xxepacia t x i x  ipeAeyawx ran aipepaxax Aaxaaax xpaare baaOyay «’* *  raxpx apoxadax aa l 
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xrpaaxeiaa r y r  ’E x irpe ire r '  AxoaaT atrraaawr llpo xdxya a. ryx  bxalax baeeyayx *atd«d**oii- 
<r*r y EAAyxiah Kvid*p* ye*{ 4*a r y r  a a ix n p x  Oxxyp*dya aal y T x ttp o x y  ’ AxeaaTaxraxawr
Tlj airpai n ~]T * a c  ^ ---------------------- ’ ------ —— I l apl  xyy d-daaaaarawr rya
*^ax*ne4**rveaaaV pal r * x  oppx r e t  aipepaxax oexatox da aa l r e f  Axxrapapaiaaya exaypedya 
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axdxTxa re e ru x  Oappaxpfxaxx o n  axor.AaOx* papaa r* *p « A « y ia a  raxrya.
’O r Aeraepapaxrapox AariOare* 6- Text oxtyrOax T y tg w e xxe a  4*er4fax*. y ipaAoyu* axry 
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H  KY B E P M H 215 T B S  E A A H N IK H l A H 1 IO E P A T U I.
D ated th e  le t  day o f N o rem b er 1924.
T H E  O O m X M K N T  OF T H E  K E F U B U C  OF U BEE C E.
‘O dtaxdxxrya re v  Aypovtox Xpaava. 
-T. L APOJOnOYAOl.
•O 'Y xoxpyot r d x  Oucaxapiadx.
k d n . r K o n a a .
T a i  d i r x o t o r  o r  T U I H x l l r r i c  P u b l ic  D e b t,  
O. J. DKOeSOPOULOS.
T h b  M ix r a rn *  o r  F i b a s c i ,
CDN8T. Q 0TZI8 .
MIA O M O A O riA  100 A lPflN  A IT A IA Z  
7% E l l  TO N  K O M IIT H N .O N E  7% B O N D  O F  £ 1 0 0  T O  B E A R E R .
A P I* .
Itaue in London of £7.500.000 and in Athens 
of £2.500.000 Principal Amount 
Seven per Cent. Bonds,
In  denomination) of £1 .0 0 0  £S00 £10 0  and £ 2 0  dated Norember le t 1924 due 
Norember le t 1964.
Internet payable eeml-annually on Hay le t  and Norember l i t  In each year.
Thb Bond form! part o f the £10 .0 0 0 .0 0 0  SterUnff iarae of the abore Loan
dlrided In to :—
1.500 Bond, of £ 1 .0 0 0  No. 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0 0 1 5 0 0  -  £1 .600 .000
5 .000 „  £ 600  0 0 1 6 0 1 -0 0 0 5 0 0  ... £2 .600 .000
60.000 „  „  £10 0  „  0 0 0 5 0 1 -0 6 0 6 0 0  - .  £ 6 .000 .000
60.000 .  .  £20  „  0 6 6 6 0 1 -1 0 0 6 0 0  -  £1 .000 .000
£ 10.000.000
" E x S 'O a s  iuoXoyiSip ovofuioi&Kov xe^aXaiov ev
AovUvo) 7.500.000 "Kipaiv K a i ev 
’Ad j/v a is  2.500.000 X ipw v.
i t  rp y p a re  rtdx 1000, 600, 100 «a* 20 A*pS» i«la*rra>t lys  Naapdpiav 1924 xa* 
A - i f~ r  lg .JS yxp£ p« *19 64 .
Texet xAypmTcef xeF k fe pyx iax  r k r  ly x  H e le v  xa* ly x  NexpBpiev ixa e re x  xrext.
11 bpeAeyia « f iry  dxexxAe* p ip . t  rya da XXV rpySAxvapfxyt lx> ii v»Mt  ix  Aipdx ’Ay>A ixt 
) .0 0 0 .0 0 0  4uypypxxyt «ia
1.600 apaikeyhx rdx 1.000 A*pdx vv’ ap^. 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0 0 1 6 0 0  ... i.tooJSoO6.000 ,. 500 0 0 1 6 0 1 -0 0 6 6 0 0  ... 2 .600.000
60.000 ,. 100 ,. „  0 0 6 6 0 1 -0 6 6 6 0 0  .. 5 .000 .000
60.000 20 „  ,. 0 5 6 6 0 1 -1 0 6 6 0 0  .. 1.000.000
F o b  Ha h b b o s  b a s k  L i m it e d .
Diaw jTO K o m O T H i l l u i o  P u b l ic  
Auv&vrriff rov  Aijlumr£ov Xpcovs.
Illustration of a bond 
of the First Refugee 
Loan
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10. Conclusion
The following constructions may be placed on what would become the largest and most 
'political' loans of the interwar period. First, the scenario of foreign dependence was enhanced 
with the entrance of the League of Nations. True to the pattern set in 1898, Greece following an 
unsuccessful war motivated by irredentism was forced to accept foreign intervention in the 
economic sphere. However, it was not the foreigners who rushed in but once invited in they 
manipulated the situation financially, politically and militarily, to their advantage. Second, the 
negotiations preceding the loan provide a good example of how in international finance, 
economic factors are often intermingled with political and economic considerations. Notably, the 
Bank of England and the League of Nations withheld funds as a means to impede the 
government from abolishing the monarchy and military 'expansionism'.108 Third, the Bank of 
England and the League of Nations were too optimistic regarding the prospects of Greek 
finances and the political situation. Indeed, in September 1924 in the preface to the Geneva 
Protocol Sir Arthur Salter maintained that the general situation in Greece was healthy, with the 
exception of the unexpected burdens that resulted from the need to settle the refugees. It is 
apparent at this stage that the League believed that Greece would not require a stabilization 
plan.109 It is also noteworthy that at this point Britain did not want to take advantage of the loan in 
order to reenhance the position of the I.F.C. - as mentioned above it shed the ideas of economic 
sanctions as propounded by France. Thus, the mechanism of control established via the Geneva 
Protocol of 1924 over Greek public finances was loose and ineffective. Four, this loan was the last 
non-Empire foreign government loan to be raised in the City prior to the imposition of a temporary 
embargo designed to stabilize the pound sterling.110 But after November 1925, when Britain 
returned to the gold standard a new period of seclusion began for Greece as a result of its 
'inability' to settle the war debt owed to Britain and due to a host of other factors such as the 
deterioration in the political and financial situation. (See Book I, Section II). Thus this Refugee 
Loan did not mark the beginning of an easy flow of capital into Greece as was anticipated in 
Athens. Five, the general impression is that the proceeds of the loan were employed with care 
and good economic sense.111 However, it should be noted that the net contribution of the 
£12,300,00 loan to the foreign exchange position of the country was only £3,500,000. Of the
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£10,000,000 yielded by the issue £2,000,000 was issued in Greece and £4,500,000 was spent 
on importing necessary equipment for settling the refugees.112 It should be noted that when the 
Greek Refugee Settlement Commission was dissolved in December 1930, the larger part of rural 
settlement had been completed. It had settled 552,000 out of a total of 570,000 rural refugees, 
making them self-supporting farmers. The work that remained to be done was undertaken in an 
ad hoc fashion by various governmental departments. This pattern whereby the government 
finished off a 'foreign' scheme was repeated to a much larger degree in the realm of foreign 
portfolio investment in infrastructure. (See Book II.)
How did the experience of Greece compare with that of other countries in relation to similar 
refugee schemes carried out by the League of Nations? In Bulgaria the dimensions of the 
problem were smaller. Bulgaria with a population roughly equal to Greece (approximately 
5,500,000) received only 250,000 refugees. The 7% League loan raised in 1926, perhaps due 
to the smallsize of the issue (it amounted to only £3,000,000) was of a more international 
character. It was floated simultaneously in Britain, Holland, Switzerland, Italy and the U.S.A.113 
The loan negotiations were of a shorter duration. As was observed at the time, Bulgaria being a 
former ally to the central powers submitted more easily to the demands of the League.114 As with 
Greece, the League viewed with suspicion the military and strategic intentions of Bulgaria. In 
addition to blocking the building of two new railroads that were of a strategic nature, the League 
also refused to settle the refugees in the frontier districts as they were considered to be politically 
active in the movement for the establishment of an independent Macedonia.115 In addition, strict 
control was secured over the loan in order to ensure that its proceeds would not indirectly 
contribute to military expenditure.116 Another procedural similarity was that the Bank of England 
furnished advances to the loan and was thereby able to enhance its influence in Bulgaria.117
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SECTION II
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES:
PROBLEMS AND DILEMMAS OF FOREIGN CONTROL (1925-1926)
Introductory Comments
When the First Refugee Loan was floated the League of Nations and the international 
community were under the impression that Greece was on the threshold of stabilization. This was 
far from so. From early 1925 to mid 1926 financial instability and political anarchy returned. The 
budget deficit widened and the drachma rejoined its familiar downward path. (For details on the 
financial problems of these two years see: Book I, Section III, Phase One) Greece was relegated to 
the status of an outcast as the military dictatorship established under General Theodore Pangalos 
in the summer of 1925 rekindled territorial ambitions in Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace.1 One may 
argue that from the point of view of the League of Nations and other supervisors such as the Bank 
of England, the British Treasury, the Foreign Office, the I.F.C., Greece entered the postwar era, 
not in 1922 with the demise of the Asia Minor Campaign, nor in December 1924 with the flotation 
of the First Refugee Loan, but in 1927-1928 with the implementation of the League stabilization 
scheme.
During 1925-1926 conflicts amongst the country's supervisors, between them and the 
Greek government 'peaked'. Moreover, Greece experienced even more missed opportunities in 
that it was unable to arrange public flotations in the important world financial centers. Its exclusion 
from 1920 till the end of 1924 had been less detrimental as the international economy had not yet 
recovered from the post WWI doldrums. This section discusses the disparate events that were
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responsible for this twin phenomenon of 'alienation' and missed opportunities. At this point let it 
be noted that the resolution of the problems which emerged regarding Greece's external relations 
required official actions that were not feasible given the political situation. Part 1 examines 
Greece's abortive attempts to raise a supplementary refugee loan during 1925 and 1926. A 
discussion is made in Part 2 of the three specific events which enhanced League and British 
mistrust towards Greece during 1925-1926. These were: the conclusion of the Swedish Match 
Loan; the legal battle waged against the R.S.C.,2 and the Graeco-Bulgarian military episode of * 
October 1925. Finally, Part 3 analyses the British war debt debate cum embargo and its 
repercussions on the inflow of foreign capital and the exercise of external control.
1. Abortive Attempts Made to Raise a Supplementary Refugee Loan During
192 5 -1 9 2 6
1.1. Greece Tries to Raise a Supplementary Refugee Loan in the City without League 
Supervision
Shortly after the flotation of the First Refugee Loan it became apparent that supplementary 
funds would be necessary. The flow of refugees into Greece had far exceeded original estimates. 
Also expenditure per family proved higher than the initial calculations for a number of reasons 
such as the need to upgrade housing, the extended marsh lands surrounding most settlements, 
lack of agricultural tools and machinery, and the absence of a land register.3 The first attempt to 
raise additional capital for the refugees was made by Diomedes. In August 1925 -most likely 
under government orders- he explored with Hambros and the Bank of England the possibility of 
raising a fresh £5,000,000 Refugee Loan on the open market without the supervision of the 
League. They were reluctant. Hambros and the Bank of England believed that the market was 
not ready to absorb a new Greek issue as only eight months had passed since the flotation of the 
First Refugee Loan. There were also other reasons, namely financial and political instability and 
the fact that Pangalos wanted the funds to be administered directly by the government.4 Norman 
made it clear that he would not assist Greece to raise the supplementary loan, unless the 
government committed itself to place the proceeds at the disposal of the R.S.C.5 For the 
governor of the Bank of England to approve a Refugee Loan not to be handled by the R.S.C. 
would be insulting to the League of Nations.6
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But the Greeks did not give in. Notably, Diomedes in September 1925 renewed his 
request for supplementary funds by asking for a larger loan i.e. a total of £6,000,000. He 
suggested that "only" £2,000,000 would be paid directly to the government, free of R.S.C. 
control. This tranche would be used to cover that part of the budget deficit caused by 
expenditures on account of the refugees. The remaining £4,000,000 would be allocated either 
to a "quelqueonque" commission, or to "the existing commission, but under increased 
government authority".7 Norman was not impressed. He curtly announced to Hambros and the 
government that he would not allow the flotation of a loan in the City, neither for the refugees nor 
for pubic works unless the Greeks first agreed to place all supplementary funds for the refugees at 
the disposal of the R.S.C. The government would also have to accept the autonomy of the 
R.S.C., and curtail military expenditure and balance the budget as promised to the League in 
September 1924.8
1.2. The R.S.C. Approaches the League of Nations
Three months later, in December 1925, Howland -the new President of the R.S.C.- 
sounded out the League regarding the possibility of a new £4,000,000 loan. Two thirds of the 
proceeds of the Refugee Loan had already been spent but 200,000 refugees had not yet been 
settled. This request was made independent of the government.9 Pangalos continued to 
denounce a new League loan because it would enhance the power of the R.S.C.10 But, by 
February 1926 Howland had acquired a Greek "accomplice": Diomedes. It is not clear whether the 
banker joined Howland with the silent assent of the government or whether he took the initiative 
on his own.11 Nevertheless, Howland failed to arrange a new loan. In a nutshell, he was informed 
by the Financial Committee of the League that "a further loan was out of the question". Greece 
would first have to settle her war debt with Britain. It would also have to pass through a trial period 
during which it would be called to attain some degree of financial and political stability as well as put 
things right "vis a vis the League".12
But, one month later, in March 1926, Norman announced that the Bank of England would 
grant in conjunction with Hambros and the National Bank of Greece a £1,000,000 advance in July, 
if the Financial Committee approved during its June session the flotation of a supplementary 
£4,000,000 refugee loan.13 Norman made this gesture because he was keen to see a League
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loan raised. It would be good business for the City and would also provide an opportunity to
'force' stabilization without the Bank of England having to bear all of the onus. As for the
government, in the absence of an alternative solution, it tacitly accepted a League loan.
In the end, no Bank of England advance was granted as the Financial Committee in its June
1926 session limited itself to a preliminary examination of Greek public finances and failed to
authorize a supplementary refugee loan. It is obvious that by this stage the League was moving
4 already in the direction of linking the issues of a new refugee loan and stabilization. A
questionnaire handed out to the Greek Treasury on June 5 1926 effectively reveals that the
League's major concern was no longer the settlement of the refugees but instead the
comprehensive political and financial stabilization of Greece.14 The following excerpt from a letter
of the president of the Financial Committee to Howland is characteristic:
"In its [i.e. the Financial Committee's] view the obstacles to raising a new loan have 
nothing to do with the settlement scheme per se as it has itself developed well. 
Obstacles are due to the fact that there are a number of factors in the policy and 
financial situation of Greece which cannot but seriously prejudice any new loan: a) 
the budget situation, b) the substantial increase in military and naval expenditure, c) 
militarism, d) the currency position and policy- arrangements must be made to secure 
the stabilization of the drachma, e) the political situation, f) the war debt, g) the 
conflict between the League-appointed R.S.C. and the government, although yes 
there has been some improvement there."15
In short, the negotiations that the R.S.C. and the government opened in early 1926 with 
the League for a supplementary refugee loan soon became much wider and involved Greece's r  
comprehensive adjustment to the post WWI international order.16 Although the Financial 
Committee did not approve a supplementary loan in its June session, the Greeks were not totally 
discouraged. Salter had indicated that if by September 1926 Athens had begun to adopt 
orthodox economic measures and agreed to curtail its military expenditure, a ban could be fbated 
in the autumn.17 However, this was not to be as in July there were two unfortunate 
developments. The government irritated the League by placing an unproductive loan in Sweden 
and the negotiations over the British war debt broke down.
Before going on to describe and analyse these events, it should be underlined that though 
a hard line approach prevailed there was dissent among the supervisors regarding whether the 
British war debt embargo (which had been imposed sometime in late 1925 or early 1926) should 
apply to a new League loan. (For the war debt embargo see below Part 3). In contrast to Salter,
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who did not consider that the failure of Greece to settle its war debt should obstruct the flotation of 
a supplementary loan,18 Niemeyer declared that the Financial Committee "would never support a 
loan to a country whose finances are in disorder because they have outstanding debts 
unregulated." In the end, it was Niemeyer who prevailed in the Financial Committee and not 
Salter. For as noted in the Foreign Office papers Niemeyer "was in fact" the F.C. and as a result 
the latter recommended "whatever" he said.19 Niemeyer was still at the Treasury and he saw to it 
that the actions of the League of Nations did not conflict with the interests of the Treasury.
At home, Niemeyer ensured that the Bank of England and the Foreign Office followed the 
Treasury line.20 However, certain Foreign Office officials accepted Salter's view that the war debt 
issue should not be linked with the question of a supplementary loan. The most articulate 
'objector* was Oliver Harvey, who argued that such a loan being humanitarian and under the 
supervision of the League was by definition a "matter of foreign affairs rather than finance" and 
should not be included in the war debt embargo. He forewarned that if the British government 
vetoed the loan in Geneva because of the unsettled war debt it would incur the "odium" of 
obstructing a "humanitarian course".21 These objections were silenced and outwardly, the 
Foreign Office presented a united front with the Treasury.
In conclusion, the supplementary funds placed at the disposal of the R.S.C. amounted to 
only £3,000,000. This was 75% of the sum that had been initially demanded by the R.S.C. back 
in December 1925. Moreover, these credits were furnished with a considerable time delay and in 
two installments. From the January 1928 League Stabilization Loan only £500,000 was allocated 
for the refugees. The bulk of the funds -i.e.£2,500,000- took the form of a loan given by the 
U.S.A. government in May 1929. (See Book I, Section III, Phase Two, Chapter 2).
2 . Greece 'Irrita tes' the League of Nations
2.1. The Swedish Match Loan
In July 1926, the Pangalos government resorted to the Swedish capital market and 
obtained a £1,000,000 private loan from the match trust Svenska Tandsticksaktielboget which 
had raised similar but larger match monopoly loans for Roumania, Poland, Yugoslavia Hungary, 
India and certain Latin American countries.22 The terms of the loan were onerous: the issue price 
was set at 94, the nominal interest rate was 8.5%, and the redemption period was 28 years. The
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I.F.C. naturally was not asked to guarantee the loan. The government however followed its usual 
practice of allocating the surplus funds of the I.F.C. as security of the loan. As part of the contract, 
the government gave to the Alsing Trading Co. the exclusive right to sell matches in Greece for 28 
years (1926-1954).23 The match company was close to Hambros Bank, 24 and had gained a 
foothold in the Greek market during WWI. Until then, Greece had been the preserve of the 
Austrian match group Solo.25
The unique status of this loan is illustrated by the following fact. Whereas the preamble of 
all other Greek loans raised abroad during our period of study indicated how the loan was to be 
spent, in this instance the title depicted the purpose for which the foreign creditor furnished the 
loan. One cannot help asking whether it was worth ceding this monopoly for such a small 
amount26 No records exist as to how the loan was spent. According to the government, it was 
employed in covering past expenditures for settling refugees outside the context of the scheme 
undertaken by the R.S.C. However, according to contemporary reports the loan was used to 
cover 1/3 of the budget deficit for 1926-1927.27 Niemeyer openly maintained that this loan was 
of an unproductive character28 The same opinion was voiced in the Greek academic 
community 29
With the conclusion of the Swedish loan the prospects of raising a supplementary refugee 
League loan became even slimmer. As has already been mentioned, the text of the September 
1924 Geneva Supplementary refugee loans did not allow the government to conclude loans for 
unproductive purposes. Moreover, the I.F.C. was also annoyed because by not requesting the 
permission of the ex-Allies before concluding the loan the government had violated article 4 of 
the Paris agreement.30 One final comment. Apparently Pangalos wanted to raise other 
monopoly loans for revenue (i.e unproductive) purposes. In the summer of 1926 he approached 
Greece's two main suppliers of petroleum products 31 the American firm Standard Oil, and the 
British Asiatic Petroleum and offered them a joint monopoly in benzine and gas oil throughout 
Greece and on kerosine in new Greece in return for a £15,000,000 loan "to be secured on the 
proceeds of the custom duties on the imports of these products"32 Both companies declined 
the offer. They claimed that they did not want to become 'bankers' and were opposed in principle 
to the obtaining of monopolies 33 Possibly, the real obstacle was that the two companies could
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not agree on the terms of the loan as each would have preferred an arrangement which excluded 
the other. Apparently Pangalos intended to elicit bids from Belgian, Roumanian and Russian 
interests. Whether such bids were made but rejected, or whether Pangalos was debarred by the 
aforementioned British and the American firms from seeking such offers is not known-34
2.2. The Campaign Waged Against the R.S.C. and the Graeco-Bulgarian Frontier 
Incident
As described above, in 1926 the government provoked the League of Nations on an 
economic issue. The year before, it attacked the autonomy of the League appointed R.S.C. on 
legal grounds and provoked a military incident on the frontier with Bulgaria. Both events are of t 
importance because they were interpreted abroad as signs that Greece was 'increasingly' 
antagonistic towards the League and the post WWI international order.
Throughout its seven year existence, the R.S.C. was seen as one more agent of control -a 
state within the state. This was understandable, considering the large sums it handled and the 
number of civil servants it employed.35 During 1925 antagonism against the R.S.C. peaked. It all 
started as follows: In the spring of 1925 complaints were lodged by disgruntled officials of the 
R.S.C. against the chief of transport of the R.S.C. at Salonika and the director general of the 
settlement programme in Macedonia. The first was prosecuted on the grounds that there had 
been a waste of funds, and the second was charged with misconduct because a contract he 
signed for the construction of 4,000 refugee houses had not been drawn in the manner 
prescribed by government regulations 36 The R.S.C. protested that the enactment of judicial 
proceedings against its employees was in violation to the Geneva Supplementary refugee loans 
because the funds and contracts of the R.S.C. were exempt from government regulation. The 
government replied that the judiciary were 'independent' in the exercise of their functions! In 
addition, the accused employees of the R.S.C. were brought under the jurisdiction of the military 
court.37 Howland, the president of the R.S.C., threatened to place the subject of the *war* against 
the R.S.C. before the Council of the League at the meeting of September 1925. As a result, at 
the end of August 1925 the R.S.C. directorates in Macedonia, Thessaly and Thrace which had 
been suppressed by Pangalos on seizing power were reestablished and the jurisdiction of military 
courts over the accused employees was cancelled. In December 1925, the charges that had 
been brought against the employees of the R.S.C. were also dropped 38 Thereafter, the
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government never again tried to challenge the authority of the R.S.C. However, throughout 1926 
relations between the Commission and the government remained tense as a result of 
government refusal to settle its £400,000 debt with the R.S.C.39 Undoubtedly, this factor and 
the preceding legal battle were in part responsible for the government's inability to raise a 
supplementary League loan in 1925-1926.
The second provocation during 1925 was the Graeco-Bulgarian frontier incident. Following 
the Neuilly Convention of 1920 and the population movements which took place after the Asia 
Minor debacle, disputes at the border posts along the Graeco-Bulgarian frontier became usual.40 
The most important incident occurred in October 1925. On the 19th, the two national frontier 
posts opened fire at Demir-Kapu, a remote site along the border north east of Salonika. Three 
days later, although the "conflagration was dying down of its own accord", Greek troops entered 
Bulgarian territory through the Struma Valley.41 The League of Nations ordered Greece to 
evacuate the occupied territory and charged a reparation fine amounting to £45,000.42
Interestingly, according to the League of Nations archive, before the Greek troops 
evacuated Bulgarian territory Salter considered the possibility of enforcing economic sanctions 
(i.e. a naval blockade and financial embargo). However, he dismissed such a measure before the 
Greeks withdrew. He gave the following three reasons for his decision: First, that a naval blockade 
or cutting off financial relations would further impede Greece from attaining stabilization. Second, 
if the blockade was long "the customs receipts would become insignificant and the commission 
[i.e. the I.F.C.] would not have sufficient funds to pay full debt service", considering that half of the 
revenues of the I.F.C. were in the form of custom duties 43 Third, due to the importance of the 
U.S.A. both as a source of supply and as a market for Greece, America's intentions would have to 
be ascertained beforehand. If the U.S.A. ignored the blockade, the League would have to face 
"the dilemma of either stopping U.S.A. ships under serious protest or going back on her 
decision".44 From Salter's 'exposition' it is clear that although the League saw its role as an 
innovator -promoter of a new order- it was aware that it did not have a completely free hand in 
Greece, given the preexisting presence of the I.F.C. and the growing role of an independent, 
actor: the U.S.A. (Let us remind the reader of the fact that the League, out of gratitude to the U.S. 
relief operations in Greece, appointed an American to head the R.S.C.)
In sum: In 1924 the League stepped into Greece in a hesitant fashion as it did not perceive 
the need for a comprehensive stabilization plan. At the time it was optimistic regarding Greece's
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financial and political prospects. (But, perhaps its initial reluctance to interfere in monetary affairs 
was in part due to the fact that another tool of international control, the I.F.C., was already 
established in Greece.) However, the League soon realized that it had 'misjudged' the situation. 
For during 1925 and most of 1926 the government displayed in more than one way that it had not 
yet adjusted to the postwar financial order: It violated the Geneva Supplementary refugee loans of 
September 1924, antagonized the R.S.C. and displayed military might. The League did not 
observe these developments passively. In each instance Athens was 'scolded'. The end result 
was the continued closure of foreign capital markets.
3 . Foreign Coercion in Another Guise: The British War Debt Issue
One of the few topics of the interwar economy to be analyzed in detail is the British war debt 
debate. However, existing scholarship has failed to recognize that the British Treasury in close 
cooperation with the Bank of England exploited the war debt embargo as a means to "force1' 
Greece to stabilize.45 It has also failed to assess the repercussions of the embargo on the inflow 
of foreign capital.
3.1. The Problem Posed
The gross debt Greece incurred to Britain as a result of WWI was £20,710,312 46 By Greek 
standards this was a large amount. It represented 80% of her total war debt and was equivalent to 
40% of the nominal value of the foreign loans raised by the government during 1922-1932. 
However, for Britain, Greece's debt amounted to only a small fraction of the total £6,500,000,000 
owed by her ex-allies 47 Thus, once again, Greece was in a lopsided relationship with Britain.
Table 1
Greek Gross War Debt Capital and Interest due on March 31,1925
i. Material supplied under 1918 agreement
ii. Material supplied under 1919 agreement
iii. Cash advances to Provisional Government (1916-17)
iv. Cash advances supplied under 1918 agreement
£ 8,941,708 
£ 1,712,940 
£ 1,296,250 
£ 8,759,414
Tota l £20,710,312
Source: B.G./T.A.,Document 98/97, titled: 'Greek war debt', March 31 1925.
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London had been pressing to open negotiations from 1920 onwards, but Athens was in no 
hurry to reach a debt funding agreement. One reason being its weak financial position, a 
weakness intensified by the fact that reparation payments from the ex-enemies were much less 
than those agreed upon at the Spa Conference in July 1920.48 Another reason was resentment 
towards Britain for the post-November 1920 financial embargo.49
3.2. The Negotiations
3.2.1 The determination of the size of the gross debt (October 1924-August 1925)
Suddenly, in late October 1924 the government agreed to open discussions with the 
Treasury about the value of the war material.50 It had been agreed during the war that the value of 
the war material supplied would be determined after the end of hostilities. (See Table 1 above for 
a breakdown of the gross debt.) This volte face was the result of two developments. On the one 
hand, the British Treasury had become more persistent since 1923, because it had started paying 
annuities amounting to £33,000,000 to the U.S.A.51 On the other, the Greeks were making 
preparations for the flotation of the First Refugee Loan and saw this move as a good opportunity 
to please Niemeyer who as already noted was a key Treasury and League of Nations official. 
Niemeyer's terms were accepted almost unequivocally by Emmanuel Tsouderos 52 who had 
been placed in charge of the negotiations.53 The preliminary agreement signed in August 1925 
was a tactical success for Britain.54 Greece accepted the Treasury's estimates of the value of the 
war material and the size of the gross war debt.55
The citv imposes an embargo
Shortly after the signing of the preliminary agreement, the Treasury wished to commence 
negotiations for the determination of the net debt (i.e. the proportion of the gross debt that would 
actually be repaid) and the mode of repayment. But, the Greek government was not willing to 
discuss and the Treasury opted for the use of coercion. It ordered the City to refrain from raising 
fresh loans for the Greek government until the war debt towards Britain was settled. No formal 
declaration or diplomatic representation was made announcing the imposition of this embargo. As 
a result, it is difficult to ascertain the exact date when it was enforced. However, a careful reading
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of the archival material suggests that the embargo was imposed in the late autumn or of 1925 or 
early winter of 1925-1926.56
The British establishment did not want this embargo to be publicized. Pointedly, the R.I.I.A. 
in its study The Problem of International Investment, published in the thirties, fails to mention the 
war debt embargo, although it was applied indiscriminately to all of the countries that had failed to 
settle their war debts with Britain.57 It should be underlined that when the war debt embargo ( 
came into effect Greece was already blacklisted in the City. It may even be permissible to argue 
that this embargo was superimposed on a preexisting unofficial embargo which had been 
imposed because the banking establishment in Britain was displeased with the post December 
1924 resurgence in deficit financing and irredentism. (For deficit financing see Book I, Section III, 
Phase One).
3.2.2 The determination of the net debt and mode of repayment (February 1926-April 
1927)
Negotiations held under the Pangalos regime
In February 1926 the Greek government again agreed to open negotiations on the net 
debt. It had high hopes as in late January Britain had signed a debt funding agreement with Italy, 
which was highly adavantageous for the debtor.58
Not surprisingly, Greece proposed to the Treasury that it receive equal treatment with Italy. 
Namely, that the net debt should not amount to more than 48% of the gross war debt59 But 
Niemeyer refused this proposition because he was eager to prove to the opposition in Britain that 
the Treasury had not lost control and would not use the Italian case as a precedent for future 
agreements.60 Greece's representatives, (the governor and deputy governor of the N.B.G.), 
were willing to drop the claim for equal treatment with Italy in the interest of a quick settlement. But 
Pangalos did not agree.61 The dictator preferred to borrow foreign capital on embarrassing terms 
outside Britain rather than to kowtow to the British Treasury. (See above section on the Swedish 
Match Loan and Book II, Section I, Chapter 3)
When the negotiations reopened in May 1926 under Venizelos 62 a 'radical' memo was put 
forward to the Treasury demanding that on economic grounds (i.e. Greece's low payment 
capacity) and for moral reasons (the Allied desertion of the Asia minor Campaign), the net debt
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should amount to only 23% of the gross debt.63 In addition, Venizelos proposed that the 
Treasury settle its obligation to provide the remaining £5,000,000 book credits- owed to Greece 
under the Paris Agreement by arranging with the City for the flotation of a 5% £5,000,000 loan to 
be used partly by the R.S.C. for the settlement of the refugees, and partly by the N.B.G. to 
improve its gold cover.64 But, the Treasury refused. The reply of Churchill, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, was brief and to the point. He did not even bother to comment on Venizelos' 
proposition regarding the book credits. And, though he acknowledged that Greece had 
"emerged from the wars with Germany and Turkey weakened and harassed with troubles, both 
external and internal", he concluded that she had the capacity to repay the gross debt in full. 
Churchill maintained that what Greece suffered from was not a lack of funds but 'unnecessary 
fixed costs’ such as the 'gracious' compensation of the war victims and the far 'too lavish’ 
rearmament expenditure. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had touched a sensitive spot. 
Approximately 6.5% of the state budget was allocated to pensions for the war victims. Moreover, 
expenditure on the army and the police as a percentage of the state budget was twice that spent 
in other European countries! Clearly, what the government perceived as top priority financial 
obligations from a socio-political and military-strategic point of view, were considered by her 
supervisors as foolish goals 65 Venizelos was so infuriated by Churchill's response that he 
informed Treasury officials that "the negotiations would have to be put off to a more propitious 
moment".66
Table 2
The Shifts in the Negotiation Positions Regarding the Determination of the Net Debt
I. February 1926
Greek position : netdebt=48% of gross debt.
British position: net debt= 100% of gross debt.
II. May 1926
Greek position : net debt= 23% of gross debt.
All of the remaining book credits should be granted.
British position: net debt= 100% of gross debt.
Britain has no obligation to provide remaining book credits.
ill. Debt Funding Agreement of April 1927
Britain agrees to accept a net debt equivalent to 55.5% of the gross debt.
Greece in return accepts to drop its claim for the remaining book credits.
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Parenthetically, it should be noted that in early June 1926 the Treasury increased its 
indirect pressure on Greece. Namely, it widened the war debt embargo so as to include loans to 
Greek public bodies. This was a well timed measure for at the moment Hambros was preparing the 
flotation of a loan for the National Mortgage Bank of Greece.67 Treasury intransigency and the 
widening of the embargo were interpreted in Athens as a reflection of the diminished strategic 
importance of the country. Tsouderos, more or less summed up the sentiments of the state when 
he wrote:
"Since we did not succeed in maintaining the great Greece of the two continents, we 
are now considered indigues d'interet for Great Britain. The sceptres have passed 
to foreign [i.e. other] hands".
Apparently, Thanassis Aghnides of the League Secretariat was the only Greek to realize 
that the uncompromising attitude of the British was directly related to Greek militarism, antagonism 
towards League supervision, and the ad hoc fiscal and financial policy of the dictator.68 But, the 
Greeks -regardless of political affiliation- downplayed the significance of these factors.
Negotiations after Panoalos
After the downfall of Pangalos a spirit of conciliation prevailed on both sides. Financial 
stabilization under the auspices of the League of Nations became a prime goal for Greece. As this 
necessitated the flotation of a syndicated loan in the City, the government realized that it would 
have to become more compliant on the subject of the war debt. The Treasury for its part, without 
retracting from its basic position that Greece 'had the capacity' to repay the debt in full, announced 
in December 1926 that it would be willing to write off the debt for the war material if in return 
Greece desisted in its demand for the remaining book credits 69 This last proposal was accepted 
by the government and finally on April 9 1927 a debt funding agreement was signed. The net 
debt was valued at 55% of the gross debt and the annuity charged was approximately 
£380,000 70 Britain abandoned the right it had under clause 4 of the 1918 Paris Agreement to 
impede the government from raising new foreign loans and agreed to facilitate the flotation of a 
Greek Stabilization Loan 71
In order to set these negotiations in context, it seems appropriate to underline the 
following: First, that the Foreign Office repeatedly advised that a less hardline stance be adopted
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by London regarding the embargo.72 Second, that since the Greek political establishment had 
accepted that a foreign capital inflow was a sine qua non for infrastructure development and 
ultimately the 'independence' of Greece vis a vis the Powers, it should have either opted for a 
quick albeit 'more costly' settlement of the war debt, or worked in the direction of stabilization. 
Had the political leadership given the bankers -Diomedes and Tsouderos- a free hand throughout 
the negotiations it is possible that a debt funding agreement would have been signed in 1925 not 
in 1927 and the war debt embargo would not have arisen. This antithesis between the politicians 
and the Greek banking establishment should be seen as one more example of the ongoing 
'conflict' in terms of goals and policy orientation in the inner quarters of the state -that is between 
the government and the National Bank. Government policy was short sighted, whereas the 
N.B.G. could have an overall view of the Greek economy, its structural restrictions, and its deeper 
relations with the world economy.
3.3. The Direct Impact of the Embargo on Foreign Capital Inflow and Stabilization
Although it became impracticable for the government to raise a loan for the refugees, 
stabilization, and the land reclamation of the Vardar valley, the war debt embargo did not 
altogether block foreign capital inflow. Infact, the total amount furnished to the Greek state and 
public bodies by the international capital market at this time amounted to £7,600,000. This was 
possible for two reasons. First, up to June 1926 the embargo was directed against the Greek 
government not public institutions.74 Second, the Greek government resorted to the more 
expensive and smaller capital markets of Europe (i.e. Belgium and Sweden). But this does not 
mean that the embargo was of no significance. Possibly, had the embargo not been imposed, the 
government would have been able to raise larger sums abroad during the mid twenties and the 
momentum of infrastructure development during 1925 could thereby have been maintained. (For 
the impact of the embargo on the financing of public works see: Book II, Section I, Chapter 2)
Regarding the interrelationship between the embargo and stabilization two arguments in 
large part contradictory and opposing can be put forward. One is that the British Treasury through 
the embargo prevented Greece from reaching stabilization at an earlier date. The other -opposing
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argument- is that by refusing to compromise, the Treasury inspired prudent fiscal and monetary 
policy which ultimately fostered political stabilization. The result was improved relations between 
Greece and the League. In a strange way, it seems necessary to accept both of these arguments 
for they are not in our opinion mutually exclusive.
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SECTION III
FOREIGN FINANCE, CONTROL AND STABILIZATION
Introductory Comments
In 1927 Greece joined the list of countries subjected to League supervised reconstruction. 
Below, the developments that led to this new form of foreign intervention (Phase One), the 
details of the stabilization scheme (Phase Two), and the institutional factors responsible for its 
demise (Phase Three) will be described. Two themes will underlie the analysis. The first concerns 
the divergent economic philosophy of The Bank of England vis a vis the views of the Greek 
authorities. The two sides did not have an identical perception as to how stabilization ought to be 
attained and 'maintained'. The second, central to the analysis, is the underlying antagonism 
between the International Financial Commission and the League of Nations. The Bank of
of
England kept the I.F.C. out of the stabilization programme of 1927-1928 inspite the initiative the 
I.F.C. had taken in this direction in 1926. Once the programme was installed, coexistence 
between the representatives of these two organs of foreign supervision was not an easy affair.
Greek historiography and recent research have presented the League enforced 
stabilization plan in an incomplete manner, neglecting the two themes outlined above.1 As a 
result, the reasons why Greece stabilized late has been insufficiently analyzed. In addition, the 
multifacet nature of foreign tutelage and the extent to which the stabilization plan and the reforms 
that it entailed were imposed by outside fiat has not been explored. Interestingly, the elder 
generation of leading public figures (such as Xenofon Zolotas and Panayotis Tzannetakis) who 
had a firsthand knowledge of the interwar period, downplay the significance of the League.2 This
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is the antithesis of the attitude which prevailed during the twenties. Indeed, at the time there was 
a widespread tendency among politicians, academics, bureaucrats and journalists, to exaggerate 
the importance of the League and the foreign factor in general in Greek economic affairs. This 
difference in mentality can partly be explained by the fact that after WWII the Greek government 
through the Marshall plan experienced a type of control which though narrower was much more 
thorough and extensive.3
In phase One below the reasons why Greece was unable to attain financial stability in 1925 
and 1926 will be presented. The problem was twofold. On the one hand, the state lacked the 
financial resources, the political determination, and in the last analysis, a clear perception of how to 
stabilize. On the other, it was not prepared to accept an extension of foreign intervention in order 
to attain this goal. Inevitably, a deadlock was created. Furthermore, as already noted militarism 
and irredentism enhanced antagonisms with foreign supervisors. With the benefit of hindsight, it 
can be argued that had the government and the National Bank been more compliant towards the 
League of Nations, the Bank of England (and the British Treasury) prior to 1927, financial 
reconstruction would have materialized at an earlier date.
PHASE ONE
THE I.F.C. TRIES TO REESTABLISH ITS AUTHORITY OVER GREEK MONETARY AFFAIRS 
AND PROPOSES A PLAN FOR STABILIZATION (1925-1926)
1. The I.F.C. Parameter
The role of the I.F.C. in the stabilization of the drachma has been completely overlooked in 
the historiography. This is a serious omission for the reason that the first stabilization plan 
proposed was the one put forward to the Bank of England and the Greek government in 1926 by 
L.G. Roussin who was the British representative sitting on the I.F.C. If one individual instigated the 
banking reform it is he. The nature and extent of Roussin's involvement reveals interesting facets 
of foreign tutelage. His presence in Greece and involvement with stabilization reflected the desire 
of the British Treasury and the Bank of England to establish a closer supervision over Greek 
financial affairs. However, the fact that it was the League of Nations and not the I.F.C. that in the
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end 'enforced' a stabilization scheme indicates that neither the British financial establishment, nor 
the Greek government were in the last analysis willing to extend the powers of this 'parochial' 19th 
century 'international' institution.
At this stage a short resume of this chapter is useful. It will examine how the British Treasury 
came to appoint a full time member on the I.F.C. (i.e. Roussin) in early 1925. It will then describe 
the ensuing debate with the N.B.G. regarding monetary issues. Special attention will be given to 
the rejection by the National Bank of Greece and the Bank of England of I.F.C. stabilization 
proposals. Throughout, the analysis will delineate the developments in monetary affairs during 
1925-1926 and the extent to which Roussin succeeded in convincing the Greek monetary 
authorities of the need to conform to an 'orthodox' mode of behaviour and drop their 'banking' 
school principles.
2 . The British Government Appoints a Full Time Member on the I.F.C.
Prior to early 1925, the Counsellor of the Legation in Athens had served as British Member 
of the I.F.C. This arrangement had been made at the beginning of the 20th century when as an 
observer put it, "Greek finances were in so stable a position that the margin of services pledged to 
the I.F.C. were so wide that nothing more was needed but honest accountancy and a general 
supervision over the operation of the various guarantee loans”.1
After November 1920 the situation had changed markedly, a full time member became 
necessary because the work of the Commission increased as a result of "the infinitely complicated 
condition of Greek finances" and exchange instability.2 (For the rapid rise in state expenditure, 
large military costs, widening budget deficit, and the increasing monetary circulation see below 
Tables 1 and 2). Before 1920 the fiscal gap had been narrow, with the exception of the Balkan 
war years and 1918-1919. Moreover, the deficit had been financed through extraordinary 
taxation and foreign borrowing. After 1920, state expenditures rose markedly and the 
government resorted to the printing press and raising a forced loan in 1922 to finance the growing 
budget deficit. As a result, the I.F.C. and the principles of monetary prudence for which it stood 
were blatantly ignored.3
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Table 1
Structural Disequilibrium: 1920-1927 
(1920=100)
Year
B anknote
C ircu la tion
G overnm ent
E xp end itu re
Cost of L iv in g
Drachma/ 
S terling Rate
1920 100 100 100 100
1921 143 134 113 207
1922 209 270 181 487
1923 310 519 336 867
1924 323 746 351 723
1925 354 878 403 914
1926 323 1109 465 1130
1927 329 1391 511 1077
Compiled from: Tables: 1b, 2a and 3a in Appendix 2.
Table 2
New Issues of Drachma Notes: 1920-1924
Date Total Amount of Emission 
(mill, drs.)
-----------^
Used fo r Tate Needs 
(m ill, drs.)
May 27 1920 300 200
September 21 1920 400 400
March 31 1921 500 500-
February 17 1922 550 550
October 29 1922 600 600
March 3 1923 1,050 750
Total 3,400 3,050
• On the same date the National Bank of Greece supplied to the state from its reserves the amount of 
50,000,000 drs.
Compiled from: Bank of Greece, The First Fifty Years of the Bank of Greece 1928-1978. (Athens, 1978), 
p.35.
The erratic fiscal and monetary policy pursued after November 1920 had a negative impact 
on the drachma. (See Tables 3a & 3b in Appendix 2) The annual income accruing to the I.F.C. did 
not rise sufficiently to counterbalance the steep decline of the drachma. The margin between the 
government revenues assigned to the Commission and the amounts necessary for the service of 
the loans under its supervision narrowed. The I.F.C. protested but was ignored. As long as 
Greece was debarred from the international capital market, the government considered that there 
was no reason why it should abide by orthodox economic principles.
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Presumably, out of neglect the British did not even bother to assign a full time member. In 
an ironic way, the idea that the British government should appoint a full time financial expert (to the
I.F.C.) was put forward to Norman by Diomedes in the spring of 1924, on the occasion of the 
discussions concerning the flotation of the First Refugee Loan.4 It is difficult to ascertain 
Diomedes' intentions, whether he really wanted the advice of a foreign specialist, or if in the back 
of his mind he viewed such an appointment as a way to flatter Greece's supervisors and facilitate 
the recruiting of foreign capital, assuming that such a figure could act as a liaison between Athens 
and British financiers. But, regardless of his motives one thing became obvious, Diomedes would 
not welcome criticism of banking policy.
Apparently, the Diomedes proposal acted as an extra impetus for an appointment because 
"The same idea had already been germinating in the mind of the Treasury some time ago." 
Indeed, the British Treasury hoped that the "...Commission could, if it were more expert exercise a 
more decided influence...upon the machinery of Greek financial operations."5 Roussin was 
chosen and he arrived in Athens during the first weeks of 1925. From the start he created havoc 
with his persistent effort to initiate Diomedes on the principles of the currency school.
3 . The I.F.C. In Open Conflict with the N.B.G. Over Monetary Issues
When Roussin arrived in Athens euphoria triggered by the First Refugee Loan had already 
subsided. The City was once again *worried' about Greece's financial position, and the price of 
Greek bonds had begun to fall.6 Rumours were rampant in Britain that a military coup was 
'imminent' and that the government was once again preparing to embark on an ambitious 
programme of rearmament.7 On the financial front the improvement of the external value of the 
drachma that had occurred during November and December 1924 proved to be only a passing 
phenomenon. In January 1925 the drachma reverted to its familiar pattern of decline.8 Thus, 
Diomedes' anticipation that, following the flotation of the First Refugee Loan, the drachma would 
'stabilize' at a rate of no more than 250 drs. to sterling through the interplay of market forces' did 
not materialize.9
The Greek authorities did not believe that the renewed tumble of the drachma merited the 
adoption of a restrictive emission and credit policy. Herein lay the origin of the conflict between
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Roussin and Diomedes. The story was as follows. In early February 1925 the National Bank of
Greece proposed to expand the note issue by 600,000,000 drs., making a net addition of about
13% to the existing circulation.10 (See Tables 2 above and in Appendix 2.) This new issue was to
have a different orientation from previous post November 1920 emissions. The amount the
»
N.B.G. proposed to issue on its own account (400,000,000 drs.) would be used to provide 
advances to agriculture, industry and commerce. In Diomedes view, this was warranted given the 
growth in output and transactions resulting from the refugee influx. As for the 200,000,000 drs. 
to be printed for state needs, it would not be 'wasted' as usual on current expenditure but would 
be allocated to the department of public works.11
The news that the N.B.G. wanted to print additional notes did not come as a surprise. A 
note expansion of 750,000,000 drs. planned for 1924, had been postponed because Norman 
and Niemeyer had advised that such a measure would be inappropriate before the flotation of the 
First Refugee Loan.12 What was novel, was that for the first time since 1920, the National Bank 
now reverted to the practice of asking I.F.C. permission.13 Roussin refused to approve a new 
emission. He maintained, that there was no essential difference between government inflation 
(printing notes in order to cover the budget deficit), and banking inflation (printing notes in order 
to meet the demand of producers for bank credits). To him both paths were destabilizing and 
caused the currency to depreciate.14 Instead, Roussin countered that the N.B.G. resolve cash 
stringency through 'non inflationary' measures,15 such as increasing the capital of the Bank or 
inducing the government to fund -by an internal loan- that part of the floating debt owed to the 
N.B.G.16
Diomedes was annoyed. In his opinion, the British member of the I.F.C. failed to grasp that 
the principle of monetary restraint could by no means be endorsed in a country "emerging from an 
acute crisis and making marked efforts to gain its equilibrium".17 Without realizing that they had 
already given tacit approval to Roussin, Diomedes asked Niemeyer and Norman to 'put some 
sense in Roussin's head'. They replied that the National Bank should not take any decision 
without reaching prior agreement with the I.F.C.18 Obviously, Roussin had convinced London 
that the credit policy of the N.B.G. was responsible for the continuous fall in the external value of 
the drachma. Although Diomedes did not obtain the consent of the I.F.C., in March 1925
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400,000,000 drs. were issued for the needs of the National Bank.19 Technically, this emission 
was not an act of defiance towards the Commission. According to article 30 of the Law of Control 
of 1898 the National Bank of Greece had the right to increase the note circulation without asking 
the permission of the I.F.C. "providing that this was done for the needs of commerce".20
Nevertheless, this emission was interpreted by Greece's economic supervisors as an 
outright provocation. From a tactical viewpoint it was wrong for Diomedes to ask for the I.F.C. 
permission and then 'discover* that according to the Law he did not need it. Also, the governor of 
the National Bank made a serious mistake on a matter of substance: he employed the second 
tranche of the First Refugee Loan of 1924 held by the R.S.C. at the National Bank of Greece as 
cover for the new emission without the knowledge and consent of either the R.S.C. or the Bank 
of England. Infact, Diomedes had misle;/ d both < i institutions 21 Thus, in the last analysis, it is not 
surprising that there was a belief in British official circles that Greek bankers were a peculiar 
species.
This incident shows that after Roussin's arrival, the British official circles acquired a more 
informed view of financial developments in Greece. What is more, the 'reactions' surrounding the 
new emission brought to the surface the familiar problem of the I.F.C. versus the N.B.G. which 
were now compounded by the personal antagonism of Roussin -a firm follower of the currency 
school- and Diomedes who maintained that free' or expansionist banking was necessary for the 
economic development of the country.22 It has been argued, that animosity between Roussin 
and Diomedes was solely of an ideological nature.23 However, it must be underlined that more 
was at stake. Intellectual antagonism between the two men reflected the underlying conflict of 
interest between the two institutions they served. From the point of view of the bondholders it 
was of paramount importance that Greece acquire a stable exchange, whereas the N.B.G. was 
more interested in the country's economic development prospects than in stabilization per se. 
Moreover, the two men were involved in a power game. Roussin upon arriving in Greece tried to 
reestablish the authority of the I.F.C. as regulator of monetary policy and Diomedes resented 
this 24 Thus, it was not surprising that Roussin complained that Diomedes was not frank, lacked a 
firm grasp of basic economic principles, and that he did "...not appear to desire the advice or
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cooperation of the Commission, except insofar as its consent is [was] required for his inflationary 
projects."25
In the last analysis, Roussin was disappointed not only with the N.B.G. but also with his 
superiors. In a moment of exasperation he wrote to Sir Henry Strakosch, "...I should have liked to 
see their [i.e. the I.F.C.] powers reaffirmed in the protocol of the Refugee Loan."26 This comment 
is intriguing in that it leads to the inevitable question of whether or not the Bank of England and 
the League of Nations wanted to reaffirm the powers of the I.F.C. Indeed, . they were not in 
favour of giving too much 'influence' to the Commission. Why this was so will be explained in 
detail below.
4 . Roussin's First Stabilization 'Plan' and The Times, Articles
The letters of Roussin to Niemeyer and Chamberlain show that from his early days In Greece 
he was concerned to effect a stabilization plan that would be supervised by the I.F.C.27 His first 
stabilization 'plan' was put forward in a paper to the National Bank of Greece in July 1925. 
Apparently, the Bank of England was not involved 28 It was a vague proposal and no mention was 
made of the role that the I.F.C. was to play although in private Roussin did not hide his desire that 
stabilization be undertaken under the Commission's supervision 29 Roussin argued that Greece 
would be able to reestablish confidence in the drachma and draw on foreign capital only if it 
acquire a sound monetary system based on gold. He maintained that if the authorities espoused 
monetary orthodoxy and if the immobilized reserve of the N.B.G. was liquidated, it would be 
possible to establish convertibility of the drachma at around 300 drs. to the pound sterling.30 
Roussin's proposal fell on deaf ears. Diomedes was deprecatory and proclaimed that thoughts for 
stabilization were still premature in view of "the unsettled state of the public finances, the large 
floating debt, the new situation created by the inflation itself, and the need for elasticity".31 
Meanwhile, the drachma continued to tumble and by mid-September 1925 it reached 335 drs. to 
the pound.
During the third week of September 1925, three articles in The Times, attacked the 
monetary policy pursued by the N.B.G. They reiterated Roussin's argument that the fall in the 
external value of the drachma was caused by the 'unsound' credit and banking policy of the
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National Bank.32 Though the articles were written by Milnes, financial editor of The Times,, it was 
believed that they were instigated by Roussin.33 It is notable that The Times, conveniently forgot 
to mention that the National Bank had already by this date begun to display a less "unsound' 
policy. Namely, in August 1925 the discount rate had been raised from 8.5% to 10%; and from 
July 1925 advances remained almost stationary, in contrast to the previous twelve months 34 
Perhaps this owed something to Roussin's July 1925 stabilization proposition. (For discount rate 
see Table 3)
Table 3
Discount Rate (1914-1927)
From 11.11.14 6.5%
8.3.18 6 %
6.9.18 5.5%
1.1.20 6 %
15.5.20 6.5%
1.1.23 7.5%
23.2.25 8.5%
18.8.25 10 %
7.7.26 11 %
6.6.27 10 %
Source: G.Haritakis(ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1939. (Athens, 1940), part II, p.280.
The attack in The Times created a stir in Greece. The articles were reprinted and criticized 
in the local press 35 The facts surrounding this affair have been chronicled in detail36 From the 
point of view of this thesis, the following two aspects of this incident are of interest. First, it 
underlines the close cooperation that existed between Hambros and the N.B.G. Hambros did not 
accept the interpretation of The Times and British official circles that the National Bank was 
responsible for the depreciation of the drachma. Sir Eric Hambro, in addition to expressing to 
Diomedes his sympathy, intervened in an active manner37 by holding repeated conversations 
with the editor of The Times and expediting the publication of a response by Diomedes. 
Moreover, it was no coincidence that P.Freme, a stock broker close to Hambro, wrote to The 
Times in support of Diomedes and the policy pursued by the N.B.G 38 Indeed, it is apparent that 
Hambros as the exclusive underwriter of Greek loans in Britain did not wish to see Greece's 
reputation damaged by an antagonistic campaign in the British press 39
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The second, more important, aspect of the attack waged by The Times is that it appears to 
have had some impact on policy makers. It is notable that before printing in The Times the answer 
prepared by Diomedes, Milnes advised the deputy governor of the National Bank that the Greek 
government should make an official declaration to the effect that no new emission of money 
would take place and that the drachma would be stabilized.40 Perhaps it is not coincidental that 
about one month after The Times articles, in an effort to combat exchange speculation, the 
government curtailed the freedom of the commercial banks to buy and sell foreign exchange 41 
This coupled with the forced loan of January 1926 (designed to amortize the floating debt owed 
to the National Bank and cover part of the current state expenditures) provoked a short 
recession 42 The amount of money held by the public decreased by 25%.43 The forced loan was 
well received by Roussin and officials of the National Bank. Roussin had proposed as early as 
February 1925, as had the officials of the Bank that the state diminish its floating debt. Finally, in 
addition, to the forced loan, the government attempted to limit the future growth of the floating 
debt by a forced consolidation of outstanding paper.44 But these moves did little to halt the 
depreciation of the drachma.45
5 . The Bank of England and the N.B.G. Reject Roussin's Second
Stabilization Plan
Nevertheless, given the increased willingness of the Greek authorities to adopt a 'stringent' 
monetary policy, Roussin came up with a more concrete stabilization plan in March 1926. He now 
proposed that it would be possible to make the drachma freely convertible at a rate of 275 drs. to 
the pound sterling. This was an optimistic estimation considering that the going market rate was 
approximately 350 drs 46 He based this calculation on the twin presumption that a foreign long­
term credit of £2,000,000 would be made available and that the N.B.G. would be reorganized and 
liquidate its gold securities held as cover47
Before presenting his plan to the National Bank, Roussin showed it to Niemeyer and 
Norman in the hope that the Bank of England would support it and grant the necessary credit.48 
Although not enthusiastic, they did not discourage Roussin from discussing the plan with the 
Greeks. In the end this scheme did not materialize as neither the Bank of England, nor the N.B.G. 
granted their approval. Diomedes, in contrast to what had been the case eight months earlier, no
131
longer declared that it was premature to discuss stabilization. However, he turned down the 
Roussin plan for several reasons. First, he maintained that complete freedom in the buying and 
selling of foreign exchange would be impracticable given the high tendency for speculation in 
Greece. Presumably, he wanted stabilization without free convertibility.49 Second, insufficient 
foreign credit was available.50 Third, and more importantly, he reacted strongly to Roussin's 
proposal that a special issuing department be set up at the N.B.G. entirely independent of the 
other services of the bank and under the control of the I.F.C. Roussin wanted the issue 
department to be handled "as an extension" of the I.F.C.'s "supposed power of veto over new 
issues” for as long as was necessary in order to repay the credit that would be granted from 
abroad.51 According to Diomedes a separate department of issue as existed in England, could 
not operate in Greece without significant difficulties. He pointed out that the National Bank was a 
mixed bank, institutionally similar to the Continental banks, and that on this account its large issue 
department could not be segregated from the commercial activities of the bank. Diomedes made 
a counterproposal which was not accepted, but which nevertheless is interesting because it 
reveals his aversion to institutional changes and to the I.F.C. He advised that the N.B.G. set up a 
special department charged with note issue and foreign exchange dealings. This department 
could be placed under the strict supervision of a temporary commissioner to be suggested (but 
not appointed) by The Bank of England on condition that London provided the necessary credit 
for stabilization. The commissioner would not have unlimited powers and his post would expire 
the moment the N.B.G. repaid the credit. In order to appease the I.F.C., Diomedes also 
suggested that the commissioner be refrained from interfering with the de facto rights of the I.F.C 
regarding the issue of banknotes.52
The Bank of England effectively blocked the second Roussin proposal by refusing to 
extend the necessary credit. It acted in this manner for a combination of reasons. First, because 
the National Bank of Greece was not keen on going ahead with the creation of a separate issuing 
department. Second, Norman did not agree with Roussin over the method to be adopted 
regarding stabilization. Whereas the latter favoured pegging the drachma, that is supporting its 
rate until it improved to about 300 and then stabilizing, the former was against pegging without 
stabilizing first on the grounds that this procedure had created difficulties in a number of countries
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such as Italy, Belgium, and France. Third, in contrast to Roussin who was eager that stabilization 
be effected at once, Norman expressed the fear that stabilization could not succeed given the 
anomalous political situation the Pangalos dictatorship was still in power. Fourth, Norman wanted 
to combine a refugee cum stabilization ban.53 Moreover, though Norman did not openly suggest 
at any time that stabilization should not be carried out by the I.F.C., apparently he preferred such a 
scheme to be directly implemented by the League. In addition to the fact that the Bank of 
England had tight links with the League of Nations, possibly Norman realized that Greek 
resistance to a foreign supervised stabilization plan would be greater if The Contror (i.e. the 
I.F.C.) was placed in charge. After the rebuff of his second offer, Roussin's name drops out of the 
archives with regard to the subject of stabilization.
To recapitulate. The second plan of Roussin proved to be a premature step towards 
stabilization. The N.B.G. was not ready to embrace free convertibility and an institutional 
reorganization. Nor was it willing to extend the supervision of the I.F.C. over its affairs. The 
incident also serves to highlight the fact that the views of Roussin were not always identical with 
those of the Bank of England. Clearly, the policy of The Bank of England was determined by a 
number of factors. Overall, its priority was to serve its banking interests. However, it is apparent 
that at times the Bank also sought to accommodate the Treasury. A good example of this 
occurred less than four months after Norman refused to condone the Roussin stabilization plan. 
In June 1926, the deputy governor of the Bank of England made an interesting offer to Venizebs 
who was at the time in London holding negotiations with the Treasury about the settlement of the 
Greek war debt. If Greece agreed to repay the gross war debt in full, the Bank would be willing to 
open a credit of £2-3,000,000 for the stabilization of the drachma. Apparently no strings were 
attached (such as the demand that a special issue department be set up). It is permissible to 
assume that this offer was given under specific orders from the Treasury as a bait to push the 
Greeks towards reaching a speedy war debt settlement.54
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6 . Norman Suggests a Comprehensive League of Nations Stabilization Plan
By early 1926, Diomedes and Venizelos, each in his own manner, had started to give more 
serious thought to stabilization.55 They acknowledged that foreign capital would be necessary for 
stabilization, but thought that external control could be obviated. In addition, both the banker and 
the politician were optimistic enough to belive that once funds were available from abroad the 
drachma would more or less stabilize on its own. They did not see the need for institutional 
reforms nor the enactment of a formal stabilization programme.
The first effort in the direction of securing foreign capital which would not embody foreign 
control was made by Venizelos. In June 1926, while war debt negotiations were under way in 
London, he proposed to the Treasury that the balance of the credits owed by Britain to Greece 
according to the Paris Agreement of 1918 should be granted for the twin purpose of completing 
the settlement of the refugees and increasing the country's foreign exchange reserves.56 
Apparently, the Treasury did not even bother to discuss this proposal. However, knowing that 
Athens was eager by this point to stabilize, the Treasury pressed the Bank of England to make the 
offer mentioned above (see p. 132). Failing to secure the credits,57 another route was explored in 
early 1927 when the Bank of England was asked to back a policy of pegging the drachma. 
Specifically, a long-term loan of £6,000,000 was requested to double the country's foreign 
reserves so as to raise the gold and foreign exchange cover from 35% to 70%, and thereby give a 
large safety margin for a policy of pegging 58
Not surprisingly, Norman rejected this proposal. Not only did he believe that a cover of over 
50% would be superfluous he was against pegging as a matter of principle 59 Norman had already 
expressed his intense dislike of pegging when the second Roussin stabilization plan was 
discussed and he insisted that Greece, under the strict guidance of the Bank of England, should 
aim for a comprehensive stabilization which would combine the balancing of the budget, the 
complete liquidation of the government's floating debt towards the N.B.G. and a reform of the 
banking system. He insisted that Greece would have to raise one large League loan that would 
provide the capital necessary for the completion of the refugee settlement and the stabilization of 
the drachma. Norman suggested that as a preliminary measure the Greek government should
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make a formal request to the Bank of England to undertake a study of the financial situation of the 
country.60
Diomedes was not pleased with the idea of a comprehensive League of Nations loan. As
he put it to Norman, stabilization was 'a question apart from the Refugee Loan. Diomedes' stance
was dictated by two considerations. First, the procedure for floating League loans was time
consuming and he was in a hurry to stabilize. By this point he realized that monetary instability was
impeding the inflow of foreign capital, a top priority of the N.B.G. Second, he was wholeheartedly
against League supervision over stabilization, not least because he did not want to carry out a
radical banking reform that would alter the structure of the National Bank. In a letter to Venizelos
on February 16 1927 he wrote:
"The demands of the League were absurd because they dream of carrying out on 
their own an 'enquete', establishing ‘controle’ and a kind of ‘reconstruction’. No one 
-at least in Greece- feels that such things are necessary.
Good sense is sufficient, and I hope that we are beginning to develop this on our 
own.
An outside imposition of good sense will not be tolerated by our people for better or 
for worse. I declared that if such a procedure set out the Greek government would 
prefer to resign from the idea of a loan".61
Diomedes' firmness on the issue of foreign control is not paradoxical, considering that he 
knew how the mechanisms operated and was well qualified to appreciate the consequences of 
foreign control. It can be argued that he was against the involvement of the League because he 
held a totally different theoretical orientation from the Bank of England and, by extension, the 
Financial Committee of the League regarding the nature of stabilization and the operation of 
central banking. Diomedes was not alone in resenting the League plan. As late as mid March 
1927 the message conveyed to the Foreign Office by Greek diplomatic channels was that further 
foreign control was out of the question and that the financial stabilization of Greece lay outside the 
'authority' of the League.62
This rejection of further League supervision is of special significance, considering that the 
political leadership after the downfall of Pangalos had become on the whole more compliant 
towards the League of Nations. Two indications of that changing climate were provided by more 
cooperative government dealings with the Refugee Settlement Commission and its assurances 
to the League on October 7 1926 that it would comply with the statutes of the Geneva Protocol of
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September 1924, meaning that it would balance the budget and refrain from raising unproductive 
loans.63
Interestingly, the notion that a League stabilization programme would enhance British 
influence was feared and resented not only by Greeks but also by the French. In January 1927, 
while Salter was away from Geneva, J.Avenol (the Deputy Secretary General of the League of 
Nations) suggested to Dendramis (Greek Charge'd' Affairs in Bern) that the Bank of France 
should grant the necessary credits for stabilization. He argued that France was not happy with 
Greece's growing dependence on England, and he insinuated that if Greece resorted to the 
League, it could not escape from the financial imperialism of the Bank of England. Avenol also 
confided that France would not like certain rights -that traditionally belonged to the I.F.C.- to be 
"usurped" by the League. A few days later Diomedes passed by Geneva and Avenol repeated to 
him the same arguments.64 Later, in March 1927, the general secretary of the French delegation 
in Geneva confirmed to Dendramis that what interested France more than anything else was to 
safeguard the existing rights of the I.F.C.65
In sum, prior to the end of March 1927, the main obstacle to stabilization was the refusal of 
Greece to accept further foreign supervision. Negotiations about the war debt also delayed 
stabilization.
7. Greek Views on Monetary Instability and Financial Reconstruction
Concern about the depreciation of the drachma was voiced in Greece as early as 1922. 
Academics, politicians, industrialists, and the National Bank of Greece, all agreed that the 
cumulative weakening of the drachma had a negative impact on economic activity and led to an 
everincreasing foreign subservience.66 Only one vested interest did not complain, the 
commercial banks. Their 'indifferent' stance was due to the fact that they had profited by 
speculating against the continuous fall of the drachma.67
Regarding the question of the origins of this phenomenon there was a marked divergence 
of opinion. For example, the governor of the National Bank of Greece, Diomedes, maintained that 
the prime factor responsible for depreciation was the sudden upsurge in imports of machinery and 
basic foodstuff following the refugee influx 68 Whereas, Kofinas, sometime minister of finance,
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believed that depreciation was due to the budget deficit and the 'inflationary policy' of the 
N.B.G.69 Others, such as Tsouderos stood somewhere in between.70
With respect to the issue, of whether the drachma should be revalued or simply stabilized at 
the going market rate, initially there was a wide discrepancy of opinion. However, as time went by 
the proponents of revaluation became fewer.71 By early 1927 a remarkable consensus had 
developed that the drachma should be stabilized at the going market rate and that political stability 
was a fundamental prerequisite for the success of stabilization 72 However, not all were in favour 
of free convertibility, and the concept of legal stabilization was not popular with the liberals or the 
opposition.73 In addition, the necessity of undertaking a radical banking reform was questioned 
by the commercial banks. Finally, it is noteworthy that the business community, though it was in 
favour of stabilization, was eager to establish that the circulation of money would be adequate to 
cover its needs and that there would not be a credit squeeze.
How did this internal debate relate to criticisms put forward by Greece's foreign supervisors 
regarding monetary instability during 1925-1926 ? Apparently, foreign criticism acted as a catalyst 
and provoked fears about monetary instability. By 1927, the climate was ripe for stabilization in 
that internal forces were pressing policy makers to take definitive action in this direction. But, the 
Greek perception of what had to be done did not coincide with the philosophy of Greece's foreign 
supervisors. (For example the former were in favour of de facto pegging whereas the latter 
advocated legal stabilization). This was the main reason why intense criticism was waged against 
the stabilization programme applied by the League of Nations 74
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647,739-740.
73. For example Kofinas was in favour of free convertibility whereas Diomedes was not. See: G.Kofinas, 
EkBsoic noounoXoviouou Yohosac 1923-24. (Report on the Budget of 1923-1924), (Athens, 1923) 
and "H Noiuopami'j noAiUKfj xou 1923 kcu 1924” (Monetary Policy during 1923 and 1924), nXodroq, 
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74. For example the populist Tsaldaris and the Venizelist Diomedes agreed that legal stabilization was 
not the path that should be followed. See: EQvucdc Ki)puKaq, op.cit., Vol. 9, Session of August 22 
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'schools' of thought.
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PHASE TWO
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS DEVISES A COMPREHENSIVE STABILIZATION PLAN
(1927-1928)
Chapter 1
The Stabilization Plan is Born
1.1. The Government Decides to Raise a League Loan
This chapter will consider in detail how the comprehensive League stabilization plan was
devised and the reforms it entailed. It will extend themes explored in the previous section: namely
Greek opposition to ‘Anglo-Saxon’ currency premises. The major issues of dispute throughout
were the question of foreign control and the nature of the banking reform to be carried out. Infact,
few sectors of Greek opinion were happy with these two aspects of the League scheme. They
were accepted out of necessity. This was one of the fundamental reasons why the
implementation of the stabilization plan was wraught with difficulties from its inception. The key
figures in the negotiations on the part of the League of Nations were once again British: Sir Arthur
Salter, and Sir Otto Niemeyer. And as had been the case with the First Refugee Loan, Norman
was omnipresent. Notably, the League kept the I.F.C. out of this process, although as explained
in the text it had laid the ground work during 1925 and 1926.
As seen above, in early 1927 Diomedes had reacted negatively to Norman's proposal for
formal stabilization and a comprehensive refugee-cum-stabilization loan to be raised under the
auspices of the League. Yet, in late March 1927, these reservations were dropped given the
realization that Britain would never grant the book credits and the only option facing Greece was to
play along with the wishes of the League of Nations. In Diomedes' words:
"Most countries follow this path now [i.e. legal stabilization] and even France which 
was all for pegging is now entering the path of orthodoxy" and" that as things stand 
today we can do nothing without the assistance of the League, and that through her 
we can achieve a lot. Our pride will not be insulted if with the intervention of the 
League we achieve our goal... Also the revival af the dogma of self containment is 
piteous for our independence is not threatened and our dependence on others is 
an unquestionable fact".1
Politicians were more resilient than bankers, not because they had strong views in favour of 
pegging, but because they feared the political cost that would result from the extension of the 
League's authority over Greek public finances. Up to the signing of the war debt with Britain on
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April 61927, George Kafandaris -the minister of finance and key figure in terms of economic policy 
making during the period of coalition government- maintained that a League plan would be 
disadvantageous for the country. Apparently, he hoped the British Treasury would give in and
boO ^  n
provide the remaining credits for stabilization/
With the signing of the British war debt agreement in April 1927, Kafandaris was obliged to
face the fact that the Paris Agreement of 1918 had become a dead letter. Churchill wrote to the
Greek minister of Foreign Affairs the day after the agreement was signed:
"I wish to assure you that His Majesty's Government would view with the utmost 
sympathy any well considered plan of financial reconstruction framed on adequate 
lines, and will gladly give such a plan the fullest support that may be in their power.
His Majesty's Government are the more ready to give this support in view of and in 
return for, the waiver by the Greek Government, as part of the debt funding 
agreement of their claim to the balance of the credits arising from the agreement of 
10th February 1918."3
A few weeks later the League Secretariat was invited to undertake a detailed examination of 
the financial situation of Greece.4 By a twist of irony, the mission sent to Greece in May 1927 was 
headed by Avenol. Its other members were E. Felkin, J.Rueff, and J. Von Walre de Bordes, all of 
whom belonged to the Financial Committee. These League experts with the help of the Greek 
government "carried out an investigation as tactfully and unobtrusively as possible, in view of the 
sensitive state of public opinion on the question of foreign interference and control".5 At the end 
of May the mission submitted to the Secretariat a lengthy report on the accounts of the state 
Treasury, the Budget, the National Bank of Greece and the general economic situation of the 
country.6
1.2. The Study of the League and the Report of the Greek Committee of Experts: The 
Juxtaposition of Two Different 'Worlds'
The League of Nations mission in its study reached the conclusion -possibly as a result of 
Bank of England pressure- that a solitary Refugee Loan was not advisable and that a 
comprehensive treatment of the whole financial situation, budgetary and monetary would be 
necessary. In particular, it proposed that the National Bank of Greece would have to be divested 
of its 'mixed banking' character and reformed so as to conform to the structure and functions of a 
modern central bank.7 In addition, it advised that the existing system of accounts be scrapped
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and the budget unified. At the heart of this suggested budgetary reform lay the principle that the 
annual budget would have to incorporate all of the accounts of the state during the running year.
The study reached the conclusion that a £9,000,000 loan would be necessary. It proposed 
that £3,000,000 would go to the N.B.G. in order to increase liquidity and foreign exchange 
holdings and thereby making it possible for Greece to join the gold standard. £3,000,000 would 
be employed to eradicate more than three quarters of the existing budget arrears.8 A further 
£3,000,000 would be used for the completion of the refugee settlement.9
The League study was important because it was used as a blueprint for the stabilization 
programme subsequently implemented. The best way to set into context the significance of its 
propositions is to juxtapose it with the report prepared by the Greek Committee of Experts In the 
beginning of 1927. The comparison highlights the different perspective between the Greek 
administration and intelligentsia versus the country's official supervisors. It brings out the differing 
philosophies permeating those parties that played a decisive role in the preparation of the two 
respective reports. Namely, the Bank of England-Niemeyer and the National Bank of Greece.10
of
The coalition government that came into office in December 1926 had set as one its main 
goals the restoration of state finances. The presumption being that stabilization would be the 
'golden key' that would open the door to a new era of massive flows of foreign capital and emigrant 
remittances. Among the first tasks of the coalition was the establishment of a Committee of 
Experts to propose corrective measures in the realm of fiscal and monetary policy. But, though 
the intentions of the government were presumably 'radical', the resulting report failed to envisage 
structural modernization. It was nationalistic and conservative in tone. Its analysis was based on 
the assumption that Greece's problems stemmed from historical and not structural factors. The 
report did not blame the Greek government, or the National Bank of Greece for the unbalanced 
state of the budget and the monetary chaos, but instead the long war effort and the inadequate 
assistance received by the ex-Allies. This was an argument which had been put forward 
repeatedly by Diomedes.11 Regarding fiscal affairs it proposed the unification of the budget.12 
But, like its predecessor -the 'Economies Committee' that had been set up in early 1924- its basic 
recommendation was that the fiscal problem would have to be tackled from the side of 
expenditures rather than revenue- given that the percapita tax burden in Greece was in real terms
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among the highest in Europe.13 Indicative of the growing conviction that Greece would have to 
put aside irredentism for good was the fact that the report stated that the burden of the cuts (i.e. 
about 70%) would have to be basically carried by the two defense ministries.14
The attitude of the report towards monetary affairs was totally complacent, indeed, with an 
amazing ease it brushed away the topic by maintaining that "the mechanism of stabilization is a 
matter of technicality” . Correctly, in our opinion, the bibliography has observed that the 
committee of experts "did not envisage in its report any need to reform the N.B.G." and that "The 
necessity of a banking reform was posed by the representatives of the League of Nations".15 
The narrow scope of the report becomes all the more apparent considering that the study 
prepared in France in 1926 by a similar committee of experts laid out a complete stabilization 
programme.16 Last, in order to set the Greek report in context it should be noted that it aptly 
reflected the incongruity of the country's leadership towards the 'foreign factor'. On the one 
hand, the experts made the daring proposition that the foreign debt under the supervision of the
I.F.C. should be repaid in drachmae and not foreign currency earnings. On the other, they urged 
the Greek government to reach as soon as possible a final settlement of the war debt in order that 
foreign capital flow once again into Greece, the presumption being that foreign finance was a sine 
qua non for the development of the country.
To sum up. The common point between the League Report and that of the Greek experts 
was that they both suggested the unification of the budget. The basic difference was that the 
foreign report proposed a sweeping reform of the National Bank. The antithesis between the 
National Bank of Greece and the country's foreign supervisors had by now run its full course. The 
repeated complaints expressed by the Bank of England, the British Treasury, the I.F.C., and the 
League had grown into a radical reform proposition. It is easy to discern that the banking reform 
and the stabilization plan were exogenously" imposed". As stated above, it is apparent that the 
Greeks if they had been left on their own would have left the N.B.G. intact and would have 
followed a policy of pegging and defacto stabilization.
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1.3. The Terms Posed by the League of Nations
During the proceedings of the 27th session of the Financial Committee held between the 
8th and the 14th of June 1927, the question of a Greek stabilization plan was discussed in detail. 
The delegation which arrived in Geneva in order to present the Greek case was comprised of 
Kafandaris (minister of finance) and Michalakopoulos (minister of foreign affairs). In their 
appearance before the Committee, these two liberal politicians described the positive steps taken 
with regard to economic policy. A significant development was the curtailment of military 
expenditure. In addition, as it had not been possible to carry out in full expenditure cuts 
recommended by the Committee of Experts, new measures for increased taxation had been 
introduced by Kafandaris.17 By no coincidence the day before leaving for Geneva, the latter 
presented the 1927- 1928 budget to the National Assembly and pleaded that his tax proposals 
be voted at once. His request was granted and once in Geneva, the Greek minister set out to 
convince League officials that the coalition was determined to attain its goal of securing a budget 
surplus for the fiscal year 1927-1928.18
The Financial Committee was pleased with the improvement. Indeed, during the last six 
months the drachma had 'stabilized' at a rate of 370/375 drs. to the pound sterling. However, the 
F.C. recommended to the Council of the League a £9,000,000 stabilization loan, only after it 
ascertained from the Greek delegation that the government was prepared to reduce the volume 
of the state debt towards the N.B.G. and centralize in the bank all the monetary operations of the 
state and its enterprises. Athens also had to agree that the N.B.G. would be independent from 
state control, would limit future advances to the state, would grant only short term loans, would 
divest itself from other commercial activities i.e. restrict its business to central banking and would 
unify its note issues and constitute sufficient cover to allow Greece to join the gold standard on a 
permanent basis.19 The Greek delegates accepted these terms and as a result they were 
publicized by the League in the official report of the June session.20
However, archival material shows that the Financial Committee, prior to reaching its decision 
to recommend a new Greek loan, also asked Kafandaris to agree in private that the Greek 
government would maintain the 1927, 1928, 1929 budgets at a level of 9,000,000,000 drs., 
report in detail to the F.C every three months on the progress of those budgets, would agree that
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the proceeds of the loan to be allocated to the refugees would be handled by the R.S.C., accept 
that the revenues for the new loan would be administered by the I.F.C., consent to establish a 
legal stabilization at the rate that 'had ruled' in the last six months and would appoint a foreign 
financial expert to the N.B.G.21 The Greek minister of finance accepted all of these 'terms' on 
condition that the foreign advisor would not have a power of veto -as was the original desire of the 
Financial Committee- but would serve in a consultative capacity 22 On the last day of the 
proceedings, Kafandaris, with the blessings of the Financial Committee, made an official request 
from the Secretary General that the League raise under its auspices a comprehensive 
£9,000,000 loan. The Council met three days later (i.e. on June 17) and it agreed to approve a 
comprehensive stabilization plan during its September session. In the interval: the Secretariat 
was to prepare a loan supplementary refugee loans and the Financial Committee would draw up a 
convention which would determine the manner in which the National Bank of Greece would be 
restructured.
It would be an oversight to close this section without reference to political factors. 
Throughout 1926 the Financial Committee had not stopped advocating that in order to 
recommend to the Council a supplementary loan, political stabilization would be required. This 
presupposed that the military would no longer be allowed to intervene in politics and the country 
would acquire a definitive constitution, regardless of whether it would be Republican or 
Monarchist23 Indeed, the Financial Committee was true to its word. The decision to recommend 
a Greek loan in June 1927 was not unrelated to the fact that on June 3, the National Assembly of 
Greece finally voted a new constitution.24
1.3.1. The banking reform and the statutes of the new central bank
The subcommittee set up in mid June 1927 to delineate the specific reforms to be 
implemented in the banking system was composed of Sir Henry Strakosch, M.Jansen, M.Dubois, 
Osborne, and De Bordes. However, it was Tsouderos and not they who came up with the idea of 
creating a modern central bank. During the first meetings between the subcommittee and 
Tsouderos, who had stayed on in Geneva in order to 'assist' the deliberations a serious stumbling 
block emerged. The latter wanted to turn the N.B.G. into a pure central bank and strip it
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completely of its commercial activities. But, Diomedes, who was giving orders to Tsouderos from 
Athens, insisted that the National Bank should not be completely divested of its commercial 
character and that it should be allowed to maintain the right to accept deposits.25 The 
subcommittee was equally unyielding and determined in its resolution to transform the N.B.G. into 
a proper central banking institution. The only concession it was prepared to make was to extend 
the time limit it had set for the completion of the metamorphosis of the National Bank from two 
months to two years.
In order to avoid a stalemate in the preparations for the League plan, Tsouderos came up in 
late June 1927 with what appeared at the time to be an 'ingenious' proposition. It was to remove 
the central banking functions from the National Bank of Greece and to set up a separate bank of 
issue. Tsouderos presented this idea to Strackosch, who headed the subcommittee, as well as to 
Niemeyer, Salter and Cecil Lubbock of the Bank of England. They all accepted it and Strackosch 
began at once to prepare the statutes for a new central bank, although there was no certainty that 
Athens would give its approval. Indeed, the situation was peculiar for Tsouderos presented his 
idea directly to the League officials without having beforehand cleared it with Diomedes or the 
government. Luckily, he found no difficulty in convincing the governor of the N.B.G. and 
Kafandaris of the expediency of such a scheme.26
The statutes of the new central bank were closely modeled on the Estonian and Indian 
precedents. The first drafts were prepared during early July 1927 at the Bank of England by 
Osborne and Debordes under the direction of Strackosch. Tsouderos participated in a 
consultative capacity. In the words of Osborne he "suggested only a few alterations but these 
chiefly in the direction of further strengthening the bank against the Government"27 DeBordes 
took copies of the final London draft to Brussels and Basle for approval by Janssen and Dubois. 
Janssen was almost in complete agreement with the text, but Dubois disliked the idea of a central 
bank. In fact, with hindsight he was prophetic in that "He feared that the new bank would not have 
sufficient standing and would not be strong enough to control the financial market". The two most 
important modifications made as a result of Dubois' reservations were that the stipulation 
permitting the government to revoke the note issue privilege from the bank if the statutes were 
violated was withdrawn and the clause forcing the commercial banks to deposit a 7% reserve with
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the central bank was also excised. The latter clause had been suggested by Sir Henry and 
although Tsouderos may have thought that it was an excellent idea, the Greek commercial banks 
reacted strongly against the proposition.28 The suggested titles for the new bank during the 
preparation of the London drafts had been The Reserve Bank of Greece, Central Bank of Greece, 
and Bank of Greece. The third title was the one finally chosen- it was simple as well as 
impressive.29
At the end of July Tsouderos returned to Athens with the final drafts in hand for the charter 
of the new bank and the convention between the National Bank and the government. (The main 
object of this convention was to determine the recompensation due to the N.B.G. because it was 
stripped of its issue privilege 'prematurely'). The two drafts set off a political crisis. The Populists, 
under the instigation of their financial advisor Maximos, departed from the coalition in late August 
1927 under the pretext that the issuing privilege should not be taken away from the N.B.G. What 
was at stake however was more. This party in December 1926 had agreed to join the coalition in 
order that Greece "make a good impression abroad" and thus secure the necessary funds for 
stabilization.30 However, the Populists proved incapable of shedding their resentment towards 
the twin phenomenon of growing state control and the enhanced presence of the League in 
Greek public affairs. The League was viewed with suspicion because it was under 'British' 
tutelage. Notably, the Populists did not hold Britain and the other ex-Allies in esteem because of 
their role in the dethronement of King Constantine in November 1920.31
Finally, the statutes of the Bank of Greece, the convention with the N.B.G., and the ban 
Protocol were signed by the Government on September 15 1927 32 One week later they were 
approved by the General Assembly of the League of Nations. This l L. ?roVoco\ .j
-which became known as the Geneva " ^ c 0Voeo \ : of September 1927-
contained in full the conditions under which the League agreed to grant its approval for the 
flotation of a loan "yielding an effective sum equivalent to not more than nine millions sterling". 
The Greek government undertook that the proceeds of the loan would be applied only for 
stabilization, the budget, and the refugees. Furthermore, the protocol
stipulated that the government would have to set up a central bank and "a new system of public
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accounting in conformity with the unity of the State Budget". Ail of the receipts and payments of 
the State and public enterprises would have to be centralized at this new bank.33
Apart from the fact that the appointment of a foreign advisor at the Bank of Greece was not 
mentioned, the v c l  P r o - t - o  - o !  : described in full the mode of supervision that was
to be established. It gave formal status to those terms the Greek delegation had been 'cajoled' 
into accepting during the June session of the Financial Committee 34 In addition, it posed one 
more term that had not been mentioned during the June session. The Greek government 
undertook not to seek short term advances or issue Treasury bills or other short term similar 
obligations in excess of 800,000,000 drs. This was equal to approximately 9% of the plafond set 
by the Financial Committee for government expenditure. The time length of this restriction was 
not specified although it was insinuated that it would hold for as long as the Financial Committee 
thought necessary 35
To recapitulate. The scheme devised by September 1927 rested on three cornerstones. 
First, the establishment of tight League supervision over Greek fiscal and monetary policy so as to 
ensure that the authorities would conform to orthodox British economic thinking. Second, the 
setting up of a modern central bank. Third, the creation of a new system of public accounting. 
The third segment of the scheme was the least criticized. Nevertheless, it was implemented with 
difficulty due to the administration's incapacity to effect the required changes at a satisfactory 
pace. Regarding the first two provisions it is noteworthy that institutional factors played a 
prominent role in the demise of free convertibility. (This issue is addressed below in Book I, 
Section III, Phase Three.)
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Chapter 2
The Concessions Made
In the previous chapter we presented the reforms and the tight supervision imposed by the 
League of Nations within the context of the stabilization scheme. This chapter will examine 
another aspect of policy dependence. It will look at the 'indirect', yet important, 'concessions' the 
Greek government had to make. These were posed, as preconditions by the governments of 
those countries that had a power to block the flotation of a stabilization loan. These concessions 
entailed the settlement of three issues confronting the coalition government. First, the long 
standing dispute of the state with the I.F.C. Second, certain private economic claims regarding 
Britain, U.S.A. and France. Third, Greece's war debts.
2.1. The Dispute with the I.F.C. and Private Economic Claims
After WWI a dispute broke out between the state and the I.F.C. regarding two issues. On 
the one hand, the I.F.C. claimed that due to the depreciation of the drachma after 1918 the 
foreign exchange value of the annual revenues under its control had suffered and that as a result 
it had lost potential income. On the other hand, the state asserted that it had been 'cheated* by 
the I.F.C. owing to the fact that following the post 1914 depreciation of the franc, and in order to 
improve the annual return of the bonds of the 'old gold' loans, a peculiar method of calculating the 
surplus values had been devised. (Namely, the Commission converted the drachmae in its hands 
into paper francs. Then, ignoring the depreciation of the paper franc, it equated the x amount of 
paper francs with the same amount x in gold francs, demanding payment in gold francs! In this 
manner the I.F.C. had made a profit of £1,350,000.)
From 1921 onwards, there was deadlock as the state wanted to refer to arbitration only its 
claim, (i.e. it refused to refer to arbitration the Commission's counterclaim regarding the losses 
from the depreciation of the drachma). However, in the spring of 1927, the coalition adopted a 
more conciliatory attitude and referred both issues to arbitration. The arbiters reached their 
decision in 1928 and from reports that exist, the I.F.C. was not compensated for its post-1918 loss
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of 'potential income', but the bondholders of the 'old gold' loans retained the greater part of the 
disputed £1,350,000.1
The outstanding private economic claims were: the ratification of the contract for the 
electricity concession that had been granted to a consortium headed by the British group Power 
and Traction Co; the expost recompensation of British, French and Italian nationals whose 
properties in Greece had been expropriated in the early twenties; and the expost exclusion of 
these nationals from the forced loan of 1926.
The Hellenic Electricity Co. or 'Power* as it was referred to in short was the largest British 
concern operating in Greece during the interwar period. This 60 year concession had been * 
granted during the Pangalos dictatorship, and because of its 'scandalous' terms had come under 
heavy criticism.2 As the National Assembly had been suspended by Pangalos, the contract had 
not been ratified. Thus, when the coalition came into power the subject of its ratification became a 
major political issue. On February 4 1927, a member of the opposition called the government to 
cancel the 'Power* convention. This request led to a heated debate, and on February 11 the 
National Assembly finally ratified the contract with the understanding that the government would 
renegotiate certain of its terms.3 This latter task was completed by March 22 1927, and was not 
too difficult to attain because 'Power1 was keen to soothe the opposition against it.4
Regarding the second issue, the coalition arranged that the nationals of Britain, France and 
Italy, who owned land in Greece expropriated under the land reform be paid fourteen times the 
price that had been given to Greek proprietors! This favourable settlement was attained in 1927, 
after the British government used the I.F.C. "as a channel for exercising coercion". Namely, 
Britain had threatened that it would not allow the I.F.C. to pay out from the revenues at its disposal 
the £500,000 recompensation Greece owed to Moslem nationals for the properties they had left 
behind when they departed from Greece after the Asia Minor debacle. The hands of the state 
were tied for according to a convention signed with Turkey within the context of the Lausanne 
Treaty, it was irrevocably specified that this payment could not be made through the Greek 
Treasury. Thus, to put it simply this convention would have fallen through had Britain refrained 
from ordering the I.F.C. to release the required credit. France and Italy took advantage of the 
British precedent and demanded that their landowners be given also equal treatment. Infact,
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£400,000 from the proceeds of the Stabilization Loan went directly towards the compensation in 
gold of these foreign nationals.5 Finally, the coalition in early 1927 exempted expost British 
subjects from the forced ban of 1926. (Some £25,000 was involved) Such an arrangement had 
also been made posteriorly regarding the forced ban of 1922.6
In sum, when the coalition in June 1927 applied to the League of Nations for the flotation of 
a stabilization ban, the pending disputes of the state with the I.F.C. and foreign private economic 
interests had been settled. That was considered as an absolutely necessary prerequisite by 
Greece's foreign supervisors.
2.2. The War Debt Settlements
The British debt funding agreement of April 7 1927, was examined separately (in Book I, 
Section il) because of the significant repercussion the British war debt embargo had on the fbw of 
foreign capital and destabilization during 1925-1926. The American debt funding agreement and 
the French opposition to the ban will be presented in this chapter because these events became 
interwined with the last preparatory phase of the stabilization scheme.
2.2.1. The American debt funding agreement - The Second Refugee Loan
The war debt Greece had incurred towards the U.S.A. was small in comparative terms. At a 
mere $15,000,000 (i.e. approximately £3,000,000) it was equivalent to less than 15% of the war 
debt owed to Britain. Though the scale of the two debts differed, the government adopted the 
same approach regarding their repayment. Thus, when the U.S.A., in August 1925, first asked 
Greece to fund its war debt the reply given was that this obligation would be carried out only under 
the condition that the American government would agree to grant the remaining $33,000,000 
owed under the Paris agreement of 1918.7 The U.S.A., in antithesis to what was the case with 
Britain, decided to satisfy Greece's claim to the remaining credits. Thus, in May 1926 an 
agreement was reached with the Pangalos government whereby the U.S.A. would provide the 
$33,000,0000 "due". The Greek government, in return, undertook to repay to the U.S.A. this 
amount plus the existing $15,000,000 war debt (i.e. a total of $48,000,000) "under terms which
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compared unfavourably with any other debt funding agreement". Namely the redemption period 
was to be only 15 years and the interest rate charged 4.5%.8
Upon coming to power, the coalition government renounced the agreement as one more 
fiasco of the Pangalos dictatorship, whereupon the U.S.A. declined to renegotiate. Indicatively, 
when Norman was in New York in early July 1927, he was informed that if Athens did not 
acknowledge the agreement, Washington would not allow part of the Stabilization Loan to be 
raised in the U.S.A. and would block the ban altogether. Norman was not pleased with such a 
prospect. He maintained that it would not "be reasonable, even if it were possible, that London 
should issue any part of the proposed loan without the cooperation of America."9 In view of the 
situation, he contacted Salter and Hambros and asked them to " press the Greeks to reach 
immediate settlement in Washington". The above incidence highlights the fact that Norman 
wanted the loan to be an international affair and also that he was keen on seeing the League 
scheme implemented without delay.10
In time, the Greek government became more eager to reach a settlement with the U.S.A. 
This became particularly obvious in November 1927 in view of French opposition to the ban.11 
Thus, the Greek Ambassador to Washington speeded negotiations with U.S.A. and an 
agreement was reached on December 6 1927. The total war debt owed to the U.S.A. (including 
interest) was valued at $19,659,836 and it was agreed that repayment would be made over a 
period of 62 years along the lines of the British settlement. The Greek government renounced its 
claim over the remaining credits and the American government in return undertook to "release 
fresh credits to Greece amounting to £2,5 million [i.e. $12,167,000] on account of the American 
share of the 1918 credits, but earmarked for refugees in order to make the credits more palatable 
to Congress".12 Thus, the objective of the Greek government to attain under 'reasonable' 
financial terms a combined war debt and credit agreement was attained.
Since these £2,500,000 U.S. funds were to be handed directly to the R.S.C., it was 
arranged that the Stabilization Loan floated have a net value of only £6,500,000, not £9,000,000 
as specified in the Geneva September 1927 Protocol. In order that the intentions of the League 
of Nations stabilization scheme be carried out as planned, the proceeds of the ban would be 
divided in the following manner: £3,000,000 would go towards the budget, £3,000,000 would be
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set aside for the Central Bank, and only £500,000 would be earmarked for the refugees. It is 
worth noting that the League officials insisted that though the U.S.A. government credits had to 
be part of the stabilization scheme, under no conditions should it appear openly that the American 
government was effectively participating in a League loan. These credits -which became known 
as the 'Second Refugee Loan'- were 'issued' at par, had a 4% interest rate and a 20 year 
redemption period. Thus, financially, this was the most advantageous foreign loan of the 
government during the interwar period. Indeed, the only unfortunate aspect of this deal was that 
Congress delayed giving its approval for the release of the credits.13 Instead of passing a 
resolution in March 1928 as was expected, it finally gave its seal of approval in the spring 1929.
2.2.2. The loan is nearly blocked by France
A pre-condition attached to the stabilization Protocol was that the I.F.C. supervise the 
repayment of the loan. Thus, for the Protocol to become effective Britain, France and Italy had to 
sign a declaration authorizing the I.F.C. to be trustee for the loan. Theoretically, this document 
should have been signed in Geneva in September 1927. However, this was not possible 
because the French government declared that it would not sign until there was a settlement of the 
war debt. The Greek state owed France 539,000,000 francs for the provision of war materials. 
Poincare, the French minister of foreign Affairs, wanted Greece to repay this debt almost in full 
and in gold francs, although properly speaking it was a paper debt.14 The French demands 
appeared impertinent to the Greeks not least because the British had written off the Greek debt 
for the supply of war material. In addition, although Poincare did not dispute that France owed
408.000.000 gold francs to the N.B.G. for covering the cost of the French army in Macedonia, he 
refuted the Greek government's assertion that the damages done by the French in Macedonia 
amounted to 137,000,000 gold francs. In his opinion the value of the damages did not exceed
68.000.000 gold francs. As things stood France was determined to come out of a war debt 
agreement with a net financial gain of almost 63,000,000 gold francs.15
The refusal of the French to sign the I.F.C. declaration < at Geneva in September 1927 led 
to a chain reaction. On the one hand, the other two members of the I.F.C. (i.e. the British and the 
Italian) postponed signing the declaration in the hope that it would be possible by December for all
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three countries to sign concurrently and thus for the I.F.C. to maintain a united front vis a vis the 
international community.16 On the other hand, the Greek minister of Finance did not sign the 
Protocol because he did not want Greece to undertake responsibilities and commitments vis a vis 
the League before the countries sitting on the I.F.C. signed the declaration.
A difficult situation arose as a result of the ‘last minute decision’ of France. It was technically 
impossible for the British and the Italians to bypass the French objection by majority vote and 
establish I.F.C. supervision over the loan, because at the time the French member was head of 
the Commission and he had veto power.17 Nor would it have been feasible to assign the 
supervision of the repayment of the loan to some other ad hoc body or person such as the foreign 
advisor at the Central Bank, for the reason that it would have been necessary to make changes in 
the Protocol.18
Following the announcement that the French would not sign, Athens proposed that the 
subject of the war debt be referred to international arbitration. However, the French delegate at 
Geneva refused.19 In the meanwhile, the Bank of England, the Treasury and the Foreign Office 
became concerned that the League scheme might fall through and that the Greeks might throw 
up' the sponge before the December meeting of the Council. For news arrived from Greece in 
mid October that Kafandaris was so disheartened by the obstinacy displayed by the French that 
he was close to deserting the League scheme altogether and was flirting again with the notion of 
raising a loan on the open market.20
Niemeyer and Leith Ross of the Treasury rushed to offer ‘sound’ advise to both French and 
Greek experts. Niemeyer privately proposed to each side that they "should agree to wipe the 
slate clean and call quits". Athens agreed but Paris remained adamant.21 Tsouderos officially put 
forward this suggestion to the French on November 15 1927 only to have it rejected. Finally, the 
French under the pressure of the British Treasury and the Bank of England accepted to refer the 
matter to international arbitration.22 At the eleventh hour -i.e. on December 8 1927 - one day 
before the December sessions of the Financial Committee and the Council were over- an 
arbitration agreement was signed with Greece.23 Hurriedly, the same day the annex of the 
Protocol assigning the I.F.C. to supervise the loan was signed also.
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Hence, in the end the whims of the French did not change the course of events. 
Nevertheless, this incident is important. In addition, to depicting that France, in conformity to 
Britain, used the I.F.C. as a lever to extract concessions from Greece,24 it also highlights that: 
First, the stabilization of the drachma within the framework of a League plan was basically a British 
affair and that the French -to put it mildly- were indifferent as to whether the League plan would be 
carried out. Second, the Bank of England by this stage was keen to ensure that the Greek 
stabilization plan would be put into practice. If the latter did not materialize the Bank of England 
considered that it would suffer a blow to its and the League's prestige.25 Third, up to the last 
moment Greece was not committed to the idea of a League plan cum loan.
Above the 'indirect' cost of the Stabilization Loan -namely the concessions that the 
government was called to make in order to secure the loan- have been presented. These, 
together with the financial terms imposed (as for example the real rate of interest charged), and 
the degree of external control it entailed constitute the total real cost of the loan. The conclusion 
that emerges is that Greece was a victim of the limited options it faced. Notably, its access to the 
international capital market was to a large extent 'determined* by the governments of Britain, the 
U.S.A. and France. All three exploited the power they wielded over Greece in order to extract 
concessions of various types.
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Chapter 3
The Loan
Up to early December 1927, there was no certainty as to whether the League stabilization 
plan would materialize. Due to the obstacles raised by France, the Greek government did not 
preclude the possibility of resorting to the open market for a 'stabilization loan'. And, after the 
French withdrew their objections on December 8 1927, for five weeks the major issue was 
whether the League ban would be raised by Hambros or whether the government would defect 
and raise a 100% American loan. The purpose of this chapter is to describe in detail how these 
events unfolded.
3.1. The Swedish Counter Offer
While the Financial Committee had been deliberating during its June 1927 session the 
terms under which the League would carry out a stabilization plan in Greece, in Athens, a group of 
Swedish banks, through their Greek agent, approached the government and offered to arrange a 
£9,000,000 loan. Reportedly, this group was controlled almost entirely by American interests and 
had a large amount of idle funds at its disposal. The money had been raised to purchase from the 
French government the national match monopoly but this project fell when the French Parliament 
refused to give its approval.1
The terms offered by the Swedes were not exactly appealing from a financial viewpoint. 
f The proposed loan would b s ^ r interest at 7% and would be floated at 94. The spread 
(commission) demanded would be 7 points, i.e. the net produce of the ban would be 87 and the 
real rate of interest 8%.2 However, this offer did not involve the League of Nations and the Greek 
government would not be required to appoint a foreign supervisor or advisor. In addition, 
£3,000,000 would be made available for refugee work 'immediately upon acceptance of the 
proposition by the Greek government'. The idea that it would be possible to raise a stabilization 
cum refugee loan Immediately and on the open market inevitably appeared attractive. 
The Swedes had touched a soft spot for there was widespread resentment among the public and
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within the Populist party against the existing involvement of the League in the settlement of the 
refugees and the pending League stabilization scheme.
The timing of the Swedish offer, as Skinner -the American minister in Athens- noted, 
created an embarrassing situation for Kafandaris. The Greek minister of Finance, who was in 
Geneva, sent a telegram stating that the results of the negotiations held with the League were 
extremely favourable and hence it would not be necessary to negotiate for a loan on the open 
market. This statement was at the time interpreted as meaning that an arrangement had already 
been reached in private with Hambros. This was not far from the truth.3
The proroyalist press and the Populist party presented in a favourable light the Swedish 
proposal and embarked on a personal attack on Kafandaris who was accused of being "bound to 
his British friends”, to such an extent that he was not open to other "more advantageous" offers 
than the one made by Hambros.4 Throughout the summer of 1927 Kafandaris did not seem to 
give serious consideration to the Swedish offer. However, he almost came close to deserting the 
League and assigning the stabilization loan to the Swedes in the early autumn of 1927, because 
he feared that the French would not allow the I.F.C. to supervise the League loan rather than 
because he was influenced by the opposition.5
Upon being informed of Kafandaris fears', Niemeyer retorted that if Greece accepted the 
Swedish offer and rejected the League scheme, it was probable that the League might refuse to 
have further dealings with Athens and that the market would not look with favour on Greek loans. 
As a result, stabilization "would be either impossible or carried out under the worst possible 
conditions".6 Thus, Kafandaris was discouraged from 'searching' for a loan on the open market 
either in Sweden or elsewhere. Nevertheless, the incident is of interest in that it portrays the 
intensity of Greek aversion to foreign control.
3.2. Final Negotiations With Hambros for the Conclusion of a Loan Agreement
Even after the Council of the League of Nations gave the green light on December 9 1927, 
there was no certainty that Hambros would be assigned the loan. Though the flotation date had 
been set for the end of January 31 1928, this uncertainty prevailed up to the 10th of January. 
The reason was that Kafandaris in December began to flirt with the idea of raising the League loan
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totally in the U.S.A. Three American firms -which incidentally had no affiliation with Hambros- made 
offers: Chapman & Co., J.W.Seligman & Co., and Blair & Co. Reportedly, the first two banks made 
offers that were not considered worthy of attention.7 However, Blair offered to provide a 6.5% 
loan under terms roughly similar to those of Hambros 8 Incidentally, this firm had raised large loans 
in 1922 and 1927 for railway construction in Yugoslavia.9 (For the interest of these American 
banks in Greek infrastructure schemes see Book II: Section I, Chapter 2 and Section II, Chapters 1 
and 2)
Kafandaris announced that he found the idea of placing a loan with Blair appealing.10 The 
possibility that the League loan might be raised in the U.S.A. set off a panic at Hambros, the 
League quarters, and the National Bank of Greece. It is not easy to determine whether the 
finance minister's preference for an American flotation was genuine or whether it was simply a 
tactical move in order to force Hambros to improve its terms. However, Kafandaris must have 
sounded convincing as Tsouderos and Diomedes sped to write to him long letters in which they 
insisted that Greece should stick with Hambros.11 Under the circumstances, Hambro came up the 
last moment with a surprise offer on the 9th of January 1928. The bank would float the ban at an 
exceptional 6% with an issue price of 85,5 and this move swayed Kafandaris. No other 
banker had offered to raise a 6% loan. The Greek minister of finance preferred this formula to the 
alternative offers of 7% or 6.5% because the burden on the budget would be less heavy and a 
precedent would be set for future flotations.12 (See Table 1)
Table 1
Terms of the Various Loan Offers Made for the Stabilization Loan to be Raised 
Under the Auspices of the League of Nations (January 1928)
Issuing House Nominal 
Interest Rate
Issue Price Real 
Interest Rate
Hambros
First offer 7 % 93 7.5 %
Second offer 6.5 % 88 7.4 %
Third offer 6 % 85,5 7 %
Blair
First offer 7 % 89 7.8 %
Second offer 6.5 % 88,5 7.4 %
Compiled from: B.G./T.A., Document 22/33: Kafandaris to Zaimis, January 9 1928.
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Following the government's decision to assign the loan to Hambros, a draft contract was 
prepared. It was placed under the scrutiny of Tsouderos, the deputy governor of the N.B.G. This 
procedure was necessary because Hambros tried to strike a deal more advantageous than the 
First Refugee Loan in two respects. It wanted to charge a higher fee and desired to include a 
clause stating that: "The Bankers shall have the opportunity of contracting for all future external 
bans proposed to be issued by the Government during the currency of this ban, upon terms not 
more onerous to the Government than those offered by any other party." Hambros had tried 
without success to include such a clause in the contract for the First Refugee Loan in December 
1924.13 The goal of Athens was to achieve at least as good, if not better terms than those 
holding for the first League loan.14 Under the insistence of Tsouderos, Hambros retracted and 
accepted a fee lower than that charged for the First Refugee Loan, (see Table 2 below) In 
addition, it was not able to tie the hands of the Greeks with respect to future borrowing. The 
government refused to promise all future bans to Hambros, but committed itself for the one year 
folbwing the signing of the contract not to float an external ban without prior consultation with 
Hambros and its associates who were to float the American tranche of the ban.15
As indicated in Table 2, the Stabilization Loan was issued on terms more favourable than 
the First Refugee Loan. It should be noted that whereas for the First Refugee Loan interest was 
charged from 40 days prior to fbtation, with the Stabilization Loan it was agreed that the interest 
rate would only apply from the day after issue. Also, while with the First Refugee Loan provision 
was made for an accumulative sinking fund this was not now the case with the new contract. 
Similarly, whereas with the first League loan the bankers had to provide to the government the 
produce of the loan in instalments within three months of its fbtation, with the Stabilization Loan 
they were obliged to grant the produce in full within one month.16 Furthermore, with the 
Stabilization Loan provision was made for an early redemption. Namely, the government was 
allowed to begin redeeming the ban -nominally a 40 year issue- as of August 1 1938. Finally, 
though the ban was placed under the control of the I.F.C., it was agreed that it would not be 
necessary to assign new revenues to the Commission.17
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Table 2
Comparison of the Financial Terms of the Two Greek League Loans: the First Refugee Loan (of 
December 1924) and the Stabilization Loan (of January 1928)
First Refugee 
Loan
S tab iliza tion  | 
Loan I
price bonds sold to public
price of issue
spread
nominal interest rate
real interest rate paid by the government, 
redemption period
88 %
81 %
7 points 
7 %
8.7 %
40 years
91 % I 
85.5 %
4.5 points 
6 %
7 %
40 years
International comparisons
average issue price of foreign government 
loans raised during the current year in 
Britain1
92.2 %2 94.8 %3
current banking rate (Britain) 4 %2 4.5 %3
1This figure does not include loans raised by countries belonging to the commonwealth.
^he figure given is the average for 1924.
3The figure given is the average for 1928.
Compiled from: Angelopoulos, ibid, David Butler, Jennie Freeman, British Political Facts 1900-1967.2nd ed., 
(London, 1968), p.225.
Thus, the government had good reason to be pleased with the deal made with Hambros for 
this loan which had a nominal value of £7,500,000 and a real value of £6,500,000. Neither, did it 
appear to be worried any longer about whether Congress would approve the £2,500,000 credits 
for the refugees. (For the earlier worries of the government on this subject see: Book II, Section II, 
Chapter 1.) However, because there was no possibility of securing the ratification of the 
Congress prior to March 1928, the Financial Committee of the League pressed Kafandaris to 
officially announce that
" in the improbable event of the Agreement between the Hellenic Government and 
the Government of the United States of America...not being ratified both by 
Congress and the Greek Parliament before April 30th 1928, the Hellenic 
Government hereby undertakes to raise, in accordance with the Protocol signed by 
the Hellenic Government on 15th September 1927 a loan yielding an effective 
amount of £2,5million sterling supplementary the public issue yielding an effective 
sum of £6,5 million sterling....and ranking pari passu with it".18
No time limit was set for the conclusion of a supplementary loan nor was any commitment 
made as to who would issue it and under what terms. However, the material indicates that 
Hambros took it for granted that it would be the one to issue a supplementary loan.19
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Table 3
Financial Terms of Government Loans Issued Under the Auspices of the League of Nations
C oun try IssueP rice1
Nominal 
Interest Rate
R edem ption
Period
Real 
Interest Rate2
Austria(1922) 80 6 % 20 8.95 % I
Hungary(1924) 88 7.5 % 20 9.25 % I
Germany(1924) 92 7 % 25 7.95 %
Greece(1924) 88 7 % 40 8.25 %
Bulgaria(1926) 92 7 % ? 7.6 %
Estonia (1927) 94,5 7 % 40 7.4 %
Greece(1928) 91 6 % 40 6.6 %
Bulgarian 928) 97 7.5 % 40 7.7 %
1 Price at which bonds are sold to the public at the time of the flotation of the loan.
2This real interest rate has been estimated on the basis of the price at which the bonds were sold to the 
public. The expenses for commission and stamp duty have not been taken into account.
Compiled from: N.B.G./H.A., X Loans, A' Public loans, File 145, Refugee Loan: Diomedes to N.B.G., 
November 11, 1924; Also B.M./V.A., File 51, document titled: 'Loans', date: 1928 (month and day not 
specified).
Discussions about the details of the Hambros contract were over by the 26th of January and 
the door was open for the flotation of the loan. Interestingly, although Congress did not ratify the 
credits before May 1929, a supplementary loan was not raised, it is not clear why the government 
waited patiently for Congress! Perhaps it had no other option. No bank would have been willing to 
undertake such a fbtation. For indeed, the record of post stabilization capital inflow was far from 
impressive. This devebpment comes into stark contrast to the fact that the Stabilization Loan 
signified the peak point regarding Greece's foreign borrowing capability. It is indicative that it had 
the lowest real rate of interest among all of the loans floated on the international capital market in 
the twenties by: i) the Greek government and ii) the League of Nations. Indeed, as Table 3 above 
indicates the most onerous of the eight League bans raised (i.e. the 1924 Hungarian Loan) had a 
real interest rate of 9.25% compared to 6.6,% for the Greek Stabilization Loan. Also, the 1928 
Bulgarian Stabilization Loan compared unfavourably with the one for Greece.
3.3. The Fbtation of the Loan
The Stabilization Loan, or the Tripartite Loan as it was often called as a result of its triple 
purpose, was issued on January 31 1928. Compared to the First Refugee Loan the new League 
ban had a much more international character.(Table 4) It was fully issued outside Greece. Apart
168
from Britain and the U.S.A., Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland participated. Indicative of its 
international character was the fact that there were two issues: a sterling and a dollar.(Table 5). 
The extent of its multi nationalism, however, should not be exaggerated. In quantitative terms the 
loan was highly concentrated. Britain and the U.S.A. took 85.5% of the loan capital, compared to 
80% for the First Refugee Loan.
Hambros headed the sterling issue (i.e. the flotation of the loan in Britain, Italy, and 
Sweden) but its overall responsibility was only for 44.5% compared to 61% for the First Refugee 
Loan. It is worth noting that the Swedish participant the Enskilda Bank belonged to the 
Wallenburgs. The family had been friendly with the Hambro's since 1879 and also had close 
connections with the League.20 Infact, Jacob Wallenburg, the director of the Enskilda Bank, had 
participated in the December 1927 session of the Financial Committee.21 Regarding the dollar 
issue, Hambros' arranged that it be undertaken by its American associates Speyers and the 
National City Bank. Both banks were familiar with foreign issues although they were not leaders in 
this field. It is obvious, that in substance the Greek government was not able to relieve itself from 
dependence on Hambros.(Table 5).
Table 4
Geographical Breakdown of the Two Greek Loans Issued Under the Auspices 
of the League of Nations Loans
C oun try First Refugee Loan (1924)
S tabilization Loan 
(1928)
Britain 61 % 44.5 %
U.S.A. 19 % 41 %
Greece 20 % -
Italy - 5 %
Sweden - 4 %
Switzerland - 5.5 %
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1932. (Athens, 1933), pp. 513-514, 
520-521.
169
Table 5
Issuing Houses that Participated in the Flotation of the Stabilization Loan
Sterling Issue
i) Hambros and Erlangers:
ii) Banca Commerdale Italiana & Credito Italiano:
iii) Stockholms Enskilda Bank & Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget:
£ 3,370,960
£ 400,000 
£ 300,000
Total nominal value of sterling issue: £ 4,070,960
Dollar Issue
i) Speyer and Company & National City Company:
ii) Credit Suisse:
$15,000,000 
$ 2,000,000
Total nominal value of dollar issue: $17,000,000
Compiled from G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1932. (Athens, 1933), pp. 520-521.
Apparently, the fact that this loan had an 'international' character was in large part due to the 
intervention of the Financial Committee and the new importance of New York. A note prepared on 
January 6 1928 by Felkin of the Financial Committee reveals a concern not to appear totclosely 
associated in the eyes of the public with British financial interests. As Felkin put it to Kafandaris, a 
flotation with an 'international character* would be "most desirable both in the interests of Greece 
and those of the League". It was for this reason that the League official Felkin put forward the idea 
of a separate dollar and sterling issue and proposed that: the American tranche be only 
£2,500,000, the British not surpass £3,000,000 and that the international capital markets of 
France, Holland, Italy, Switzerland and Sweden raise a total of £1,119,000.22 Felkin seemed to 
believe that his plan would materialize because he had the tacit consent of Kafandaris and he had 
prepared Sir Eric Hambro for an international flotation. Hambros duly approached Dutch and 
French financiers, but they showed no interest in a Greek loan.23
The flotation went reasonably well. The New York issue was "heavily oversubscribed". The 
London issue was covered by the public six times over. In comparative terms this was not a 
remarkable feat considering that the London tranche of the first Greek League loan had been 
oversubscribed by twentyone times!24 (The material at hand does not reveal how the flotation 
went in Sweden, Switzerland, and Italy.)
170
The bonds were offered to the investors on attractive terms. They were sold at a price of 91 
and this was a good deal for the public considering that the average issue price of loans floated 
during 1928 in London and New York was 94,8- The real return to the investor at 6.6% was 
roughly equal to the net value of capitalisation of the Belgian Stabilization Loan during December 
1927. (Table 6).
Table 6
Net Value of Capitalization of Various Stabilization Loans on December 1927
Austrian 6.10 %
Czechoslovak 7.45 %
German 6.7/8 %
Serbian 8.10 %
Belgian 6.55 %
Source: G.H.L.A./D.A., Negotiations of Tsouderos and Venizelos, London 1927, Diomedes to Kafandaris, 
December 22 1927.
From the government point of view it was not a bad deal. The 6% nominal Interest rate 
charged, though not low by the standards of the day, was the lowest rate to be charged for a 
Greek flotation during the interwar period. The real interest rate amounted to 7% and the current 
bank rate in the international capital market (London and New York) was 4.5%. The 'spread' 
between the two figures was 2,4 points. This was low in comparison to the 4,6 point 'spread' for 
the First Refugee Loan. (See Table 2) Nevertheless, inspite of this improvement, the Greek 
government continued to remain a weak partner in the international capital market. In an ironic way 
the Stabilization Loan failed to become the starting point of a massive foreign capital inflow. The 
lateness of the scheme was an important -though not the exclusive factor- responsible for this 
'disappointing' outcome! Let it be noted at this point that the issuing of foreign securities peaked 
in New York in 1927 and in London in 1928.25
At the time of the flotation of the loan there was euphoria in Greece. Although there was 
criticism from those who saw the loan as an enslavement to British interests,26 it was assumed 
that the country was about to embark into a new era of financial stability and prosperity.27 Abroad, 
the scheme was seen as a 'milestone' in the economic history of modern Greece.28 However, 
concern was expressed in official circles that the government would no longer curtail its hunger for 
foreign loans in order to finance its infrastructure development 'programme'.29 The tone of the
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British Foreign Office report for Greece in 1927 is characteristic. Regarding the public work
schemes and loans it stated that:
“One cannot but feel misgiving, not only as to wisdom of this policy at this juncture, 
of further burdening the coming generations, but also lest this sudden influx of 
foreign capital may not lead to a 'boom' the inevitable resultant reaction from which 
may have the gravest results. It is hoped that those directing the economic policy of 
the country are alive to this danger, and will see that the bans are only taken up 
gradually and as the works for which they are intended progress."30
In the end, the amount of foreign capital that entered the country for infrastructure
development proved 'inadequate ', not because the state was hesitant to resort to the
international capital market but for the reason that it was unable to conceive and steer
a well thought out economic policy. Of course, the external environment -i.e. the drain of
capital back to the U.S.A. from late 1927 and the world financial crisis of 1931- and the late date at
which Greece stabilized also played a part in impeding the 'smooth flow' of capital. (For a detailed
discussion of poststabilization capital inflow and the importance of each of these blockages' see
Book II, Section III and Book I, Section III, Phase Three, Part 2).
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PHASE THREE 
THE STABILIZATION PLAN IN ACTION (1928-1932)
1. The Institutional Factor and the Demise of Free Convertibility
1.1. Introductory Comments
Before considering the stabilization plan in action, it is appropriate to make a few comments 
regarding how the plan was received in Greece, and pose two critical questions. Those who 
reacted most adversely to the financial reconstruction plan of the League were conservative 
politicians (the Populist Party) and the commercial banks. The former resented the extension of 
Britain's economic stronghold over Greece and the growing state interventionism. The creation of 
a state central bank was seen as yet another incidence of statism, although theoretically this new 
bank was an autonomous institution. The second group fought stabilization because they had 
profited from speculation.1 It is therefore, difficult to accept the thesis put forward by recent 
research that: "The stabilization of 1928 which was based on the currency principle constitutes a 
confinement of commercial interests by the industrial-banking capital in the struggle for the 
political financial hegemony of the Bourgeoisie in Greece".2 This argument is based on the false 
assumption that banking capital was united and homogeneous. As has already been stated the 
commercial banks did not share with the country's largest banking institution -the National Bank of 
Greece- the conviction that stabilization was necessary. Furthermore, this kind of argument 
overlooks the fact that the business community -the merchants and industrialists- shared certain 
interests in common. Namely, on the one hand they were united in their demand for monetary 
stability, and on the other hand they feared the possibility of a credit squeeze. Indeed, the light' 
credit policy applied under the instigation of the Bank of England, the I.F.C., and the League 
(from the second half of 1925 onwards) was resented by commercial as well as industrial interests. 
Thus, in no way is it possible to establish a case for a concerted action on the part of the banks and 
industrialists.
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If stabilization is to be viewed in terms of power struggles, it would be more accurate to 
propose the following interpretation: Stabilization marks the imposition of a radical reform in the 
banking system which was instigated by foreign control and 'passively' condoned by the state. As 
a result of this process the National Bank acquired a more liquid and healthy portfolio and was able 
to concentrate more effectively than before on the development of Greek industry. But, it must 
be underlined that this last phenomenon was an 'unwitting by-product' of stabilization, that it 
involved only one bank and not the whole of the banking system.
Moving on to the questions, the foremost one that cries for an answer is: in what way were 
political and financial stabilization interconnected? Which preceded the other? Political 
stabilization appears to have preceded financial stabilization but also to have resulted from it. This 
may seem a contradictory statement but it depicts the situation as it evolved. On the one hand, 
prior to the setting up of the League scheme, the coalition government showed to the nation and 
the outside world that Greece was well on its paih to attaining a true parliamentary democracy and 
adjusting to the post war modus vivendi. Irredentism, militarism were pushed aside and the war 
debts were settled. On the other hand the existence of the coalition was staked on the League 
scheme and financial stabilization. That is political stabilization came to depend on financial 
stabilization. This was something which was recognized both at home and abroad. The following 
two quotations may attest to it. Venizelos wrote to Kafandaris on April 7 1927: "...without foreign 
assistance the rehabilitation which is required for the reestablishment of normal political life will not 
be possible...". A few months later a Foreign Office Official wrote in the minutes of his 
department:"We must, I think face the fact that if the Greek loan is again held up at the December 
meeting of the Council the Greek Government would almost certainly fall and Greece will once 
more enter the period of coups d'etat and military dictatorships from which she was, after infinite 
difficulty rescued last year."3 Another significant question is whether Greece's financial 
supervisors actually impeded Greece from stabilizing? They did not but it is clear that they 
prevented her from stabilizing on her own terms and possibly delayed stabilization until the eve of 
the inter-war depression. The Greek perception of what stabilization should entail did not 
coincide with either the philosophy or policy goals of her^supervisors.
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1.2. The Contribution of This Thesis
In April 1932 the drachma reverted to the system of forced circulation. The collapse of free 
convertibility was in large part a result of the cumulative negative impact of the world financial crisis 
on Greek external accounts. These circumstances and the inability of Greece to eliminate its trade 
gap throughout the twenties has been analysed extensively.4 (For data on the chronic structural 
gap in the balance of trade and the imbalance in the balance of payments see Appendix 3, Tables 
1 and 2). However, it is our contention, that free convertibility was doomed to fail even if the 
aforementioned factors had not existed* /The reason being that the new institutional framework 
created by Greece's supervisors was not allowed to function smoothly. The purpose of this 
section is to trace the unfolding of this process and uncover the incentives as well as the actions 
of the various actors who opposed the new banking order. Seen in a larger compass the Greek 
stabilization plan demonstrates the difficulties associated with structural change when it is 
imposed by external fiat. Legal stabilization and the founding of the central bank opened up a 
new page in the story of Greece's 'inherent resistance' to the principles of orthodox monetary and 
fiscal policy as perceived by the British. The Bank of Greece during the years of free convertibility 
was caught in the center of a whirlpool. It failed to manage the gold standard in a satisfactory way 
because it suffered from 'structural flaws'. On the one hand, it was not willing to satisfy all of the 
guidelines as laid down by the Geneva Protocol of September 1927. Diomedes, the French and 
German educated governor of the Bank of Greece, never really dropped his 'banking' school 
principles and failed to adopt wholeheartedly - the precepts of the 'currency' school as 
propagated by the Bank of England. On the other hand, the Bank of Greece operated in a hostile 
environment. Venizelos, who became once again Premier shortly after stabilization, took too long 
to grasp the significance of why it was necessary to have a central bank. He also did not abide by 
the fiscal rules as laid down by the League of Nations in the Geneva Protocol. As for the National 
Bank of Greece and the commercial banks, they literally exploited free convertibility in order to 
erode the foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Greece. What is more, the I.F.C., although it 
was in principle a staunch supporter of monetary stability 'undermined* stabilization by refusing to 
alter its methods regarding the administration of the assigned revenues that came under its 
authority!
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The campaign of Venizelos, the National Bank of Greece and the commercial banks has 
been presented in the literature.5 However, no reference has been made to contributory action 
by the I.F.C. The reason for this oversight may be that the antiparathesis between the I.F.C. and 
the League during the term of free convertibility did not receive publicity in Greece. The country's 
supervisors pleaded with Greek officials not to expose them in public.6
1.3. The Government Reneges on to the Geneva Protocol
Regarding fiscal policy, already in 1928-1929, the state broke the commitment it had 
undertaken not to raise budget expenditure above 9,000,000,000 drs. until the end of the 
financial year 1929-1930.7 It also wasted the large budget surpluses of 1927-1928 and 1928- 
1929. Only during these two fiscal years was the state able to attain substantial surpluses.8 (See 
Table 3, Appendix 3) The second way in which the state undermined stabilization was indirect. 
Venizelos took it for granted that financial policy was to be dictated by the cabinet and not 
regulated by the central bank.9 It was usual practice for the government to issue orders regarding 
the level of the discount rate or operations on the open market.10 The Bank of Greece did not 
always comply-thanks to the intervention of Horace C. Finlayson, the financial advisor appointed 
to the bank by the League of Nations. For example, in September 1930 -at a time when the Bank 
of Greece was loosing large amounts of gold- the government ordered the Bank of Greece to 
lower the interest rate by 1 unit because industry was crying out for more funds. Apparently, the 
foreign advisor for reasons of central banking prudence did not allow the bank to obey this 
command.11
Apart from intervening in the sphere of credit policy, the government slighted the Bank of
Greece in one more respect. It failed to consult it on general financial matters. One example is
that the Bank was not asked to participate in the negotiations for the conclusion of the first loan to
be raised after stabilization for infrastructure development. (See: Book II, Section III, Chapter 2).12
In the words of a British Foreign Office official:
"the present [i.e. Venizelos] Government, led as it is by a statesman of great 
determination and self-will, is not in the least likely voluntarily to contribute towards 
the growth in importance and power of an institution [i.e. the Bank of Greece] which 
having become strong enough, could dictate financial policy to the Government 
itself, unfettered by statutory obligation or indeed by anything but the civic virtues of 
its governors".13
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Fmlayson's statement that the government tried to strangle the central bank at birth may 
have been an exaggeration. However, the fact was that, it did not respect the autonomy of the 
bank and was slow to realize the expediency of strengthening it vis a vis the commercial banks. 
Actually, Venizelos began to back the independence of the Bank of Greece and give it strength 
vis a vis the N.B.G. and the commercial banks only once the world crisis broke out.14
1.4. The Campaign of the N.B.G. and the Commercial Banks Against the Bank of Greece
The National Bank of Greece wanted to retain its quasi monopolistic position in the banking 
sector. It was for this reason that it proposed to act as the permanent representative of the Bank 
of Greece in the countryside. The Bank of Greece rejected this proposition mainly because a 
large part of the foreign exchange coming into the country was concentrated in five major 
provinces. Thus, by May 1931 the central bank had set up 8 branches and 11 agencies in the 
countryside.15 However, the National Bank managed to impede the centralisation of the state 
funds. In short, the story had as follows: The Geneva Protocol stipulated that within two years the 
accounts of the various Caisses (Public fund bodies) of the State would have to be transferred to 
the new central bank. As things stood all the (available) surplus funds of the Caisses were 
deposited by a special arrangement with the National Bank of Greece. The latter had made a good 
profit from this 'deal' because the amounts involved were large and the interest it paid to the 
Caisses was 1% lower than for other depositors.16
In February 1928, the N.B.G. 'pressed' the Greek government to extend its exclusive right 
to hold the surplus funds of the Caisses up to 1951. Naively, the governor of the Bank of Greece, 
Diomedes, seconded the N.B.G. in its request because he did not want to see his old institution 
completely emasculated as a result of the banking reform and because he believed that the 
National Bank would not use these funds to 'fight' the new central bank.17 This move was against 
the letter of the Geneva Protocol. Niemeyer and Finlayson voiced a strong objection on the 
grounds that the centralisation of the public funds was "vitally necessary for the proper control of 
credit and currency".18 They feared that the N.B.G. would employ these funds in the market in 
such a manner so as to undermine the financial policy of the Bank of Greece.19 However, in view 
of the insistence of the N.B.G., the Financial Committee was forced to go halfway. A compromise
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solution was reached in July 1929, whereby it was agreed that the N.B.G. would retain the surplus 
funds of the Caisses so long as the Bank of Greece did not consider this arrangement would 
conflict with its credit policy. In mid 1930, the Bank of Greece appointed a representative to the 
board of directors of the Caisses because it felt that the N.B.G. was exploiting its position of 
power.20 Nevertheless, this corrective move did not alter the basic fact that the Bank of Greece 
had a limited capacity to intervene in the open market. Notably, three years after its establishment, 
the total portfolio of the Bank of Greece was only 365,000,000 drs. whereas that of the National 
Bank was 6,000,000,000 drs 21
Apart from the fact that it was short of funds, the Bank of Greece was in a precarious position 
because its very existence was staked on its ability to maintain free convertibility. According to its 
statutes the issuing privilege could "be revoked at any time" if the bank failed to ensure that the 
gold value of its notes remained stable.22 The task of sustaining the drachma at a stable value did 
not prove easy. In the second half of 1928, during what was the 'stabilization' euphoria stage, 
there had been a net inflow of foreign funds in Greece for the purpose of buying Greek securities. 
But, this 'exceptional* trend did not last. Already from the beginning of 1929, foreign finance was 
scared away as a result of Venizelos' policy regarding the exchangeable bonds and the intense 
criticism waged against Power and Traction for its handling of the Athens electricity concession. 
What is more, a concerted drain in exchange took place as the large commercial banks invested 
some £3,000,000 abroad in order to speculate in foreign securities. By a twist of irony, in 1931 - 
by which time it had become apparent that the Bank's reserve was being rapidly depleted- the 
commercial banking community began to put pressure on the government to amalgamate the 
Bank of Greece with the National Bank of Greece. (For the depletion of the foreign exchange 
reserves of the Bank of Greece see below Table 1) This exasperated Niemeyer. As he put it this 
proposition was crazy and the Central bank's lack of strength was due to the fact that from day one 
the trading banks had fought it.23
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Table 1
Foreign Exchange and Gold Reserves of the Bank of Greece in Pound Sterling
May 14 1928 £ 10,570,663
End of 1928 £ 11,297,935
End of 1929 £ 8,316,000
End of 1930 £ 8,028,533
September 26 1931 £ 4,716,836
End of 1931 £ 3,422,448
April 26 1932 £ 650,264
End of 1932 £ 1,894,248
Compiled from: B.G./T.A., Document: 23/1, League of Nations, Financial Committee, Extraordinary Session 
held in London, June 6-14th 1933, Report to the Council on Greece, p.31. Also Document 46/83. Memo 
prepared by Finlayson, November 19 1929.
The Bank of Greece eventually improved somewhat its control over the commercial banks 
during the financial crisis of 1931-1932. In early 1931 a bill was passed obliging the banks to 
either keep a reserve of 12% or deposit 7% of their sight deposits in a blocked account at the 
central bank. Let us remind the reader that this measure which was in agreement with the 
orthodox 'banking' principles of the day had been initially advocated by Sir Henry Strackosh when 
the statutes of the bank were being drawn.24 However, it should be underlined that the passing 
of this 'orthodox' bill did not signify that henceforth the Bank of Greece consistently or blindly 
copied the principles of monetary restraint and accepted advice offered by the Bank of England 
officials. A notable example is that at the end of 1931 and the beginning of 1932 -at which point 
of time the drain on its foreign exchange reserves by the commercial banks had attained massive 
proportions- it pursued an 'unorthodox' policy from the point of view of orthodox central banking 
principles. Namely, it increased substantially its commercial credits and discounts in order to 
enhance its position in the market25
To recapitulate. The stabilization plan was not applied wholeheartedly by the Greek 
authorities. The fiscal guidelines laid down by the Geneva Protocol were not adhered to. More 
importantly, prior to 1930-1931 the Bank of Greece was not able to function as a true 'Bank of 
banks'. It was basically an 'outside' institution, run by a governor who did not want to change 
drastically the existing organization of the banking sector. The government did not take it 
seriously. For its part the N.B.G. wanted to maintain control over credit policy and entertained the 
hope that it might one day amalgamate with the Bank of Greece. As for the commercial banks they 
were consistent to their tradition of going after a quick profit. They were against the existence of a 
stable drachma. As they saw it, the new monetary framework installed by the League had robbed
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them of large profits they had made in the past in exchange speculation and they were 
determined to exploit convertibility so as to find a new source of income (i.e. speculation in foreign 
securities). It should also be noted that the commercial banks resented the Bank of Greece 
because they were against the system of rediscounts it established. In the past, the N.B.G. had 
given the commercial banks unwarranted credits at very low interest rates "in order to appease or 
mitigate them" for the fact that they lived a shadowy existence.26
1.5. The I.F.C 'Undermines' Stabilization
The I.F.C. as opposed to the commercial banks did not want to undermine stabilization. 
However, it unwittingly contributed to its demise because it was not willing to divest itself of the 
arrangements established by the Law of Control back in 1898 regarding the management of the 
assigned revenues. Namely, these were:i) the blocking in its account for long periods at a time 
funds that belonged effectively to the government, ii) the purchase of foreign exchange 
whenever this suited it on an irregular basis and iii) the holding of large balances abroad. This 
state of affairs had been set up at a time of monetary instability in order to protect the interests of 
the bondholders in the event of a Greek financial collapse. However, from the moment that 
Greece stabilized, these safeguards appeared to be no longer necessary (at least theoretically!) 
and interfered with the smooth functioning of free convertibility.
It is notable that the I.F.C. at the beginning of each financial half year retained all the 
proceeds of the assigned revenues until it secured in foreign exchange an amount sufficient to 
service the debt for that half year. This safeguard did not interfere with monetary policy directly. 
However, it served to weaken the state portfolio considering that the I.F.C. controlled almost half 
of the country's tax resources. The flow of receipts into the hands of the government was 
irregular and for long periods- indeed many months at a time large sums became immobilized in 
the hands of the I.F.C.27 It was quite a usual phenomenon for the Commission's deposits with the 
Central Bank to be abundant whereas the deposits of the state were insignificant. For example, in 
February 1931 the I.F.C. held with the Central Bank a deposit in excess of 200,000,000 drs. 
whereas the state in its current account held only 10,000,000 drs.!28 This situation helped to 
enlarge the internal debt, for the quixotic situation arose whereby the Bank of Greece would lend
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to the government at a high interest rate funds that really belonged to the government!29 
Finlayson, asked the I.F.C. to spread over the year the amounts retained by the assigned 
revenues.30 But, the Commission refused to accede to this demand, and it brought up the legal 
point that to depart from its usual practice would entail a transgression of the Law of Control.31 
However, in the spring of 1931 it made the following concession: to "pay over [to the 
government] of its own accord from time to time such sums [i.e. surplus revenues] as may safely 
be released without any formal surrender of [the] priority rights of the bondholders".32 The 
government was not satisfied by this concession and it actually threatened to appeal to the 
League of Nations. In the end, this threat was not carried out as Ramsey of the British Legation in 
Athens 'scolded' Venizelos by asking whether the latter would like the removal of the I.F.C. 
altogether33
Regarding the second practice, the I.F.C. purchased the exchange required for the service 
of the foreign debt under its control during the first two months of every half year. In the past - i.e. 
during the days of monetary instability, the yield of the assigned revenues left a margin of 50- 
60%. But, after stabilization this increased to 180%.34 Thus, this policy of the I.F.C. to hold large 
exchange balances abroad appeared anachronistic 35 Finlayson tried without success to 
convince the I.F.C. to spread the purchases of foreign exchange on a monthly basis and to 
transfer its foreign account to the Bank of Greece.36 He also wanted the I.F.C. to stop buying 
more foreign exchange than was necessary for the annual service of the loans under its control.37 
Finlayson went so far as to claim that following stabilization, the I.F.C. had become an anomaly 
because it was an independent body which for all practical purposes was "free to determine its 
foreign exchange operations without any absolutely control by the Bank of Greece"38 To put it 
succinctly, he looked down upon the I.F.C. and tended to treat the latter as an institution 
subordinate to him and the Bank of Greece.
This attitude of Finlayson did not please the British Treasury. The latter did not want the
I.F.C. to surrender its priority rights. However, following Britain's suspension of the gold standard 
in September 1931, it urged the Commission to become more compliant towards the Bank of 
Greece so that the negative consequences of this measure on the external value of the Greek 
drachma might be alleviated. Thus, in late September 1931 the Commission 'allowed'
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100.000.000 drs. (i.e. the surplus in its current account) to be placed on time deposit with the 
Bank of Greece till December 31 1931, in order to improve the reserve position of the Bank of 
Greece which at that stage had fallen below the statutory minimum level.39
Probably, the most interesting aspect of the undermining of free convertibility by the I.F.C. 
is the conflict which developed at a personal level between Roussin, and Finlayson. Roussin was 
appointed on the I.F.C. by the British Treasury whereas Finlayson was chosen by the Bank of 
England.40 Finlayson appears to have acted with a relative degree of freedom from the Bank of 
England and the Financial Committee of the League of Nations. Nevertheless, to a certain extent 
his antithesis with Roussin can in part be attributed to the fact that the Bank of England had a 
wider perspective towards stabilization than the Treasury.
The origins of Finlayson's poor relations with Roussin dated back to the autumn of 1928. At 
that time, Finlayson had apparently advised Venizelos to lower the interest rate of the first series 
of the exchangeable bonds that had been issued in 1926 from 8% to 6% on the grounds that 
Greek credit had improved since stabilization and such a high rate of interest was no longer 
warranted. The proceeds of this 20 year bond loan which had a nominal and real value of
3.500.000.000 drs. (i.e. the equivalent to £9,055,627) went towards indemnifying the refugees 
for the immovable property they had left behind in Turkey 41 Though this was an internal loan a 
large quantity of these bonds had been chanelied through the London Stock market. It was 
believed that one English group held about £1,000,000 worth of these bonds. Naturally, the
I.F.C. was perturbed by Finlayson's proposal. It argued that such a move would be against the 
interests of the bondholders as well as the standing of Greek credit in the City. As Finlayson came 
under fire from the Treasury and the British Legation in Athens, he was forced to recant and 
convince Venizelos not to go ahead with his proposal42 Interestingly, the Foreign Office 
supported wholeheartedly Roussin in the attacks made against the I.F.C. by Finlayson.43 It 
believed that there was "something to be said for a system [i.e. the I.F.C.] which enables what is 
virtually an outpost of the Treasury on the Greek territory to be maintained at Greek expense".44
The British financial supervisors of Greece were not capable of integrating in an effective 
manner I.F.C. responsibilities and the League inspired stabilization plan. Their approach to Greek 
affairs was in this respect ad hoc and was lacking in resolution and boldness. Moreover, neither
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the League of Nations nor the Central Bank of Greece had foreseen the extent of the attack the 
latter was to suffer from the banking establishment and the government. On paper the Bank of 
Greece may have been the most modern institution created by the Bank of England at the time, 
but in reality it was vulnerable. It was able to attain the dominant position that had been envisaged 
by the Bank of England gradually and only after a series of legal measures were passed by the 
state in 1931. These measures were passed at the instigation of Finlayson, representing the 
League of Nations, and the pressure brought about by the world economic crisis. The League of 
Nations encouraged the undertaking of legal measures that would curtail the strength of domestic 
opposition to stabilization, but had shied away from forcing the I.F.C. to alter the anachronistic 
practices of the Law of Control. Could it be that the League did not want to interfere in the 
workings of this international organization because it did not want to set a precedent, in the sense 
that it did not want to encourage the inherent tendency of the Greek state to disclaim international * 
agreements?
1.6. Convertibility is Abandoned
The world crisis was felt in Greece. There was a contraction in trade, the interest and profits 
of Greek capital invested abroad plunged, and the deficit in the current balance of payments grew.
In addition, the drop in imports led to a fall in custom revenues which formed a large percentage of 
government revenues. (See Tables 1,2,3 in Appendix 3). However, the one event that had the 
greatest repercussions on Greece was Britain's decision on September 20 1931 to go off gold.45 
More than 25% of the foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Greece had been in pound 
sterling. Thus, overnight the reserve fell below the statutory lower limit of 40% of currency in 
circulation and sight deposits. (It should be noted that when the Bank of Greece opened in May 
1928, its cover had been equivalent to 53% of currency in circulation and sight deposits)46 The 
suspension of the pound created a stir in Greece for an additional reason. For more than a 
century the Greek business community had made its quotations in sterling. Infact, according to 
Diomedes "many Greeks doubted the existence of God, but none had ever doubted the 
soundness of the pound sterling"47 The government did not follow the British example. It did 
not want to abandon the gold standard because it feared that such a move would damage its
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image abroad and would "signal a headlong flight from the drachma".48 Thus, on September 21 
1931, the drachma was tied to the U.S.A. $ at a rate of $1=77.05 drachmae. (The rate of the 
drachma to the dollar had been since stabilization 77 drs. to the U.S.$).
During the seven days that followed (i.e. from September 22 to September 27) there was 
much private speculation in foreign exchange as a result of the growing mistrust in the drachma. 
The central bank lost $3,419,301 49 Nevertheless, Venizelos insisted that Greece not desert 
free convertibility. Thus, on September 28 1931 a package of ’temporary' measures was taken for 
the protection of the national currency.50 Inspite of these measures, by January 1932 the 
financial situation of Greece had become precarious. The foreign exchange cover of the Bank of 
Greece had fallen to $16,000,000 - this was less than 30% of the monetary circulation and sight 
deposits. Also, Greece was experiencing difficulty in securing the necessary foreign exchange to 
cover the maturing April 1 1932 coupons for the 4% 1910 Loan and the Athens Water Loan.51 In 
addition, for the first time since 1927 there were signs that for the coming fiscal year the state 
budget was going to run a deficit.
In a desperate effort to stave off a financial crisis Venizelos appealed to the governments of 
Britain, France and Italy (i.e the three member countries represented on the I.F.C.) to grant 
Greece a $50,000,000 loan in order to complete the land drainage schemes (in four annual 
installments of $12,500,000 each) and to 'allow' Greece to suspend amortization payments on the 
foreign debt for a period of five years 52 In order to prepare the ground for a loan cum moratorium 
the Prime Minister also asked the Financial Committee of the League of Nations to undertake a 
new report on the financial situation of the country. At the time the League was also studying how 
to assist Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria to cope with the world crisis. The Financial Committee 
showed some understanding. It suggested that Greece suspend the service of the foreign debt 
for one year, that the payments for the sinking fund (i.e. 330,000,000 drs.) be deposited in 
drachmae at the Bank of Greece, that the Bank of Greece lend this amount to the government in 
order to finance outstanding public work schemes, and that a temporary loan of $10,000,000 be 
raised with the guarantee of the Powers until arrangements could be made for a long-term loan. 
But, when it met in mid April 1932, the Council of the League adopted a hard stance. It decided 
that the suspension of the payment of the foreign debt was an issue which would have to be
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discussed between the bondholders and the Greek government. In addition, it did not comment 
on the question of a loan either to Greece or the other countries that had appealed to her in order 
to maintain free convertibility.53
Upon learning of the Council's decision on April 15, Venizelos declared a temporary 
suspension on the payment of the foreign debt. The Ambassadors of Britain, France and Italy 
issued a formal declaration against the government in which they insinuated that there would be 
reprisals. Since Greece knew that it could not raise a loan under any conditions this threat had no 
practical value. On April 24 1932 convertibility was finally abandoned. In September 1932, 
Varvaresos, the new governor of the Bank of Greece announced that for 1932-1933 Greece 
would suspend payments on the sinking fund and would cover only 30% of the interest 
payments.54
It was a mistake for Greece to have maintained convertibility after Britain left the gold 
standard. Notably, Niemeyer had urged the Greeks in the spring of 1931 to follow the example of 
Britain. However, the Greek Prime Minister and the Bank of Greece rejected the suggestion. 
They naively believed that if Greece remained on gold it would be able to further tap the 
international capital market55 The Greek authorities had also made one more mistake. Prior to 
Britain's leaving the gold standard the Bank of Greece had been advised by the Financial 
Committee to convert all of its pound sterling reserves into dollars. However, it had converted 
only half of these reserves into dollars 56
In a nutshell, Greece suffered from two disadvantages. It went on gold at too late a date in 
order to reap the full benefits of international capital flows during the boom of the twenties. Also, 
in an ironic way, it went off gold too late. In closing, it should be remarked that Venizelos in the 
spring of 1932 suggested that Greece ought to have suspended payments on the foreign debt in 
1920 after the ex-Allies imposed a financial embargo as a result of the return of King Constantine. 
Had such a measure been taken for nine consecutive years he argued that there would have 
been an economy of £31,000,000 and the First Refugee Loan, the Stabilization Loan and the 
two Public Work loans would not have been necessary.57 What a peculiar logic. In essence 
Venizelos simply raised a false dilemma which exposes the naivete with which Greek politicians 
faced the issue of foreign economic relations. For the total borrowing during 1922-1932 was
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almost £40,000,000 and not £31,000,000. In addition, which foreign contractor would have 
undertaken a public work project had the state defaulted? Moreover, would this economised sum 
actually have been spent on the projects stated or would it in the end have been wasted? Finally, 
it cannot be overlooked that borrowing overseas was an addition to foreign exchange reserves.
2 . Post-stabilization Capital Inflow Outside the Public Sector: The Case off 
the Hellenic Trust
As has been noted, stabilization and the adoption of the gold exchange standard system 
did not trigger a flow of foreign capital, certainly not into the public sector of the economy. The 
following pages will present the reasons why, after stabilization, international finance continued to 
display a limited interest in Greek industry.
Prior to our period of study, the tobacco trade, insurance, shipping, mining and carpet 
manufacturing had been the only economic activities of the private sector which had experienced 
an inflow of foreign credit and direct investments.58 This limited presence of foreign capital in 
Greek business had been the product of a spontaneous procedure (i.e. the international capital 
market had come to Greece and not vice versa). On the eve of stabilization a novel development 
occurred: the N.B.G. turned to the City of London in an attempt to secure funds for Greek 
industry.59 Following the refugee influx, a large number of firms had sprang up and the domestic 
capital market was not in a position to supply their long-term capital needs.60
This move on the part of the National Bank is testimony to the peripheral status of the Greek 
economy. Unlike the case in other countries (for example Italy), even after stabilization Greek 
enterprises were not able to acquire direct access to the international financial market.61 Indeed, 
throughout the years of the Gold exchange standard system in Greece, it was only via the National 
Bank of Greece that industry was able to secure foreign funds. This institution was able to act as 
an intermediary between Greek entrepreneurs and foreign capital because of its links with foreign 
capital, the strengthening of its financial position (due to the banking reform), and its growing 
involvement in Greek industry 62
The framework set up for the flow of foreign funds to Greek industry was the following. An 
English registered Investment Trust was created in London in January 1928 by Hambros, 
Erlangers, the N.B.G. and the Ionian Bank. It was named the Hellenic and General Trust Ltd.. With
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a paid up capital of £1,000,000, its size was that of a typical English investment Trust.63 (At the 
time, there were 152 investment Trusts in Britain.) The policy of the Hellenic and General Trust 
Ltd. was dictated by Hambros and it served as the nucleus for the industrial credit department of 
the N.B.G. Pointedly, by WWII, the N.B.G. had become the single most important source of credit 
for Greek industry and the sole ‘proto’ development bank in Greece.64 (See Appendix 4, Table 2) 
For the student of foreign capital flows, the special significance of this experiment lies in 
that it serves to underline the indifference of foreign capital towards Greek industry prior to WWII. 
Within this context, the following features of this Anglo- Hellenic joint venture are the most 
significant. First, Hambros -the foreign banker most familiar with Greek financial affairs- was not 
eager to lend directly to Greek industry. It got involved in this field as a favour to the N.B.G. and 
the Greek government in order to increase the chances that it would be assigned the flotation of 
the First Public Works Loan and the financing of major municipal works in Athens.65 Second, 
Hambros was not willing to provide all of the Trust's paid up capital. Thus, it posed as a sine qua 
non for the creation of the Trust, Greek participation of some 33.5% 66 Third, there was a large 
discrepancy between the Hambros and the N.B.G. view of the purposes of the Trust. The former 
wanted it to have a general character- as was the case with most English investment Trusts at the 
time. Namely, it did not want the interests of this body to be tied exclusively either with Greece nor 
with Greek industry in particular. The National Bank, on the other hand, wanted the Trust to be 
solely geared towards financing Greek industry.67 Fourth, although the capital of the Trust was 
£1,214,770, in total only £479,000 was furnished to Greek industry. The reason being, that after 
August 1930 (i.e.two and a half years after the Trust was established) Hambros tost all interest in 
Greek industry. This was due to a combination of factors, of which the onset of the world financial 
crisis was only one. The most important factors were the following: i) Hambros, with whom the final 
decisions upon applications for industrial loans rested, was not always provided with sufficiently 
detailed information by the N.B.G.68 ii) The N.B.G. seemed to view rationalization in much looser 
terms than Hambros. The latter was inclined to insist that loans be given to companies that were 
well organized and efficiently managed. Infact, it was usual for it to demand that the Trust acquire 
some management control over the borrowing firms. But, most companies irrespective of size
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were family concerns and the idea and practice of relinquishing family control over management in 
return for large loans was not acceptable to most Greek industrialists. To put it plainly, Greek 
private business concerns wanted foreign finance but not foreign control.69 iii) The poor 
performance of some of the borrowers in repaying their debts had already become apparent.70 
Once the Greek government posed restrictions for the outflow of exchange in September 1931, 
given Hambro’s already apparent withdrawal symptoms, it was only natural that the flow of the 
Trust's capital into Greece would already dry up. To state the obvious: Even if Hambros had 
remained committed to Greece, surely there would have been no further Trust investments for 
some time following this government measure. However, this should not underscore the fact that 
the Trust failed to secure larger amounts for Greek industry basically for reasons related to the 
underdeveloped state of the latter and the institutional framework within which it operated.71 
Fifth, regarding the investment criteria of Hambros three things are notable: i) 61% of the amount 
lent went to cement, distilleries, wine, electricity and textiles. (Tables 1 and 2) The last sector was 
both large and fast growing. The other sectors were small but, with the exception of wine, they 
were dynamic in terms of their rate of growth. For example, between 1928 and 1938, in terms of 
volume, electricity output almost quadrupled and cement output doubled. (See Appendix 4, 
Table 3). ii) As a rule Hambros turned down applications from small companies. This feature was 
not peculiar to Hambros. For most trusts and merchant banks the costs of dealing with small 
businesses were considerable as it was difficult to assess their needs and viability. Hambros 
preferred large, secure and well established firms with favourable prospects. Thus, most of the 
companies which received loans from the Trust had already by 1925 acquired an important place 
in Greek industry, which they maintained even after WWII. (See Table 3). As has already been 
noted above, Hambros wanted to push rationalization- merger schemes. For example, in the 
spring of 1928 the Olympus Cement Co. made a request for a £80,000 loan. Hambros imposed 
as a precondition that the firm amalgamate with one of the large cement companies so that it could 
be competitive. Hence, instead of granting a loan to Olympus, in October 1928 the Trust gave a 
£60,000 to the General Cement Co. 'Hercules' with which Olympus had merged.72
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Table 1
Sectoral Breakdown of Loans Granted by the Hellenic and General Trust Ltd.
Sector
Amounts granted 
by the Hellenic and 
General Trust Co.
(In £)
Percentage of total 
amount granted by 
Hellenic and 
General Trust Co. 
to Greek Industry
1. Construction
i. Gen. Cement Co 'Eraklis' S.A 60,000
ii. Cement Co, Titan 60,000
iii. Greek Potterers 'Kyklops' S.A 12,000
T o t a l 132,000 27.5 %
I I . Food
i. A.P. Cambas (wine) 15,000
ii. Distilleries S.A 60,000
iii. A. Aliprantis & Sons (wine) 3,000
iv. Michaelidis and Konstantinis (pasta) 3,000
v. Olive Oil Co, of Greece 25,000 II
T o t a l 106,000 22 % 1
I I I . Textile I
i. G. Tsitsis and Sons 10,000 fl
ii. G. Tsitsis and Sons 12,000
iii. Shipping Co V.l Tourpalis S.A 5,000 1
iv. Toumivoukas and Bros 2,000 H
v. Piraiki Co S.A. 20,000 H
vi. Jute Factory "Torres" 8,000 1
T o t a l 57,000 11.8 % H
IV . Electricity |
i. Electric Co of Volos S.A. 25,000 1
ii. Greek Electricity Co S.A. 5,000 1
iii. Greek Electricity Co S.A. 20,000 1
T o t a l 50,000 10.4 % 1
V. Metallurgy and Mining I
i. Greek Metallurgy S.A. 6,000 1
iii. French Mining Co of Lavrium S.A. 20,000 u
T o t a l 26,000 5.4 % |
V I. Agricultural Tools |
i. M.K. Stamatopoulos and Sons 7,000 D
ii. M.K. Stamatopoulos and Sons 4,000
iii. Glavanis Industry S.A. 12,000 D
T o t a l 23,000 4.8 %
V II. Wood Processing
i. Building and Wood Co ‘Elloul ” S.A. 8,000
ii. Building and Wood Co 'Elloul" S.A. 7,000
iii. Georgiades and Sekeris 3,500
T o t a l 18,500 3.8 %
V III . Chemical Products
i. Chemical Inustry S.A. 15,000 3.1 %
IX . Miscellaneous
i. Greek Co of Electrical bulbs S.A. 4,000
ii. E. Poulopoulos and Son Hat makers S.A. 15,000
iii. N. Karastamatis 2,000
iv. Eleftheroudakis Publishing Co, S.A. 5,500
v. General Co "Vio"* S.A. (car bodies) 25,000
T o t a l 51,500 10.7 %
G r a n d  T o t a l 479,000 100 %
*£50,000 was given to this company but it transferred half of the amount to the Olive Oil Co of Greece. Vio
S.A. participated in the creation of the Olive Oil Co thus we put the amount of £ 25,000.
Source: Compiled from data in: NBG/HA XXII Banks, IE Banking Institutions File 38: the report of Dec. 
1939 on the Hellenic and General Trust Ltd.
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Table 2
Selected Branches of Industrial Production
Branch
% of Total 
Industrial
1928
Value of Greek 
Production
1938
% of Total Amounts Granted by 
the Hellenic and General Trust 
Co. to Greek Industry 
(1928-1939)
Conatruction
i. Cement 1.9 2.2 25
ii. Potteries 0.5 0.1 2.5
Food
i. Distilleries and Wine 0.09 0.06 16
ii. Pasta 2.06 1.8 0.6
iii. dive oil No inf. No inf. 5.4
Textiles
i. Cotton speaning weaving 9,3 10.6 10.2
ii. Jute 1.2 0.7 1.6
Electricity 5.9 8.4 10.4
Mettalurgy and Mining 0.9 0.5 5.4
Agricultural tools 0.12 0.04 3.8
Wood processing 4.7 3.8 3.8
Chemicals 13.9 21.8 3.1
Source: Data compiled from G. Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1939 (Athens, 1940), pp. 
188-265.
Table 3
Rough Estimates of the Importance of the Firms to which the Hellenic and 
General Trust Ltd. Made Mortgage Loans
Company 1925 1949*
General Cement Co 'Eraklis' S.A. 2nd (in importance) cement A
Cement Co Titan’ S.A. 1st cement A
Greek Potteries 'Kyklops' S.A. 1st pottery A
A.P. Cambas 2nd wine A
Distilleries S.A. 1st distillery
A. Aliprantis and Sons Not mentioned B
Michaelidis and Konstantinis 1st Pasta A
Olive Oil Co of Greece** Not mentioned A
Tsitsis and Sons Large textile B
Spinning Co V.l. Tourpalis S.A. Large spinning B
K.P. Toumivoukas and Bros Large Textile D
Piraiki Co S.A. 1st spinning A
Jute Factory 'Tones’ Large Jute factory A
Electricity Co of Volos S.A. One of the largest electricity plants C
Greek Electricity Co S.A. 1st electric. A
Greek Metallurgy S.A.** 2nd metallurgy Not mentioned
French Mining Co of Lavrium S.A. 1st mining A
N.K.Stamatopoulos and Sons Medium to small agric. tools A
Glavanis Industry S.A. 1st agric. tools A
Building and Wood Co 'Elloul' Large wood processing A
Geordiades and Sekeris Large wood processing A
Chemical Industry S.A. Large chemical A
E. Poulopoulos and Son Hatmaker of 1st hat Not mentioned
Greek Co of Electrical Bulbs S.A. 1st bulb B
Eleftheroudakis Publishing Co Most important publishing A
General Co 'Vio' S.A. Large car bodies A
*1949 classification of industries by the Confederation of Greek industrialists in order of importance:
A,B,C,D.
“ Not mentioned because it was established in 1932. From the beginning of its foundation it was a very 
large firm.
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Department of Trade and Industry, Greek Industry. Athens 1925, 
Confederation of Greek Industrialists, Directory of Greek Industry. Athens 1949.
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In the last analysis, the Trust may have failed to restructure Greek industry but it did improve 
the liquidity of the National Bank. In an ironic twist, the loans furnished were not used for new 
capital investments although back in 1928 the National Bank of Greece had stated that foreign 
funds were to be tapped for the rationalization of Greek industry. The truth was that most 
borrowers were heavily indebted to the N.B.G. and used the larger part of funds furnished by the 
Trust to liquidate their short term, high interest debts with the bank.73 (See Table 4)
Table 4
Loans that Firms Received from the Hellenic General Trust and 
Amounts Received after Deducting Their Debt to the National Bank
Com pany
A
Loan granted 
by the Hell 
General Trust
(in £)
£L
Amount which 
Co received after 
deducting debt 
towards NBG
(in £)
B
as a % of 
A
Chemical Industry S.A. 15,000 6,196 41.3
Greek Co of Electrical Bulbs S.A. 4,000 4,000 100.0
Cement General Co ‘Erakles’ S.A. 60,000 37,000 61.6
E. Poulopoulos and Son, Hatmakers S.A. 15,000 11,775* 78.5
A.P. Cambas (Wine) 15,000 4,089 27.2
Greek Potteries ‘Kyktops’ S.A. 12,000 6,997 58.3
Distilleries S.A. 60,000 6,200 10.3
A. Aliprantis and Sons (Wine) 3,000 3,000 100.0
N. Karastamatis 2,000 1,472 73.0
M.K. Stamatopoulos and Sons (agric. tools) 7,000 7,000 100.0
M.K. Stamatopoulos and Sons (agric. tools) 4,000 2,100 52.5
G. Tsitsis and Sons (agric. tools) 10,000 10,000 100.0
G. Tsitsis and Sons (agric. tools) 12,000 6,000 50.0
Spinning Co. V.l. Tourpalis S.A. 5,000 5,000 100.0
Building and Wood Co ‘Elloul’ S.A. 8,000 2,543* 31.7
Glavanis Industry S.A. (agric. tools) 12,000 6,759 56.3
K.P. Tournivoukas and Bros (textile) 2,000 2,000 100.0
Cement Co ‘Titan’ S.A. 60,000 - -
Eleftheroudakis Publishing Co S.A. 5,500 - -
Greek metallurgy S.A. 6,000 6,000 100.0
Michaelidis and Konstantinis (pasta) 3,000 3,000 100.0
General Co ‘Vio’ S.A. (car bodies) 50,000 20,000 40.0
Georgiades and Sekeris (wood processing) 3,500 3,500 100.0
Electricity Co of Volos S.A. 25,000 5,000 20.0
Piraiki Co S.A. (spinning) 20,000 - -
French Mining Co of Lavrium S.A. 25,000 15,000 60.0
T o t a l 447,000 182,631 40.8
*ln these cases the debt was owed to the National Bank of Greece and the National Mortgage Bank of 
Greece.
Source: NBG/H.A, XXII, Banks IE’ Banking Institutions, file 38; General Overview of Industrial loans, July 
1936 (in Greek).
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To recapitulate, poststabilization capital inflow in Greek industry was less impressive than 
what had been expected and in comparison to direct foreign investment in other countries. The 
late date at which Greece stabilized and the World Crisis were not the sole factors responsible for 
this disappointing performance. The story of the Hellenic Trust shows that the inflow of foreign 
capital was thwarted before the onset of the world depression largely because Hambros and the 
N.B.G. were not capable of establishing a fruitful working relationship regarding the operation, 
financing and rationalization of business concerns. It became apparent at an early date that the
f
two parties had a different economic philosophy. In a nutshell, this case study reveals one more 
facet of the clash between a Southern Balkan country and the West. In part, the problem was 
created by the perennial suspicions of Greece towards the West. The West came to symbolize 
greed and modernization. Whereas, Greece wanted to acquire the latter without succumbing to 
the former. It failed to do so largely because fear of western greed stood as a mental block, 
impeding necessary changes in business and official economic culture. In the last analysis, 
stabilization was not sufficient in itself to integrate Greece into the world capital market.
Before closing it is pertinent to stress that this study proves that before WW II the presence
✓
of foreign interests in Greek industry was marginal. Foreign direct investment -unlike the case in 
other predominantly agricultural countries of Europe such as for example Poland, Yugoslavia and 
Roumania- was almost non existent.74 Protectionism in industry and the cheap pool of labour 
brought about by the refugee influx did not act as motives for investment by foreign firms.75 
Thus, the argument that foreign economic penetration distorted Greek industrialization does not 
hold for the interwar period.76 The weaknesses of this sector were the result of domestic * 
anomalies. Indeed, if anything it can be maintained that this sector was starved of foreign long­
term credit and expertise: it remained for too long isolated from the international capital market.
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CONCLUSION
The Stabilization Plan Seen From a Comparative Perspective
The two central preoccupations of Greece's formal supervisors during the twenties was the # 
settlement of the refugees and stabilization. As noted in the introduction the contribution of the 
League refugee scheme to the economy of Greece has been well documented in the literature. 
Hence, much of Book I has revolved around how the mechanisms of official supervision as 
established over Greek finances through the League of Nations and the I.F.C. operated. The 
reasons for the delay in stabilization and the poor performance of the gold exchange standard 
system have been portrayed in detail. The institutional resistance to the reforms have been 
underscored. Moreover, the i^sons why stabilization failed to trigger foreign financial flows in 
Greek industry have been delineated. As already indicated Book II will analyse the reasons why 
stabilization failed to deliver the expected inflow of foreign capital for public works. It must be 
stressed again that the motives for stabilization differed. The supervisors viewed stabilization as a 
means to reinforce the gold exchange standard system built by the Bank of England. The Greek 
authorities viewed stabilization as the means generating a large inflow of foreign capital. Thus, at 
the end of the day,and for different reasons, neither the state nor the Bank of England were 
satisfied with the experiment in free convertibility. Finally, Book I has placed the League 
stabilization experiment in Greece in a wider context, by resorting to spatial and temporal 
comparisons.
1. The Spatial Comparison Greek Stabilization in the European Context
1.1. Greece and the General European Experience of Financial Recovery During the 
Twenties
Greece was not unique. Other European countries adopted the gold exchange standard 
system during the twenties. Overall, the Greek case appears to conform to the general 
experience of European financial recovery. In particular, two observations seem appropriate. 
First, that the gold exchange standard was "neither a purely rules-based nor a purely discretionary 
system". Second, that currency stabilization was the effect of the relative stabilization which in the
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meantime had taken place in the economic and political sphere.1 However, Greece differed in 
that she stabilized at a late date. Studies that have focused on short term vicissitudes in Europe 
have split the twenties into two periods. The first going from the end of the war up to 1923 during 
which political tensions and monetary instability cum inflation prevailed. The second (1923-1929) 
"characterized by much more stable conditions in the political as well as in the monetary field".2 In 
Greece the 'twenties' began in 1922 and the first period ended in 1927. A fundamental 
difference of Greece regarding the second (i.e. poststabilization) period is that the inflow of 
foreign capital did not show any marked increase. It is on the basis of this observation that we 
have reached the conclusion that Greece during the twenties experienced missed opportunities. 
Nevertheless, Greece seems to conform with the thesis propounded in the literature th a t« 
stabilization as a rule did not stimulate economic activity.3
Finally, in conformity with most European countries Greece during the twenties became an 
even more open economy. Trade experienced rapid growth largely as a result of the rise in the 
import needs of the country. Foreign capital flows also reached high levels. However, as we have 
seen, they largely consisted of long-term government loans. Short-run capital movements and 
foreign direct investments in Greece were on average lower than what was the case west of 
Greece.4
1.2. The Role of the League of Nations in European Reconstruction - The Stabilization 
Programmes Revisited
League of Nations involvement in Greece should be studied as part of its general scheme 
to block the reemergence of bellicose tendencies in Southeastern Europe for strategic reasons 
and to rebuild the international monetary and trade system along the prewar lines.5 With regard to 
this second function the League implemented a series of reconstruction stabilization schemes in 
Central Europe and the Balkan.6 Stabilization was short-lived. The side effects of the deflation 
associated with the stabilization schemes led to severe stress. All of the countries involved 
experienced a financial collapse with the unfolding of the world economic crisis of 1931. It has 
been argued that these reconstruction operations contributed to the world crisis.7 Yet, it must be 
acknowledged that the administrative and institutional reforms entailed in the stabilization 
schemes had a long lasting positive influence for the countries concerned. For example, the
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principle of independent central banking was universally applied. In those countries where central 
banks already existed, they were restructured and made more autonomous from government 
interference. A good example is that of the Reichsbank in Germany. Whereas Hungary, Austria, 
and Greece did not have a central bank, they set one up.8
As Greece found, the Bank of England was the dominant influence behind the 
International Financial Committee which had been set up after the Brussels Conference of 1922 
and was the League tool responsible for economic policy formulation.9 For example, the Financial 
Committee granted advances on the League reconstruction loans and prepared the drafts of the 
charters and constitutions of the new or reformed central banks set up. Not surprisingly, these 
drafts were instilled with the principles of independent central banking as visualized by the Bank 
of England. These precepts entailed that there should be no government interference in the 
Bank's affairs, limited lending to government, the board of directors was to be elected by the 
shareholders. The involvement of the Bank of England was so extensive that some countries 
such as France viewed the League as "an engine of British financial hegemony".10 The ties 
between the League and the Bank of England became even closer in 1927, when Sir Otto 
Niemeyer who was the dominating figure on the Financial Committee moved from the Treasury to 
Threadneedle street. With regard to the degree and nature of foreign economic control entailed 
in the League stabilization schemes, it must be remarked that all of the countries involved -and not 
only Greece- were compelled as a result of the assistance received to accept some form of 
supervision. In the cases of Austria and Hungary a foreign Commissioner General, with a wide 
spectrum of prerogatives, was appointed. In Germany half of the governing board of the reformed 
Reichsbank was composed by foreign members approved by the League.11 Bulgaria and 
Roumania were obliged to appoint a foreign technical advisor -chosen by the League- at their 
Central Banks, and to submit to the Financial Committee every three months a report on the 
economic situation of the country.
Opposition to foreign control was a usual phenomenon in these countries. It stemmed from 
two sources: from those who as a matter of principle resented foreign economic dependence and 
from vested economic interests whose position was threatened as a result of the new measures 
and reforms. Indeed, in at least one case opposition to foreign control was responsible for the fact
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that the League of Nations did not implement a stabilization scheme. Portugal in 1928 applied for 
a loan to restore its finances. However, the negotiations broke down because it refused to accept 
the control which was entailed in the reconstruction plan put forward by the League.12 In short, 
Greek reconstruction was less comprehensive than the Austrian, Hungarian and German 
schemes.13 Apparently it was closer to the Bulgarian and Estonian plans.14
Finally, we would like to underline the remarkable concurrence of the Greek case to the 
League stabilization plans regarding the intentions of the League of Nations and the local reaction 
towards the reforms and degree of control it imposed. 15 It is obvious that Greece was not unique 
and that it shared a common European experience. Its peculiarities lay in the specific details.
2 . The Temporal Comparison: The 1898 Law of Control and the League of
Nations Stabilization Scheme of 1928
It has been argued that the control introduced with the League stabilization plan was similar 
to the supervision imposed on Greece in 1898 by the I.F.C.16 Indeed, certain basic fundamental 
similarities existed. Both forms of control were established after Greece was defeated at war and • 
an enquiry into the finances of the state was carried out by foreign experts. In addition, the I.F.C. 
and the League entered Greece on the occasion of the issue of a loan. In each case, the loan 
raised was placed at the disposal of the new supervisor. What is more, both institutions formally 
stated that their main concern was to restore Greek finances. Also, both favoured a system of free 
convertibility. Moreover, it cannot be overlooked that the I.F.C and the League were basically 
international only in name. Effectively, they were under British influence. (Although, the I.F.C. at 
the time it was set up was predominantly under German influence).17 Finally, it must be added 
that both the I.F.C. and the League were conveniently used by the British and the French  ^
governments as a means to extract better terms from the Greek government regarding economic 
issues unrelated with the main goals of these two institutions of control. However, the similarities 
end here. The drawing of a parallel between the two forms of control in an unequivocal ma,... 
masks the subtle yet important differences between the two cases with respect to their goals and 
their functions.
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For each of these two institutions there existed a twin set of goals with regard to their Greek 
involvement. On the one hand the 'official' 'presumed' or 'declared' goals and on the other the 
hidden agenda. Divergences between the two tools of control were manifest on both the official 
and the "hidden" level. Regarding the I.F.C., officially its main goal was to restore Greek finances 
and protect the bondholders by ensuring the smooth and full repayment of the Greek 
government foreign debt. However, a careful reading of the Law of Control of 1898 shows that in 
reality the Commission was expecting to do much more. It sought through the appreciation of the 
drachma to secure for the bondholders extra bonuses in addition to their fixed income.18 As for 
the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, it tackled Greek affairs from a wider perspective 
than the Commission. Officially, it declared that it wanted to integrate Greece in the interwar world 
financial system through political and financial stabilization. Nevertheless, as was the case with the
I.F.C.: the League automatically assumed that what was good for its narrow interests was good for 
Greece!! The 'hidden' goal of the Financial Committee of the League being that Greece should 
come under the direct orbit of the Bank of England.
Given the differences in their goals it is not surprising that the specific functions of these 
two institutions were far from identical. As noted in the text, the League stabilization plan 
provided for a strict supervision over fiscal policy in general. Whereas the I.F.C. was placed solely 
in charge of the specific task of collecting and managing a part -albeit large- of the government 
revenues that went towards the repayment of the foreign debt.19 The involvement of the I.F.C. in 
fiscal affairs did not displease the League. On the contrary, the League enhanced the position of 
the Commission regarding debt management, by requiring that it supervise both League loans.
As far as monetary policy was concerned, it is notable that whereas the control established 
by the I.F.C. had provided for a gradual appreciation of the drachma, the League implemented on 
the spot a full-fledged stabilization plan. In practical terms in 1927 the League of Nations with the 
assent of the Bank of England effectively 'superceded' the I.F.C. in the realm of monetary 
policy.20 The I.F.C. resented this intrusion. For this reason and due to its narrow financial 
interests there was ample of conflict with the League. Let it be noted at this point that after the 
default of 1932 the state emasculated the I.F.C. by imposing restrictions regarding the collection 
and administration of the revenues. It came as no surprise when the I.F.C. was 'discretely'
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extinguished during WWII. As for the League of Nations, the umbilical cord was cut in 1937.21 
From 1932 onwards the League's major preoccupation in Greece was to fight off the successive 
proposals made by the commercial banks and the ruling Populist government to either fuse the 
Bank of Greece with the National Bank, or to abolish the branches of the Bank of Greece and 
restrict its operations. But, this subject belongs outside the thesis.22
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BOOK II
FINANCING PUBLIC WORKS WITH FOREIGN CAPITAL:
Costs, Conflicts and Sovereignty
INTRODUCTION
Foreign capital inflow outside the framework of supervision financed the expansion of the 
country's physical infrastructure undertaken by foreign contractors.*1 This aspect of foreign 
portfolio investment in the public sector is an unexplored territory. Book II fills this gap. It 
examines the terms under which contractors undertook each specific work and describes the 
reasons why the actual outcome often failed to meet the goals set by the state. The plans, 
preferences and roles of the foreign and local bankers, the construction companies, the state 
'technocrats', the National Assembly, the Greek government, and the country's foreign 
supervisors are all examined. The Book shows why the momentum attained in public work 
financing and building prior to stabilization was not maintained under the gold exchange standard 
system. The process whereby internal conflicts were a reflection of the juxtaposition between the 
state and foreign capital (and vice versa) and the contribution of domestic funds to these foreign 
projects' are brought into relief. Finally, the Book examines unfulfilled 'dreams', namely the loan 
that did not materialize (the Seligman loan), the concession that was cancelled (the concession 
for the Vardar valley) and the Anglo-Hellenic joint ventures that floundered (the Hellenic 
Construction Co.).2 (See Table 1 for an outline of the infrastructure loans raised, projects and 
concessions granted to foreign contractors between 1922 and 1932).
*Of the £16,000,000 raised outside the framework of foreign formal tutelage all but £1,000,000 (i.e. the 
Swedish match loan of 1926) were spent on public works.
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The story to be told is of broad interest for the history of modern Greece in that it sheds light 
on the internal weaknesses of the state. But the analysis of the role of foreign capital in the 
development of Greece's infrastructure is not only of Greek interest. In recent years, the literature 
on the history of multinational enterprises has dealt with two themes which have traditionally been 
neglected and which occupy a central position in this Book. The first is the nature of the 
relationship between merchant banks and multinational firms. The second pertains to the ways in 
which foreign capital has interacted with domestic institutions. This thesis supports Mira Wilkin's 
observation that foreign capital saught to create the familiar within the unfamiliar.3
Table 1
Foreign Portfolio Investment in Infrastructure: 1922-1932
The Loans (nominal value)
The Athens Water Loan (1925) ($10,000,000)
The Belgian Railway Loan (1925) ($21,000,000)
The First Public Works Loan (1928) (£ 4,000,000)
The Swedish School Loan (1930) (£ 1,000,000)
The Second Public Works Loan (1931) (£ 4,600,000)
Total nominal value of the loans £16,000,000
Real capital of the loans £13,672,000
The Schemes
The Athens water scheme 1925
The Belgian railway project 1925
The reclamation of the Vardar valley 1925
The building of a national road network 1928
The reclamation of the Struma valley 1928
The construction of schools 1930
The Concessions
I. Management of the Athens water system.
II. Land development agency of the Vardar valley.*
III. National road maintenance company*
‘This concession was cancelled by the government after the legal papers were drawn. See Book II, Section 
I, Chapter 3 and Section II, Chapter 1
In the following pages and chapters the web of the close cooperation of Hambros with the 
National Bank of Greece is delineated. Hambros saw the N.B.G. as a factor of stability and 
continuity within an unstable environment.4 By investigating the process through which Hambros 
sought to extend its dominance in Greece two points are revealed: i) the tactics used by British 
merchant banks abroad to obstruct foreign competition (which in this instance came under the
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guise of American rivalry); ii)the ways in which local banks 'exploited' their foreign connections in 
order to enhance their power at home.
1. The Methodological Framework
The features of each project are highlighted. (See below chart 1 for a brief outline of the 
unique features of each scheme). The thesis examines the extent to which a common pattern 
was established. In the absence of access to data referring to similar projects undertaken at the 
time by foreign capital in other countries (at relatively the same stage of development as Greece) it 
is not possible to make a comparative, international cross-section analysis. Thus, the approach is 
necessarily a "micro" time-series, comparing five Greek schemes. An interesting incongruity 
developed over time. At the start of the period the government had difficulty raising foreign 
capital and imposing 'hard' terms on the contractors. However, by the end of the twenties 
although foreign finance was still difficult to secure, the state had become more expert in the 
'policing' of foreign contractors who were now prepared to accept a lower remuneration, more 
government control, stricter adherence to deadlines etc..
Unfortunately, the economic aspects of the projects, important as they may have been, 
cannot be studied in detail within the context of this dissertation. First, the available data is limited. 
There is no information with respect to; how much was spent on labour, what percentage of the 
funds was spent domestically, what was the actual level of general expenses charged by the 
contractors, and whether the contractor used the funds with care in purchasing materials and 
services. Second, the macroeconomic and long-run contribution of these projects to the Greek 
economy cannot be accurately ascertained for a number of reasons. In large part the absence of 
economic data for all five schemes is a serious constraint. Moreover, in at least two instances (i.e. 
the road and railway schemes) the projects were never actually finished! Two other projects (i.e. 
the reclamation of the Vardar and Struma valleys) were completed not by the contractors but 
directly by a state agency long after WWII. The study of the economic impact of the land 
reclamation schemes falls thematically and chronologically outside the boundaries of this 
dissertation. Finally, even if these problems did not exist a pure cost benefit analysis of the 
schemes would not be possible for two additional reasons. First, with the exception of the land 
reclamation projects they were not directly productive (i.e did not directly lead to an increase in
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ouput-national income). Second, in the final event, foreign capital contributed only marginally to 
these schemes. What started out as foreign investments were often transformed into mixed 
'Greek' investments.
Chart 1
Unique Features of Each Project
i. The Athens water scheme: The only instance in which the contractor set up a 
management company. This and the fact that the long-term financing of the 
project were arranged in advance account for its successful implementation. 
The scheme also demonstrates the alliances foreign capital made with 
antagonistic local banking interests and vice versa.
ii. The reclamation of the Vardar valley sheds light on the behind-the-scenes 
activities of Hambros and the National Bank and shows how political instability 
and underdevelopment hampered the flow and absorption of foreign capital.
iii. The Belgian railway scheme stands out as an exception in that militaristic 
considerations were given priority over economic.
iv. The road scheme illustrates the backward state of Greek contractors and how 
the government was inclined to offer them extravagant terms.
v. The reclamation of the Struma valley exemplifies the state's desire to maintain a 
balance between the penetration of American and British contractors into 
Greece. It is also a good example of the fact that the state did not decide which 
contractor would be awarded a project solely on narrow economic grounds. 
For, which firm was cheapest was secondary to considerations of a  wider 
politico-financial nature such as keeping both the U.S.A. and British 
governments satisfied.
2 . The 19th Century Legacy and the 'New' Framework
The first public utilities in Greece were set up, owned and managed either by Greek local 
authorities or by foreign registered companies. These operated under the terms of a specific 
licence.5 Prior to 1922, the central state spent funds for infrastructure only on roads and 
railways.6 The amounts spent represented only an insignificant portion of total government 
expenditure and foreign borrowing. (See Table 2) The building of roads was granted to domestic 
construction companies and was financed through the state budget. Eventually a 'road fund' was 
set up.7 Railways were built by foreign contractors but for strategic reasons the state did not want 
to leave this activity totally to the discretion of foreigners. Thus, the pattern used was the 
following. The cost of construction and the fee of the firm commissioned to build a certain line 
were paid from the proceeds of a loan raised by the government on the international capital
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market. Upon the completion of the work, the state would either award to the contractor a 
concession for the new line or operate the line itself. By 1922 the state operated half of the 
country's railway network.
Following the Asia Minor debacle, sharp pressures developed and heavy burdens were 
placed upon the Greek economy, largely because of the refugee influx. The handling of this 
problem brought into relief the backwardness of the country's socio-economic infrastructure. The 
state was by necessity forced to widen its economic role. The expansion of the country's
cultivable land (so as to improve the land labour ratio), the building of roads, as well as the creation
of a modern water supply and electricity networks in the urban areas, were urgently required. 
Railway development was only a small part of the new package of social overhead capital projects 
required. At this point borrowing for public works became a major element of foreign borrowing. 
(See Table 2).
Table 2
Foreign Loan Capital Raised for Public Works by the Government
I. Public work loans as a % of the total foreign loan capital raised
i. 1824-1922: 6.6%
ii. 1922-1932: 37.6%
II. Railway loans as a % of the total foreign loan capital raised for public works
i. 1824-1922: 100%
ii. 1922-1932: 26%
Compiled from: D.Stephanides, Foreign Capital Inflow and its Economic and Political Consequences. 
(Salonika, 1930), pp.179-183, and A.Angelopoulos, The Public Debt of Greece. (Athens, 1937), pp.30-44.
Nevertheless, the new public work projects were designed on the 19th century 'railway 
model'. Namely, the state commissioned foreign firms to construct specific projects on the basis 
of an agency contract. It resorted to this pattern of foreign investment in order to avoid the kind of 
dependence associated with foreign direct investment. However, this mode of financing social 
overhead projects was not totally free from external informal control. All of the loans raised were 
tied and in the case of the Athens water scheme the contractor operated a long-term 
concession.8 The agency contracts proved to be expensive affairs, as the foreign contractors 
offered their services on a cost-plus and not a lump-sum basis. Usually, the construction costs,
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the fees and general expenses were exorbitant. The result was that foreign portfolio investment 
in infrastructure, in addition to bloating the external debt of the state, served indirectly to enhance 
institutionalized foreign tutelage. As the debt grew and more revenues were mortgaged to 
foreign interests, the more the government became vulnerable vis a vis the League of Nations 
and the I.F.C.
It should be remarked at this point that a lopsided situation developed regarding the 
allocation of American and British capital in Greek public works. American contractors were 
commissioned to construct three out of the five projects. The British had to contend themselves 
only with the promise of a land reclamation scheme which actually began after 1932. However, 
Britain (i.e. Hambros) succeeded in almost monopolizing the provision of funds for public works. 
More than 37% of the loan capital was issued directly by Hambros while the U.S.A. provided only 
about 6.3% of this capital. (See Table 3).
Table 3
Distribution of Foreign Loan Capital Raised by the Government for Public Works 
by Country of Origin: 1922-1932
Britain 37.5%
Belgium 27 %
Greece 12.5%
Sweden 9.4%
U.S.A. 6.3%
Switzerland 2.5%
Italy 2.5%
Holland 1.9%
Compiled from: G.Haritakis ted.L Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1932. (Athens, 1933), pp.513-526.
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3 . Blockages to Pure Foreign Direct Investment*
The long gestation period, the large sums involved, and the technical skills required for 
infrastructure development made necessary the importation of capital and expertise. The 
question then arises as to why the state did not turn to foreign direct investments. It is not easy to 
give an answer. On the one hand there are indications that foreign capital was not eager to invest 
in this type of activity in Greece. On the other, there prevailed in Greece a climate which was 
hostile towards concession granting. To a certain extent this phenomenon was related to the 
surge in the quest for national autonomy which developed following the Asia Minor debacle.9
Three large direct investments were undertaken. One was the telephone network in major 
cities which involved Dutch capital, the New Antwerp Electrical Works. This concession remained 
dormant until 1931. The second, the transfer of control over the P.A.P. rails to Hambros, became 
a minor affair. A major net transfer of foreign funds did not take place because Premier Venizelos 
refused to grant the concessionaire the terms demanded.10 Only the third concession, the 
electrification of the greater Athens area by a group set up by the British firm Power and Traction 
materialised as planned. It is notable that it was not a pure foreign investment as the foreign 
contractor (i.e the Power and Traction group) demanded that half of the amount invested should 
be covered by a local consortium of banks. This project enjoyed active support under the Trade 
Facilities Act, and the contract for its implementation was signed during the Pangalos dictatorship, 
at a time when the National Assembly was emasculated of its power to ratify or cancel international 
economic agreements.
The net inflow of foreign direct investments was small. It was not much over £4,500,000.11 
The only public institution that supported foreign direct investments as an alternative strategy for 
economic development was the National Bank of Greece. Indeed the N.B.G. set up a local 
banking syndicate in September 1924 (the Syndicat des Etudes des Enterprises) at the request 
of British Financiers with whom it was negotiating a F.D.I. regarding the electrification of the 
Athens area. (For the controling interested of the N.B.G. in the syndicate see below Table 4).
*As already mentioned in the General Introduction foreign direct investments are not examined in the 
context of the thesis.
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In addition, the National Bank of Greece reached agreements with foreign banks and institutions, 
that did not always meet with the approval of the Greek government. In at least one instance the 
National Bank sought a secret arrangement with foreign capital.
Table 4
Distribution of Share Capital of the Syndicat des Etudes et des Enterprises
In s titu tio n Number o f Shares
National Bank 8
Bank of Athens 2
Anatolian Bank 2
Ionian Bank 2
General Bank 1
Popular Bank 1
Commercial Bank 1
National Economy Bank 1
Industrial Bank 1
Bank of Values 1
Compile from: N.B.G./H.A., the minutes of the General Council of the N.B.G., of October 23,1924.
It might be argued that had foreign direct investments been the rule instead of the 
exception, the public work projects would have been completed sooner. The contractor would 
have had an incentive to build at a faster pace. As things turned out, the framework of 
fore ign po rtfo lio  Investment proved unsatisfactory as the state was unable to 
raise the capital needed for the works assigned to  foreign contractors.
4 . New Arguments Put Forward by the Dissertation and Conclusions Reached
1. The story of the public work contracting reveals the country's peripheral status in the world 
economy. Concession hunters were attracted to Greece. But, it was no Eldorado in the eyes 
of the international business community. There were not many bankers and contractors who 
wanted to invest in Greece as compared with Latin American countries. The contendQrs for 
any one specific project were never more than five. In part Greece was not attractive because 
of its small size and population. Greece faced limited options, and that was true both before 
and after stabilization.12
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2. The story of foreign finance for infrastructure underlines the differing strategies of the U.S. and 
British governments in SouthEastern Europe during the interwar years. The government of 
Britain, in an aggressive manner, sought to promote British private national economic interests 
in Greece (as for example, the assignment of contract, the selling of surplus industrial stock, 
etc). For the U.S. government, Greece was and remained on the periphery of its political and 
economic interests. It actively intervened on behalf of private business interests seldom and 
only when under pressure.
3. The public works undertaken were all necessary. Only in the case of the railway scheme did 
strategic criteria prevail. The loans raised for infrastructure development proved to be non 
selfliquidating. This will be explained separately for each of the projects under consideration. 
Let it be noted here, however, that with the exception of the Athens water scheme, no 
detailed plan was laid down in advance although in some cases surveys had been made in the 
late 19th or early 20th. Lack of planning at both the technical and financial levels resulted In 
excessive waste in time and economic effort. Furthermore, with the exception of the two land 
improvement schemes, the other projects were not directly productive in that they did not 
directly increase national revenue. Moreover, all of the infrastructure works undertaken had an 
extended maturity period. In addition, the sudden and drastic curtailing of capital supplied in 
1932 came at a time when only one of the five projects had been completed. A visobus circle 
set in. Unfinished projects could not produce income to service the loans raised during 1922- 
1932. In turn, the 'closing' of the international capital market hampered the completion of the 
works. In the end, two out of the five projects were abandoned halfway and never reached 
fruition. For a country suffering a shortage of capital and backward in terms of infrastructure 
facilities this was little short of catastrophic. Of course, Greece was not unique in this respect. 
In other backward countries such as Brazil and Colombia the record was similar as schemes 
were either abandoned or finished after a considerable delay. Indeed, there was a peculiar 
coincidence between some Columbian and Greek militaristic railway scheme.13
4. The story of foreign finance for public works highlights the difference in approach and 
mentality of the Greek statesmen with the orthodox AngloSaxon tradition of economic 
thought. The political body had a structuralist 'naive-Keynlian' approach towards infrastructure 
development. No one in Greece disputed the need for the schemes. The agony of 
productively absorbing the stream of refugees was real and in part explains such an
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orientation. But, beyond this short-run dimension, public works were seen as the prerequisite 
for economic development and for economic autonomy vis a vis the west.
The British financial establishment viewed the Greek government's public works 
'programme' with reserve. It felt already by the mid-twenties that the government was 
borrowing indiscriminately. Although it admitted that the schemes contemplated were 
"undoubtedly necessary" it advised the government to slow down. The British feared that a 
continuous influx of large amounts of foreign capital would interfere with stabilization and 
ultimately hurt the credit position of Greece and the interests of existing bondholders. As the 
years went by the criticism voiced became more and not less vocal.14 The objection of the 
British is not surprising considering that at the time in Britain the Treasury view* prevailed 
regarding the utility of state sponsored public works. Indeed, in the name of 'sound finance' 
the Treasury argued that state-sponsored public works were in principle "diversionary and 
unproductive".15
5. The weak bargaining position of the state in public work financing and contracting was a 
function of the limited interest of foreign capital in Greece. It should also be underlined that the 
Greek state was incapable of maximizing external opportunities. In large part the story of public 
work construction is a sad chronicle of this weakness. The 'bad deals' attained were primarily a 
consequence of a disarticulated state structure. Greek sociologists and political scientists 
have painted the state as being a strong and vigorous institution.16 It is the contention of this 
thesis that size should not be confused with strength. The large and evergrowing state during 
the twenties was weak, ineffective, and loose.
Often the state was unwilling and unable to translate policy into programme.17 There was 
no clear outline of priorities. The scholar is faced with spasmodic government measures. In 
the broader world climate and under the specific Greek circumstances of increased exogenous 
population pressures, Greece nearly intuitively, and copying other examples such as Italy, 
turned to "productive" investments. There was a simplistic perception that public works would 
suffice to increase the area of cultivated land and agricultural yields, enhance the 
commercialization of home produce, improve the quality of life in the urban centers and above 
all secure self-sufficiency in Greece's staple food item: cereals. But, from there on a series of 
irrational, often inconsistent policies unfolds. There is nowhere an economic argument as to
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choices for new investments, priorities, preferences, elementary cost-benefit analysis, and the 
like.
Political backwardness, reflected in the frequent changes in governments and the 
intervention of the military, spell out a scenario which was inimical to foreign investments and 
served to further weaken Greece's bargaining position in the international community. Career 
patterns were disrupted in the bureaucracy. Ironically, even those enclaves of serious cadre 
that had managed to develop failed to intervene effectively in the decision making process. 
Thus, for example the advise of the ministry of communication 'sages' was often ignored by the 
political leadership. The latter often did not give sufficient attention to the technical details, 
such as for example the real interest rate of the loans and the remuneration of the contractor. 
The question of how cheaply or efficiently the works could be done was often for the 
government an issue of lesser importance than other factors such as the need to: i) maintain a 
balance between American and British interests; ii) strike an equilibrium between the two rival 
domestic banking groups (i.e. the National Bank of Greece and the Bank of Athens); and iii) 
secure sufficient funds to finance the projects. The state did not seem able to make decisions 
on the basis of economic-technical criteria. In deciding in favour of the one or other contractor, 
weight was often accorded to factors of a general political nature. On the foreign scene, the 
tug of war and the occasional 'alliances' between Hambros and its American competitors and 
on the domestic scene the war between the N.B.G. and the Bank of Athens formed an 
endless "rosary" in the economic and financial history of the period under study with the Greek 
state watching passively.
6. In the interwar period many countries borrowed for converting older debts or covering welfare 
expenditures- "to say nothing of the funds swallowed up by corruption",18 whereas in Greece 
the emphasis was on capital projects. Furthermore, foreign capital for infrastructure in the 
world economy followed the stabilization process.19 In Greece, stabilization did not lead to a 
massive capital inflow for capital projects. After 1928 Greece resorted to the international 
capital market exclusively for public works purposes. The government was planning to raise 
£22,000,000, but the total amount already raised did not exceed £9,600,000. Prior to 
stabilization £6,400,000 was raised for public works inspite of the war debt embargo imposed 
by its major creditor, Britain.
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It can again be argued that Greece in the twenties suffered a case of missed opportunities. 
Stabilization failed to produce the anticipated stream of foreign capital partly because it was 
attained too late. Furthermore, following stabilization the Greek government made mistakes in 
handling foreign finance. Thus once again we cannot construct a linear causation argument. 
On the one hand, late stabilization was due to exogenous and internal 
blockages. On the other, the failure of stabilization to promote capital 
Inflows was due to factors outside and Inside the power of control of the 
Greek government.
Finally, was the flow of foreign capital too much or too little for setting up even a rudimentary 
process of economic change? Greek contemporary opinion held that the sums borrowed were 
inadequate and that default was inevitable. Her foreign supervisors argued that Greece 
borrowed too much. Once more differences in perspectivespresent. Which view is more 
convincing? It seems that what happened in Greece conforms with Fishlow's general 
observation that capital provided to the borrowing countries was on the whole too little, too 
late, and at too high a cost.20 It has been argued that the borrowers benefited from the stream 
of foreign capital21 To the extent that the loans were rescheduled and there was a longdrawn 
postponement of the service of the debt this was true for Greece. However, the fact that the 
works were not completed or were completed at a substantial cost and delay implied a heavy 
loss.
5 . Sources
The analysis of the subject has been conditioned by the available material, original and 
constructed. The primary material does not cover the construction and financing of all the 
schemes with equal weight. For example, the reclamation of the Struma valley the archival 
sources are nearly non-existent. A variety of private and public, Greek and foreign sources have 
been consulted. In particular, the Tsouderos Archive at the Bank of Greece, the Diomedes 
Archive at the National Bank, the Diomedes Archive at the Greek Literary and History Archive, the 
Venizelos Archive at the Benaki Museum, the National Bank of Greece Historical Archive, the 
Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, the Bank of England Archive, the U.S.A. Department of 
State Records, and the Foreign Office Documents at the Public Records Office. Extensive use
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has also been made of printed primary material (i.e.contemporary newspapers, parliamentary 
discussions, legal documents, and personal memoirs).
The type of archival material at hand suggests the striking negligence of official Greek 
archival sources. Pointedly, neither the department of Public Works at the Ministry of 
Communications, nor the Ministry of Agriculture, nor the maintenance company set up to manage 
the Athens Water Works have collected and kept financial or other records pertaining to 
infrastructure development.
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SECTION I 
THE MOMENTUM OF 1925
During 1925 the government assigned to foreign capital the construction of four large 
public work schemes*. This was no small feat! Never before was there so much activity in the 
realm of infrastructure building. However, this momentum was not maintained. During the 
following seven years (i.e.1926-1932) only two new major public work contracts were signed. 
This dissertation investigates this momentum and establishes the reasons why it was not 
sustained.
Chapter 1
The Athens Water Scheme
1.1. Introduction
1.1.1. The state of present research and the new interpretation offered by this thesis
The construction of the new Athens water system was the first infrastructure project to be 
undertaken in Greece during the twenties. It was also the first large scale public utility scheme
implemented outside the field of transportation and financed by American capital. Yet, inspite its
T
significance, this project has not been the object of serious research. Two distorted 
interpretations have been offered by the historiography. The one approach places emphasis on 
the fact that the terms imposed on the government were onerous. It is argued that the 
investment was of an unproductive character and had limited multiplier effects on the economy.
*The one, the electrification of Athens was a F.D.I, and is not examined within the context of this 
dissertation.
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The constructing firm (Ulen & Co.) and the management company set up with the Bank of Athens 
are presented as greedy rascals. It is indicative that no mention is made of the limited options 
facing the government considering that no other contractor was willing to provide financial backing 
for the project.1 The other interpretation maintains that the scheme was a good thing simply 
because it was necessary. This approach lacks critical judgement and fails to consider the terms 
under which the project was implemented.2 These two simplistic approaches, which have never 
been challenged, share the following 'methodological' mistake* they are ahistorical in that they 
have presented this scheme in isolation and have not examined it within the general context of 
foreign portfolio investment in infrastructure.3 Hence, this dissertation adopts a comparative 
stance and argues that the project was vested with three unique features. First, although it was 
strictly speaking an indirect foreign portfolio investment -the total cost of construction was 
covered by a foreign loan raised by the government-the contractor was allowed to set up a 
concession for the management of the works. Second, the construction actually finished before 
1932.4 Third, a banking institution established in Greece, other than the National Bank of Greece, 
set up a joint venture with foreign capital.
In addition, this project is of special interest to the scholar of foreign finance because it 
sheds light on the alliances local banking capital made with foreign interests and vice versa. 
Namely, it uncovers the development of two rival blocks of power: Hambros in alliance with the 
N.B.G. versus Seligman allied with the Bank of Athens. The theme of this Anglo-American cum 
interhellenic 'conflict' has never been studied before.
1.1.2. The sources
One might expect that there would be a plethora of archival documents on the Athens 
water scheme considering its significance. But, in reality this was not the case. Neither the 
ministry of communications nor the Athens Water Company possessed a historical archive. And, 
unfortunately, the Bank of Athens archive pertaining to the period is incomplete. These 
deficiencies cannot easily be resolved by references to other primary sources. The Greek 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Historical Archive contains no files on the scheme as the negotiations 
did not involve large issues of a political and strategic nature as was for example the case with the
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League of Nations loans. Also, the U.S.A. Department of State Records contain only few 
references to the subject. This corroborates the assertion of the dissertation that at first the 
penetration of American capital into Greece was undertaken spontaneously by businessmen and 
without substantial help or interest on the part of the U.S. government. However, the relative 
dearth of archival sources contrasts to the plentiful published 'primary' material dealing with the 
topic: the published reminiscences, the large number of legal contracts referring to the scheme 
and foremost the parliamentary minutes. Notably, this project was a major topic of discussion of 
nine parliamentary sessions.5
1.1.3. Origins of the problem and the first attempts to find a solution
"It is unusual if not unique for a population of some 800,000 inhabitants to suddenly 
become possessed of a complete new water supply".6 And, yet this is exactly what happened in 
the case of Athens. In the century after independence during which the capital of Greece had 
transformed itself from a squalid village of 5,000 into a bustling metropolis of more than half a 
million, absolutely nothing had been done to modernize water facilities. As a result, the artesian 
wells and the aqueduct system that had been constructed by the Roman Emperor Hadrian 
around A.D.130 had to suffice.7 The distribution of water was uneven. The few who were 
fortunate enough to have their houses connected with the large main that brought water from the 
end of the Hadrian aqueduct were reportedly as "liberally supplied with water, as they would have 
been in New York City”. While, in the poorer districts women stood in line at the street fountains in 
order to collect a few pints of water.8
The need to increase the Athens water supply had been first recognized by the state in the 
late 19th century. But, the government lacked financial resources and the foreign and Greek 
experts commissioned to study the problem were unable to provide a satisfactory solution. Two 
types of scheme were proposed: i) to draw water from lake Stymphalia which lay south of Athens, 
or ii) to tap water from the springs in the mountainous area north of the city. Both proposals were 
costly and had technical drawbacks.9
The water shortage problem was exacerbated by the beginning of 1923.10 As a result of 
the refugee influx from Asia Minor, suddenly the population of the greater Athens area almost
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doubled becoming 800,000 compared to 500,000 in 1918.11 In December 1924, it was 
estimated that the daily supply of water was less than 12 litres per person.12 Moreover, by this 
point, with the swelling of the population, the excessive impurities in the water system had begun 
to pose a serious threat to public health. Typhoid fever and water borne diseases became 
endemic.13 Under the circumstances, it became absolutely imperative to set up a new water 
system. Not surprisingly, the water issue became a favourite topic of conversation. According to 
a caustic dictum which achieved notoriety, in Athens one could "...not during the duration of one 
single day drink tea as well as take a bath. Because if one takes a bath in the morning one is told in 
the afternoon that there is no tea, whereas if one drinks tea, one is informed that he cannot take a 
bath!”14
1.2. The Decision to Construct an Artificial Lake and the International Tender
As noted above, financial and technical problems frustrated earlier attempts to improve 
water supply. However, by 1923 the second set of problems had been resolved. During the first 
half of that year the department of public works at the ministry of communications decided to 
adopt the radical proposition put forward in a report that the American firm Ford Bacon and Davis 
had prepared two years earlier for the Bank of Pireaus. This study had set out a detailed plan for 
the construction of an artificial lake at Marathon, 16 miles outside Athens.15 This solution was far 
superior to other previous proposals because it made possible a substantial increase to the 
supply of water by tapping the abundant fresh water sources of the surrounding valleys and 
mountains. In August 1923, a law was passed for the holding of an international tender for the 
creation of a modern water system.16 The project would be undertaken on a cost plus basis (i.e. 
the cost of construction would burden the Greek state) but the builder would be under the 
obligation to provide a loan so that the government could cover in full the expenses. The indirect 
placement of loans through contractors in order to finance the building of public works was usually 
employed by governments with a weak credit. For example, Latin American countries had 
occasionally resorted to this practice.17
Inspite of the urgent need for a new water system, the tender was actually held not 
immediately in August 1923, but in September 1924. It is not difficult to discern why there was a
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delay of one year. As has been explained in detail in Book I, Section I, the Greek government at 
the time was trying to win the confidence of the League of Nations, the Bank of England, and the 
Treasury in order to float the First Refugee Loan. The problem was that the law announcing the 
decision to hold an international tender was passed a few days before the signing of the Geneva 
Protocol of September 1923. With this document the League of Nations put severe restrictions 
on the Greek government with respect to foreign borrowing. Thus, had Athens proceeded 
immediately with the international competition, it would have provoked the authority of the 
League and the Geneva Protocol. It was by no coincidence that the tender was actually held in 
September 1924 shortly after the League of Nations decided to allow the Greek government to 
borrow foreign capital for productive purposes.18
The water scheme did not become a dead issue during the one year that intervened 
between the declaration of the intention to hold the tender and its actual materialization. By then, 
the Bank of Pireaus had lost interest in the project for reasons that we do not know. However, in 
the meanwhile the Bank of Athens had become interested. It was concurrently the second 
largest commercial bank operating in Greece as well as the largest foreign bank established in the 
country. This bank was a member of the Syndicat des Etudes et des Enterprises which the 
National Bank of Greece had created in September 1924. (See Book II, Introduction) One of the 
aims of this syndicate was to set up a joint venture with foreign capital for the finance, 
construction, and operation of a new water system for Athens. However, the Bank of Athens was 
not content to simply participate 'passively' in the plans laid out by its arch-rival the National Bank. 
It aspired to cooperate with foreign capital on its own strength.
Thus, the Bank of Athens which after WWI had developed close links with the U.S.A tried to 
find an American engineering firm that would be interested in undertaking the project. Its search 
was fruitful and in January 1924 it introduced to Venizelos -who for that one month happened to 
be Prime Minister- a likely contestant for the project, the New York firm of Ulen & Co.19 
Technically, Ulen & Co. was more experienced in constructing sewages rather than water work 
systems. In addition, it was not one of the bestknown American construction firms. However, it 
was not exactly a newcomer in the field and was a fast growing company.20 Already by 1924 it had 
undertaken a number of projects for the U.S. Federal, the Polish and Latin American
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governments. Two were the factors that weighed heavily in favour of Ulen, from the point of view 
of Greece. The first was that it had constructed -the longest water tunnel in the world-.the 18 mile 
long Shankeden water tunnel for New York city. For, the most difficult aspect of the Athens water 
scheme was that it necessitated the construction of a long tunnel.21 The second was that this
p
American contractor was familiar with the practice of accepting government bonds in return for 
building a specific project. (For example, it had undertook to build a new railroad across the 
Andes for the Bolivian government within such a financial framework.) This was a definitive 
advantage for during the early twenties not many contractors "were attempting to do much 
financing themselves".22 The fact that Ulen & Co. joined forces with a financial institution was not 
peculiar for this firm. It usually worked with an "associated group of bankers". In this instance by 
cooperating with the Bank of Athens it acquired a local ally in a country which was little known to 
American interests 23
By the time the international tender was held on September 27, 1924, Ulen & Co. had 
discussed the project with each of the four cabinets that had served since January of that year! 
However, Ulen & Co. chose not to participate in the tender. The explanation offered in 1925 from 
governmental sources was that this firm had not had enough time to prepare a written offer.24 
But, it seems unlikely that this was the real reason for the abstention considering that it had 
already submitted a detailed offer to undertake the scheme with the Bank of Athens in February 
1924.25 A more plausible explanation is that Ulen & Co. decided to abstain as a matter of tactics, 
because, prior to the international competition, the department of public works had found its 
terms onerous.
Of the four companies that competed in the tender, the two, i.e. Philip Holzman and 
Siemens Bau Union made offers that were of high technical competence and "marvels of minutiae 
and of painstaking detail".26 However, neither of these two firms succeeded in being awarded 
the project because neither one was able to offer financial backing for the construction of the 
scheme. (It is not known whether these two firms were short on cash or whether they were not 
willing to risk funds in Greece). Consequently, for one more time in modern Greek history the 
critical factor facing the government was the 'financial constraint'. The latter had to came face to 
face with the bitter fact that due to shortage in the effective supply of capital it had limited options
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facing it. Indeed, insofar as Ulen was concerned the failure of the tender was good news. It 
enhanced its bargaining position vis a vis the government as it was the only contractor willing to 
offer a loan to the government for the realization of the project.
1.3. The Assignment of the Project to Ulen & Co. and The Bank of Athens
The Athens water scheme was not the only project under consideration during the autumn 
of 1924. After the signing of the new Geneva Protocol in September 1924, there had been an 
outburst of 'activity' in the field of infrastructure development. Plans were being discussed 
regarding the electrification of Athens; the creation of a national road network; the extension and 
repair of the existing railway system; the reclamation of the Vardar valley. One gets the impression 
from looking at the facts that the foreign concession hunters, the Greek banking establishment 
and the government were in a hurry to catch up with the time lost.27
Ten days after the tender was held for the Athens water scheme in September 1924, the 
liberal politician Andreas Michalakopoulos stepped into office. He was the fifth Premier to serve 
during 1924 and managed to stay in power for only eight months. A dilemma he faced was 
whether to postpone the Athens water scheme, or to sign a contract with Ulen & Co. considering 
that it was the only firm that had offered to provide financial backing for the project. The Premier at 
once took the decision to reopen negotiations with this American firm. Michalakopoulos did not 
want to postpone the creation of a new water system because the lack of water had become a 
social problem and health hazard after the refugee influx. However, it is also apparent that in 
deciding to go ahead with this project first, he was also influenced by the fact that an American firm 
(i.e. Ulen & Co.), and a bank without British connections (the Bank of Athens) were the single joint 
contestants.28 As yet, relations with the American government had not been poisoned. No 
prehistory of financial cum political dependence existed with the U.S.A., as had been the case 
with France and Britain. Greece was a country that still belonged "to the backwaters of American 
foreign policy"29 The American government was neither interested in Greek politics nor did it 
pursue an aggressive commercial and financial policy. Its attitude was that of leaving business to 
itself.30
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Michalakopoulos was against opening new fields of economic dependence from British 
financiers and in particular Hambros.31 This aversion of his was partly due to the close ties which 
this merchant bank had with the Greek monarchy and partly to the fact that the British 
establishment (the F.O., the Treasury, the Bank of England) were at the moment exploiting 
Greece's desperate need to raise capital for the settlement of the refugees in order to extract 
favours and concessions from the government.(See: Book I, Section I, Chapter 1)
Testimony to the Greek Premier's antithesis towards British capital was his unwillingness to 
go ahead with the scheme for the electrification of Athens. Michalakopoulos was indeed in a 
difficult position. In his urge to secure support for the refugee loan from London, he had 
promised that the financing, construction, and operation of the new electricity concession in the 
greater Athens area would go to British interests.32
Ironically, by rushing into arranging a deal for the creation of a new water system for Athens 
with Ulen & Co.,and by avoiding completely (after the flotation of the First Refugee Loan) to even 
discuss the electricity concession, the new Premier became inadvertently entangled in the battle 
between the N.B.G., and The Bank of Athens. For, these two important rival banking institutions 
were at odds on the 'electricity' question: On the one hand, the N.B.G. joined forces with British 
capital and demanded that the government grant the new concession to an Anglo-Hellenic 
syndicate (in which The Power and Traction Finance Co. would have the controlling interest)33 
On the other hand, the Bank of Athens had an important stake in the old 'Athens Electricity 
Company'. This firm wanted to renew its concession and undertake the new electricity works in 
Athens with the assistance of the Belgian capital34
This situation had repercussions on how the negotiations were carried out for the Athens 
water system. Theoretically, the department of public works should have been charged with the 
conduct of the discussions with Ulen & Co. and the Bank of Athens for this important project. 
However, they were handled almost singlehandedly by the Premier35 Michalakopoulos feared 
that certain engineers of the department of public works -who continued to hold reservations 
about whether the scheme was technically feasible- might under the instigation of the N.B.G., 
undermine his effort to reach an agreement with Ulen & Co. and The Bank of Athens 36
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1.4. American Versus American: The Contract in Parliament
The flotation of the First Refugee Loan in mid-December 1924 was a great success and the 
international community appeared to have regained confidence in the Greek economy.37 Within 
the general context of this euphoria, the government decided that the water works contract which 
had in the meanwhile been drawn, should be signed the soonest possible. The date set for this 
event was December 22 1924. On the previous day, an American contractor, J.R. MacArthur, had 
arrived in Greece and publicly demanded that the signing of an agreement with Ulen & Co. be 
postponed for one week in order that he have time to prepare and present a written counter 
proposal.38 This contractor had participated in the international tender held in September 1924. 
However, his offer had at the time been rejected by the government on technical and financial 
grounds 39 For Ulen & Co. the prospect that the government might yield to MacArthur*s demand 
for postponement did not seem either appealing or improbable, as twelve months had already 
gone by since it had first proposed to undertake the project. Thus, on December 22 1924, Ulen 
& Co. announced to the government that if during the day the contract were not signed it would 
consider itself absolved from any obligation. This ultimatum served its purpose and the contract 
was signed at once.40
MacArthur did not give up hope as the agreement had to be ratified by the National 
Assembly within two months 41 MacArthur at once prepared in writing a counterproposal and 
launched an aggressive publicity campaign, which consisted of granting interviews and standing 
in person outside parliament handing out pamphlets with details on his "superior" offer42 
Accusations appeared in the Press that the contract with Ulen & Co. was a $ef(/ out to foreign 
interests and a national scandal43 The MacArthur counterproposal drew public sympathy and 
served as an attractive focus for criticism against Michalakopoulos. The fact was that the Premier 
had become unpopular not only with the National Bank of Greece, but also with the radical 
elements in the National Assembly and the rightist quarters of the political spectrum.44 As a result 
of the public stir over the 'water* issue the government did not hurry to present the contract 
signed with Ulen & Co. for ratification. Instead, it stalled on purpose with the hope that in the 
meanwhile interest in the MacArthur offer would subside, and that as a result prolonged debates
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in Parliament would be avoided. Thus, the legal decree for the ratification of the contract was 
presented to the National Assembly by the minister of communications on February 7 1925, i.e. 
two weeks before the deadline for its ratification.45
But the manoeuvre failed. The government was forced to face a long, complicated 
parliamentary debate which occupied the center stage for almost eight weeks as all other issues 
of importance such as the drawing of the new republican constitution receded into the 
background 46 In view of the public stir MacArthur created, the special parliamentary committee 
set up to study the contract followed an 'unorthodox' procedure: it subjected the signed contract 
to a point by point comparison with the proposal put forward by MacArthur47
The MacArthur proposition was attractive compared to the contract signed with Ulen & Co. 
in that it 'promised' a larger loan at a lower real rate of interest and a longer redemption period. In 
addition, the level of general expenses it charged for the building of the works was lower. 
However, MacArthur was unable to secure the approval of the parliamentary committee and the 
National Assembly for three reasons. First, the disadvantages of his offer regarding the cost of 
construction were plenty. (See Table 1 below, Part II, points A.C.D.E). Second, MacArthur was 
not a serious man of business. He had just departed from the well established firm of MacArthuris 
& Bros and was experiencing serious financial difficulties.45 Recently he had proven incapable of 
providing in full the amount of capital he had promised the Italian government for the construction 
of an important water scheme in Italy.49 Third, his offer was 'fictional' considering that he had no 
financial backing. Indeed, his claim that Speyers & Co.-the New York Bankers who had floated the 
American tranche of the First Refugee Loan- had agreed to provide a loan of up to $16,000,000 
to the Greek government if his newly set up firm, The American Hellenic Development Co., 
undertook the implementation of the water scheme, was proven false.50
In contrast to The American Hellenic Development Co, Ulen & Co. enjoyed the advantage 
that it was a well established firm, capable of providing financial backing for the scheme. In 
addition, it also enjoyed the assent -albeit silent- of the higher echelons of public administration in 
Greece. For J. Coundouriotis who was Head of the board of directors of The Bank of Athens was 
the brother of the President of the newly founded Republic 51
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On April 4, the eve of the final deadline for the "validification" of the contract, the National 
Assembly gave a unanimous vote in favour of a modified version of the original contract that had 
been signed on December 22. Expost the MacArthur counterproposal served one useful 
purpose: Ulen & Co. and The Bank of Athens were more easily 'convinced' to accept the 
modifications j)ut forward by the parliamentary committee. (See Table 2 below).
The construction of the water works did not start immediately after the domestic opposition 
was won over and the ratification procedure completed. This was not possible for the first tranche 
of the Water Loan was floated -not as was hoped within a few days- but instead in July 1925. This 
delay of over three months was due to the obstacles put in way of the flotation of a loan by Britain 
and the French government. (The first wanted to block the penetration of American capital into • 
Greece and the second wanted to force Greece to reach a settlement on the Ottoman debt. For 
details see section 1.6.1, b. below.).
In sum, the manner in which the Athens water problem was handled by the Prime Minister, 
and the criticism voiced against it, cannot be studied in isolation. What was at stake for both the 
opposition and the government where larger issues apart from the specific question of how to 
quench the thirst of the Athenean population. For Michalakopoulos the central issue was the 
need to secure funds for the scheme and establish close economic ties with the U.S.A. so as to 
lessen the growing dependence on Britain as a source of capital. For, the opposition parties what 
was at stake was the Premier's inability to form a strong central party. As for the N.B.G., it's prime 
concern was to secure its position of dominance in the newly opened field of infrastructure 
development.
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Table 1
Comparison Between the Terms of the Contract Signed and 
the American Hellenic Development Co. 
December 1925
1) The Loan
Ulen & Co A.H.D.C.
A. Nominal amount of loan
B. Price of issue
C. Nominal interest rate
D. Real interest rate
E. Redemption period
F. Right of early redemption
G. Flotation method
$10,000,000
85%
8%
9.4%
22 years 
after 5 years 
4 tranches
$16,000,000
87%
7.5%
8.6%
20 or 60 years 
after 5 years 
1 or 4 tranches
II) The Construction
Ulen & Co A.H.D.C.
A. Estimated cost of works
B. General expenses
C. Profit of constructor
D. Gain for constructor if scheme 
completed at less than estimated 
sum
E. Penalty for contractor if total cost 
of the scheme surpassed the 
estimated cost
F. Penalties for contractor if works 
completed after 5 years
$6,400,000 
17% of cost 
$1,200,000*
none
none
none
$8,9-11,000,000 
14% of cost 
10% of cost of works
50% of economies
10% of surplus amount spent 
if 115% of estimate surpassed
$300 per day
III) The Concession
Ulen & Co A.H.D.C.
A. Duration of concession after 
completion of works 22 years 20 or 60 years
B. Profit of concessionaire 7.5 % of net income if 20 years: 7.5%, if 60:1/3 
more
"This was a fixed fee.
Compiled from: G.P.D., Fourth Constitutional Assembly. Vol.D, Minutes of the Assembly of March 23 1925, 
pp. 610-624. Also: G.G., First issue, Folio 100, April 24 1925, Water Works contract.
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Table 2
The Water Works Contract: A Summary of the Terms as Phrased in the Original Contract and
the Modifications Proposed.
I. The Mode of Financing of the Scheme
A. Basic characteristics of the original water works contract of December 22 1924.
a. $10,000,000 loan to be supplied to the Greek government jointly by Ulen & Co. and The Bank of 
Athens in four annual tranches beginning in April 1925. The I.F.C. placed in charge of the 
service of the loan.Real rate of interest 9.4%.
b. Supplementary loan to be raised jointly by the constructor and The Bank of Athens when 
needed. Terms of loan to be determined by the conditions ruling in the international capital 
market at the time of it's flotation.
c. $1.000,0000 short term loan to be granted jointly by Ulen & Co. and The Bank of Athens with the 
same real rate of interest as the $10,000,000 loan in order to improve on the existing water 
supply system.
B. Modifications proposed by the parliamentary committee.
a. The $10,000,000 should not be placed under the control of the I.F.C. This proposal was not 
accepted by Ulen & Co. and The Bank of Athens and the contract as a result was not modified. 
(However it is explained why I.F.C. control did not become effective).
b. The terms for the supplementary ban should not be heavier than those of the $10,000,000 ban. 
Ulen & Co. and The Bank of Athens refused to accept this proposal and as a result the contract 
was not changed.
c. The short term loan for the provisional works should amount to $2,000,000 and not $1,000,000. 
This proposal was not accepted by the constructor and The Bank of Athens and the contract 
was not modified.
II. The Terms under which the Project was Constructed
A. Basb characteristics of the original water works contract of December 22 1924.
a. No upper limit is placed for the cost of construction. Agreed time perbd for completbn of works: 
five years. If works are not completed within the one year following the time specified the 
contractor will be declared in default. If project will cost less than estimated then the 
constructor undertakes to build sewerages with the remaining funds.
b. The Greek government will supervise the construction through an inspection and an audit 
committee.
c. The constructor will receive a fixed fee of $1,200,000. in addition the general expenses of the 
constructor could amount to a maximum of 17% of the construction cost.
d. The government should be consulted beforehand by the contractor when purchases and 
subcontracts are made for over $5,000.
e. No financial penalty is posed for the faulty execution of works.
f. Whenever Greek materials suitable for the works are available on equal terms with foreign 
materials they shall be given preference. Also foreign experts and specialists will be used in the 
construction and administration of the works only when necessary.
B. Modifications proposed by the parliamentary committee.
a. The contract should stipulate that thirty days after the ratification of the contract Ulen & Co. 
shall have engineers on the ground ready to begin work and prepare the definite plans. This 
proposal was accepted by the contractor. Also it was proposed that it be clearly stipulated in 
the contract that in the event that the realized cost is less than the estimated the contractor will 
construct those sewages as might be indicated by the government. This modification was also 
accepted by the contractor.
b. It should be stated in the contract that the government should have the right to decide in which 
order the plans will be executed. The contractor accepted this modification, but substituted the 
verb to decide with the verb to indicate.
c. The general expenses of the contractor should not exceed 14% of the cost of the works. This 
proposal was accepted by the contractor.
d. The government should be consulted beforehand for all purchases or subcontracts over $2,000. 
This proposed modification was not accepted by the contractor.
Compiled from: G.P.D., Fourth Constitutional Assembly, Minutes of the Assembly of April 2, 1925, Vol.D, 
pp.804-808.
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Before closing this presentation on the internal opposition to the contract it must be 
remarked that although there is no direct evidence, there are indirect indications that the N.B.G. 
sometime before April 1925, (i.e the ratification of the contract) made a trade off and perhaps a 
secret deal with The Bank of Athens. Apparently, the Bank of Athens appears to have become 
more compliant with respect to the establishment of the new electricity concession. And on its 
part the N.B.G. stopped inflaming public opinion and the Press against the water works 
contract.52 Thus, what we see here is an example of how domestic banking antagonists 
exploited their connections with foreign capital in order to enhance their position of dominance. 
This displays the intricate internal and external dynamics that developed during the period and 
which have been ignored by the literature.
1.5. The Post Ratification Amendments
That the contract passed through the sieve of the National Assembly is testimony to the 
limits placed on the discretionary power of the government.53 However, the latter had ways to 
escape from this kind of control. And indeed, it used these powers intelligently regarding the 
sensitive issue of the water management company to be set up by the concessionaires. No 
wonder that public opinion often came to identify the penetration of foreign capital with 'dark 
secretive procedures’. The story was as follows. Only six days after the ratification of the water 
works contract, the government passed a ministerial decree which stipulated that: i) for a minimum 
period of ten years -instead of five years as specified in the ratified contract- the state would not 
be allowed to buy out the concession to be set up by Ulen & Co. and the Bank of Athens; and ii) 
in the event that the government made a new issue of securities in order to provide funds for an 
early redemption of the loan, Ulen & Co. and The Bank of Athens would have the right and option 
to purchase these new securities to such an amount as would produce funds sufficient "for the 
redemption and retirement of all the bonds then outstanding". By acting automatically the two 
lenders would continue to operate the Societe des Eaux until 1952 "and thereafter until all the 
[new] bonds have been amortised and paid in full".54 It is obvious that these 'improvements' had 
been promised by the government to the concessionaires before signature of the contract in 
December.
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In addition, in the next few months following ratification, the cabinet approved 'by special 
resolutions': the statutes of the Concession to be set up to operate the Athens water system;55 
as well as the procedure for estimating the indemnity to be paid to the concessionaires in the case 
that the government would redeem before 1952 the loans to be furnished by the constructor and 
The Bank of Athens 56 The terms reflect the inexperience, dependent status and low bargaining 
power of the Greek state in the twenties 57
1.6. From Contract to Implementation
In the following pages we will examine how the new Athens water system was financed, 
constructed and operated. This illustrates salient features of Greek dependence and socio-, 
economic backwardness. Nevertheless, it must not be overlooked that despite its poor terms, 
the narrowsightedness of Greek politicians, the inefficiency of the administration, the selfishness 
of Greece's financial supervisors and the arrogance of Ulen & Co., the technical goals set were 
largely attained.
1.6.1. The financing (or to put it simply the high politics of finance)
Two foreign and five domestic loans amounting to a total of $14,500,000 were raised by the 
government in connection with the building of the new Athens water system. (Table 3) The sum 
borrowed for the ‘water works', at $ 14,500,000 was a significant figure for the small Greek 
economy. (Table 4) Originally, the government had intended to rely exclusively on foreign 
finance. However, this did not prove possible because the total of $11,000,000 provided in 
1925 by the concessionaires did not suffice. By 1930, at which time it became apparent that the 
scheme would require more funds than initially estimated the capital market of the U.S.A. had for 
all effective purposes become a closed preserve for foreign issues. Under the circumstances the 
government resorted to the domestic market for additional funds. (For the bans raised in this 
manner see again Table 3). In this respect, the Athens water scheme was typical within the Greek 
context. The remaining five other projects undertaken on an agency basis during our period of 
study followed the same pattern of mixed-financing. ,
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Table 3
Debt Incurred by the State for the Athens Water Project
I. Loans Provided by Ulen & Co. and the Bank o f Athens
Year Nominal Amount Real Interest Rate
1.1925 (long-term loan)
2.1925 (short-term ban)
$10,000,000
$1,000,000
9.4%
9.4%
TOTAL In $11,000,000
II. Domestic Loans Provided by Public Institu tions
Year In s titu tio n Nominal Amount Real Interest Rate
1. 1930
2. 1930
3. 1930
4. 1931
5. 1931
(Deposits and bans dept) 
(Post Savings Office) 
(Post Savings Office) 
(Post Savings Office) 
(Post Savings Office)
100,000,000 drs.
90.000.000 drs.
25.000.000 drs.
25.000.000 drs.
30.000.000 drs.
7%
8%
8%
8%
8%
TOTAL in drs. 270,000,000
TOTAL in $ 3,500,000
GRAND TOTAL (l)+(ll) In $14,500,000
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.LEconomic Yearbook of Greece for 1932. (Athens, 1933), pp.564-569. Also 
D. Stephanides, Foreign Capital Inflow and its Economic and Political Consequences. (Salonika, 1930), 
pp.235-238.
Table 4
The Significance of the Water Debt
1. Water works bans
2. Annual average of Greece's exports (1925-1932)
3. Annual average of the ordinary revenues of the Greek state (1925-1932)
$14,500,000
$79,700,000
$99,600,000
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1929. (Athens, 1930), pp.199,275. 
Also, G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1939. part II, pp.39,171.
Table 5
British* and American Participation in the Long-term Loans Raised by the Greek Government:
1922-1932
1. Total nominal value of the foreign bans raised by the Greek
government (1922-1932) £39,300,000
2. Participation of Hambros* in (1) £16,870,960
3. Participation of American Capital in (1) £10,500,000
4. Total nominal value of the foreign bans raised for public works after
the flotation of the $10,000,000 Athens water loan (July 1925-1932) £14,000,000
5. Participation of Hambros in (4) £ 6,000,000
6. Participation of American capital in (4) —
*AII of the flotations in Britain for the Greek government were undertaken by Hambros Bank.
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1932. (Athens, 1933), pp.513-528.
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Table 6
Securities Assigned for the Service of the Athens Water Loan
I. Surplus revenues assigned to the service of the public debt and subject to the control 
of the I.F.C.*
II. A first lien charge or mortgage upon the existing water supply system, and the works 
to be constructed
III. A temporary 8% tax on the net incomes from buildings in the Athens area for the 
duration of the construction works.
*By surplus revenues is meant those government revenues assigned to the I.F.C. that remained, after the 
I.F.C. met the payments for the service and amortization of the old gold loans and the First Refugee Loan. 
That is surplus revenues -  Total revenues assigned to the I.F.C. - the payments for the service and 
amortization of the old gold loans and the First Refugee Loan. These amounted to roughly £3,800,000 on an 
annual basis in the mid twenties.
Compiled from information in the Athens Water Works contract and the contract for the First Public Works 
Loan.
a. The $10,000,000 Athens Water Loan
The $10,000,000 loan furnished jointly by Ulen & Co. and the Bank of Athens provided the 
bulk of the funds for the project. This 'American loan' was the first non-railway public works foreign 
loan. Through it the newly established Hellenic Republic saught in a naive way to detach itself 
from the rising financial hegemony of Britain over Greece. However, this experiment failed in that 
a chain effect was not established. During the twenties American contractors were assigned two 
more important projects (i.e. the reclamation of the Vardar and Struma valleys). But, primarily as a 
result of the timely interventions and manoeuvring of Hambros American capital did not participate 
in the loans raised for (these or other) infrastructure works. (See below Table 5. Also, for details 
on this phenomenon see below Book II, Section III, Chapter 2.)58
Indeed, as will be delineated in the following pages, the British Treasury did not view the 
conclusion of this first and only American infrastructure loan with sympathy.59 Regarding 
Hambros, its attitude was that it should be the banker par excellence of the Greek state. (As will 
be explained below Eric Hambro made an offer to finance the scheme which the government 
rejected). The $10,000,000 loan provides an example of the kind of official and unofficial 
supervision London was practicing over Athens. But, before looking into the terms of this loan it 
must be noted that strictly speaking it was not purely an external loan as half of the funds were 
provided by a bank established in Greece. This was not an unusual practice in Greece during our 
period of study. This peculiarity signified in each case, on the one hand the unwillingness of
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foreign capital to undertake alone the risk of investing large sums in Greece, and on the other the 
financial strength (cum tight links with foreign capital) of the local banking establishment.
The terms of the $10.000.000 loan
The $10,000,000 water works loan was raised in order to cover the cost of construction of 
the new water system. The formula agreed upon was that immediately after the ratification of the 
contract by Parliament, the government would issue 10,000 sinking fund gold bonds of a total 
nominal value of $10,000,000. The contractor (i.e.Ulen & Co.) and the Bank of Athens would be 
obliged to buy these bonds in four equal annual installments. They would be taken up by them at 
the price of 85. Thus, the amount to actually reach the hands of the state was only $8,500,000 
and not $10,000,000 which was the nominal value of the loan.
This was a medium term loan. All of the bonds issued would mature on April 1 1952. 
Before 1930 -which was the planned date for the completion of the project- no amortization 
payments would be made. Or, put otherwise, a ten year grace period was granted. From 1930 
onwards the government could fully repay the loan if it so wished.60 Indeed, at the time of the 
signing of the water works contract in December 1924, it was apparent that Ulen & Co. and The 
Bank of Athens had struck a very good financial deal: First, there was an international guarantee 
because it was stipulated that the I.F.C. would intervene in the service of the loan "in the same 
manner and form as for the other national debts which were placed under its control".61 Second, 
more than ample security was offered. The annual service of the loan did not surpass 
$1,002,5000 (i.e. roughly £207,425) and the surplus revenues of the I.F.C. alone had an annual 
yield of £3,800,000. Regarding the 8% tax imposed on the net incomes from buildings in the 
Athens area (see Table 6 above) it must be noted that it worked at cross purposes, indicating 
once more the contradictory nature of Greek economic policy and the lack of even elementary 
economic analysis running through it. This tax must have certainly discouraged the building trade 
and house construction at time when the refugee influx had created pressures for new houses. It 
also put the burden on the lower and middle incomes rather than on the higher brackets whose 
incomes were not associated with rents.62 Third, and most important, with an issue price of 85 
and a nominal interest rate of 8% the real rate of interest of the loan amounted to 9.4%.
241
Effectively ,in retrospect the Athens water loan had the highest real rate of interest to be charged 
on a foreign loan during 1922-1932. This rate also compared unfavourably with the infrastructure 
loans that the government had raised in the past as well as with the domestic interest rates 
charged in Greece during 1925. (Table 7 below).
The state of the American financial market cannot be held responsible for the fact that such 
a high real rate of interest was to be charged for the Athens Water Loan. For 1925 was not a year 
of capital stringency-tight money. During that year the discount rate in the U.S.A. was 3.4%, and 
there was a large number of new foreign issues.63 (Table 8 below). The explanation for the high 
real rate of interest is strikingly simple. To begin with it must be noted that this loan was private 
and that as a general rule loans of this category were more expensive for the borrower than public 
flotations. In addition, another factor of importance was that for the American capital market, 
Greece was basically a newcomer, a terra incognita. The only Greek loan which had as yet been 
partly raised in the U.S.A. was the First Refugee Loan. The participation of an American banking 
firm in that instance was attained largely through British Initiative.64 In the last analysis, the 
high real interest rate charged was the price that the government had to pay in order to start the 
project at once and gain 'independent' access to the fastly growing in importance American capital 
market. (The word independent is used to signify the absence of the tutelage of Hambro).
Table 7
.............. ...................
1. Past Infrastructure (Railway) Loans
Loan Title Real Rate o f Interest
i. 170,000,000 gold francs loan of 1884 7.1%
ii. 155,000,000 gold franc loan of 1889 5.4%
iii. 56,200,000 gold franc loan of 1902 5 %
II. Interest Rates In 1925
i. Official discount rate in Greece 8.9%
ii. Internal loans raised*:
450,000,000 gold drs. loan 1.5%
2,000,000 drs. Volos Courthouse loan 6 %
100,000,000 drs. Tekton loan 12 %
‘Real rate of interest
Sources: For the railway loans see D. Stephanides, Foreign Capital Inflow and its Economic and Political 
Consequences. (Salonika, 1930), pp.179-184,200-205. For the official discount rate in Greece, see: 
G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1929. (Athens, 1930), p.32. For the internal loans, see: 
G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1932. (Athens, 1933), pp.544,555.
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Table 8
New Foreign Capital Issues in the U.S.A.
Year Number of New Issues Total Value I 
In millions
1924 120 $1,217
1925 164 $1,316
1927* 265 $1,577
*1927 was the peak year for new foreign capital issues.
Source: Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Problem of International Investment. (Oxford, 1937), 
p.171.
The government engulfed itself in contrived rationalizations instead of coming up with the 
simple and true statement that it had no other option. The official story it presented in public was 
that the high interest rate was a blessing in disguise which would permit it to rid itself of foreign' 
interests at an early date. Namely, the government claimed that it had accepted this 'onus' in 
order to lure the contractor and the Bank of Athens to accept in return the condition that it would 
be able to redeem the loan and buy out the rights of the management company to be set up only 
five years after the flotation of the loan.65 But as already noted above this condition was short­
lived. Six days after the ratification of the water works contract the right of the government to buy 
out the concession became ten years. Moreover, Michalakopoulos in trying to defend the loan 
and save face in Parliament purported that "on the whole the terms of the Water Loan were not 
more onerous than those of the First Refugee Loan" because it had an early redemption date and 
a grace period, it was to be granted in tranches, and the bank commission charged was low.66 
(Table 9).
Important as these advantages may have been, they could not outweigh the simple fact that 
the margin of difference between the real rates of interest charged on these two 
contemporaneous Greek loans was substantial. The arguments offered by the government 
sounded even at the time ridiculous. In the end the decisive factor, which forced even the 
staunchest critics of Michalakopoulos to give their seal of approval, was the urgent necessity to
he intense^jlamour over the terms of the loan only one minor 
deputy dared to suggest that the scheme be postponed for later. Whereas the majority of the
build the scheme. Infact, inspitejt
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deputies had accepted Alexandras Papanastassiou's view that "Though the terms of the loan are 
onerous, the postponement of the Athens water scheme would be even worse for Greece."67
Table 9
First Refugee Loan Athens Water Loan
Nominal Amount £12,300,000 $10,000,000 or £2,070,000
Bank commission-expenses 6.75% 0.25%
Nominal Interest Rate
Real interest rate* 8.7% 9.40%
Tranches 1 4
Redemption Period
Earliest redemption date 12 years 5 years
Grace period 10 years
*ln estimating the real rate of interest the bank commission and expenses have been included.
Source: A.Angebpoulos, The Consequences of Foreign Borrowing on Greek Public Finances”, in Review of 
Social and Public Economics, Athens, 1934, p.175.
b. British and French Opposition to the Loan
The Greek government after silencing domestic criticism faced the challenge of warding off 
British and French opposition. In Britain, opposition to the $10,000,000 loan sprang from two 
sources: Hambros and the Treasury. The manner in which Hambros' tried to impede Athens from 
raising an American loan sheds light on the tactics this merchant bank employed in order to
'wtr
maintain and enhance its dominating position in Greek finance. Indeed, Hambros was quick in • 
reacting to the news of the agreement for the Athens water scheme. Almost immediately after the 
signing of the water works contract, Sir Eric Hambro, head of this firm, with the assistance of his 
American collaborator and co-issuer of the First Refugee Loan, A. Speyer, tried to persuade the 
Greek government to cancel the Athens Water Loan. The criticism expressed by these two 
bankers was more articulate than that voiced inside Greece.68 It touched upon issues that were 
not brought up either in the local press, nor discussed in the National Assembly. To begin with, 
they raised the point that the poor terms of the Athens water project proved that the international 
financial community was not willing yet to absorb a large flow of Greek government bonds.69 The
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fact that half of the amount was raised by a bank established in Greece corroborates the statement 
of Hambros and Speyers. In addition, they also expressed concern that the Athens Water Loan 
bonds, because of their high return to their holders, might seriously Interfere with the market 
prices of the government bonds quoted on the international bourses, and as a result would 
"forever" damage the creditworthiness of the Greek government on the international capital 
market. This foreboding of Hambros and Speyers did not stem out of any altruistic interest in 
Greek affairs. On the contrary, they were motivated by self-interest. Hambros,was the most 
anxious of the two. Unlike Speyers who was a newcomer in Greece, his bank had ambitious 
future plans in connection with this country.
The not-so-secret wish of Sir Eric Hambro was that Greece should not rush into financial 
deals with other Banks and financiers. He desired that the government wait for his bank to 
undertake at a later date, under one package deal (of some £12-13,000,000) the financing of all 
of Greece's large infrastructure schemes! (i.e. the Athens water scheme, the land reclamation t 
projects, road and railway building) It was on the basis of this expectation that Sir Eric suggested 
to the government to postpone the loan "for at least six or eight months in the hope that in the 
meanwhile Greece would be able to attain better terms." But, Hambro's plea fell on deaf ears. The 
response of the Greek officials to his proposal was: "Well,we must have water and do not care 
what we pay for it."70 Once Athens made it clear that it had no intention of cancelling or 
postponing the loan, Sir Eric modified his 'strategy'. His aim became to restrict the freedom of the 
construction company and the Bank of Athens to place bonds on the market. Specifically, he 
demanded that the bonds of the water loan should not be offered for public subscription before 
January 1 1926, nor sold at a rate giving a higher yield than the market rate of the First Refugee 
Loan prior to July 1 1926. 71 By mid April, Ulen & Co. acquiesced to these two demands. The 
Greek government convinced it that if it did not yield on these points, Sir Eric might use his 
connections with the Bank of England and block the flotation of the loan altogether.72 Clearly the 
government was trying to balance the situation by curbing Greece's dependence on Hambro 
without however provoking his wrath.
But, Sir Eric was still not satisfied. He continued to maintain that Greek credit would be 
seriously damaged as a result of the Water Loan. In early June the Greek press reported that
245
Hambros and Speyers were actively trying behind the scenes to cancel altogether the flotation 
of the loan.73 The archival material substantiates the accuracy of these rumors. It provides 
evidence that Sir Eric Hambro since late January 1925, while trying directly to convince the 
government to cancel the loan, had also been concurrently extensively engaged in using his 
influence in official circles. He worked in two directions. First, he asked the League of Nations to 
issue a protest to the Greek government. However, the League refused to comply for the reason 
that this loan being of a productive character did not violate the Geneva Protocol of September 
1924.74 Second, through his contacts at the Bank of England and the Treasury, Sir Eric tried to 
persuade the British government to block the loan either by not giving its consent as was 
necessary under clause IV of the Paris Agreement, or to withhold its sanction that the I.F.C. 
assume control over the loan.75
The British government was as keen as Hambro to see the ban cancelled for it was envious 
of America's financial penetration in Greece. In addition, it feared that the ban would affect 
negatively the country's prospects regarding stabilization and the ability to punctually repay the 
existing foreign debt. But, at the same time, it was reluctant to play along with Hambro and exploit 
its rights under the Paris Agreement to block the ban altogether. British official circles wanted to 
avoid a head-on confrontation with the government of the U.S.A. for a scheme that as Roussin 
put it "appeared to be a sound one economically and financially".76 Regarding the question of 
whether the I.F.C. would supervise or not the ban, the British Treasury (with whom the final 
decision lay) agreed completely with Hambros that the I.F.C. should not assume control over the 
service of the ban. Certainly, the Greek government had followed an unorthodox procedure. 
For, without seeking prior permission from the Commission, it had stipulated in the water works 
contract of December 1924 that the I.F.C. would assume control over the loan.77 But, more 
importantly, the Treasury objected to the granting of I.F.C. supervision for reasons of principle. It 
believed that if the Commission undertook the responsibility of supervising new bans the Greek 
government would find it easier to embark on a foreign borrowing spree.78
Furthermore, the Treasury saw no reason why the Commission should become a stepping 
stone for the penetration of American capital in Greece. Characteristically, Niemeyer, went to the 
heart of the matter in stating that "Prima facie, there does not seem much reason why the
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International Financial Commission should look after securities for the benefit of private American 
loans."79 Thus, the Treasury outrightly refused to allow the I.F.C. to assume control over the 
$10,000,000 loan. As a result of this decision, the clause pertaining to the I.F.C.control in the
Ov
water works contract became ineffective. In an indirect way -and without provoking a head front » 
clash with the U.S.A., the British government in addition to defending its status quo and existing 
interests- created an unpleasant situation for the Greek government. For I.F.C control and 
supervision was something that Ulen & Co. and the Bank of Athens, had been keen on securing. 
(Without this guarantee, they feared that the general public in the U.S.A. would hesitate to buy 
the bonds when they would be offered for public subscription.)80
London gave its assent to the flotation of the loan, as was required under the Paris 
Agreement of 1918, in June 1925. By assent we mean that it allowed Athens to assign the 
surplus revenues of the I.F.C. as security for the loan.81 Had these surplus revenues not been 
assigned as security it would have been impossible for the government to raise this loan. (That 
the government was informed of this affirmative decision of the British through a telegram which 
Hambros sent to the N.B.G. is one more testimony that this merchant bank had close connections 
with the British government and that it wanted Greece to know this.)
In return for being 'allowed' to float this American loan, Greece was asked to settle its war 
debt with Britain. Sir Otto Niemeyer declared that the Treasury had given its "consent" with the 
understanding that Athens would "become less dilatory" in the negotiations for the settlement of 
the war debt82 Once again, as was the case with the First Refugee Loan,Greece was reminded 
of the simple fact that her British supervisors expected something in return when they "allowed" 
the flotation of a foreign loan. The legacy of British control had become a well established fact.
Greece needed also the approval of France 83 This however was not secured until mid 
July. The French were unwilling to give their permission unless it was explicitly agreed that the 
Ottoman debt, and not the water loan should have first charge to the surplus revenues assigned 
to the I.F.C. This request was not unreasonable because the Geneva Protocol of September 
1924 had explicitly stated that the Ottoman debt would have priority to the surplus revenues over 
all other subsequent loans to be floated.84 Once the contractor acquiesced to the French 
demand the only remaining issue to be faced before the flotation of the loan was the formal
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appointment of the Chase National Bank as fiscal agent.85 This was arranged in late July, and the 
first tranche of the loan was granted a few days later. Michalakopoulos was no longer Premier as in 
the meanwhile, a coup d'etat had occurred on June 26, 1925. The new Premier, dictator 
Pangalos, during his first weeks in power indulged in publicly castigating many of the actions of 
his predecessors.(See Book II, Section I, Chapter 2 on Pangalos’ fight against the contract signed 
by Michalakopoulos with the American firm The Foundation Co. for the drainage of the Vardar 
valley). Interestingly however, he did not breathe one word of criticism against the water works 
contract. Nor did he try to block the flotation of the Athens Water Loan. It is possible to discern an 
explanation for this behaviour. The National Assembly less than three months before the 
Pangalos coup had in a unanimous vote validated the water works contract. The dictator had 
usurped power with the silent assent of the National Assembly and during his early days in office 
did not want to antagonize it.86 Neither did Pangalos have any reason to be too provocative 
towards the U.S.A. by attacking both American contracts. Moreover, he was close to J. Eliascos 
the General Manager of the Bank of Athens.87
Hence, the provision of the first tranche took place without any obstacles being raised by 
Pangalos. A small package of the 'wateri bonds were placed on the Athens and Alexandria 
bourses during the second half of 1926. Few, if any bonds were offered in the City. The fears of 
Greece's supervisors that the market prices of the other Greek bonds on the international market 
would fall as a result of the water ban were not realized.88 However, their premonitions were not 
all faulty. Indeed, after the flotation of the Athens Water Loan the Greek government met 
increasing difficulties in raising additional capital. But, the evidence indicates that this difficulty 
had more to do with the deterioration in the political situation and the war debt embargo which 
Britain imposed than with the Athens Water Loan 89
Retrospectively, the Athens Water Loan over the long-term did not prove to be such a bad 
deal for the Greek government. Three years after the completion of the works, in August 1935, 
the bondholders agreed to lower the nominal interest rate of the loan to 4%, and to extend the 
date for the full redemption of the bonds from 1952 up till 1985, (i.e. the rate of amortization was 
halved).90 The government succeeded before WWII to arrange a rescheduling agreement, 
partly, because this loan had the most onerous terms of all the loans raised during our period of
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study.91 However, it is also possible that The Bank of Athens -which still held a large part of the 
water bonds- agreed to a rescheduling in order to secure in exchange that the water management 
company it had set up with Ulen & Co. would be assigned the construction of an aqueduct that 
would further increase the supply of water by connecting Lake Marathon with the Souvala springs # 
in Parnassos.92 (The management company was actually assigned this project in 1938. See 
below 1.6.2, a.).
c. The Supplementary Loans for the Athens Water Project
In the water works contract it had been stipulated that in the event the $10,000,000 did not 
suffice for the construction of the works, Ulen & Co. and the Bank of Athens would secure an 
additional loan capable of covering the extra costs under terms to "be fixed in accordance with the 
conditions ruling the financial markets of the world at the time".93 But, in 1930 when the need 
rose for additional funds, the concessionaires were not in a position to provide them. Thus, the 
government was forced to turn to the domestic market for supplementary financing. The five, 
drachma bans raised in May 1930 and in May 1931 by the Department of bans and Deposits, and 
the Post savings Office (equivalent to approximately $3,500,000) had a redemption period of 
only ten years. But they had the distinct advantage of having been issued at par. (See again 
Table 3) Their interest rate at 8% was bwer than Athens Water Loan, and the bank rate in Greece 
during 1930-1931.94 As these internal bans were not rescheduled during the thirties, after 1935 
their terms in the bng run compared unfavourably with those of the $10,000,000 ban.
Finally, besides raising drachmae bans, up to 1932 the government incurred one more 
debt with respect to the construction of the water system. This was the $1,000,000 five year 
credit furnished in 1925 by Ulen & Co. and the Bank of Athens in connection with the provisional 
works.95 These works were undertaken, by Ulen & Co. during 1925 and 1926, in order to 
alleviate the water shortage problem until the completion of the new water system 96 But, 
actually, a large part of these temporary works were still in use after the completion of the new 
network.
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All in all, the debt incurred for the Athens water works amounted to approximately 
$14,500,000. This sum was equivalent to a little over £3,000,000, and was 31% larger than the 
debt Greece had originally estimated for building the water works. But in the last analysis what 
counts is that the new Athens water system was ‘speedily’ constructed. It is noteworthy, that the 
other five agency contracts undertaken during 1922-1932 were completed with substantial delay 
for the reason that the foreign loans provided for their implementation were relatively more 
inadequate in size, than the Athens Water Loan.
In conclusion, it is a central contention of this dissertation that we cannot isolate the 
* economic from the political phenomena. Regarding the finance of the Athens water works there 
is ample evidence pointing to how international politics and cover activities of bankers and policy 
makers coalesced against the interests of weak and backward economies such as Greece of the 
interwar period.
1.6.2. The construction of the new water system
If we are to judge the new Athens water system in technical terms the verdict is that this 
scheme was a success story. (For a description of the works see below Table 10). Up till the 
completion of the artificial lake in 1931 it was not possible even for the contractor to maintain with 
any certainty that the estimated increase in the supply of water would be obtained.97 Once the 
project was finished all doubts were erased. There was a tenfold increase in the supply of water. 
Modern standards of hygiene were established and the death rate from typhoid dropped by more 
than half! (See Table 11 below) However, the ascertainment that technically the project was 
satisfactory does not give us the whole story. It tells us nothing about the terms posed, and how 
in fact the construction was carried out. A close study of the facts shows that though the terms 
were onerous the conscientious manner in which the contractor undertook to construct the 
project made up for the basic weaknesses of the contract.
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Table 10
Brief Description of the Works
I) The Marathon collection and storage reservoir.
This reservoir had a surface of 593 acres, and a volume of 10,8 billion gallons. For European 
standards it was a medium size artificial lake. Its principal claim to fame was that its 177 foot 
long barrage was made exclusively of marble.
II) Aqueduct-tunnel system.
This was set up for conveying the water to the outskirts of Athens. From a technical point of 
view the aqueduct was the most difficult part of the project to implement. This was so because 
a 13,4 klm (8 mile) long water tunnel had to be constructed in order to connect the reservoir with 
the main aqueduct at Helidonou. (This remained the longest water tunnel to be constructed in 
Greece uptill the 1970's.)
III) Purification plan.
This had a capacity of 15 million gallons per day.
iv) Distribution system.
This covered 20 sq. miles in area, and contained 600 miles pipeline.
v) House connection system.
Approximately 78,000 connections of the main system with specific houses were set up.
vi) Complementary Infrastructure works.
These were: a road leading to the site where the reservoir was to be built, the installation of a 
power plant at Kastri, and a dock at the port of Chalkis.
Compiled from: R.W.Gausmann, Water For Athens. (Athens, 1940), pp.36,124-137.
Table 11
I. Per Capita Supply of Water In Athens*
1924 2-2,5 gallons
_______1931_____________20-23 gallons
II. Death Rates from Typhoid In Athens
1923 44 per 100,000
1934 14,2 per 100,000
*The figures have been estimated for a population of 88,000.
Compiled from: R.W.Gausmann, Water for Athens. (Athens, 1940), p.303. Also, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
La Grece Actuelle. (Athens, 1933), p.256. Also, R.W.Gausmann, "Brief notes on the Operation of the 
Athens water supply", (1935), pp.6-9.
a. The Terms as Agreed in the Water Works Contract
The water works contract was an agency contract of a cost plus type.98 Theoretically, the 
Greek government could have assigned the project to Ulen & Co. on a "unit price" or a "lump 
sum" basis. However, neither of these two alternative types of agency con tracts was feasible. 
The reason for this was twofold: On the one hand, the Greek state machinery did not possess a 
technical staff capable of designing and knowing in advance, exactly what type of structures
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would be required, and how much their construction would cost. On the other hand, from the 
point of view of the builder a cost plus agency contract was preferred when investing in 
underdeveloped countries for it provided maximum safeguards and minimized potential risks.
The basic disadvantage for the government posed by cost-plus contracts was that the 
builder had no pressing incentive to economize on the actual cost of construction. The problem 
specifically with the water works contract was not simply that it was a cost plus agency contract, but 
that it was an onerous one. Namely: i) No upper limit was placed to the cost of construction." ii) 
The contractor's general expenses could reach up to 17% of the cost of construction of the 
works.100 iii) Ulen & Co. would not be penalized in the event that it: it poorly executed any part of 
the work; delayed to finish the project; or exceeded the estimated cost of construction, iv) The 
Greek government in its capacity as 'commissioning authority' had limited control over the 
contractor. Notably, in the event that the government did not approve of the plans and the 
estimates prepared, it could merely Indicate" to the builder the modifications it desired. This last 
stipulation was vague as the latter would not be obliged to adopt the changes suggested by the 
government. Moreover, the administration of the construction works was exclusively "within the 
control and jurisdiction" of the contractor.
Nevertheless, the government managed to exercise some degree of control in that it 
obliged Ulen & Co. to accept the following terms. First, to appraise the government of purchases 
of materials or subcontracts that were above the amount of $5,000, (the twin aim of this stipulation 
being to debar the contractor from indulging in unwarranted waste and to ensure that as many 
Greek firms as possible would be awarded large subcontracts). Second, if Greek materials were 
available on equal terms with foreign materials they would be preferred. Third, whenever possible 
Greek citizens would be employed in the carrying out of the works and the contractor would bring 
to Greece only such experts and specialists as would be necessary for the proper administration 
and execution of the scheme.101 The government imposed these clauses because in its own 
naive way, it wanted to assure that the maximum multiplier effect would be present for the Greek 
economy.
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Table 12
Cost Plus Contracts for the Large Infrastructure Schemes of the Interwar Period
P u rpose Name o f Firm
as % of 
C o nstruc tion  
C ost
1. Athens water supply 22.12.1924 Ulen & Co. 32.7/24.71 I
2. Salonika reclamation 6.10.1925 The Foundation Co. 34.5
3. Railways improvement 27.8.1925 Societe Commerciale de Belgique 29
4. National road system 18.5.1928 P.G. Makris et.al2 25
5. Strymon reclamation 8.12.1928 J. Monks & Sons-Ulen & Co. 21.6
6. Thessaly reclamation3 17.12.1929 H. Boots & Sons 19
7. New Water Works 19.7.1938 Societe des Eaux4 < 145
1The general expenses and the fee were 32.7% of the estimated cost of the works. However, because: a) 
the fee was fixed, b) the level of general expenses actually realized was only 11.1% of the cost of the 
works, and not 14% of the cost of works (as was stipulated in the ratified contract), the general expenses + 
fee amounted to only 24.7% of the actual cost of the works.
2This firm though Greek was the agent of Shell in Greece and had close connections with Hambros. Also 
although this contract was a ‘ lumpsum contract it was actually carried out as a cost-plus contract.
3The terms under which the scheme was to be carried out were agreed in 1929, but the reclamation of the 
Thessaly valley actually began in 1937.
4This firm was jointly operated by Ulen & Co. and The Bank of Athens.
5lt is not possible to state the exact percentage agreed. This is so for the reason that the oost of the works 
were broken down into nine categories of expense. It was then stipulated that the general expenses would 
be estimated in the following manner: a maximum of 9% on six of the categories of expenditure of the cost of 
works plus a maximum of plus a maximum of 5% on the remaining three categories. As for the fee it was 
stipulated that it would amount to 5% of the six categories and 2% on the remaining three categories. Thus 
the only definitive comment that can be made is that the amount paid by the government for general 
expenses and fee was less than 14%. See Athens water works contract: articles 15,16,17,and 18.
Compiled from: the contracts for all the projects mentioned. See the relevant chapters.
The immediate reaction of the public and the opposition to the terms pertaining to the 
construction of the scheme was negative.102 The government was castigated for agreeing to pay 
such a high fee and general expenses. These two together amounted to 32.7% of the estimated 
cost. This was indeed the second highest general expenses cum fee payment to be charged for 
a public work scheme during 1922-1932. (See Table 12 above). However, regarding the general 
expenses it must be noted that at the time i.e. during 1925, a rate of 17% for general expenses 
was not unheard of. For in 1922, the French company which began certain improvement works to 
the port of Pireaus charged for general expenses the same rate as Ulen & Co.103
As can be seen from part II of Table 2 above the modifications proposed by the 
parliamentary committee regarding the construction terms served basically two goals: First, to 
increase government control over the construction of the works. Second, to decrease the cost of 
the project. The contractor, insofar as government supervision was concerned refused to make
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any concessions. However, it agreed to lower the level of general expenses from 17% to 14% of 
the cost of construction. The parliamentary committee had anticipated that as a result of these 
lower general expenses awarded, Ulen & Co. would prefer to employ Greek engineers because 
they could accept low salaries. It was argued that employment would rise, Greek engineers would 
be trained, and the government indirectly would be able to augment its supervision over the 
project. However, retrospectively, the lowering of the level of the general expenses did not have 
the desired result in respect to indirectly increasing ‘supervision’ of the project or providing jobs 
for Greek engineers. Whereas, needless to say the majority of the ‘unskilled* labour employed for 
the works were Greeks.
From the discussions in newspapers, the parliament, articles in journals a recurrent theme 
emerges. It becomes evident that the state and the elite of Greece, were united in their desire to '  
achieve through the public work schemes full employment and a transfer of technology. Of 
course, the state lacked a coherent economic development policy. Nevertheless the basic 
recognition of the need to develop existed. This was an undercurrent theme that resurfaced 
during the public debates held regarding the construction of social overhead capital projects.
The water works contract compared unfavourably with the other agency contracts signed during 
1922-1932. (See again Table 12). Indeed, in an ironic way, both the worse and the best 
contracts to be signed during the interwar years concerned the Athens water system. For the 
contract which the government signed in July 1938 with the Societe des Eaux (i.e. the water 
management company set up by The Bank of Athens and Ulen & Co.) indeed was the most 
advantageous cost-plus contract concluded prior to WWII.104
This 1938 contract was for the construction of the first section of an aqueduct to connect 
the Souvala springs (at Mount Parnassos) with the Marathon lake. This new project 
chronologically falls outside the scope of this dissertation. However, it is of interest to us all the 
same because it serves as a point of reference for purposes of comparison.105 Apart from the 
fact that the level charged for general expenses and fee was low, this new agency cost plus 
contract had a number of other important advantages as well, such as that: i) if the cost of 
construction surpassed the amount agreed in advance, the contractor would not receive on the 
surplus 'cost' the percentage amounts stipulated for the general expenses and the fee; ii) if the
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quantity of materials used exceeded those fixed in advance the additional cost would burden the 
contractor; iii) the builder would be obliged to carry out the modifications to the final plans which 
the government would indicate; iv) the approval of the government would be necessary prior to 
any purchase over $660. All these stipulations resulted in a stricter control over the builder than 
was the case with the Athens water scheme. By 1938, as a result of the experience gained in 
connection with the Athens water contract (and the other infrastructure schemes that had started 
in the meanwhile), the government had both the necessary expertise and the 
bureaucratic/technical infrastructure in order to assert itself. It was able to 'determine' in advance 
the exact cost of the works. Notably, shortly thereafter, the government dropped the practice of 
concluding cost plus contracts altogether and began to prefer the more advanced forms of 
agency contracts i.e. the "lump sum" or "unit price" contracts.
To repeat, though it is obvious that the terms in the 1925 waterwere indeed heavy, we 
must also take into consideration that the circumstances under which it was concluded were 
unfavourable for the government. On the one hand, its state machinery lacked experience with 
such projects, and on the other the conditions under which foreign capital could be procured 
were narrowly circumscribed.
b. The Actual Construction of the Project
of
Inspite a number of weaknesses the building of the project took place along satisfactory 
lines. Though the government did not always agree with the contractor no major dispute broke 
o u t106 Moreover, the actual amount of Ulen's general expenses reached only 11.1% of the 
realized cost of the works. This figure was lower than the amount allocated in both the original and 
the ratified water works contract (see above Table 12). In retrospect the fixed fee of $1,200,000 
was not as onerous as it initially appeared to be. This fee was equivalent to 18.7% of the 
estimated cost, but it amounted to only 13.7% of the realized cost of the works.
Considering that this was the first large infrastructure scheme to be undertaken after WWI, 
the performance of Ulen & Co. was outstanding. Infact, the divergence between the actual and 
the realized date of completion, cost of construction, and performance of the works was small 
compared to the other infrastructure projects undertaken within the framework of indirect foreign
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portfolio investment during our period of study.107 With respect to the time of completion there 
was a delay of one and a half year only, the actual date the project was finished being 1932.108 
Regarding the cost of construction it is noteworthy that expost, the failure to place an upper 
plafond or to impose a financial penalty on the constructor, was not of great significance. This was 
so because the actual cost of construction did not exceed more than 126% of the estimated cost. 
(This was a low figure for the standards of the day). Indeed, if we deduct the expenditure for the 
house connections which had not been accounted for when the estimates had been made the 
actual cost of construction was equal to 117% of the estimated cost. (See Table 13). Thus, 
overall the realized cost of construction compared favourably with the estimates that had been 
made by Ulen's antagonists. (See Table 14). The "ability" of Ulen & Co. to adhere to its estimates 
is manifested also in the case of the provisional works. (See Table 15).
Table 13
The Cost of Construction of the New Water System*
1. Reservoir and dam
2. Aqueduct and Boyiati tunnel
3. Siphon line
4. Purification Plant
5. Distribution System
6. House connections
7. Miscellaneous permanent works
8. Temporary construction**
$1,580,545 
$1,922,378 
$ 336,726 
$ 335,235 
$3,277,619 
$ 786,500 
$ 92,221 
$ 455,950
A. Total cost of construction
B. Total - item(6)
C. Estimated total cost of construction
D. (C) as a % of (B)
$8,786,776
$8,000,276
$6,426,000
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No account is taken of the general expenses, the fee granted to the constructor, depreciation, insurance, 
and miscellaneous expenditure. If all these are taken into account the total expenditure actually realized 
was $11,289,162. [=> As we will see in the next section the general expenses that the contract allowed to the 
constructor were up to 14% of the total construction cost]. However Gausmann in his accounts puts under 
the heading "general expense" the sum of $940,544 which amounted to only 12% of the construction cost.
Under the heading of temporary construction are the infrastructure works that were considered necessary 
such as: the construction of highways and roads leading to the reservoir, the power plant at Kastri, the 
building of a dock at Chalkis, and the camps set up for the workers at the construction site.
Source: Gausmann, Water for Athens, p.307.
Compiled from: information in R.W. Gausmann, Water for Athens. (Athens, 1940), pp.299-301,307-308; and 
G.P.D., Minutes of the Assembly of March 23 Session of March 23 1925, p.620.
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Table 14
Estimates for the Cost of the Construction of the New Water System1
1 A. Ulen & Co.(estimate) $ 6,426,000
1B. Ulen & Co. (realized)2 $ 8,000,276
2. A.H.D.C.3 $ 8,990,000
3. Siemens $10,716,000
4. Hoichman $12,000,000
1The general expenses and the fee are not included in these estimates.
2The cost of constructing the house connections is not included because the decision to build them was 
taken during the construction of the works.
3American Hellenic Development Company, i.e. MacArthur.
Compiled from: G.P.D., Minutes of the Assembly of March 23, pp.610-611,620.
Table 15
The Total Cost of the Provisional Works*
A. Estimated cost $850,000
B. Actual cost $973,000
(B) as a % of (A) 114
*General expenses and fee included.
Compiled from: R.W.Gausmann, Water for Athens. (Athens, 1940), p.289.
Of course, it may be argued that the actual cost of the works could have been less than the 
estimated. This was an argument that was expressed by the representatives of the Chamber of 
Greek Engineers. The latter accused the contractor for not saving sufficiently on the use of 
expensive machinery. Undoubtedly, the contractor by purchasing expensive machinery from 
affiliated companies in the U.S.A. could in an indirect manner gain a commission. The same was 
true with the leasing of machinery. Moreover, it is clear that the major input into the scheme i.e. 
the iron cast pipes were bought in the U.S.A. Whether the price paid for the pipes was the best 
that could have been attained is a question we cannot answer.109
As already noted from a technical point of view the new water system was a success. But, in 
1925 no one could be certain that this would be so. The anxiety over the technical feasibility of 
the project was reflected in the debate in Parliament. Characteristically, in recommending the 
project to the National Assembly, the parliamentary committee did not fail to point out that it 
reached this decision "though no definite proof existed that the water works would solve securely 
and absolutely the water shortage problem.110 Indeed, the unease over whether the reservoir
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would actually fill up eventually spread to the engineers of Ulen & Co. Statistics of rainfall levels 
were lacking and by an unfortunate coincidence during the first two years of the construction of 
the project due to adverse hydrological conditions the measured rainfall and runoff was unusually 
low. This situation did not pass unnoticed, and as a result there was plenty of adverse criticism 
against the scheme. Not surprisingly, the press at the time tried "to inflame" the public against the 
company. Among the cartoons that appeared in the newspapers one depicted the company as 
offering water from a medicine dropper.111
The worries were dissipated on June 73 1931 when for the first time water flowed into 
Athens from the Marathon reservoir. Luckily, by this date the reservoir had filled, which meant that 
"even if there was no drop of rain there would be water for Athens and Pireaus for three 
years".112 From this point onwards, the performance of Ulen & Co. was judged on the basis of 
how it managed the new Athens water system. But, this subject belongs to the next section.
1.6.3. The concession
The "Societe Anonyme Hellenique des Eaux des villes d’ Athenes-Piree et Environs" was 
set up by Ulen & Co. and The Bank of Athens in October 1925. Practically no government 
supervision was established over it. (The only issue over which the government had some 
measure of control over the company was the determination of the water rates). Its purpose was 
to run the Athens water system (i.e. to collect and distribute water, as well as to maintain and 
improve the system). Its duration was fixed at 27 years. However, ipso jure the concession would 
be prolonged thereafter for as long as it took the Greek government to repay its debt towards the 
Bank of Athens and Ulen & Co. (i.e. the two dollar loans which amounted to a total of 
$11,000,000). Upon the complete amortization of the loans in 1952 or thereafter, the 
government would take over the Societe without paying an indemnity of any kind. But, if the 
government wanted to take over the management company before the expiration of the 
concession in 1952: it would have to wait until 1935 and in addition to redeeming the debt in full, 
it would also have to buy out the concessionaires. In reality, the Societe continued to operate 
under foreign control' for long after 1952. It was finally taken over by the Greek state in the 
seventies.
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The Societe des Eaux (as it was called in brief) together with the General Hellenic Electricity 
Company which was founded in 1925 by Power & Traction, were the largest public utilities # 
company to be set up in Greece before WWII. Until 1926, the management of the existing water 
system had been in the hands of the municipalities of Athens and Pireaus.113 Both municipalities 
had charged miniscule flat rates. Furthermore, the collections of the water rates had been lax and 
for years there had been large deficits in the operation of the water system. Reportedly, there 
existed a large "free list” of persons who because of their government connections were 
exempted from the obligation of paying their bills. Also those who did not pay their bills did not 
suffer any consequences.114 Thus, the immediate problem facing the concessionaires was to 
make acceptable to the public the principle that they would have to purchase their water on a "no 
money-no water" basis. Moreover, for the first five years of its operation, the Societe des Eaux 
was "obliged" by the government to collect from house owners in the area a 8% extraordinary tax 
on the theoretical (fictional and real' incomes accruing to them from their houses). The purpose 
of this tax was to ensure the smooth payment of the interest charged on the two loans provided 
by Ulen & Co. and the Bank of Athens. Considering that this tax was paid for the duration of the 
building of the new water works, (i.e. prior to the increase in the water supply) it is not surprising 
that it was highly unpopular with the public.
Nevertheless, as is obvious from the press, and the contemporary primary material that the 
Societe des Eaux inspite of the tax was never as unpopular as the General Hellenic Electricity 
Company.115 The latter was granted scandalous terms, and indeed, at those times when the 
public became exceedingly intolerant and antagonistic towards the electricity Concessionaire the 
British fleet by coincidence would pay a visit to the port of Pireaus. Whereas it had never been 
necessary for the American fleet to pay a visit in order to soothe the opposition against the 
Societe des Eaux. Notably, often in cartoons the British company Power and Traction (which was 
the major shareholder of the General Hellenic Electricity Company) would be depicted as a large 
beast(usually a bear) and by its side would be a smaller beast with the inscription "Ulen".116 The 
other major problem, aside from the "hostility" of the public, which the Societe des Eaux faced 
during its first years of operation was that there were no maps or plans showing all of the existing 
water system.117
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The Societe des Eaux expanded fastiy. When it was set up it served 17,000 households. 
The taking of water from the new water system was compulsory. As a result of this, and the 
increase in the size of the Athens area, by 1940 the number of households connected with the 
new water system amounted to 117,000. The management company by 1934 had already 
become large concern with a little over 1,000 employees.118 However, eventhough the Societe 
des Eaux supplied water to the majority of the Athenian households, installed water metres and 
duly collected the water rates, its revenues failed to reach the estimated amounts. It is clear that 
the government was intent on not allowing the Societe to impose the rates which would have 
been appropriate from a strictly economic point of view. It acted thus, out of fear that the public 
would accuse the government for following a 'reactionary' economic policy under the instigation 
of foreign economic interests. Thus, though it had been estimated in 1924 that the Societe's 
annual income (gross receipts) would amount to 200,000,000 drs. a year, this was far from being
" o f
the case.119 Indeed, they started off at 10,500,000 drs. in 1926 and by 1938 inspite their steady 
increase they had reached only 169,000,000 drs. In contrast, the operating expenses of the 
company declined impressively over the years as a percentage of the gross receipts of the 
company. In 1926 they amounted to 132% of the receipts, by 1931 they were 86%, and by 
1935, they had declined to 36%.120
Unfortunately, the amounts which remained after the deduction of the operating expenses 
and the profit to be awarded to the "owners" of the Societe did not suffice for both the 
maintenance of the works and the smooth repayment of the two dollar loans. Thus, in the end the 
larger part of the burden for the repayment of the loan rested with the state. Taken to an extreme, 
it could be argued that in a narrow sense the loans raised fo r the creation o f the new 
water system were not expost productive because due to  the in tervention of 
the government they failed to generate an adequate income for their repayment.
Before closing the discussion on the concession, I would like to note that during the thirties 
the state as a result of its policy of 'economic nationalism' and its experience was able to lower the * 
profit rate that accrued to the concessionaire. Namely, in 1935 the guaranteed annual fee of 7%
'of the net amount of all revenues and sums collected or received by the Societe' was lowered to 
4% in order to assist the government to meet the annual service of the two loans that had been 
raised in connection with the project.
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1.7. Conclusion
This very first experiment of foreign finance in the realm of infrastructure development in 
Greece was unique in many ways. It was the only instance in which a foreign portfolio investment 
materialized in a satisfactory manner. From our study it construes that it was a success story 
basically for two reasons. On the one hand the state knew exactly what it wanted and a detailed 
outline of the scheme existed beforehand. And, on the other hand the contractor had incentive 
to finish this scheme at an early date because it was eager to operate the concession. Another 
important factor which contributed to the 'early' completion of this project was that when the 
foreign funds dried out the domestic capital market was still in a position to furnish credit. Thus, 
the government was not forced to resort to the state coffers as was the case with the other 
projects when the flow of foreign finance stopped.
The story of the Athens water scheme also reveals how the formal and informal British 
control responded to the rise of U.S. interests in Greece. Formal control hesitated to take a 
polemical attitude whereas informal control (i.e. Hambros was more aggressive in its tactics). In 
addition, the events pertaining to this project testify that the I.F.C. was interested in supervising 
only the League of Nation loans. It is clear that it did not want to extend its presence in Greece by 
guaranteeing an American loan for public works. It is ironic, but the fact was that the Greek 
government wanted the I.F.C. to guarantee all of its foreign loans. Finally, this scheme uncovers 
the nature of alliances foreign business interests made with local capital and vice versa.
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Chapter 2
The "Vardar" Valley Land Reclamation Project
Chronological Summary
September 1924: 
April 7, 1925:
May 28, 1925:
June 24, 1925:
June 25, 1925:
September 7, 1925: 
October 7, 1925: 
December 1925: 
April 1926:
October 25, 1927:
October 1930: 
March 1932:
April 1, 1937:
Special law passed in the National Assembly for the materialization of 
infrastructure schemes in Macedonia.
Private agreement signed between the syndicate des Etudes et des 
Enterprises, The Foundation Co. and the firm Gordon Leith and Co.
The Hellenic Construction Co. is set up in London by the syndicat des 
Etudes at des Enterprises, The Foundation Co. and the firm Gordon Leith 
and Co.
The government of Michalakopoulos signs a contract with The Foundation 
Co. for the reclamation of the Vardar valley.
General Theodore Pangalos overthrows Michalakopoulos. The dictator 
refuses to submit the contract signed by the previous government to the 
Assembly for ratification.
The Pangalos government signs a "new" contract with The Foundation Co. 
The Pangalos cabinet ratifies the contract of September 7,1925.
The Foundation Co. begins work on schedule A.
The Foundation Co. grants to the Greek government a temporary loan of 
$2,500,000 for the reclamation works of the Vardar valley.
The National Assembly ratifies the contract concluded under the 
Pangalos government with The Foundation Co.
The Foundation Co. completes schedule A.
Premier Venizelos asks The Foundation Co. to resign from its right to set 
up a maintenance company. The contractor acquiesces to this demand.
A state agency for the productive works is set up. Its purpose is to finish 
off the Vardar valley, and the Struma reclamation works, and to supervise 
their cultivation.
2.1. Introduction
2.1.1. Land reclamation projects: The problem defined
Greece from its inception suffered from a basic structural imbalance. Although an 
agricultural country, it depended extensively on imports in order to cover its needs in staple food 
stuff such as bread, meat and sugar.1 (Table 1) The quest for autarchy in basic goods became a 
major policy issue after WWI. The naval blockade imposed by the allies on Greece during the 
turbulent period 1916-1917 acted as a catalyst which (along with anti-Western sentiments) fueled
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this goal.2 Food security, was identified with the concept of national autonomy and dignity3 It was 
thought to depend on two prerequisites. First, the extension of the country's cultivable frontiers 
through land reclamation in Macedonia.4 This large province, which was annexed in 1913, was 
seen as Greece's potential breadbasket because its climatic and geographical conditions were 
more favourable than elsewhere for the creation of rich pasturelands and cereal production. The 
problem was that half of this land lay to waste because it was covered by marshes, water logged 
lakes, and overflowing rivers.(At the time, it was estimated that wheat yields on reclaimed lands 
would be double the national average).5
Table 1
Cereal Production and Imports 
(thousand tons)
Year Im ports Imports as a % o f Production
Tota l
C onsum ption
1911 243 623 28
1914 255 849 23
1920 384 770 33
1922 406 640 38
1924 615 545 53
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1929. (Athens, 1930), pp.48,54.
The second prerequisite was the distribution to the peasantry of the country's large 
estates.(Parenthetically, let it be noted that most of these estates were in Thessaly and 
Macedonia). The purpose of such a reform was dual. It would appease the demands of the land
o
hungry peasants who were no longer content to labour on the Chifliks of absentee landlords. * > 
Moreover, the peasants as independent landowners would become more productive - 
responding to an assumed incentive to increase output. Capitalist modernization would facilitate 
the development of markets and thus the supply and allocation of factors and produce.6 The 
expropriation of land made sense from an economic point of view for one more reason: the 
landowners of the large estates on purpose restricted their cereal production in order to keep
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domestic prices high and "instead concentrated on raising rents and letting the land out for 
grazing and pastures".7
By the beginning of 1919, there were signs that the state realized the need to reclaim and 
redistribute land. However, they were postponed as a result of the Asia Minor Campaign (1919- 
1922).8 During this short but turbulent period the extension of the country's geographical 
frontiers became the prime policy goal. But, with the refugee influx, the need for land reclamation 
and redistribution became even more urgent. The abrupt 20% net increase in the population 
caused a substantially greater dependence on cereal imports and an even greater imbalance in 
the country's land labour ratio.9 It is clear therefore, that given:i) the state's quest for self- 
sufficiency in basic goods, and ii)the socio-economic pressures brought about by the refugees, 
the decision taken in 1922 to implement at once a radical land reform and an extensive land 
reclamation policy was an inevitable and rational choice.10 it must be emphasized that 'land 
improvement' in addition to decreasing foreign dependence on staple foodstuff, facilitating the 
settlement of a large number of refugees in the sparsely populated northern provinces, creating 
an independent peasantry with a rising standard of living, aimed at decreasing unemployment and 
combating malaria.11
2.1.2. The new framework
Before the Balkan wars, the limited amount of reclamation works implemented had been 
undertaken within the framework of foreign direct investments. The most significant example was 
the Lake Copais scheme. This project which was carried out by the British firm, The Lake Copais 
Co, began in the late 19th century and it involved the reclamation of no more than 140,000 
stremmas* of land. It can be argued that the Lake Copais concession, with all the tensions that 
developed between the concessionaire, the local peasants and the state, served as a model of 
what not to do.12 Indeed, following WWI, foreign direct investments in this type of large scale 
projects became from a social point of view unacceptable as a result of the intense local pressures 
for a radical land reform. Thus, the state followed two alternative paths between 1922-1932:
*1 stremma is equal to a quarter of an acre.
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First, minor projects were assigned to local firms. Between 1922 and 1932, three Greek 
concessionaires undertook (at their own cost) to drain 126,000 stremmas in various areas of the 
country.13 The record was not impressive: two out of the three companies were not in a position 
to complete the works.14 The second path followed by the state was the assignment to three 
foreign firms the reclamation of large areas (a total of 3,200,000 stremmas) within the framework 
of agency contracts i.e foreign portfolio investment.15 The aim was to extend the cultivable 
frontiers of Greece by more than 25%. Had all three projects been fully implemented by 1932, 
the face of the country would have been transformed. In reality however, by 1932 only on a 
fragment of the land had the reclamation works been completed. In part the reason for this was 
that these schemes had a late start.(lndeed, the third scheme -the reclamation of the Thessaly 
valley- began in 1937!) This was due to the difficulty in raising finance before and after 
stabilization. The sums involved were large. In fact, the estimated total cost for first two schemes 
(i.e. the reclamation of the Vardar and Struma valleys) was approximately $44,000,000. This was 
more than four times the size of the anticipated cost for the building of the new Athens water 
system.16
Table 2
Vardar Valley
Total area of the valley 
Area to be reclaimed 
Area actually reclaimed by 1932 
Area actually reclaimed by 1936 
Area actually reclaimed by 1936
2.200.000 stremmas
1.303.000 stremmas 
90,000 stremmas
793,000 stremmas1
1.093.000 stremmas2
Struma Valley
Total area of valley 
Area to be reclaimed 
Area actually reclaimed by 1932 
Area actually reclaimed by 1936 
Area actually reclaimed by 1936
1,560,000 stremmas 
902,357
522.000 stremmas
557.000 stremmas1
807.000 stremmas2
1 Figures given by the Greek state.
2Figures given by the contractors. Though the claim of the Greeks that the figures given out by the 
contractors were wild exaggerations may be true, we must accept the likelihood also that the Greek figures 
may have been too low.
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1931. (Athens, 1932), p.108; 
G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1933. (Athens, 1934), pp.346,349; and G.Haritakis 
(ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1936. (Athens, 1937), p.199.
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In a nutshell, the "tale" of the land reclamation works or the productive works (as they were 
dubbed contemporaneously) is quite a different story to that of the Athens water works: The two 
projects which began during our period of study were not completed by 1932; no management 
companies were established; and in 1937 the state directly took over the completion of the 
works. (See Table 2).
2.1.3. The sources
The primary sources consist largely of the recently opened files of the Historical Archive at 
the National Bank of Greece and the Diomedes Archive at the Greek Literature and Historical 
Archive. Relevant documentation exists also in the U.S. State Department Papers. The 
existence of material in this last archive on the Vardar project reflects the growing interest of the 
U.S.A. government in investments in Greece. Unlike the Athens water works this project did not 
become the subject of long parliamentary debates, nor did it attract to a significant extent the 
attention of the press. Personal testimonies (such as diaries and personal accounts) of those 
who were in charge of the project are lacking. Thus, inevitably the weight of our account is based 
on archival (and not printed) primary sources.
2.1.4. The present state of research on the subject
In the historiography of the interwar period the reclamation of the Vardar Valley has served 
(together with the other two reclamation schemes undertaken in the interwar years) as the focus 
of the wider debate that related to the issue of self sufficiency in cereals.17 This debate confused 
and identified the two subjects. It is the contention of this dissertation, that though it is obvious 
that land reclamation was a sine qua non for the attainment of self-sufficiency in cereals, it by no 
means logically follows that the land should have been used exclusively for the production of 
cereals. This chapter presents for the first time a detailed and comprehensive treatment of this 
scheme. The story to be told is interesting, yet sad. The construction dragged on for more than 
twenty years at a cost multiple of the original estimations. Political instability prior to 1928 and the
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rise of economic nationalism in the early thirties affected negatively how the project was planned, 
built, and managed. The Greek state emerges as a weak actor. On the one hand, it was unable to 
take full advantage of the small but enlightened cadre of technocrats' at its disposal. On the other 
hand, it was manipulated by the N.B.G.
The thesis also uncovers the multifaceted nature of foreign capital inflow. In this instance 
an American contractor is backed by Hambros and the N.B.G. For reasons that will be explained, 
these bankers in the early stages of the project operated behind the scenes i.e. against the ' 
knowledge of the Bank of England and the Greek government.
2.2. The Basic Features of the Project for the Reclamation of the Vardar Valley and Points 
of Contrast with the Athens Water Scheme
The task which the American firm The Foundation Co. undertook in 1925, was to reclaim 
1,300,000 stremmas of land in the Vardar valley through the drainage of large swamps and lakes, 
river canalization and other anti-flooding works.18 At the time it was believed that as a result of 
these works, the cultivable area in the Vardar valley would be extended by around 45%, and that 
of Greece, as a whole by approximately 8.3%.19
It was a more important project in economic terms than the Athens water works. Larger 
sums were involved (its estimated cost was $26,570,000); its impact on the increase of 
production was direct;20 it had a larger multiplier effect because proportionally a smaller part of the 
funds was spent on the importation of capital goods; and it made use of large amounts of 
indigenous labour.21 In certain respects there were similarities between the two schemes. They 
began more or less concurrently; in both cases the builders were U.S. multinational engineering 
firms; these were the only two agency contracts -of the interwar period-in which foreign builders 
were granted concessions for the long-term exploitation of the works; and last, foreign finance 
was not sufficient.
However, the points of contrast were greater than the similarities. This scheme serves as an 
example of Anglo-U.S. collaboration and not displacement as was the case with the Athens water 
scheme. The Foundation Co., unlike Ulen & Co. had strong British connections. It enjoyed
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longstanding close ties with Hambros Bank, and had a subsidiary in London. Notably, although 
the Vardar valley scheme was officially assigned to the New York headquarters, in practice the 
London subsidiary contributed extensively to its implementation. British involvement had a 
'domestic' corollary: the National Bank of Greece played an active role in the materialization of the 
project. The involvement of this institution in this instance was disguised and quite distinct from 
the open involvement of the Bank of Athens in the Athens water works.
Other differences were that the contractor did not provide financial backing nor was there 
an exclusive Vardar valley loan on the lines of the Athens water loan. In addition, the control of 
the Greek government over the construction of the works was more pronounced. This, in 
combination with the fact that in 1932 the government took away from the company the right to 
set up a concession worked to the advantage of the builder's public image. For, it was not forced 
to undertake unpopular measures such as imposing and collecting tax rates.
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2.3. The Assignment of the Project to The Foundation Co.
In September 1924, upon the signing of the modifications to the Geneva Protocol, the 
government publicized that it was contemplating assigning to foreign contractors on an agency 
basis various projects in northern Greece such as the drainage and irrigation of land in Macedonia 
and Thrace, and, the construction of the Kavalla- Drama railway line. This was no integrated 
programme, but just a list of some of the schemes that had been mentioned in the 1919 
Venizelos 'manifesto'.22 (For details see: Book II, Section III, Introductory comments, The 
economic 'philosophy' of Venizelos).
The reclamation of the Vardar valley in Central Macedonia was at the top of the list because 
of its large size and the growing threat of inundation to the port of Salonika from the Gallikos and 
Axios rivers 23 Contrarily to what was the case with the Athens water works and the other 
reclamation schemes that followed, no international tender was announced or decided. 
Unfortunately no explanation is provided for this deviation 24 The procedure followed in this 
instance was that the government notified the foreign legations in Athens accordingly of its desire 
to go ahead with this project.25
Although the government this time did not require from the contractor to provide the 
required loan , the list of suitors was not long. Apparently, one German, one British and two 
American firms declared an interest in undertaking the scheme. 26 Both American firms were 
among the largest companies in their line of business. The one firm, Stewart Co., had undertaken 
a number of similar projects for the U.S.A. government27 The other was The Foundation Co, 
with experience in hydraulic works, sanitation works, public buildings, roads, railway and bridge 
construction. It had undertaken works in the U.S.A., Canada, Argentine, Chile, Columbia, Peru, 
Bolivia, Urugay, Mexico, Britain, France, Japan, Australia, East Africa 28
This 'multinational' was brought into the scene not through the state’s appeal to the foreign 
legations in Athens but via the National Bank. Diomedes was determined that 'his' bank act as a # 
liaison between foreign capital and the Greek state. It is not surprising therefore, that he searched 
out a likely contestant for the project while he was in London during December 1924 for the 
purpose of <^c*i«*+fr*jthe flotation of the First Refugee Loan 29 This move of Diomedes once 
again testifies the dependent position of the state vis a vis the N.B.G. as an intermediary between 
it and the international financial community. The governor of the National Bank was introduced to
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the president of the Foundation Co. by the Hambros family. The ulterior motivation of the latter 
being that in the past it had financed certain of the schemes undertaken by this American firm.30
The Foundation Co. showed, at once an interest in undertaking the reclamation of the 
Vardar valley, as well as the other projects the government was contemplating in Northern 
Greece. In cooperation with Hambros, and the N.B.G., it set out the following plan: Hambros Bank 
would raise (either on its own or in cooperation with American bankers and the N.B.G.) the loan 
capital that would be required in order to cover the cost of as many schemes the Greek 
government would assign to The Foundation Co.
To our knowledge, the National Bank introduced The Foundation Co. to the government in 
early 1925. In the Greek press it was reported that on the eve of the ratification of the contract for 
the Athens water works by the National Assembly, that is on April 2 1925, the president of 
Foundation Co., F.Remington and Diomedes, presented to the Prime Minister a package offer 
that The Foundation Co. undertake all of the reclamation schemes and railway construction 
planned in northern Greece. But, Michalakopoulos was at the moment willing to discuss and 
negotiate only for the reclamation of the Vardar valley.31 All of the 'Macedonian' schemes could 
not start concurrently because of their high cost. Moreover, the assignment of numerous projects 
to one firm would provoke criticism from the opposition.
Four days after the meeting held at the Prime Minister's office, government sources 
announced that within a month an agreement would be reached with the Foundation Co. for the 
reclamation the Vardar valley.32 However, more than a month went by and no contract was 
signed. Public opinion did not impede the conclusion of an agreement. The press did not launch 
an attack either against the builder or Michalakopoulos although the popularity of the latter 
continued to decline.33 The absence of an aggressive opponent and the fact that by April 1925 
the two rival banking institutions- i.e the N.B.G. and the Bank of Athens had entered a period of 
truce were largely responsible for this omnipresent 'public' acquiescence. (For truce see Athens 
water scheme, p.236).
The reasons for the delay in the signing of the contract lay elsewhere. An internal dispute 
broke out within the administration. The minister of communications, Valalas, and the technocrats 
at the department of public works refused to accept the builder's demand that the project be 
assigned to it on a cost-plus basis. Instead, they maintained that The Foundation Co. should 
accept to undertake the works on a fixed cost basis (or regie cointeresse as it was called in
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Greece). At the time, the municipalities of Pireaus and of Salonika, had assigned two 'minor1 
infrastructure schemes to foreign firms on a lump sum basis, and the ministry of communications 
officials wanted to extend this contract system. The Foundation Co. counterargued that it was not 
possible to undertake construction on a fixed cost basis because it was the first time that land 
reclamation was to be carried out in Greece on such a large scale and no detailed study of the 
project had as yet been prepared.34
There was deadlock. Neither the minister of communications nor the builder were willing to 
alter their position.35 An internal governmental crisis developed as the Premier took the side of 
the contractor, and demanded from the minister of communications to give in to The Foundation 
Co. As long as Valalas continued to be minister, Michalakopoulos could not sign a contract. 
Luckily, for The Foundation Co., on June 15 1925 the minister of the interior resigned, and 
Michalakopoulos was forced to resort to a major reshuffling of his cabinet in an attempt to save his 
government.36 Not surprisingly, Valalas, was replaced by Karapanayiotis who ignored the 
technocrats of his ministry and proved more cooperative. Indeed, nine days later, on June the 
24th, the restructured Michalakopoulos cabinet approved and signed a contract with The 
Foundation Co.
Thus, in the end it was the Greek Premier who had his way and not the bureaucrats. Let us 
repeat that with regard to the Athens water scheme the bureaucrats had also been sidetracked, 
but the scenario had been different. The opposition in Parliament and the N.B.G. had sided with 
them, whereas in this instance they created an internal governmental crisis. Pointedly, regarding 
both projects they put pressure on the political leadership to be more demanding vis a vis foreign 
interests.
On the whole the largest part of the press was sympathetic towards the contract and 
highlighted its strong points vis a vis the Athens water project.37 However, not all were pleased. 
That part of the press which was against Michalakopoulos presented it as a poor deal. Particular 
note was made of the fact that Hambros would in all certainty finance the project38 Once again, it 
was falsely claimed that when the contract for the First Refugee Loan had been signed, the 
government had undertaken a legal commitment towards Hambros that it float all the future 
foreign loans of the Greek state 39 It must be underlined that it was the National Bank that had 
insisted on "assigning” the financing of the project to Hambros. Michalakopoulos 'gave in' on this
in
point for the reason that in the contract no definitive commitment was made that Hambros would 
finance the scheme. (For details on the financing of the scheme see below section 2.6.1.)
Ironically, the signing of the contract for the reclamation of the Vardar valley coincided with 
the end of Michalakopoulos premiership. One day later, i.e. on the 25th of June, General 
Theodore Pangalos declared a coup d'etat. Thus, Michalakopoulos did not have a chance to 
submit the contract to the National Assembly for approval. As we will see below, once again 
politics interfered with economics and issues of foreign finance.
2.4. Pangalos and the ‘New’ Contract
A typical dictator, Pangalos cast himself in the role of saviour of the nation. Once in power, « 
he launched an attack against his predecessors by picking among other things the freshly signed 
contract with The Foundation Co. as a scapegoat. He refused to submit the contract for approval 
to the National Assembly with the contention that it was a sell out to foreign interests.40
As stated in the previous chapter the dictator condoned the other public works contract that 
had been signed by the Michalakopoulos government: Namely the one for the building of a new 
water system. His antithetical behaviour towards these two contracts was related to the fact that 
the internal political and economic background surrounding these two foreign investments was 
different. For one thing, Diomedes -who was intensely disliked by the dictator for his strong pro- 
Venizelist sentiments- was actively on the side of the Foundation Co. Moreover, the contract had 
not yet been ratified, and thus, Pangalos could freely attack it without fear of insulting the National 
Assembly. (As stated in the chapter on the Athens water scheme, the dictator could not afford to 
antagonize this institution during his early days in power) 41
The Foundation Co. did not passively accept the marked turn of affairs in its fortunes. Its 
president, F. Remington, who had expressly stayed on in Greece since early April 1925, took two 
courses of action so as to compel Pangalos to adopt a conciliatory stance. First, he carried out a 
publicity campaign in the local press.42 In addition, he asked the American Legation in Athens to 
drop, in this instance its overall attitude of leaving business to itself, and to intervene on the 
grounds that an American company was being wronged.43
Pangalos was not a strong dictator. Thus, this dual pressure proved adequate to soften his 
disposition. On September 6 1925, he conveniently forgot all his accusations against The
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Foundation Co. and announced triumphantly, the signing of a ‘new’ contract with this firm. A copy 
of the ‘old’ (i.e. the Michalakopoulos) contract does not exist, but fortunately a list of the 
modifications made was published in the press . As Table 3 below demonstrates Remington was 
exagerating by claiming that only minor changes were made in the terms "accepted by 
Michalakopoulos to avoid having it go on the record that unqualified approval had been given to 
an act of the preceding government".44
Table 3
Improvements Made in the Contract Drawn Under Pangalos with The Foundation Co.
The financing of the project
I. The clause stating that a loan would be acceptable from the contractor's group 
even if the terms were worse than those of the First Refugee Loan was removed.
II. The terms pertaining to the guarantees to be provided for the loan were made less 
onerous.
III. The clause stating that, for 18 months after the flotation of a Vardar loan the Greek 
government would not be allowed to raise another external loan, was removed.
The construction
I. Five years after the completion of schedules A, and B, the government would be 
released from the obligation to assign to schedule C of the works to the 
contractor.*
II. The contractor would have to present a study for the irrigation works.
III. It was explicitly stated that if the government upon receiving the works found any 
omission or defect, the builder would be obliged at his own expense to make the 
necessary corrections.
*For a description of these schedules see Appendix 5.
Compiled from: list in the EAeOQepov Bfpa, September 8,1925.
The ‘new’ contract was ratified by the Pangalos cabinet on October 7 in the manner of a 
purely pro forma action. This was a far cry from the procedure that had been followed for the 
Athens water works.45 Finally, it must be noted that although a British bank had more or less 
secured the financing of the project, the British government was not pleased. This is 
understandable considering that within the time span of a few months two large infrastructure 
projects had already been assigned to American firms, whereas no progress had been made in 
the negotiations pertaining to the Athens electricity scheme that had been promised to the 
consortium set up by the Power & Traction Finance Co. Thus, after the Pangalos regime ratified 
the contract which it signed with the Foundation Co. in September 1925, the British Ambassador
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in Washington addressed a note to the State Department in which he maintained that the Vardar 
valley contract constituted a breach of Greece's international obligations which should not be 
allowed to pass without a protest.(The government was 'in fault' on the grounds that it had 
assigned state revenues for the future flotation of a ban without prior permission from the U.S.A., 
Britain and France as stipulated in the 1918 Paris Agreement. Unfortunately we do not know what 
Hambro's reaction was to this British protest.)46
The State Department replied to the Ambassador that since no flotation of loan had taken 
place, no grounds existed for the voicing of a protest. However, in order to keep appearances it 
conceded that if the Greek government floated a Vardar valley loan without consulting first the 
U.S.A. government "then the Department would be disposed to bring the matter to the attention 
of the Greek government"47 This answer satisfied the British only temporarily. For as we will see 
below they rekindled the issue of a joint protest when the contractor granted a temporary 
$2,500,000 ban in May 1926. Clearly, the British were not content because they felt that the 
Greek government was overborrowing for public works. However, one cannot overlook the fact 
that there was also an element of envy on the part of the British regarding the recent preference 
for American contractors.
Below we will bok into the terms posed and how these were actually carried out. But, 
before embarking on this task we will briefly explore the British investment trust that was set up by 
Hambros, the N.B.G. and The Foundation Co. at the time when the latter was negotiating with the 
Greek government the assignment of the reclamation of the Vardar valley. This trust was covered 
with a veil of secrecy. However, the discovery of its existence in the archives is useful because it 
sheds light on the behind the scene role of Hambros and the National Bank of Greece regarding 
this infrastructure project.
2.5. The Secret Pact: The Hellenic Construction Co.
On May 28 1925 the Hellenic Construction Co. was set up in London. With a share capital 
of only £15,000 this investment trust was of limited financial significance 48 it basically was an 
agreement of cooperation among Hambros, the N.B.G. and The Foundation Co.- the end 
objective being to secure the financing, construction and exploitation of the Macedonian projects 
the government had announced in September 1924 49 The formal members of the Trust were:
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The Foundation Co, the Syndicat des Etudes et des Enterprises (the Greek banking syndicate 
set up in iate December 1924 under the auspices of the National Bank), and the British banking 
firm Gordon Leith & Co. This last partner, as the representative of Speyer's & Co. in London had 
cooperated closely with Hambros. (See: Book I, Chapter 1).50
The responsibilities and gains of each of the formal partners are delineated in detail in Table 
4 below. The Syndicat des Etudes et des Enterprises was to act as a liaison between the 
government and The Foundation Co., and Gordon Leith was appointed as the financial advisor of 
the Trust. In return for these specific services these two members would: i) receive a 10% 
commission on the net profit The Foundation Co. would earn from the construction of the 
projects assigned to it; and ii) be allowed to participate in the concessions the government would 
award to the American contractor.51 It is not clear whether this participation of the two bankers 
would be of a management as well as of a pecuniary nature.
It was clearly stipulated that the financing of the projects to be built by The Foundation Co. 
was to be handled by Hambros. The two formal banking members of the Trust, i.e. the Syndicat 
des Etudes et des Enterprises and Gordon Leith, would arrange for partial flotations in Greece 
and the U.S.A. respectively, only If Hambros decided not to carry on its own the full risk of 
financing the Greek schemes of this American contractor. (Infact, in order to safeguard its position 
Hambros asked the Syndicat to commit itself to raise up to 25% of the loan capital if 'necessary'). 
Considering that Hambros was instrumental in setting up the Trust the question which arises is 
why it did not appear as a formal member.52 It is not easy to discern a straightforward answer. 
However, a plausible explanation is that Hambros preferred not to participate openly in the 
Hellenic Construction Co. as a measure of precaution because public opinion at the time was 
critical of its tendency to monopolize Greek financial affairs. If we assume that this was the case, 
Hambros was extra cautious for the existence of the Trust was not publicized before or after it was 
set up. Notably, there was no mention of it in the daily Greek press;53 nor in the annual report of 
the N.B.G. for 1925.54
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Table 4
Responsibilities and Benefits of the Three Members of the Hellenic Construction Co.
I. The Foundation Co.:
Responsibilities:
i) To negotiate with the Greek government the financing,construction, and 
exploitation of those public works in which The Foundation Co. was interested in.
ii) To submit for approval to the Trust any final agreement reached with the 
government.
Benefits;
i) The assignment of the construction and exploitation of infrastructure projects in 
Greece.
II. Gordon Leith
Responsibilities:
i) To act as a financial advisor to the Trust and arrange for partial flotations of loans in 
the U.S.A. if Hambros wished.
Benefits:
i) A 10% commission on the net profit that the builder would earn.1
ii) The right to participate in the concessions granted to The Foundation Co. by the 
Greek government.
Syndicat des Etudes et des Enterprises
Responsibilities:
i) To act as a liaison between the government and the builder.
ii) To be willing to raise up to 25% of the loan capital required for the construction of 
the works.2
Benefits;
0 A 10% commission on the net profit to be earned by the builder.1
ii) The right to participate in the concessions granted to The Foundation Co. by the 
Greek government.
1This was to be 5% in the case of the reclamation of the Vardar valley.
2ln July 1925 Gordon Leith proposed that it be clearly stated that "should the issuing bankers in London 
and/or New York agree" only then would the syndicate of Greek banks participate to "the minimum extent of 
25%. Whether this change was accepted is immaterial due to the complications which arose with the 
financing of the scheme.
Compiled from: Source: N.B.G./H.A., New archives I", File 10: Memorandum and Articles of Association of 
the Hellenic Construction Co., London, May 1928. Also, Report prepared by the National Bank on the 
Hellenic Construction Co. (undated) and Gordon Leith to Diomedes, July 9,1925.
The Hellenic Construction Co. is a good example of the intricate network of interrelationship 
that characterized the phenenomenon of foreign capital inflow in the public sector of Greece. 
The government and the N.B.G. stand in this case not as partners that trusted one another, but as 
members of opposing camps. It is the case that the National Bank of Greece, placed its private 
interests in top priority. The inflow of foreign capital was good business: it provided a pecuniary 
profit and helped to promote its influence over the other major commercial banks -which as
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already mentioned it had engulfed in the Syndicat des Etudes et des Enterprises. The Hellenic 
Construction Co. also exposes one more facet of the fight which Hambros gave in order to 
establish a hegemonical position in the Greek arena. For this bank was viewed with suspicion 
throughout the political spectrum. Indeed, its only trusted ally in Greece was the National Bank. In 
short, the actual record of the Hellenic Construction Co. expost proved less impressive than the 
goals set. First, The Foundation Co. undertook only the reclamation of the Vardar valley. 
Second, the Trust in the end did not manage to set up a concession for even this one project. 
Third, the financing of this single scheme was in large part covered from the budget. (See below, 
Book II, Section III, Chapters 2 and 5).
2.6. The Heart of the Matter: The Project in Operation
The basic framework for this land reclamation scheme is provided in the contract signed by 
the government of Pangalos, and the Foundation Co. on September 7, 1925.55 But, after the 
demise of the dictatorship three laws were voted by the National Assembly modifying unilaterally 
certain terms. At first, in 1927 it was specified that the loan to be raised would have terms at least 
as good as those of the Stabilization Loan.56 Then, in 1928 the government dropped its plan for 
an exclusive 'Vardar Valley' loan. Instead, it lay the framework for the flotation in tranches of a 
general purpose public works loan that would cover this and other projects.57 Finally, in 1932 the 
builder was deprived from its right to set up a maintenance company.58
The government through the aforementioned "corrective "legal documents did not 
improve the terms under which the construction of the project was taking place. The 
remuneration of the builder -although it was the highest rate to be charged for our period of study- 
was not lowered. It can be argued that this inertia on the part of the government and the National 
Assembly was related to the fact that the contractor on the whole carried out the works 
conscientiously. (See below 2.6.2.). However, beyond doubt the most important factor 
responsible for this passive behaviour was that none of the successive governments which ruled 
during the twenties wanted to antagonize the U.S.A. (As is explained in Book II, Section I, * 
chapter 3, the other Pangalos agency contract: the railway scheme was subjected to major
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corrections. For the terms were indeed scandalous and Belgium was not a major source of capital 
for Greece.)
2.6.1. The mode of financing
a. The Terms Posed in the Contract
The Foundation Co. was burdened with the responsibility of making the necessary 
arrangements, for the flotation through public subscription of a loan that would be adequate to 
cover the project. If by May 1927 (i.e. within 18 months of the conclusion of the contract), the 
builder for any reason whatsoever failed" to secure a long-term bond loan under terms at least as 
good as those of the First Refugee Loan, the government would have the right to terminate the 
contract with respect to schedules B and C, that is the two schedules that constituted the bulk of 
the project. (For a description of these two schedules and schedule A, see: Appendix 5.)59
Hence, the contractor's position would in no way be solidified until a loan was secured 
under the terms posed by the government. It was agreed that during the 18 month trial’ period 
the builder was not to rest idle. It was to commence immediately after ratification Schedule A and 
was to provide a $600,000 advance. Thus, The Foundation Co. carried a double risk if no loan 
was forthcoming. In addition to loosing the second and third parts (schedules B and C) of the 
project it would also have to recover the $600,000 it would spend.
The size of this bond loan was not specified in the contract signed between the 
government and the Foundation Co. But, it was left to be assumed that it would cover the full cost 
of the reclamation of the Vardar valley which was estimated at $26,570,000. The securities 
offered were described in detail (See below Table 5). As was the case with the First Refugee and 
the Athens Water Loans, they were sizeable and of a similar nature. However, the loan was not to 
be placed under the control of the I.F.C. By this point, the Greeks had got the message that 
regardless of whether British financiers were involved or not the Commission did not wish to 
supervise public work bans.
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Table 5
Securities Offered for the Flotation of a Loan for the Vardar Valley
I) The surplus government revenues assigned to the I.F.C. that remained after 
the service of the Loans issued up to September 1925, including the 
remaining portion of the Five Hundred Million 5% Loan of 1914 not yet 
issued. Also, if the government issued a second refugee loan the latter would 
have a position of priority preceding the loan contemplated for the Vardar 
reclamation scheme.
II) The proceeds of the existing taxation on the land itself or its yield, of the 
Vardar plain.
III) The proceeds of any additional taxation which the government would impose 
on the lands of the Vardar valley.
IV) Mortgage on the land to be drained, as well as that land which is periodically 
inundated and which already belongs to the state. (Unfortunately, the 
contract does not give an estimation of the pecuniary value of this land).
Compiled from: Articles 28 and 29 of the Vardar Valley contract.
The most interesting feature of the contract with regard to the financing of the scheme was 
that it marked a re-embracing of Hambros. For it was unequivocally stipulated that: i) the financial 4 
group to whom the contractor would first apply [for the loan] would be the Group which has issued 
the First Refugee Loan (i.e. Hambros); ii) Hambros would be assured the flotation of the loan, 
under the condition that it fulfilled one prerequisite: to offer to float a loan within 18 months under 
terms at least as good as those of the Refugee Loan. This commitment on behalf of the 
government would hold even if a th ird  party offered to  the government terms that 
were more advantageous than those o f the First Refugee Loan.
The 'reinstatement' of Hambros was a matter of seminal importance for the National Bank 
and The Foundation Co.60 As noted above, this American multinational, had entered into a 
secret pact with Hambros in the spring of 1925 because this bank was familiar with the 
complicated financial conditions in Greece. In addition, as a matter of principle, the management 
of The Foundation Co. considered that in this instance it ought to cooperate with a British and not 
an American bank because it believed that the interests of Britain would always be larger than the 
U.S.A.'s in the Near East.61
Immediately upon the ratification of the contract by the Pangalos cabinet, the builder and 
the National Bank furnished an advance of $600,000.62 This advance was granted at par and at 
an interest rate of 6%. At the time, it was considered sufficient to cover the cost of schedule A 
which was planned to take approximately 24 months.63 The contract had stipulated that this 
advance would be granted exclusively by The Foundation Co. Given the small sum involved it
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seems offhand strange that this 'multinational' did not fulfill this obligation solely on its own. Infact, 
it should be remarked here that the builder insisted that the N.B.G. grant half the amount.64 
Apparently, The Foundation Co. felt that because a dictator was in power its position in Greece 
was 'precarious'.65
From the point of view of the Greek government, in the last analysis, the reembracing of 
Hambros was 'inevitable* given the limited options facing the Greek government. A Hambros loan 
under 'good' terms, was a better alternative to no loan at all. In the end, no exclusive £3,500,000 
Vardar reclamation loan was raised by Hambros by May 1927. (For the long-term financing of the 
project see again below Book II, Section III, Chapters 2 and 5).
b. The Advance and Temporary Loan Furnished by The Foundation Co. 
and the National Bank
The participation of the National Bank in the advance was kept secret. A plausible 
explanation is that the Bank did not want its connection with The Foundation Co. to be publicized. 
In addition, the National Bank of Greece was under constant pressure from Pangalos to lend 
capital to the state.66 Diomedes repeatedly objected to the demands of the dictatorship for loan 
funds. Thus, had it become known that the N.B.G. had lent $300,000 for the Vardar reclamation 
project, inevitably, Pangalos' criticism against the Bank and in particular its pro Venizelist governor 
would have become further inflamed.
The $600,000 advance made possible the beginning of schedule A at once in December 
1925. The deadline for the flotation of a loan was May 1927, and theoretically the contractor had 
plenty of time ahead in order to make the necessary arrangements. However, the president of 
the Foundation Co., considered that a loan should be raised as soon as possible. Indeed, 
Remington was concerned that the activities of his company were unfolding under the growingly 
dictatorial regime of a "madman".67 He was aware that in Greece the political situation could 
change from one moment to the next, and was afraid that once an elected government was 
reestablished, the National Assembly might try to cancel or modify the existing contract. It was 
obvious that the contract would stand less chances of being rejected by a constitutional 
government after the inevitable downfall of Pangalos, if in the meanwhile, a loan had been raised 
and the cancellation clause voided. (Remington did not openly admit it, but an additional reason 
why he must have been anxious to see this clause voided was the high remuneration that had
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been awarded to The Foundation Co. (See below 2.6.2.). Hambros in the summer of 1925 had 
declared to the government that it expected the temporary embargo, which the City had imposed 
in order to facilitate the stabilization of the pound, to be lifted in the autumn, and that it would be 
possible soon thereafter to raise a £3,500,000 loan for the Vardar reclamation project. But, 
Remington discovered one month after the contract was signed with Pangalos -i.e. in October 
1925- that Hambros Bank was no longer willing to keep the 'promise' for an early flotation.68 The 
explanation offered by Hambros for its change of mind was that "...the public here [i.e. the City] 
are [were] still a little nervous as to the effect of the military 'coup d'etat' and will not be reassured 
until a constitutional government has been nominated by public vote".69
Indeed, during the weeks that followed the ratification of the contract, Pangalos' public 
image abroad deteriorated. The British press attacked his increasingly wreckless handling of 
Greek public finances. He was castigated for trying to turn Salonika into a great "place des armes" 
in order to expand Greece's Northeastern geographical frontiers. And, special attention was 
given to the fact that during what started out as a minor border military episode, he ordered Greek 
troops to invade Bulgarian territory.70 (See Book I, Section II, 2.2). Under the circumstances it 
was unlikely that the British public would subscribe to a 'Pangalos' loan. More importantly, the real 
stumbling block was that the British Treasury had just enforced an embargo that precluded the 
Greek government from raising loan capital in the City until an Anglo-British war debt agreement 
be reached.71 The advise Hambros gave to Remington was that The Foundation Co., should wait 
for the war debt to be settled first, at which point one comprehensive loan of some £12- 
13,000,000 could be arranged to cover the refugees, the drainage of the Vardar valley and the 
road scheme scheme. (In terms of commission and issue costs -a single ban would be cheaper 
for Greece.) Naturally, Hambros assumed that his house would undertake the fbtation of such a 
loan.72 Remington did not want to wait. Ignoring the commitment towards Hambros that it would 
finance the Greek projects of The Foundation Co. (see above, 2.5.), he approached the National 
City Bank of New York and asked it to arrange for a 'private' ban'- a public subscription was out of 
the question as in the meanwhile the U.S.A. had imposed a war debt embargo also. For reasons 
that are not known, this attempt lead no where 73
Meanwhile, in mid January, it became apparent that in order for the swamp lakes of Amatovo 
and Artzan to be rendered cultivable and not periodically flooded, in addition to undertaking 
drainage works, it would also be necessary to realign part of the Axios river. As a result the cost of
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schedule A would be almost 90% higher than originally planned. (I.e. the revised schedule A 
would require a total expenditure of $1,132,000 and not the originally estimated $532,000).74
The ministry of communications demanded that The Foundation Co. supply the additional 
funds needed. Remington panicked. Although he was eager to consolidate the position of The 
Foundation in Greece, he was not keen to increase the advance to a total of $1,132,000. He 
threatened to terminate the whole affair. As he put it to A.Filaretos, his liaison with the National 
Bank, without a loan it would be "a waste of time and energy on the part of any of us to plan the 
carrying out of an undertaking the size of our contract".75 The possibility of a 'bond issue' may 
have been ruled out for the moment, but the contractor, nevertheless, was determined to find an 
immediate alternative solution to the two pressing problems facing his company's activities in 
Greece: to finance schedule A completely, and to arrange the deletion of the cancellation clause. 
The Foundation Co. came out of the deadlock it was in, by offering to grant a temporary loan of 
$2,500,000-in which the $600,000 advance would be included, with the understanding that the 
government would agree to void the cancellation clause.76 The National Bank of Greece was 
'asked' by Remington to contribute half of the loan capital.77 This demand was unwelcome news 
to the Bank because at the moment it was in narrow financial straights. However, as the 
consolidation of the Foundation's position in Greece, was a matter of high priority for the N.B.G, 
Diomedes finally agreed to furnish the $950,000 requested. In order to meet this obligation the 
National Bank 'discretely' borrowed from Hambros £150,000 (i.e. approximately the equivalent to 
$730,000).78
As was the case with the advance of the $600,000, in the contract drawn up between the 
government and the contractor on May 14,1926, it appeared as if the temporary ban was being 
provided exclusively by The Foundation Co. The Greek government apparently did not know that 
the N.B.G. had 'provided' half of the amount. And naturally, it was not aware of the indirect 
involvement of Hambros in the affair.79
The contribution of Hambros was kept secret from the British government also. Lending 
capital to public institutions such as the National Bank was formally not against the Treasury 
guidelines as the embargo was still directed only against the Greek government and not against 
public bodies such as the N.B.G. However, it appears highly unlikely that the Treasury would 
have been pleased had it known of the Hambros ban to the National Bank. Strictly speaking, the 
final recipient of these funds was the Greek government, and thus a circumvention of the
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embargo was entailed. Without Hambros' assistance to the National Bank, the temporary loan 
would not have been forthcoming. That Hambros defied the embargo and the will of the British 
Treasury shows that this financial institution had the imagination and the determination to escape 
from the tutelage of the state apparatus when it considered that its larger interests were at stake. 
In this case the larger interest being the consolidation of the Foundation Co. in Greece. These 
events appear to indicate a banker's consortium acting with little reference to public policy and 
largely independent of official supervision.
The news of the temporary loan was received badly in Britain. This explains why Hambros 
did not inform the Treasury of its involvement in this financial deal. Once again London claimed 
that Athens had infringed the Paris Agreement. Strictly speaking, since state revenues were 
granted as guarantees for this loan, the correct procedure to have been followed was for the 
government to have asked for the consent of the Powers before signing the contract. But, as 
with the First Refugee Loan, and the Athens Water Loan, the policy of Greece was to present the 
Powers with a fait accompli -i.e. to notify them after the foreign ban contracts were signed and 
ratified. (The logic being that the Powers would thereby be discouraged from using their right of 
veto). It came as no surprise, when in August 1926, the British Ambassador in Washington 
suggested to the State Department that a joint protest should be made by the governments of 
the U.S.A., Britain and France for the $2,500,000 advance.80 The State Department did not 
agree and Grew, its Acting Secretary communicated to the British Ambassador that "it should be 
helpful to learn the reasons which have led H.M.G. to suggest the making of a joint protest at this 
time and the restricting of the scope of such a protest to the particular case mentioned" since 
other violations existed for which the British government had made no complaint. For the Greek 
government had raised the Canadian Wheat Loan of 1923, the Belgian Railway Loan of 1925, 
and the freshly concluded Swedish Match Loan of July 1926, without asking beforehand for the 
assent of the Powers.81 The British Ambassador did not reply to Grew's letter. However, in 
November of the same year it once again brought up the issue. Interestingly, the American 
Treasury was of the opinion that the U.S.A. government should- as a matter of principle-file a 
protest against the Greek government. However, the State Department took no action on the 
grounds that if it filed a protest American interests in Greece would be hurt82 It must be noted 
that the antithesis expressed between the U.S.A. Treasury and the State Department in this 
instance, is reminiscent of the clashes that developed between the Foreign Office and the British
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Treasury with respect to policy making towards Greece. The Treasury appeared to adopt a more 
narrow financial attitude on certain important pending issues with Greece, (e.g. the war debt or the 
infringement of the 1918 Paris Agreement) whereas the Foreign Office had a broader commercial 
perspective.83 In the end London dropped the issue, and no protest was made by either one of 
the three Powers.
The temporary loan enabled the builder to start the construction of the project at an early 
date. (The first long term loan which contributed to the financing of this scheme was raised in 
December 1928 - at which time $2,250,000 out of the total of $2,500,000 of the advance had 
already been spent.) It could be argued, that the Greek government might have tried to raise a 
bond issue in a capital market other than London and New York prior to the settlement of the war 
debt. However, such an attempt would have failed. France was not interested in Greek loans. 
And, the capital markets of the other continental countries familiar with Greece were not able (or 
willing) to provide anything other than expensive private loans tied to specific projects from which 
they would have a direct benefit. (See in Book II, Section I, Chapter 3, and in Book I, Section II, 
2.1). Thus, there would have been no interest in financing a project that had already been 
awarded to an American contractor.
c. The Inadequate Long Term Financing of the Project
Eric Hambro as early as 1925 had suggested to the Greeks that it was in their interest to 
combine the financing of various projects (and the provision of supplementary funds for the 
refugees) under one loan after the embargo was lifted by the City of London. He forewarned that 
if the government came to the market at frequent intervals for smaller sums, Greece's international 
creditworthiness and bargaining position would deteriorate.84 A combined refugee public works 
loan was never raised. However, the government "followed' the advise of the British banker in 
that it floated two 'umbrella' general purpose productive works loans after stabilization.85
The First Public Works Loan issued in December 1928 amounted in total to £4,000,000. 
But, only £1,658,000 was allocated to the reclamation of the Vardar valley. The second ban 
raised in May 1931 had a nominal value of £4,600,000, but only £434,988 was spent on this 
scheme. Thus, in total, no more than £2,000,000 was made available through foreign finance. 
(For a breakdown of how the proceeds of the two bans were allocated see bebw Table 6). These
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funds proved insufficient, and after 1931 whereupon the inflow of foreign capital suddenly dried 
up, the government was forced to resort to the Treasury in order to complete the reclamation of 
the Vardar valley. Approximately 43% of the amounts spent up to 1936 were raised in this 
manner. (See Tables 7 and 8). No other option was open for the reason that the weak domestic 
capital market had already been tapped for the Athens water scheme for the sum of 270,000,000 
drs. which was a large figure for the standards of the day. (Unfortunately, we do not have data on 
the amounts spent on the project after 1936).
Table 6
Breakdown of the Two Public Works Loans:
First Public Works Loan (1928)
i) The underwriter - issuing house:
Hambros Bank Nominal capital of ban: £ 4,000,000
Net amount made received by the government: £ 3,560,000*
ii) Breakdown of the use of available funds:
a. Vardar reclamation project: £ 1,658,000
b. National road network: £ 850,000
c. Agricultural Bank of Greece: £ 373,000
d. Struma reclamation scheme: £ 420,000
Second Public Works Loan (1931)
i) Issuing houses:
a. Hambros Bank: £ 2,000,000
b. National Bank of Greece: £ 1,000,000
c. Enskilda Bank (Stockholm): £ 500,000
d. Credit Suisse(Zurich): £ 400,000
e. Banca Commerciale Italiana (Milan): £ 400,000
f. Mendelshon & Co. and Nederlandsche Handel
Maatschappij (Amsterdam): £ 300,000
Total nominal capital of ban: £ 4,600,000
Net amount received by the government: £ 3,772,000
ii)
a. National road network: £ 908,429
b. Struma reclamation scheme: £ 560,317
c. Vardar reclamation project: £ 434,988
d. Payment of Hambros advance**: £ 1,500,000
e. Payment of Speyers advance**: £ 218,994
f . Various works undertaken by the ministries
of communications and agriculture: £ 102,299
"By net amount made received by the government is meant the capital made available to the Greek 
government after we make allowance for the price of issue, the cost of printing the bonds , the commission 
of the bankers,and any other cost related to the flotation of the loan which is deducted from the net produce 
of the loan.
“ The funds of the Hambros advance were spent on the public utility projects undertaken by foreign capital. 
However, unfortunately we do not know how exactly these funds were allocated.
Sources: G.L.H.A /D.A: File 37, Document 22 "Productive Works and road scheme-completion expenditure 
1930-1932", documents titled: "Comprehensive table of henceforth funding”; and "Capitaux disposes hors 
du budget-Produit d'emprunt productif 6% 1931". Also, G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 
1931. (Athens, 1932), p.52.
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Table 7
Funds Provided from the Two Public Work Loans: 1925-1931*
1925 $ 36,000
1926 $ 664,000
1927 $ 770,000
1928 $ 778,000
1929 $ 5,802,000
1930 $ 1,125,000
1931 $ 2,175,160
‘Because of the advances granted funds were made available prior to the flotation of the two public work 
loans.
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1936. (Athens, 1937), p.199.
Table 8
Funds Provided from the State Budget up to 1936
1931 $ 632,954
1932 $ 1,293,970
1933 $ 828,157
1934 $ 1,291,989
1935 $ 2,043,357
1936 $ 2,562,097
TOTAL* $ 8,652,524
*The construction of the project did not stop in 1936. However, we do not know what was spent after 1937. 
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1936. (Athens, 1937), pp.198-199.
in conclusion, it must again be emphasized that the Greek government, did not have a 
consistent and well planned policy: it aimed too high and achieved too little. The possibility of 
raising a loan only for the reclamation of the Vardar valley and at an early date proved a posteriori 
not feasible for two reasons: One, the Pangalos dictatorship was a stumbling block. By the time 
the dictator signed and ratified the contract the City was no longer willing to raise money for the 
Greek government. Second, as we will see in the chapter on the First Public Works Loan it is 
obvious that the stabilization of Greece came chronologically too late so as to permit a massive 
capital inflow from the U.S.A. Thus, in the three years that intervened between 1928 (i.e. the 
stabilization) and the world crisis of 1931, due to its continuing financial dependence on Britain, 
Greece had a limited success in securing the requisite capital for the project. One, perhaps, might 
be allowed by overstating the argument to maintain that this project would have been completed
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on time had a similar deal been made to that attained for the Athens water works, i.e had the 
builder been obliged to finance the construction of the scheme.
2.6.2. The works
The Foundation Co. carried out in the Vardar valley the drainage of swamps and lakes, 
antiflooding works such as river realignment and repairs to, as well as, the building of bridges and 
roads. (For a detailed description see again Appendix 5). In addition, the government had 
agreed to assign to it the construction of an irrigation system -under similar conditions as those 
specified for the reclamation works- in the event it decided to embark on such a project within five 
years after the drainage was completed. However, this commitment was not kept and the 
irrigation of the Vardar valley was undertaken in the forties by the same state agency which 
finished off the reclamation.86 Theoretically, this thesis should answer two questions. These are 
whether the works were of high quality and whether they were constructed at the lowest possible 
cost. The data on both counts are insufficient. However, at the time, there was a general 
concensus that: i) although the company was sued on a few occasions the end product was of a 
high quality87, and ii) there was plenty of waste and the slow pace of the works was not the sole 
reason for this 88
Table 9
Land Cultivation and the Reclamation Works in the Vardar Valley
I.
II
Total area of Vardar Valley: 2,200,000 stremmas
II.
a. Land cultivated before the reclamation: 480,000 stremmas
b. Pasture land before the reclamation: 321,000 stremmas
III. Land to be reclaimed by Foundation Co.*: 
a  lands drained: 502,000 stremmas
b. lands protected from floods: 801,000 stremmas
c. total (i.e. (a)+(b): 1,303,000 stremmas
d. Area of (c) classified as cultivable: 944,000-1,100,000 stremmas
IV. Reclaimed land to be irrigated**: 776,000 stremmas
*The area to be reclaimed would not be 100% cultivable. The most conservative estimate was that only 
944,000 stremmas from the land made available through the reclamation would be cultivable, whereas the 
most optimistic was that 1,100,000 stremmas would be rendered cultivable.
**Part of the areas drained and part of the areas protected from floods was to be affected by the irrigation 
works that Foundation Co,, wanted to undertake. However, no contract was signed for these works, though 
both sides agreed that they were necessary.
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1931. (Athens, 1932), p. 109. Also, 
Supreme Economic Council, The Exploitation of the Lands From the Productive Works in Macedonia. 
(Athens, 1935), pp.19-20.
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The terms posed
In conformity with the other large social overhead capital works built at the time, the basic 
weakness of this scheme -from the point of view of the state- was that effectively no upper limit 
was placed on the builder regarding the cost of the works.89 The fee and general expenses 
awarded to the contractor were high. At 34.55% of the cost of the works, this remuneration was 
actually the highest to be awarded to a contractor throughout 1922-1932. (See Book II, Section I, 
Chapter 1, Table 12.) The upper limit placed for the general expenses was 17%. In addition, the 
agreed fee was not a fixed sum as was the case with the Athens water works. Instead, it was 
determined on a percentage basis and it was to amount to 15% of the cost of the works cum the 
general expenses. It must be underlined that the other cost plus percentage fee contracts of 
the interwar period determined the fee only on the basis of the cost of the works. Thus, this 
particular agency contract gave plenty of incentive to the builder to blow up the expenditures 
related to the construction of the project and to ensure that the general expenses would actually 
reach the agreed ceiling.
The high remuneration of the contractor was in large part related to the fact that no 
aggressive competitor appeared for the scheme, as had been the case for example with 
MacArthur in the Athens water works. Moreover, given Pangalos' overturning of the normal 
parliamentary procedure, one cannot avoid indulging into making the hypothesis that had the 
contract been submitted for ratification to the National Assembly in 1925 (i.e. right after it had 
been concluded as had been the case with the Athens water scheme) the rate of remuneration 
would have been lowered. As things stood, the contract was submitted for ratification to the 
National Assembly after Pangalos' downfall in 1927. Because the contractor had by this time 
begun work on the scheme, Parliament feared that if it lowered the tatter's general expenses and 
fee American capital in general would be scared away from Greece.
The one vital area in which the terms of this project marked a significant improvement was 
that relating to government control over the actual construction of the scheme. Whereas with the 
Athens water works the government was more of an advisor than a supervisor to the 
contractor,the opposite was true for the Vardar valley reclamation. Namely, in this case, it was 
clearly specified that "the works shall always be constructed in accordance with the plans etc of 
the contractor as finally approved or modified by the Employer either at the time of their
294
submission, or during the execution of the works".90 However, the cost of this enforced 
supervision was high- to the extent that the 'exuberant' remuneration awarded to the contractor 
was a trade off for more extensive government supervision.
The actual record
The works lasted around twentyfive years-i.e.they were completed sometime in the late 
forties.91 In the contract it had been stated that the reclamation of the Vardar valley would take 
seven years. However, although the contractor began work in 1925, as originally planned, by 
1932 only schedule A was finished 92 Schedule B was in a half finished state and work had not 
yet begun on Schedule C 93 Schedule A was of minor significance, considering that the total 
amount of cultivable land to become available through the whole project had been estimated at 
around 940,000-1,100,000 stremmas.
Through schedule A the cultivable frontiers of the Vardar valley were actually extended by 
only 81,000 stremmas. This was 20% lower than the initial estimates regarding the area of 
cultivable land to be reclaimed through this part of the project. This was an abominable record. 
And ironically, inspite the acute land shortage problem, the 81,000 stremmas supplied through 
schedule A, were not taken full advantage of. Up to the late thirties, the increase in the cultivated 
land in the Vardar valley was approximately only 46,700 stremmas. The 45,000 stremmas of this 
newly cultivated area consisted of privately owned plots, situated between the two lakes and the 
Axios river, which had in the past fallen into disuse because they were periodically flooded by the 
river.94
The remaining 1,700 stremmas of schedule A, which were put to cultivation, belonged to 
the 36,000 stremmas of state land made available through the drainage of the lakes Amatovo and 
Artzan. The larger part of this new land was not ploughed. The government did not hand out this 
area to the refugees as originally planned nor did it create a special farm agency'.95 In view, 
therefore, of the fact that the population pressure exerted by the refugees was still a stark reality, 
the inertia displayed by the government was indeed unfortunate from both an economic and 
social angle.96 (For details on this subject see below: 2.6.3.)
One small digression. This inaction cannot be explained by the contraction in the world 
commodity markets. Greece's major exports in the interwar period in order of importance were
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tobacco, currant and wine. Currant exports rose by 8%. On the contrary, the volume of tobacco 
and wine exports fell by about 20% and 72% respectively. (See Table 10) However, the area of 
land devoted to the cultivation of these three exports actually increased by 4%. Thus, with the 
contraction in world trade there was no substitution effect. I.e. in Greece it was not the case that 
land previously devoted to the production of agricultural exports was re-located to grow basic 
foodstuffs for home consumption. Thus, the need to expand the country's cultivation frontier 
was just as urgent after the world crisis as before.
Table 10
Tobacco
Currants
Wine
Value o f exports
(mill.drs)
1926-1930 1931-1939
3.411
1.267
453
3.141
1.332
206
Volume of exports
(thousand tons)
1926-1930 1931-1939
Tobacco 51 41.2
Currants 91 98
Wine 112 43.3
Area of cultivated land
(in stremmas)
1926-1930 1931-1939
Tobacco 932,000 874,000
Vine 1,142,400 1,271,900
Total 2,074,400 2,145,900
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1939. (Athens,1940), part I, pp.93,117; 
part II, pp.32-35.
Overall, the substantial delays in the completion of the works was due to a number of 
factors. First, in contrast to the Athens water scheme, no detailed plan existed before the project 
was assigned to the contractor. Second, because of the high incidence of malaria, the building 
activity of the Foundation Co. during the first two years almost exclusively consisted of digging 
temporary ditches and trenches.97 Third, the project suffered from poor organization. Too many 
parts of the scheme began concurrently. Thus, when the supply of foreign funds dried up 
suddenly in 1932 no one part was ready apart from the drainage of the Artzan and Amatovo 
swamps.
From 1932 the pace of construction became exceptionally slow. This led to a number of 
complications because various segments of the works were deserted halfway through, and as a
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result they suffered physical deterioration.98 One particular menace was the periodical incidence 
of floodings. Due to this, the contractor had to spend extra time and money on necessary repairs. 
A chain effect process set in whereby one delay led to further delays and rises in expenditure. 
Given the urgent need to finish the scheme and the poor financial standing of the state, this 
waste had a high economic and social cost.
Table 11
Estimations Made Regarding the Total Cost of the Reclamation-lrrigation Works
in the Vardar Valley1
I. Estimated total cost by the Greek government:
a. reclamation: $ 18,900,000
b. irrigation: $ 7,000,000
c. total fal+flrt: $ 25.900.000
II. Initial estimated total cost by Foundation Co.(1925)2:
a. reclamation:
schedule A $ 600,000
schedule B $ 15,750,000
schedule C $ 10,220,000
M 3l $ 26.570.000
b. irrigation no estimate made.
III. Revised estimated total cost (1932):
a. reclamation:
schedule A: $ 1,052,894
schedule B: $ 16,426,322
schedule C: $ 1,870,000
lQlal $ 19.349.216
b. irrigation: $ 7,500,000
c. total (aUftrt $ 26.849.216
IV. Amount spent by the end of 1932: $ 13,300,000
V. 1932 estimates of additional 
amounts needed in order to
complete works3: $ 14,300,000
VI. 1932 estimates of the amount 
needed for the mise envaleur
of the works: $ 11,000,000
VII. (IV+V=VI): $ 38,600,000
1ln the total cost are included the fee and the general expenses.
^he original estimates made in 1925 by Foundation Co. and which are mentioned in the contract.
3These estimates were made by the Ministry of Agriculture in early 1932, and they include the cost for the 
irrigation works.
Compiled from: the Vardar Valley contract, G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1931. 
(Athens, 1932), pp.112,123. Also, Supreme Economic Council, The Exploitation of the Lands Reclaimed 
From the Productive Works in Macedonia. (Athens, 1935), p. 14.
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We do not know the exact figures involved. However, it is clear that the final cost of the 
works exceeded many times over the original estimates that had been made when the contract 
was signed in 1925. At that time, the estimated cost had been in the area of $26,000,000. (See 
Table 11 above) By the end of October 1932 $13,300,000 had been spent on the project. 
During 1933-1936 an additional $7,000,000 was spen t." We have no information on the cost of 
the works after the state agency took over the scheme in 1937. However, it must have had large
dimensions considering that 67% of the land drained and 62.5% of the land protected from
!■
floods was completed during the forties.100 (See Book II, Section III, Chapter Five, Table 3)
Table 11 above portrays the estimates made by various sources regarding the total cost of 
the works. It must be underlined that these estimates are of an ex ante nature- i.e. they were 
made prior to the completion of the works. We have no information regarding the breakdown of 
the cost of the works. However, according to one source the contractor until December 31 1929, 
had kept its general expenses at a level substantially lower than the plafond that had been 
specified by the contract. We do not know if after this date, The Foundation Co. continued to 
display such a conscientious behaviour.
As the years went by The Foundation Co. maintained a good image. Nevertheless, we 
cannot fail to point out once again that the handing over of the works to the state was marked with 
a number of disagreements.101 In 1937 the government removed the contractor from the 
project. It does not appear that this 'nostrification' move was taken because there was any 
fundamental disagreement with the company. Instead it should be seen as a product of two 
interrelated developments. First, the rise of economic nationalism in Greece. Second, the state 
at this stage had begun for the first time to show signs of economic planning. (The state agency 
which finished the scheme took over also the completion of the other large reclamation 
schemes.)
To recapitulate. The basic failing of this infrastructure project as already mentioned was the 
fact that it proceeded with considerable delay. A viscous circle set in whereby halfcompleted 
segments deteriorated and led to the need for repairs and a rise in expenditure. The latter in 
return led to further delays. Another failing, which the contemporary foreign supervisors of
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Greece stressed was the absence of complementary works.102 The serious study of best crops, 
preparation of markets, the undertaking of irrigation works etc., did not proceed pari passu with 
the drainage scheme. These should have taken place in order to ensure the success of the 
commercial side of the project. In the last analysis, the state due to its financial constraints, 
adopted a piecemeal approach. In the case of the Athens water works, a water supply cum 
sewage system should have been built. As for the Vardar valley, a radical solution would have 
been for a drainage cum irrigation scheme plus all the necessary secondary works to have been 
undertaken concurrently. The state was naive to believe that it could revolutionize Greek 
agriculture, multiply the yield of cereals, and achieve a substantial Increase the production 
possibility frontier simply by draining land.103 It should have tackled the problem in a 
comprehensive manner. But to make such a statement is to verge into counterfactual history, for 
the basic prerequisites were absent: the ability to 'plan' and borrow the required foreign capital for 
such projects.
2.6.3. The concession that never was
The concession granted in 1925 to The Foundation Co. is only of purely academic interest 
for it never materialized. It pointedly reflects the rising sentiment of economic nationalism 
following the world economic crisis and the drying up of foreign capital inflow. The story was as 
follows. The "Pangalos" contract of September 1925 had laid down in full detail the terms under 
which The Foundation Co. would have operated for thirty years (either alone, or in cooperation 
with whoever it chose) the concession fo r the maintenance of the Vardar valley 
reclamation works.104 This concern, was to be set up a few months after the termination of 
schedule A.105 In essence, as Table 12 demonstrates it was to be an agrarian development 
agency and not a simple maintenance company. For, in addition to maintaining, improving, and 
extending, the reclamation works, the concessionaire would be obliged to contribute in a direct 
manner to the economic development of the Vardar valley.
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Table 12
Obligations of the Concessionaire According to the Vardar Valley Contract of September 1925
i) The training of farmers that would be settled on the drained land in a 
scientific method of cultivation;
H) The promotion of cattle breeding in the valley, encouragement of beetroot 
production, and the creation of a sugar industry ;
iii) The establishment and running of a model agricultural and stock-breeding 
farm;
iv) The building and maintenance of wharehouses sufficient for the 
requirements of the valley;
v) To supply to the farmers of the Vardar valley at reasonable prices with 
seeds, manure, agricultural machinery, and tools.
From the above list it is apparent that the state would rely heavily on the concessionaire for 
the creation of an independent peasant class and the stimulation of production in the three staple 
food items (cereals, meat, and sugar) over the whole breadth of the Vardar valley, and not only 
over the lands to be drained.106 The functions assigned to the concessionaire being of a broad 
developmental nature, the government assured that its control over the maintenance company 
would be stricter and narrower than that which had been prescribed for the Athens water works. 
Two government officials would be appointed on the Board of Directors of the maintenance 
company, whereas in the case of the Societe des Eaux, no such provision had been made.107 
Moreover, the minister of agriculture would supervise (albeit, loosely) the activities of the 
company.
Schedule A was not completed in 1927, as initially planned, but in October 1930. When 
this occurred, the contractor notified the other two members of the Hellenic Construction Co., 
and asked them if they were still interested in undertaking the option that had been granted to 
them in the private agreement of April 7,1925, to form a maintence company. Gordon Leith & Co. 
was no longer interested in participating in the concession. The National Bank of Greece, which 
after the dissolution of the Syndicat des Etudes et des Enterprises in February 1930 had become 
the third member of The Hellenic Construction Co., was also against participating.108 This 
change in attitude was not without reason.109 The two dissenting members (i.e. Gordon Leith & 
Co. and the National Bank of Greece) claimed that they did not at the moment have adequate 
funds at their disposal in order to participate in the maintenance company.110 Indeed, given the
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wide spectrum of activities this concern would have, it was apparent that a large capital outlay 
would be necessary. (Let us at this point, remind the reader that the private agreement of the 
three members of the Hellenic Construction Co. was signed in April 1925, whereas the contract 
for the reclamation of the Vardar valley was concluded in October 1925. Thus, the members of 
the Hellenic Construction Co. when signing the private agreement had not known that the 
concession would entail such a wide range of activities). Nevertheless, it appears that what 
basically scared off the two dissenters was not the size of the capital outlay per se, but the fact that 
they were convinced that the terms as posed in the 1925 contract would preclude the 
concessionaires from enjoying a "respectable" profit from the operation of the maintence 
company. According to Gordon Leith and the N.B.G.: i) the monetary fee to be awarded to the 
concessionaire by the state was inadequate; and ii) the 40,000 stremmas of the reclaimed land 
from schedule A which the government would 'donate' to the concessionaire for a period of thirty 
years was not of a high quality (i.e. its exploitation would not secure a high return).111 Thus, 
these bankers stated that they would participate in the concession only if the builder renegotiated 
the terms of the contract with the government and succeeded either to secure a larger 
guaranteed income, or to relieve the concessionaires of the obligation to undertake any activity 
other than the maintenance of the works.112
It is not known whether the contractor actually made an attempt to renegotiate the terms of 
the 1925 contract with the government. For two years the question of how the reclaimed state 
lands were to be maintained and who would develop them remained open. During this time, The 
Foundation Co. held numerous meetings with the two other members of the Hellenic 
Construction Co.113 But, the N.B.G. and Gordon Leith were adamant in their refusal to participate 
in the management concession under the existing terms. (Could it be that Gordon Leith's 
indifference was in large part a reflection of Hambros' growing disinterest in foreign investments 
after 1931 ?)114
On its part, The Foundation Co. was not prepared to act alone in an enterprise of this size. 
Clearly, The Foundation Co. must have been relieved when on March 31 1932, it was asked by 
Premier Venizelos to "hand over to the Greek government its right to set up a
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maintenance company".115 Venizelos had good reason to "breach" the 1925 contract. Times
had changed and the state partly by necessity, and in part by choice, had become more
nationalistic and confident in its powers. Moreover, it is obvious that Venizelos had become
disillusioned, and bitter with Greece's supervisors and foreign capital in general. He believed that *.
they had betrayed Greece (on such issues as the war debt and 1918 book credits) and that they
did not live up to their 'promises' with respect to the flow of capital for the development of the
Greek economy. It is worth noting that he asked The Foundation Co. to hand over its right a few
weeks before he announced Greece's decision to go off the gold standard and declared a partial
default on her foreign loans.116 Venizelos had nothing to lose by "insulting" a large foreign firm, 
o
He knew all tofwell that foreign capital would no longer be forthcoming. By 1932 it was clear to all 
that the principal international money markets would remain closed for some years.
In addition to these considerations there was a 'political' problem. As already mentioned 
above, the land that was to be reclaimed through the drainage of lakes and swamps was to belong 
to the state exclusively. The latter had advertised for a number of years that it intended to use this 
land for the settlement of the refugees. However, by 1932, only 36,000 stremmas had become 
available. According to the contract signed in 1925, the concessionaire had a right to 40,000 
stremmas of state land for thirty years. Thus, had the concession been set up this would have 
made the government very unpopular in the eyes of the refugees. At this point we cannot fail to 
note that Venizelos was heavily dependent on the refugee votes.
After the concession was cancelled, the Venizelos government asked the National Bank to 
set up a company for the maintenance of the works with the Bank of Greece and the Agricultural 
Bank of Greece. This purely Greek 50 year public benefit maintenance company was to 
undertake the management and the exclusive exploitation of the all of the state lands that would 
be made available through the Vardar and Struma Valley drainage schemes.117
The idea of the creation of a state company to be run by Greek banks was received well by 
grassroot organizations, such as for example the union of agriculturists in Macedonia and Thrace, 
for it was assumed that the land would be cultivated on a cooperative basis.118 On the contrary,
4
Greece's foreign supervisors viewed this turn towards cooperativism, and "statism" in the realm of
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agriculture with suspicion. Finlayson in particular, declared his disatisfaction with this decision and 
suggested that some independent organization along the lines of the R.S.C. be set up 
instead.119 The weakness of the state is highlighted from the manner in which it handled this 
issue. For it may have taken away from foreign interests their right to a concession, but it was not 
in a position to set up a company on its own. The National Assembly refused to pass the bill 
Venizelos presented for the creation of a maintenance company to be run by Greek banks. Once 
again no decision was reached as the state faltered indecisive as to whether such a scheme 
should primarily have an economic or a social benefit character. Almost all of the land made 
available from the drainage of the two swamps from Schedule A (as already noted in the text) fell 
into disuse and was extensively trespassed.120 Valuable time was lost and for a number of years 
what little soil was made available was waiting in waste! What irony. This episode brings to our 
mind the observation of the marxist economist Paul Baran that a basic problem of 
underdevelopment is not the lack of resources but how they are put to use.121
Finally, let it also be noted that the discussion surrounding the maintenance company is of 
interest in one more respect. It highlights the changes which had taken place regarding the role 
of the N.B.G. by the early thirties. For, it consistently refused to participate in a concessionary 
company to be set up by the members of The Hellenic Construction Co. with the excuse that it 
lacked the necessary funds, whereas it was eager to take part in a national public benefit 
company. As mentioned above this company would have had a more substantial capital outlay. 
The question that emerges is whether the N.B.G. deliberately worked against the creation of a 
concession by the members of the Hellenic, in order to facilitate the state to breach the contract of 
1925, with respect to the maintenance company. The material does not permit us to answer this 
question. However, it depicts that the National Bank was involved in some double game. 
Apparently, at the same time that it was claiming to the contractor that it lacked the funds to 
participate in a maintenance company, it was secretly making arrangements with the state for the 
creation of a public benefit company to be run exclusively by Greek banking interests. 
Parenthetically, it should be underlined that the National Bank by 1932 had acquired a more 
diversified structure of investments and was no longer so closely attached to Hambros. To the
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extent that Hambros was affiliated with The Foundation Co. and Gordon Leith we can 'diagnose' 
read its indifference towards setting up the concession with these foreign interests as fitting into 
this pattern.122
2.7. Conclusion
The scheme suffered from the fact that the works began before final arrangements were 
made regarding long-term financing. What started out as a pure foreign investment ended up as 
an American- Hellenic venture both with regards to finance as well as the construction process. It 
is of interest to the student of foreign finance not only because of its large dimension but also 
because it uncovers: the existence of a banker's consortium operating outside the framework of 
official supervision; and the ways in which the internal weaknesses of the state impeded the flow 
of foreign capital into Greece and the optimum use of the new infrastructure provided. Moreover, 
it fits in with the missed opportunities theme that runs throughout this thesis.
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Chapter 3
The Pangalos Fiasco: The Belgian Railway Scheme
The year 1925 opened with Greece well on the road of development borrowing. However, 
the contract for the so-called Belgian railway scheme signed during the year showed that previous 
bad habits had not vanished. Railways were the one area of infrastructure with which the state 
was familiar. However in this instance apart from the fact that priority was given to military and not 
economic considerations, the problem was that midway through the project the government 
changed its mind about where exactly it wanted a new line to be built. This scheme can be 
singled out as it reminds one of Greece's past pattern of revenue borrowing and indicates that 
policy change is often a 'bumpy' and non linear process characterized by periodical 
retrogressions. Another notable characteristic is that it was the only Pangalos contract to be 
subjected to major alterations prior to ratification by the National Assembly after the downfall of the 
dictator.1 The Greek Parliament fought the project basically for two reasons. It wanted to rid the 
scheme of its militarist features and Belgium was not a major source of funds, -i.e. there was no 
fear that Greece would have much to loose if Belgian capital was slighted. (Infact, no other funds 
were raised in Belgium throughout the decade under study.)
3.1. The Preliminaries
Negotiations preceding the project were conducted promptly. During the spring of 1925, 
the Michalakopoulos government considered repairing the main state railway running from 
Pireaus to Northern Greece. The line was in a deplorable condition: it was unsuitable for heavy 
traffic. New rolling stock was to be purchased and the network was to be extended. At first 
adding six extensions to the existing state network was contemplated. However, soon there was 
talk of building two new lines that were important from the point of view of national defense: the 
one would run from Egoumenitsa up to the Adriatic, and the other would connect Veroia-Kozani- 
loannina.2
The Societe Commerciale de Belgique declared an interest in the scheme. The S.C.B. was 
no newcomer in Greece. Infact, it was a major shareholder in the electricity company, which had
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supplied electricity to Athens prior to the creation of the Anglo-Hellenic syndicate headed by the 
British Power and Traction Co. and the National Bank of Greece.3 Michalakopoulos rejected the 
Belgian offer on the grounds that the terms were highly disadvantageous for the Greek 
government.4 However, for dictator Pangalos railway development was a top military and strategic 
priority and he literally rushed into signing a railway contract with the Belgians within weeks of 
coming into power.5 Whether another contractor would offer better terms or how the railways 
should be improved so as to provide the maximum benefit to the country's pace of economic 
development was of little interest to the dictator. No tender was held and Pangalos and his 
cabinet completely ignored expert opinion at the department of public works and the State 
Railways that the contract did not serve the interests of the state from a financial and technical 
point of view.6
A British firm, Armstrong, had also declared an interest in undertaking the scheme while 
Michlakopoulos was still in office and, according to the Greek press, offered better terms.7 
Officially, the Pangalos government rejected the Armstrong offer because this firm could not 
provide financial support for the project and because the cost of transporting railway material from 
England to Greece was high.8 This may have been so, but a more important factor was at work. 
Pangalos wanted to order rolling stock that suited his expansionary military plans. Had such an 
order been placed with a British firm the Foreign Office would have been furious given British 
criticism of Greek militarism.
Pangalos' keen interest in expanding the country's railway network and the importance he 
attached to it from a military viewpoint is confirmed by other projects initiated during his twelve 
month rule. In addition to the Belgian contract he also reached agreement with the French 
Chemins de fer de I' Orient for the purchase of the line running from Salonika to Monastir,9 
promoted the extension of the two largest private railway companies (P.A.P and Thessaly 
Railways),10 and placed orders for 1,300 wagons with the Czechoslovakian firm Skoda, and for 
100 with the interallied Commission in Instanbul and an unknown number from the Austrian firm 
Ringhoffer.11 Reportedly locomotives were also ordered.12
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3.2. The Contract
In addition to providing rolling stock (see below p.314), the Belgian firm was to regrade the 
main line of the state railways (350 klms) from Pireaus through Salonika up to the Northern 
frontiers of Greece and substantially extend the system.13 Although the routes were not 
designated, the S.C.B. was commissioned to build extensions totaling 345 klms by 1930.14 The 
renewal and reinforcement of the Piraeus -Salonika- frontier line and the construction of the new 
lines were to be undertaken within the framework of an agency contract, on a cost plus basis. The 
general expenses were fixed at 17% and the fee at 12% of the cost of the works. At 29% of the 
cost of the works, the total remuneration to be awarded to the contractor was low compared to the 
Athens water scheme and the reclamation of the Vardar valley. However, exceptionally the 
contractor was granted the exclusive right to supply virtually all materials at its own prices. (Indeed, 
the prices demanded by the Belgians were 80% above the world market prices).15 Regarding the 
provision of rolling stock, 1400 freight wagons would be supplied. This figure was considered at 
the time exorbitant for the reason that the state railway already had more freight wagons than it 
needed whereas it had a dearth of carriages.16 No passenger wagons were ordered because 
Pangalos was exclusively interested in equipping the railways with the necessary means for a 
pending mobilization of the army.
Regarding the financing of this project, the government resorted to the practice that had 
been employed in the case of the Athens water scheme. Namely, the contractor undertook to 
accept payment in the form of Greek government bonds. There were to be two separate issues 
of 8% short-term paper amounting to $10,500,000 each. One part (Schedule A) was issued at 90 
and was devoted to repairing the old line and the construction of extensions. The redemption 
period was fixed at only 10 years. Notably, this was the shortest time span to be granted for an 
infrastructure loan during our period of study. The other part (Schedule B) was essentially a short 
term commercial credit, to be issued in series as and when the rolling stock material would be 
supplied. The issue price was 94 and the redemption period was 6 years from the receipt of the 
goods. (See below Table 1). No government revenues were pledged as security. Instead, the 
loan was secured against a first mortgage on the new line(s) and equipment and a first charge on
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the gross receipts of the state railways. However, as the state railways operated at a deficit, it was 
assumed that funds would have to be provided from other sources.17
Table 1
Schedule A
Amount to be issued 
$10,500,000
Amount actually issued 
$10,500,000
Original real interest rate 
8.9%
Rescheduled real interest rate 
6.6%
Original redemption period 
10 years
Rescheduled redemption period 
30 years
Original goal 
i. The repair of the main state 
artery.
The actual record 
goal(i) accomplished
ii. The building of a new line (350 kms) goal(ii)not accomplished
Schedule B
Amount to be issued 
$10,500,000
Amount actually issued 
5,597,000
Original real interest rate 
8.5%
Rescheduled real interest rate 
6.4%
Original redemption period 
6 years
Rescheduled redemption period 
20 years
Original goal 
The provision of rolling stock.
The actual record 
Rolling stock and fixed material 
were provided.
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1932. (Athens, 1933),p.515. Also, see 
the ratified contract.
Credit was not immediately available, it took the Societe Commerciale de Belgique more 
than 10 months to find the necessary funds to finance the scheme.18 To our knowledge, before 
1932 the contractor tried unsuccessfully on at least one occasion to dispose of a large part of the 
government bonds accepted as payment. Specifically, between 1929 and 1931 it tried to place 
about $5,250,000 worth of the bonds through Hambros Bank. But the bank showed no interest 
in placing them privately or in offering them to the public as it did not want Greece to be 
'overexposed' in the City.19
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3.3. The Realization of the Project
The only aspect of the scheme to be fully realized was the refurbishment of the main line. 
Greek experts were content with how this was carried out. Running speeds between Piraeus and 
Salonika was increased from 14 to about 9 hours.20 But a League of Nations report maintained 
that a certain element of waste had been involved and the material used could have been less 
sturdy given the low density of the traffic.21 As for the second part of the project, extensions 
were carried out in a haphazard manner. A fundamental problem was that the state had no clear 
idea of what it wanted. As already indicated, at first, under Michalakopoulos there had been talk of 
making at various points small extensions to the existing net work. However, when the contract 
was signed the dictator instructed the contractor to connect Salonika with Angista (135 klms), and 
Larissa with Verroia (210 klms). But, in March 1927, at the moment that the Societe Commerciale 
de Belgique was ready to begin building the extension to Angista, the coalition cancelled the 
project. The company was instructed to instead start at once a 180 klms line which would connect 
Kalambaka -Kozani- Verroia.22 Notably, neither of these three 'cities' was on the existing rail 
network. Construction began in 1928 but it never got beyond the stage of preliminary 
earthworks. It was interrupted in mid 1932 because of the lack of funds 23 The ministry of 
communications had originally estimated that this segment of the project would cost roughly 
$7,000,000. But by early 1929, it became obvious that at least $20,000,000 would be required 
and this could hardly be justified on commercial grounds 24
In total about $5-6,000,000 was wasted on the construction of this 'phantom' line. This was 
equivalent to 6% of the amount borrowed for public works during our period of study.25 It was 
observed that from a commercial viewpoint the government would have done better to connect 
the Greek state railway system with the Bulgarian rail network. This would have involved the 
construction of only 20 klms of line (from Sidirokastro to Petritsi) and would have had a high 
commercial return. But, strategic reasons did not make the construction of such a line feasible.26
The provision of rolling stock was not fully carried out either. Again the coalition 
government cancelled a large part of the order placed by Pangalos. The order for locomotives 
was reduced from 65 to 20 and only 375 instead of 1400 wagons were bought. A new 
agreement concerning the provision of the rolling stock was signed on April 9 1928,27 whereby
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the total credits granted by the Belgians to the government amounted to $16,097,600, not 
$21,000,000 as initially agreed.28 In addition, the loan was rescheduled in 1929. Indeed, this 
was the only loan of the twenties to be actually rescheduled during the decade. The nominal 
interest was lowered from 8% to 6%. The redemption period of the bonds of the first schedule 
was extended from 10 to 30 years, and those of the second from 6 to 20 years. Furthermore, a 
seven year grace period was granted, and the government was given the right of full redemption a 
year after the amortization of the loan would begin. In return the government agreed to grant as 
security surplus revenues accruing to the I.F.C.29
Pointedly, after the restoration of parliamentary rule in December 1926, voices of protest 
were heard from the League of Nations urging the government to modify the contract- i.e improve 
the loan terms and cancel the order for the 'unnecessary', 'military' rolling stock. It can be 
assumed that had these orders not been of a military nature and had they not concerned Belgium 
but Britain, the League would have been less inclined to offer this 'radical' advise- the 
presumption being that as an international supervisor it had as its principle that 'international* 
agreements were to be kept and not broken or modified.30 It must be added that the Belgian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not happy with this outcome and as a result put pressure on Greece 
not to change the terms.31
3.4. Pangalos' Concession Giving
It is notable that Pangalos was the only interwar Premier to sign contracts for schemes to be 
undertaken within the framework of foreign direct investments, granting monopolies to foreign 
interests in return for the securing of loan capital. (For monopolies also see Book I, Section II, 1.3, 
for F.D.I. see Book II, introduction). The first scheme was the concession for the electrification of
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the Athens area granted in October 1925 to the consortium set up by the British firm Power and 
Traction.32 The second scheme was granted in May 1926 to the Belgian firm New Antwerp 
Electrical for the country’s telephone network. Up to this point telephone communications had 
been a state monopoly. This franchise remained dormant for a number of years and was 
eventually cancelled. In 1930 a 38 year modified version of this concession was granted to the
fGerman firm "Siemens and Halkse". Inspite Jits significance there is practically no information '
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available on this direct investment.33 Third, the British firm Eastern Telegraph Co. had its 
concession for the country's cable telegraph communication renewed for 50 years. In addition, it 
was granted a concession for wireless telegraph.34
In sum: under Pangalos an incongruous situation developed whereby the government 
took an ultra hard stance on the issue of the war debt while at the same time it was provocatively 
'soft' towards foreign business interests 35 Pangalos in his naivete failed to appreciate the simple 
fact that had he been more accommodating on the issue of the war debt foreign finance 
have been more forthcoming.
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SECTION II
PUBLIC WORKS AND THE QUEST FOR STABILIZATION (mid 1926-mid 1928)
Introduction
i. The State of Research
The extent to which infrastructure development and the concomitant inflow of foreign 
capital was influenced from mid 1926 to mid 1928 by 'exogenous' economic variables (e.g. the 
quest for stabilization and the war debt embargo) and political phenomena (e.g. the coalition 
government) has not been explored in the historiography of interwar Greece. It is also the case 
that the growing interest on the part of American financiers in Greek public works following the 
downfall of Pangalos has not been recorded either.1 This section aims at redressing these 
omissions.
ii. General Comments on Infrastructure Development After the Downfall of Pangalos
The momentum in public work projects which began in December 1924 came to an abrupt 
halt about one year later. During the pre-stabilization phase which began with the caretaker 
government of George Kondylis and lasted throughout the larger part of the coalition, no new 
investment was undertaken in infrastructure. This was not due to any lack of interest in Greece on 
the part of foreign business. Infact, the opposite was the case. Immediately after the restoration 
of democracy, there was a 'surge' in the number of foreign firms that proposed to construct and 
finance large public work projects. The coalition of five political parties (December 1926- July 
1928) showed an interest in these offers but was inhibited from continuing the infrastructure
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'boom' that preceded its installation as a result of: i) the war debt embargo imposed by Britain and 
the U.S.A. on loans to the Greek government, and ii) the stabilization programme and the 
associated constraint on foreign borrowing imposed by the League.
Regarding the embargo, it must be reminded that a debt funding agreement was signed 
with Britain in April 1927 and with the U.S.A. in December 1927. Thus, from January 1928 
onwards the government theoretically had access to the two most important capital markets. Yet 
despite entering into negotiations for various schemes, the coalition deliberately refrained from 
concluding any final agreements before May 1928. The Financial Committee of the League had 
dictated that no government loan was to be floated on the international market before Greece 
stabilized and joined the gold exchange standard. By definition foreign borrowing would have 
been part and parcel of any new infrastructure scheme as the coalition government was against 
foreign direct investments as a matter of principle.2 This was unfortunate considering that large 
scale F.D.I. would (at least in the short-term) have helped stabilize the drachma while maintaining 
the momentum in infrastructure development.
The coalition worked towards stabilization in the hope that Greece would gain the trust of 
the international community and thereby enjoy the substantial capital inflow that was required for 
the building of public work projects. Thus, politicoeconomic stabilization was seen as a sine qua 
non for the creation of a modern physical infrastructure.3 Stabilization was completed on May 14, 
1928; in an ironic way on July 4,1928 (i.e. less than two months later, the coalition broke down). 
Under the circumstances this government did not have the opportunity to embark on a massive 
public works programme. Finally, in order to set the infrastructure ‘policy’ of the coalition into 
perspective it should be noted that it was eager to maintain a balance and not take sides in the 
Anglo-American rivalry for construction in Greece. (See below Book II, Section II, Chapter 1 for 
details on how it handled the road project and the land reclamation on programme). Notably, the 
coalition government also handled with great care the issue of the re-ratification of the public work 
contracts that had been signed under the Pangalos regime and which had provoked anti-foreign 
feeling. The National Assembly had not ratified any of these three contracts, (i.e. the contracts 
signed with the British Power and Traction for the electrification of the Athens area, the Belgian 
Societe Commerciale de Belgique for railway construction and the American firm The Foundation
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Co. for the reclamation of the Vardar valley).4 The coalition did not approve of Pangalos actions.
But, as can be seen from the long parliamentary debates held during the spring and summer of 
1927, it indirectly helped the American and British contractors to win over the National Assembly.5
The coalition did not want to create points of friction with Britain and the U.S.A., that might
endanger the success of the stabilization programme. The task of winning over the National
Assembly proved arduous, especially in the case of the Athens electrification scheme for the 
extensive criticism directed against it rested on sound argumentation.6
Chapter 1
The Record
Chronological Summary
P.J. Makris submits offer to the Greek government for the construction of 
a national road network.
The minister of communications of the coalition presents to the National 
Assembly a draft law for the holding of a tender for a national road network 
to be constructed and maintained by a Greek firm, and financed by foreign 
capital.
The Law is approved by the National Assembly (Law 3404).
The tender is held. Four firms make bids. Three are backed by American 
banks and the one by a British.
The coalition cabinet decides to consider only two of the offers: one is an 
American banker the other British.
The radical Republican union withdraws from the coalition because it does 
not agree with the minister of communications that the British backed firm 
of P.G. Makris should be awarded the project.
A tender is announced for the drainage of the Struma-Thessaly valleys. 
Four days later the tender is extended to include irrigation works in the 
above two valleys. Three firms make offers: Two Americans one British.
Hambros makes a firm offer for the provision of a one year overdraft for 
the road scheme in the event that the project is awarded to P.G. Makris.
The coalition cabinet decides to assign the road project to P.G.Makris.
The coalition cabinet ‘decides’ to allocate the reclamation of the Struma 
valley to Monk-Ulen (an American consortium) and the reclamation of the 
Thessaly valley to the Foundation Co.
The coalition cabinet ‘decides’ to allocate the reclamation of the Epirus 
valley to a British firm, Henry Boot & Sons.
1924-1925:
March 31, 1927:
August 27 1927: 
October 29, 1927:
November 25, 1927:
February 7, 1928:
February 11, 1928:
March 27, 1928:
April 20, 1928:
May 12, 1928:
June 1928:
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The coalition's record regarding public works was as follows: In May 1928, it signed a 
contract for the construction of a national network of roads and it announced -without however 
signing any contract and thereby committing itself- future plans regarding land reclamation.
1.1. The National Road Scheme
1.1.1. Basic features and significance
The road scheme was unique in that it was assigned to a Greek contractor - albeit one who 
had close links with foreign business interests. Moreover, it was of a 'national', not a local scale. In 
addition, it was the only large social overhead capital scheme of the interwar period to be 
undertaken on a fixed price, not a cost plus basis. Nevertheless, the contract was long 
remembered as an example to be avoided because it was poorly designed and executed. 
Although half of the estimated expenditure was spent, the net addition to the road mileage was 
less than 3% and not over 25% as had been planned. The project demonstrated that the state 
and domestic entrepreneurship were neither mature enough to free themselves from 
dependence on foreign know-how cum management nor able to carry out an infrastructure 
scheme of national dimensions. In common, with the other large public utilities schemes already 
examined, the government turned to the world capital market for funds. Moreover, as with the 
reclamation of the Vardar valley, a concession for the maintenance of the works was granted but 
never actually applied.
The events surrounding this scheme attest to the growing interest of American capital in 
Greece and its effort to make inroads into what was considered a British preserve. Second, the 
project signals the insecurity of the Greek state and its desire not to provoke the wrath of either 
Britain or the U.S.A. Third, the road issue confirms the development of an intricate web of 
interrelations. Two different but interconnected struggles emerged: one was the antagonism 
between opposing economico-political groups within Greece; the other involved the conflict 
between Greek and foreign interests. Matters became especially complicated as external 
elements permeated the first battle and internal factors influenced the second.
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1.1.2 The problem posed
According to contemporary reports, Greece at the opening of the interwar period had the  ^
wors+ roads in Europe and the lowest concentration both on a percapita and per square kilometre 
basis. As one source put it, "The roads of Greece reflect the poverty of the country in both their 
number and quality".1 The scarcity of roads was particularly apparent in the so called new 
provinces.2 The backward state of her road system was a serious drawback, obstructing the 
creation of a unified national market. In addition, it served to perpetuate the phenomenon 
whereby large segments of the peasantry, were confined to the subsistence sector. With the 
arrival of the refugees, the need for a national road network became more pressing. A large 
number of the refugees were settled in remote areas. In addition, in order to become effective 
from an economic point of view, the land reform and reclamation schemes required that the road 
network be improved and extended. Indeed, for the elimination of the trade gap it was necessary 
to increase agricultural production and to ensure that this larger production would reach the 
market. Due to the mountainous nature of the country, the building of roads was not easy. 
However, it posed fewer technical problems than railway construction. Hence, the decision to 
construct a national road network was intrinsically sound. However, as was the case with the other 
infrastructure schemes, the terms under which the project materialized were far from 'sound'.
1.1.3. The preliminaries to the decision to hold a national tender
The road scheme commenced under the instigation of an obstinate minister of 
communications, loannis Metaxas, who incidentally was the first to apply "development planning" 
in Greece during his rule as dictator from 1936 to 1940.3 Events leading to the realization of the 
project date back to 1924, when P.G. Makris, a paper manufacturer and the representative of 
Shell in Greece, discussed with Prime Minister Michalakopoulos the possibility of the construction 
of a national network of roads. Makris had no direct experience in construction but was associated 
with nine prestigious Greek engineering firms.4 The firm conceived the idea of the road work 
project basically as a means for increasing its sales of Shell products (such as asphalt and petrol) 
”... thus aiming at the indirect profits that would accrue, ultimately, from the establishment of road 
communications and not the direct benefits that would accrue in its capacity of concessionaire
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from the construction part of the work". For example, Makris was also interested in organizing a 
motor car and lorry business in Greece through which it would promote British vehicles.5
Makris was backed both by Shell and Hambros.6 The latter was indeed eager to provide the 
£6,000,000 estimated as required in order to cover the cost of road construction.7 The National 
Bank also supported Makris tacitly because it was generally interested in developing Greece's 
communications network and for the particular reason that it had extensive interests in the firm. 
Notably, one of its top officials (Koryzis) sat on the board of directors and another (Drossopoulos) 
was made chairman of the Makris company. These facts attest to the tight links which the 
country's top banking institution enjoyed with leading Greek entrepreneurs. (See: Book I, 
Section III, Phase Three).
No agreement was concluded under Michalkopoulos who opposed the participation of 
Hambros.8 Throughout the Pangalos regime, Makris continued without success to press for the 
road project.9 It was only during the final days of the coalition, that it succeeded in signing an 
agreement with the government. However, ‘victory’ did not come easily. Metaxas reopened the 
Makris files within weeks of becoming minister.10 He wanted to sign a contract at once- 
presumably because it was the most serious firm. The cabinet not agreeing with such a 
procedure decided to hold a strictly national tender. Never before had international firms been 
precluded from participating in a competition for a large infrastructure project. This 'radical' move 
was based on several assumptions. First, although the scheme was more extensive in scale and 
cost than the other ones being undertaken or discussed at the time, it was thought to be within 
the technical competence of Greek engineers. Second, the construction of a national road 
system could provide a good starting point for the development of Greek know how and 
management. Third, it was stated that a local firm would have more incentive to do a good job, the 
total cost of the works would be lower and the amount of foreign exchange to be spent on the 
scheme would be less.11 Perhaps this was little more than wishful thinking. More significant, a 
national tender concealed an additional motivation not mentioned openly. This was that the state 
desired for nationalistic and military reasons that domestic contractors build and maintain this key 
means of transportation.
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1.1.4. The national tender
The tender for the road scheme was held on October 2 7 ,1927.12 The primary concern of 
the state -as was the case with the previous schemes undertaken- was to find a contractor capable 
of securing the necessary funds to cover the construction expenses. In this instance, the 
bidders were required to arrange the flotation of a £6,000,000 loan to be raised 18 months after 
the conclusion of the contract (so as to allow time for the stabilization plan to be put on a firm basis) 
and provide an advance of a £400,000 to enable the works to start at once. The use of this mode 
of financing, whereby the contractor was forced to arrange financial backing, indicates the extent 
of insecurity felt by the coalition regarding Greece's future borrowing prospects. Obviously, it was 
not yet fully convinced that there would be an easy flow of capital into Greece after stabilization.
Contemporary critics maintained that the tender had been preordained in favour of Makris. 
However, the material at hand shows that Metaxas had to mount a fierce battle in order to 
convince the cabinet to assign the project to Makris.13 Apart from P.G. Makris, three other Greek 
firms submitted bids: The Rallides Bros.; The Cooperative Society of Northern Greece; and 
Prezanis - Kapsambelis & Co. All of these contractors promised to secure the required funds from 
American bankers. Rallides Bros, were backed by Fox Brothers International Corporation. The 
Cooperative Society of Northern Greece presented Taylor & Bros, as their financial backer. 
Prezanis - Kapsambelis declared that Blair & Co. and Chase Securities Co. had promised to make 
a definitive commitment, after the U.S.A. government lifted its war debt embargo on loans to the 
Greek government.14 Incidentally, the British engineering company Henry Boot & Sons also 
made a bid, and reportedly asked for more or less the same remuneration as Makris but the 
cabinet refused to enter negotiations because the firm was not Greek.15 The three Greek 
bidders offered better terms than Makris regarding the cost of construction. Their unit price cost 
analysis and level of remuneration demanded, were closer to the guide figures presented by the 
department of public works than the Makris bid. (Unfortunately the exact figures are not available). 
It was not difficult for Metaxas to put the Cooperative Society of Northern Greece out of the 
picture. It was a small concern with insufficient experience and its banker could not prove that it 
had adequate capital to cover the scheme.16 However, Metaxas found strong resistance in his
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effort to eliminate the other competitors. Both were able to secure the support of more radical 
members of the cabinet who opposed Metaxas on various political issues.17
The battle for the contract unfolded in the following manner. The head of the radical union 
party and minister of agriculture, Alexandras Papanastassiou, on February 7 1928 resigned and 
withdrew his support for the coalition because the cabinet refused to accept his proposal that the 
project should go to Rallides. This firm was involved in a scandal in the ordering of new railway 
wagons during the Pangalos regime and its financial backer, Fox Brothers International 
Corporation, had left incomplete the financing of a public works project in the Soviet Union.18 
With Papanastassiou’s resignation, the Rallides offer became a dead letter. Metaxas' major task 
was now to fight off the Prezanis-Kapsambelis bid. Shortly before the holding of the tender 
Prezanis had filed for default. It also had a reputation for being a slow and poor contractor.19 
However, it was associated with the American road works construction firm Trinidad, and enjoyed 
the active support of the department of public works and the liberal George Papandreou who was 
still a cabinet member.20 More importantly, events seemed to favour Prezanis-Kampsambetis 
when in early February 1928, its financial backer, Blair, came forward with a definitive offer to 
provide the £6,000,000 loan at 2% points above the issue price of the Stabilization Loan 21 This 
was an attractive proposition considering that Hambros had only offered a £6,000,000 ban at an 
issue price equal to that of the Stabilization Loan in support of Makris.22
Unwilling to accept defeat23 Metaxas convinced Makris to undertake the project at a bwer 
level of remuneration and adjust its offer to the guide prices put forward by the department of 
public works of the ministry of communications.24 Furthermore, he gained the support of the 
Venizelist faction -which was the mainstay of the coalition- by exchanging favours. On the one 
hand, Metaxas hurriedly announced on February 11 a competition for land reclamation in the 
Struma and Thessaly valleys. It was a well known fact that the Venizelists were particularly keen to 
see these projects implemented as they complemented the radical land reform already initiated 25 
On the other hand, Metaxas openly supported the stabilization law which was presented to the 
National Assembly for approval by Kafandaris, the Venizelist faction strongman. In addition, 
Metaxas was also able to divert attention away from Blair as during March Hambros came forward
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with a proposal to offer a £1,000,000 one year overdraft to the government for the road works on 
the condition that the project would be awarded to Makris. This undoubtedly gave the Makris 
offer a competitive edge considering that the government had asked the bidders to supply only a 
£400,000 advance.26
Thus, on April 6,1928, Kafandaris, as head of the coalition, decided that the project should 
be awarded to Makris. However, he was reluctant either to make a formal announcement or to 
sign a contract with this firm before ascertaining that the American Congress would not retaliate by 
further withholding ratification of the refugee credits. (See: Book I, Section III, Phase Two). No 
time was lost. On April 11 1928 the Greek ambassador in Washington visited the deputy 
secretary of the Treasury. This visit had two purposes. One was to declare that the government 
intended to award the Struma project to one of the American bidders (i.e. either to The 
Foundation Co. or Monks-Ulen & Co). The other purpose was to enquire whether the American 
government would continue to support granting the refugee credits if the road contract went to 
Makris.27 The meeting held no unpleasant surprises. The ambassador was assured that the 
U.S.A. government had no intention to connect the issue of the refugee credits with the road 
contract. It was pointed out to the Greek minister that the delay in the ratification of the refugee 
ban by Congress was due solely to the desire of the opposition party to attack the government in 
view of the coming elections. However, it was admitted that the awarding of another project(such 
as a land reclamation scheme) to American business would have a favourable impression on 
American public opinion 28 To put it bluntly: the Greeks were told that Makris could have the 
roads if U.S. interests were to be preferred with regard to land improvement. Hambros had 
"strongly" advised Athens against approaching Washington formally on the subject of the road 
contract. It maintained that this was unnecessary because half of the ban capital for the road 
project would be provided by its American associates (i.e. Speyer's and The National City Bank) 
and the Senate Committee's approval of the refugee loan was practicably "as good as ratification". 
Moreover, it warned the government that: "Once you approach Washington in this manner [i.e. 
formally] your freedom of action is entirely lost" What an ironic statement this was considering 
Hambro's persistent 'supervision' over the Greek government!29
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On April 20 1928, i.e. nine days after the Greek ambassador visited the U.S. deputy 
secretary of the Treasury, the government decided to assign the road project to P.G. Makris. It 
must be underlined that the words of the U.S.A. Treasury official, were carefully heeded \of. • 
Thus, one week before signing the contract with Makris, the cabinet announced that the Struma 
project would be assigned to Monks-Ulen.30 Moreover, another 'precautionary' measure was 
taken. The question of who would undertake the long-run financing of the road scheme was left 
open. The coalition apparently feared that if it made a definitive commitment towards Hambros 
Bank at this stage in addition to jeopardizing the approval of the Congress for the refugee credits, 
it would be castigated by the opposition at home 'as selling out to Hambros'. Thus, the contract 
signed on May 18 arranged only for the provision of a temporary advance by Hambros.31
The Greek government was unnecessarily concerned about provoking the wrath of the 
Congress and the U.S.A. government. Though the American ambassador in Greece had 
informed the government of his 'interest' in Blair (the financial backer of Prezanis Kapsambelis), 
Department of State material at hand shows no evidence that the Greek government was 
pressurized to favour either of the American backed contenders for the road project as a 
precondition for the provision of the refugee credits. However, the British minister in Athens 
thought otherwise. He actually maintained that Greece left unsettled the question of who would 
provide the long term bond loan for the roads as a 'sop' to American interests, as by this time it was 
being forcibly represented to the government by the United States Legation and the American 
Banks that Congress might refuse to ratify "2,5 million credits promised for refugee work unless 
preference were given in Greece to American business".32 The claim of the British has been 
taken at face value and in the historiography it has been maintained that the Department of State 
ruthlessly pressured the Greek government.
The following incident described by Metaxas in his Diaries may be illustrative. On December 
29,1927, a Mr. Grossbard vice president of Fox Brothers, (i.e. the bank that had originally backed 
Rallides) visited Metaxas and informed him that his firm was in a position to secure the loan, and 
that the American ambassador in Athens, Skinner, was considering the possibility of making a 
protest. There is no evidence that such a presentation was ever actually made. This episode
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seems to indicate not so much the attitude of the American government, but the wishful thinking 
of an American entrepreneur and the prejudice of the British Ambassador. This entry in the
(r
Metaxas diary has been misread. On the basis of this incidence, Karamanlis in his book on 
Venizelos wrongly construed that the Department of State put intense pressure on the Greek 
government to grant the road project to an American firm!33 To sum up: The handling of the road 
project by the coalition portrays that two types of parameters played an important role in 
determining the policy adopted by the government: these were the overriding desire to keep 
both the U.S.A. and Britain content, and the internal political conflicts which plagued the coalition 
since its inception. The analysis has concentrated on revealing the political games which 
permeated the handling of this project because the relevant economic data are lacking. It is 
almost impossible to make a definitive statement as to whether Makris was the best choice. There 
is no way to check whether the other competitors were indeed as "unreliable" as Metaxas claimed. 
The fierce' competition over the project did political damage in that it increased the internal 
tensions of the coalition and narrowed its political base with the resignation of Papanastassiou. 
Clearly, had it not been for the tender and the fact that the radical elements of the cabinet firmly 
opposed Makris, it is unlikely that the latter would have agreed to the cost per unit price analysis 
specified by the department of public works. Nor would it have agreed to decrease its gross 
remuneration from 31% to 25%. This 'reduced' figure was 'high' in comparison to the 21% 
awarded to the firm Monks-Ulen Co. in December 1928 for the drainage of the Struma valley 34 
But it was low considering that at the time in the Athens area other road works were being carried 
out at a remuneration of 32.60%.35
In concluding, the scheme suffered from a basic disadvantage. Unlike other projects 
undertaken by foreign firms, the contract upon being signed by the government and the builder 
became automatically effective. Law 3034 pertaining to the road tender had specified that 
ra tification by the National Assembly would not be necessary - just as during the 
Pangalos dictatorship! It is probable that the law maker was lenient because the builder would be 
a Greek firm. Regardless, however, of the motives for this exemption, it is clear that had the road 
contract been subjected to parliamentary scrutiny this scheme may have had better results. As
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was exemplified in the case of the new Athens water system, the process of ratification by the 
National Assembly had positive ramifications as it gave the state a direct opportunity to improve 
the terms of the contract.
1.1.5. The implementation of the scheme
Makris lacked the sufficient experience of carrying out a project of this dimension, and that 
the government handled this project in a highly ad hoc fashion. Improvisation was excessive. 
Part of the problem lay in that no detailed specifications had been drawn up in advance regarding 
the length of the roads and the exact location of the main trunk routes and branches. Indeed, 
confusion existed as to how many kilometres of road were to be constructed. The figures 
mentioned were between 2,500 and 4,000 klms, thereby representing a 25-40% net addition to 
the existing network.36 The contract was specific only insofar as it stated that the work would 
have to be completed in six years and that the first 1,760 klms must be ready in three years.
The actual record was abominable. Although Makris duly started constructing 1,560 klms 
after four years (i.e. by the end of 1932 it had completed only 300 klms). A notable waste of funds 
occurred although the contract was of a unit price type. It was the case -as in fact it is today- that 
the ministry of communications agreed periodically to make adjustments to higher prices.37 
Apparently, the remaining 1,260 klms on which the builder had started work were never actually 
finished. Not only was the net addition to the road system of marginal significance, it also 
consisted of unconnected stretches of roads scattered all over the country. Political 
considerations predominated. It was by no coincidence that 135 out of the 300 klms actually 
completed were on Crete which happened to be the birthplace of Venizelos 38 It is apparent that 
the criteria for the allocation of government funds remained only in part technical and economic. 
The political ethos of the past was still alive. For in the 19th century those areas that got roads 
were the ones that had the more famous politicians in Greece 39 More emphasis should have 
been laid on completing the Macedonian section of the road network because in this part of 
Greece a large number of new villages were being set up in order to settle the refugees. In 
addition, the reclamation of the Vardar and Struma valleys required that the new production areas 
be linked with the urban centers in order to contribute to the economic development of Greece. 
By 1931, the government was not pleased with the performance of the contractor. Thus, on July
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8,1931, the remuneration of the contractor (i.e. fee and the general expenses) was lowered from 
25% to 21% of the cost of the works. Nineteen months later, in February 1933 the state annulled 
the contract altogether on the grounds that the builder: had failed to provide the necessary loan 
capital; was working at a slow pace; had poorly organized the project; and was wasting funds. P.G 
Makris refused to accept the annulment. Finally, in July 1934, a revised contract was signed. The 
remuneration was lowered to 16.5% of the cost of the works; the total length of roads to be 
completed was lowered from 4,000 to 1,760 klms; and the contractor resigned from the 
concession that had been granted to it in the original contract to maintain the roads for a period of 
15-25 years.40
In short, as initially planned the project had a bigger estimated expenditure and a grander 
geographical scale than the other infrastructure schemes on which the government embarked 
during the interwar period. Moreover, the anticipated multiplier effect on the National Income was 
higher. The contractor being a Greek firm a higher percentage of the capital spent would stay in 
the country (i.e. there would be fewer leakages). By definition being a labour intensive scheme, it «• 
was expected to play a substantial role in reducing unemployment. The slow pace of the works is 
indicated by the fact that the annual employment of workers on the construction site did not 
surpass 15,000 men although it had been estimated before the works began that for the duration 
of the works, 40-50,000 labourers would be employed.41 Infact, together with the railway project 
of General Pangalos it proved the most disappointing scheme of our period of study. Although 
87% of the estimated expenditure was spent less than 10% of the planned kilometres were 
completed. (See Table 1).
Once again, the government was attacked by the opposition and the press for the manner 
in which a public work scheme was being carried out42 Greece's foreign observers were also 
highly critical. In particular, they had expressed disapproval that the planned roads would not link 
the rural (agricultural and mining) producer areas with urban centers of consumption and ports. 
Instead emphasis was laid on building a main trunk primarily geared towards the development of 
the tourist industry! According to the R.I.I.A. the Greek road project proved to be far more 
unsystematic than similar schemes being undertaken at the time by foreign capital in other Balkan 
countries.43 We must add, however, that it was also far more unsystematic than the other 
infrastructure schemes undertaken in Greece during our period of study.
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Table 1
I. Length of roads to be constructed as stated in the contract:
II. Length of roads actually completed by the end of 1932:
III. Length of roads being constructed but not completed by the end of 
1932:
4,000 klms? 
300 kirns
1,572 klms1
IV. Estimated cost of the project:
V. Amount spent on the project up to the end of 1932:
5,000,0002
£4,354,995
VI. (V) as a % of (IV): 87%
VII. Amount covered from the two productive works loans:
VIII. Amount covered from the Speyer's and N.B.G. advances: 
IX Amount covered from the state budget:
£1,308,000 
£ 871,547 
£2,175,448®
(IX) asa%(V): 50%
1 About 460 klms were semi dug out roads, 892 klms were dug out but had not been laid with gravel or tar, 
and 220 klms had been laid with gravel but had not been tarred. Indeed, as late as 1939, only 296 klms of 
roads in Greece were tar-macadam, bituminous concrete or asphalt-surfaced concrete roads. Source: 
Naval Intelligence Division, Geographical Handbook Series. Greece. (London, 1944), Vol. II, pp.314-315. 
2The estimated cost is derived by the following reasoning: a) the contractor claimed that it needed a 
£6,000,000 loan; b) the contractor also claimed that this loan would have the same price of issue as the 
Stabilization Loan (i.e. 86%). That is the net produce of this loan for the government and the contractor 
would be approximately £5,000,000. Since this sum was to be spent exclusively on the scheme, we deduct 
that it was equivalent equal to the estimated cost.
3This amount was provided in drachmae and not foreign exchange.
Sources: Compiled from G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1932. (Athens, 1933), pp.297- 
298. Also, G.L.H.A./D.A.: File 37 (28) "Capitaux disposes hors du budget-produit d'emprunt productif 6% 
1931" and "Avance sur I'emprunt productif par la banque Speyer” and "Avance par la Banque Nationale de 
Grece sur I' emprunt productif".
Before closing, a few words should be added regarding the mode of financing. In the 
contract Makris signed with the government, on May 18,1928, it was agreed that Hambros Bank 
would provide a temporary advance of £400,000 to make possible the immediate 
commencement of the works.44 (Hambros conveniently forgot the offer it had made in March to 
offer a £1,000,000 overdraft). Moreover, it was specified that the contractor would in the near 
future, secure the flotation of £6,000,000 bonds on the international capital market under terms 
equal to those of the Stabilization Loan. The question of who would float the loan was not 
settled, although it was assumed that it would be Hambros.45 The advance was granted in 
August 1928, but no special road loan followed. Instead, 30% of the expenditure was covered 
from the two general purpose public work loans raised abroad under the Venizelos government in 
1928 and 1931. The other 70% was met by the state budget (see Table 1). Hence, once again 
the government had been over-optimistic about its ability to attract the foreign capital required for 
a public works scheme.
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1.2. The Land Reclamation Programme
As mentioned above on February 11 1928, Metaxas announced an international tender for 
the drainage of the Struma and the Thessaly valleys. Four days later a clause was inserted in the 
tender for irrigation works as well. There were three contenders. One was the American 
'syndicate' of Monks-Ulen which was financially backed by Seligman. (Let it be reminded that 
Ulen's collaborator - The Bank of Athens was the representative of Seligman in Greece). Ulen, by 
combining with Monks gave itself the guise of a 'new concern'. Thereby, it hoped to avoid 
appearing as trying to establish a monopolistic presence in Greece. The second contender was 
The Foundation Co.,46 which presented Blair & Co. as its financial backer. In 1925, this contractor 
had agreed to exclusive cooperation with Hambros. (Book II, Section I, Chapter 2, 2.5.) 
Apparently however, Hambros had concluded a working arrangement with Blair & Co.-the terms of 
which are not known 47 The Foundation Co. did not appear alone in this bid. It combined with the 
Greek engineering firm "Ergoliptiki Societe Generate d' Enterprises Technique M.A. 
Diamantopoulos & Cie." in the belief that if it cooperated with local capital, the government would 
be more favourably disposed to its offer. It intended to either obtain the contract in Ergoliptiki's 
own name "or thru a special company organized for this purpose" under its entire control.46 The 
third contender was the British firm, Henry Boot & Sons which was backed by Helbert Wagg and 
Co. Unlike Monks-Ulen or The Foundation Co. this contractor had no previous experience in 
Greece. However, one of its directors, Sir George Armstrong, was familiar in Greece because he 
had shown an interest in lending funds to the government during the Asia Minor Campaign and 
undertaking the construction of the railway scheme in 1925 49
Table 2
The Terms Offered in the Tender for the Struma and Thessaly Valleys Versus the Contract
for the Struma Valley
(a)
G eneral
E xpenses
(b)
Fee (a)+(b) Advance
Issue
P rice
Monks- Ulen 14.75 % 12% 28.52% $1 mill. 88%
The Foundation 12 % 14% 27.68% $2mill. 86%
Boot 12 % 9% 21 % $4mill. unspecified
Contract 11.63 % 10%’ 21.63% -- —
Compiled from: B.MA/.A., File 66, document titled: The drainage works of Struma, Phillipi, Thessally, 
Epirus, etc.'.
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The technical and a financial committees set up by the government to study the three 
proposals reported "unanimously in favour of Boots" and as a result Metaxas recommended to 
the cabinet that the schemes under consideration be awarded to this British firm. The strong 
points of the Boot offer compared to those made by the American contractors were twofold. 
General expenses cum fee charged were substantially lower and the advance it was willing to 
grant was higher. (See Table 2 above)
Nevertheless, in May the cabinet -presumably because it was insecure about the American 
refugee credits- decided to divide these two projects among the two American contestants.50 
What is peculiar is that the larger of the two schemes (i.e. the Struma valley) was allotted to Monks- 
Ulen although The Foundation Co. demanded a lower remuneration, and also proposed to 
undertake the project on a unit cost basis (regie cointeresse). The experience gained with the 
Vardar valley project gave it a competitive edge in the sense that it was the only contractor 
confident enough to depart from a cost-plus framework. It is plausible to make the assumption 
that the government thought, that if it granted either both schemes or the larger one to The 
Foundation Co., it would be accused at home as being a 'slave' to the interests of the N.B.G. and 
one specific multinational. (As mentioned above Ulen by combining with Monks took the 
appearance of a 'new' concern).
The coalition after having divided the two projects between the U.S. bidders made a 
manoeuvre in order not to totally alienate British interests. In early June, about one month before 
leaving office, the cabinet formally announced that Henry Boot & Sons would be assigned the 
reclamation of the Epirus valley. Notably reclamation work in this small valley had not been 
included in the February tender.51 In the last analysis, the decision of the cabinet to allocate the 
Thessaly valley to The Foundation Co. and the Epirus valley to Boot is of academic interest only, 
as no contracts were concluded. We cannot possibly know whether, had the coalition stayed in 
power for a longer length of time, it would have carried this decision out. To phrase it in other 
words, this episode is also a good example of the simple fact that the Greek government did not • 
primarily base its decision making regarding the materialization of public works on economico- 
technical criteria.
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Chapter 2
The Question of Public Work Financing
2.1. American Bankers 'Discover* Greece
No loan for public works was raised during the coalition's term in office. However, soon after 
Pangalos' fall American banks began to show an interest in providing financial backing for various 
projects. Up till then American bankers had been content to play a secondary role in two 
syndicated loans (the 5% Loan of 1914 and the First Refugee Loan of 1924) raised by British 
houses. The circumstances surrounding the post-Pangalos spurt of interest on the part of 
American financiers are of special significance for two reasons. First, they attest that the State 
Department did not -at least at this point of time- promote in an aggressive manner U.S.A. banking 
interests in Greece.1 Second, they are indeed 'peculiar' considering that American capital 
(banking or corporate) did not in the end participate in the financing of the two large 'land 
development' schemes assigned to American contractors. (The reclamation of the Vardar valley, 
and the drainage of the Struma valley). It is ironic that the first and last public work to be financed 
partly by American capital was the Athens water system. Notably, the funds had been provided by 
the American contractor, not by a U.S. bank.
The first U.S. banking firm to show an interest in financing infrastructure development in 
Greece was Speyers. This company had been brought into Greek affairs by Hambros Bank in 
1924 at the time of the flotation of the First Refugee Loan on the understanding that it play a 
secondary role and not act independently. However, in August 1926, one month after the 
downfall of Pangalos it "betrayed" its British colleague, and contemplated providing a 
$15,000,000 short term loan to the Greek government. This would be used to complete the 
settlement of the refugees, retire Ulen & Co. bonds, repay the $2,000,000 advance from The 
Foundation Co., and advance the construction of the Athens water system and reclamation work 
in the Vardar valley.
This Speyer offer did not materialize. The government, even if it had wanted to float such a 
loan, could not have proceeded, largely because of the unofficial "war debt embargo" imposed by 
the State Department.2 On receiving notice of Speyer's intention to issue the loan, the State
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Department declared that "for reasons of national interests" it could not "view with favour any 
Greek flotation in the United States".3 This was sufficient to kill the project. Notification to the 
State Department during the twenties was a routine procedure for U.S. banks engaged in foreign 
loan negotiations. Though the Department did not 'initiate' foreign investments "no instance has 
been revealed of any public financing being undertaken against the State Department's 
wishes".4
During 1927, although the State Department continued its ban on the flotation of Greek 
securities, eight other American banks entered into negotiations with the Greek government to 
finance public works. They were Blair & Co., J.W.Seligman & Co., Chase Securities Co., 
Harrisson H. Wheaton Inc., W. Harriman & Co., International Acceptance Bank, Chase National 
Bank, and P.W. Chapman & Co.5 The archival material reveals that the first two bankers made bids 
to finance the reclamation of the Struma and Thessaly valleys.
Not surprisingly, Hambros Bank was highly displeased with the unexpected surge in 
American competition. Sir Eric Hambro took it fo r granted that his firm  would be 
responsib le fo r financing all Greek government in frastructure  projects, it was
Hambro's perception that other banks (British, American or of whatever other nationality) would be 
called to participate in such flotations for public works only in the event and to the extent that 
Hambros thought it necessary. Sir Eric's intention was to put this plan into practice after the City 
lifted its war debt embargo and after the Treasury and the Financial Committee of the League 
completed their stabilization plan in Greece. By the spring of 1928 U.S. competition had become 
more apparent as a result of the lifting of the war debt embargo in January 1928 by the State 
Department. (See Book I, Section III, Chapter 2,2.2.1.)
However, as will be shown below, although Athens wanted to relieve itself from financial 
dependence on London, in the end Sir Eric was victorious and managed to oust his American 
competitors from the scene.
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2.2. Hambros Initially Unsuccessful Attempt to Ward Off the American Challenge During 
the First Half of 1928
Chronological Summary
The Stabilization Loan is floated.
Charles Hambro puts forward to the coalition an offer to provide an 
overdraft for the road network and the Vardar valley.
The coalition cabinet decides to assign the financing of the Struma 
reclamation project to the American firm W.Seligman & Co..
The Bank of Greece begins operating, and the de jure stabilization of the 
drachma is established.
The coalition signs a contract with the Greek firm of P.G. Makris for the 
construction of a national network of roads. Hambros provides a 
temporary advance of £400,000 in order to make possible the immediate 
commencement of the works. No decision is taken regarding the long­
term financing of the project.
Seligman makes an offer for a temporary overdraft for the road scheme 
and the Vardar valley which has better terms than those offered by 
Hambros Bank.
Sections are held and Venizelos becomes Prime Minister. During his first 
days in power he declares that he will break the Hambros monopoly in 
Greece.
Venizelos decides that the government should raise a comprehensive long 
term bond loan which will cover the required expenditures for the Vardar 
valley and all the new projects to begin (i.e. the road construction, Struma 
valley.) The Prime Minister, promises to the American firm Seligman that it 
will raise the total sum of this bond loan (i.e. £15,000,000).
2.2.1. Introductory comments
Post stabilization public borrowing for infrastructure development began with the First
Public Works Loan of December 1928, floated by Hambros. The developments leading to the
conclusion of this loan were particularly complicated. Hambros encountered keen competition
from American financiers. Infact, up till two months before the loan was raised (i.e. October 1928),
it appeared more or less certain that bonds would be placed through U.S. houses.
In the battle that developed between American and British financial interests, the Greek
government was confused and uncertain as to its position. Indeed, the evidence leads us to
conclude that the government was basically a passive observer of the warfare enacted before its 
very own eyes. The state was torn between two rivals. One was composed of the Bank of Athens
and Seligman. The other consisted of the National Bank of Greece and Hambros. The weakness
of the state vis a vis two antagonistic banking groups has been neglected in the existing literature
which maintains that the state was a competent diplomat and actively exploited Anglo American
January 1928: 
April 1928:
May 12, 1928:
May 14, 1928:
May 18, 1928:
Juna 1928:
July 4, 1928: 
Mid July, 1928:
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rivalry for its own advantage.6 Moreover, the literature fails to notice that the Anglo-American 
rivalry was connected in a subtle way with an internal conflict, namely antagonism between the 
Bank of Athens and the National Bank of Greece. Politics cannot be separated from economics 
and the position of the state towards foreign capital was primarily a function of internal politico- 
economic considerations rather than foreign policy pressures.
2.2.2. The facts
At the beginning of 1928 Hambros was engulfed by preparations for the flotation of the 
Stabilization Loan. However, in view of the increasing interest of American financiers in Greece - 
as had been aptly demonstrate by the road work and land reclamation tenders- the merchant bank 
was also deliberating how to outdo American competition in the field of public work financing. 
This was no small affair, considering that the estimated total expenditure was around 
£18,000,000.
Hambros was able to participate in the road tender by backing the firm of P.G. Makris. 
However, regarding the international competition for the two reclamation projects it remained 
effectively an outsider. Reportedly as a rear-guard defensive action it had made some kind of 
working arrangement with Blair, the financial backer of The Foundation Co. which was one of the 
main bidders for these two schemes. Hambros was not pleased, by the thought that it would not 
finance the two reclamation projects costed at approximately £8,000,000. In addition, it was 
disturbed by the prospect that the coalition might float the loan for these two schemes in the 
immediate future. At this point Hambros appeared to believe that the government should not 
resort to large scale foreign borrowing for about twelve months in order to allow the international 
capital markets time to absorb the Stabilization bonds.7 One might ask why Hambros did not 
mobilize the League, the Bank of England and the I.F.C. to ’defend' Greece's credit.
However, Hambros did not remain totally passive. The Bank offered to provide together 
with what it called its American group -i.e. Speyer's and the National City Bank- an overdraft of 
£1,000,000.8 This sum would be sufficient to enable the government to carry on the Vardar 
valley reclamation scheme without resorting to the world financial market for one year.9 That
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Hambros presented the overdraft proposal as a joint Anglo-American proposal is a good example 
of the flexibility and realism that it at times showed while pursuing its strategy towards Greece. 
Hambros reached the decision to present its offer as a joint Anglo-American and not a pure 
‘Anglo’ affair presumably for two reasons. It did not want to risk the possibility that these bankers 
might again strive for an autonomous presence in Greece given that during the previous eighteen 
months Speyers and the N.C.B. had developed an interest in financing Greek public work 
schemes. Furthermore, Hambros was well aware that the government would be favourably 
disposed towards a joint Anglo-American proposal for two reasons. The American Congress had 
not yet ratified the agreement for the provision of the refugee credits and Hambros Bank was 
unpopular among members of the cabinet and the radical opposition. Meanwhile, in late March, 
Charles Hambro offered to provide an additional £1,000,000 overdraft for the road works, on the 
condition that the project would be awarded to P.G. Makris. As indicated above, the timing of this 
‘second’ proposal shows that Hambros wanted to assist Makris and create for it a comparative 
advantage vis a vis the other chief competitor-Prezanis Kapsambelis.10 Hambro was not 
interested in making an extraordinary pecuniary benefit from the twin £2,000,000 overdrafts. 
Indeed, the price asked for the two combined overdrafts (which would be amalgamated into one 
loan) was a ‘fair’ one. Roughly speaking the interest rate (plus commission) would amount to 
6.5%.11 This merchant banker saw the overdraft primarily as a mechanism by which it could tie the 
hands of the Greek government and restrict its freedom to raise loan capital from other financiers 
for all of the projects for which no financing arrangements had yet been made.
That this was Hambro's ultimate intention is revealed from the type of demands made 
regarding security for, and repayment of, the loan. Specifically, Hambros demanded that the 
government pledge for the duration of the advance all unissued bonds of the 1914 loan. It was 
no secret at the time that the only guarantee the government possessed in order to conclude 
short term advances were these bonds which had a market value of approximately £4,500,000.12 
A pledge of only a part of these bonds would have been more than sufficient to back the 
advance. However, Hambros wanted to tie up the whole issue and so deprive the government of
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the possibility of using the balance to raise foreign capital from other bankers for the Struma - 
Thessaly reclamation projects or for any other purpose.
As for the mode of repayment, Hambros wished to follow a procedure usual for Merchant 
Bankers.13 Namely, he demanded in return for providing this short term advance that the 
government at the end of one year roll up the £2,000,000 short-term advance and incorporate it 
with a larger issue which would be large enough to cover the twin overdrafts, and the cost of the 
Vardar valley and the road works for an additional two more years.14
The government was theoretically given two options. It could either assign to Hambros the 
flotation of a long term bond loan or it could dispense with a public emission and allow the bank to 
purchase the unissued bonds of the 1914 loan.15 However, a careful look at the draft agreement 
prepared by Hambros shows that it seemed to prefer the first option.16 The coalition cabinet 
approved the Hambros twin overdraft proposal, (i.e. that a £2,000,000 advance be granted for 
the Vardar valley and the road scheme) On May 14 1928, it presented to Parliament a draft bill 
which described in detail the terms of the offer.17 The parliamentary debates and the 
deliberations of the parliamentary committee, set up to examine the draft bill demonstrate that it 
was basically those progressive deputies who had criticized Makris' bid for the road project who 
now objected to the Hambros advance.18
Criticism focused on the fact that Hambros wanted to pose serious limitations on the 
government's freedom to borrow. Indeed, the minister of finance, Kafandaris, was caught in a 
difficult position when he was asked in Parliament how the schemes for the reclamation of the 
Struma, Thessaly, and Epirus valleys "were to be financed temporarily so as to get work started at 
once" considering that the only available backing for an advance, i.e. the bonds of the 1914 loan, 
were to be used as security exclusively for the Hambros overdrafts for the road scheme and the 
drainage of the Vardar valley.19 The intention to  tie  the hands o f the government 
became all the more apparent as time went by. Notably, in the contract prepared while 
the parliamentary committees were deliberating the draft bill, Hambros rephrased some of the 
terms in such a manner so as to increase its power to control future government long-term foreign 
financing. The most blatant provision was that it inserted a totally new clause without consulting
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the minister of finance. This was that Nif and so long as any term of this Agreement remains 
unfulfilled" -i.e for the duration of the advance- the government could not "without the consent of 
the Banks [i.e. Hambros, Eriangers, Speyer & Co., and The National City Bank of New York] raise 
any external loan."20
In view of the resistance to the draft bill for the advances in the National Assembly, Hambros 
in mid June came up with the suggestion that it extend the duration of the overdrafts from twelve 
months to eighteen months and increase their value from £2,000,000 to £3,000,000. The aim 
being that the additional £1,000,0000 would be used for the reclamation of Struma, Thessaly and 
Epirus. However, this ‘new’ offer did not sway the National Assembly. The latter rejected it on the 
grounds that it would be scandalous if Hambros were allowed to get involved in the financing of 
other projects in addition to the road scheme and the reclamation of the Vardar valley. Moreover, 
Monks-Ulen, and Boots openly declared that they did not view Hambro's new proposal favourably 
as they had their own financial backers 21 It must be reminded that by this stage the coalition had 
decided to assign the reclamation of the Struma valley to Monks-Ulen, and that of Epirus to 
Boots.22 In the end, the twin overdraft was not approved. The National Assembly refrained from 
voting on the draft bill and on June 20, 1920 Hambros withdrew its offer.23 Consequently, 
because the twin overdraft was not furnished, in August 1928 Hambros provided jointly with 
Eriangers and Samuel & Co. the £400,000 advance it had undertaken to supply within the 
context of the contract that the government had signed with Makris for the road scheme on May
18. This credit was to be repaid over a period of four years at 8% - a rather high rate. But, the 
terms posed did not restrict the government's freedom to conclude further foreign loans. Neither 
was the government obliged to offer the unissued bonds of the 1914 loan as security.24
This whole affair underlines certain interesting aspects of the role played by the various 
institutions regarding the inflow of foreign capital. First, it highlights that contrary to what has been 
argued in the literature, the National Assembly was not a passive observer of the phenomenon of 
foreign capital inflow. Up to this point in the dissertation we have seen how this institution 
‘assisted’, through the ratification process, the government to impose on foreign capital terms that 
were more advantageous for Greece. In this instance we have seen how the Assembly blocked
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the advance altogether.25 Second, it reveals the insecurity and lack of sincerity of the 
government. The latter wished to hide from the public the fact that it was a weak partner in its 
dealings with foreign capital. To be specific, in public the coalition stated that on its own initiative 
it proceeded with direct negotiations with Hambros for the provision of an overdraft.26 But, the 
above was not true. The idea for the provision of the overdraft was Hambro's. Third, the affair is a 
good example of the close relationship that had developed between the National Bank fo Greece 
and Hambros Bank. The National Bank morally backed the proposal for the advance and also 
transmitted to the government the details of Hambros offer. Once again the N.B.G. was called 
upon to act as the representative of British interests vis a vis the Greek government. It should be 
remarked that Charles Hambro in March 1928 visited the Greek minister of Finance together with 
the governor of the National Bank. After Charles departure the N.B.G. carried out the necessary 
negotiations with the government on behalf of Hambros. The wording of the telegram sent by 
Hambros regarding the firm offer made for the advance is interesting as it indicates that it treated 
the National bank as an 'appointed agent'. Therein Hambros stated to the National Bank of 
Greece: "We authorize you to present to the Greek government our firm offer...". But, it is equally 
obvious that the National Bank was not a passive "go between", and that it tried to convince 
Hambros to be more flexible in its demands 27 Finally, this incident also confirms the tight links 
that Hambros enjoyed with Greece's formal supervisors. A good indication of this is that Finlayson 
(the advisor appointed at the newly founded central bank - the Bank of Greece- by the League of 
Nations) prepared a memo in which he underlined that the government should accept the twin 
overdraft offered by Hambros.28
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SECTION III
PUBLIC WORKS UNDER THE GOLD EXCHANGE STANDARD REGIME
(mid 1928-early 1932)
Introductory Comments
Less than three months after stabilization was attained, Venizelos, the outstanding Greek 
statesman of the interwar period and an enthusiastic supporter of infrastructure development, 
returned to power. He stayed in office for four years-which was a remarkable feat for a Greek 
politician! (Between November 1922 and Venizelos' advent to power in July 1928 there had 
been 10 different cabinets). Seen in a larger compass, at long last, in 1928 the country joined the 
new postwar international order. Hence, the obvious question is why foreign capital inflow for 
public work development under the gold exchange standard regime was below the expectation 
and relatively insignificant in comparison with the experience of other similar countries? A number 
of factors were responsible for this 'disappointing' development. It is obvious that Greece 
stabilized too late in order to reap the full benefit of the large international capital movements of 
the twenties. Already by 1928, there was a net flow of capital from Europe to the U.S.A. 
American capital was beginning to loose interest in European investments and the unfolding of 
the World economic crisis was approaching. It is also the case that the stabilization plan did not 
have the expected impact (end results) because Venizelos acted in a haphazard (ad hoc) manner 
with respect to the expansion and modernization of the country's infrastructure and 'unwittingly' 
scared away foreign capital. He made two mistakes. First, immediately upon stepping into office 
he began to antagonize Greece's foreign supervisors on issues of a financial nature. Pointedly, 
he wanted to alter certain of the terms of the September 1928 Geneva Protocol. (For details see: 
Book I, Section III, Phase Three, 1). Also, in December 1928 he made it known to the
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market that there would be a steady flow of new issues, as the government intended to borrow a 
total of £22,000,000 for public works over the next five years! An additional negative factor was 
that Hambros in its urge to dominate the Greek scene 'unintentionally' damaged Greek 
creditworthiness in December 1928. (See Book II, Section III, Chapter 2).
This dissertation argues that already by early 1929 the inflow of foreign capital had become 
problematic as a result of the mistakes made by Venizelos and Hambros. The literature has 
completely overlooked this factor. In its overall superficial reference to the phenomenon of the 
poststabilization capital inflow it has overestimated the negative impact which the world economic 
crisis had on the performance of the public works programme.1 To put it in a nutshell, though 
undoubtedly the world economic crisis may have dealt the final blow, a careful study of the facts 
reveals that it was neither the sole nor the original causal factor responsible for the lack of the 
necessary funds.
The Economic 'Philosophy' of Venizelos
In terms of the thesis, Venizelos' economic philosophy is of particular interest. His ultimate 
goal was that Greece achieve political autonomy vis a vis the 'Powers. Although he had a less 
than rudimentary grasp of economics, he realized that unless the country rid itself of the chronic 
structural disequilibrium in the balance of payments, political autonomy would never be attained. 
It was within this context that he embraced and proclaimed self-sufficiency in basic goods. Thus, 
Venizelos perceived economic autarky not as an end in itself -he was no isolationist- but rather as 
a means that would allow Greece to be treated as an ‘equal’ by the powerful.
The road towards self-sufficiency, according to Venizelos required a massive inflow of 
foreign capital. Only thus would the country be able to maximize the full potential of its resources. 
For as he put it back in 1910 "Greece is not poor it is unexploited". This statement came into 
contrast with the conventional wisdom of the day which was utterly defeatist.2 Venizelos tried to 
carry out his vision right after WWI. In January 1919 he announced that a state-directed public 
works programme (manifesto) would be undertaken by foreign capital in order to enhance the 
agricultural and industrial development of the country. It would concentrate on three types of 
activity: the extension of the cultivable land area- along the lines of the Italian 'Bonifica integrale', 
the improvement of the transportation network, and the exploitation of the country's energy
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resources. The specific schemes planned were: the reclamation of the Vardar, Struma, and 
Thessaly valleys; the provision of a water work system for Athens and Salonika; the production of 
hydroelectric power in Western Macedonia and Central Greece; the improvement of the ports of 
Pireaus, Salonika, and Patras; and the building of a railway line connecting Kavala and Drama. 
Venizelos also had in mind the experimental drilling of oil wells and coal mines in various areas of 
Greece. He discussed with French and British firms the possibility of undertaking the projects but 
no final agreements were reached, and interest in this ambitious program was tost as the Greek 
government eventually engulfed itself in the Asia Minor Campaign.3 Indeed, the unfortunate 
concurrence of this military expedition provokes us into the realm of counterfactual history: it 
would be interesting to consider what might have happened had the resources devoted to the 
Asia Minor Campaign (which approximately amounted to £140,000,000) been applied to the 
Venizelos programme - manifesto). (Table 1) When Venizelos returned to office in 1928, his 
predecessors had already begun the implementation of a part of this programme, namely, the 
Athens water works, the reclamation of the Vardar valley, the improvement of the port of Pireaus, 
and the extension of Greece's communication network. It is ironic that during his four year stay in 
office, Venizelos managed to begin only one more project, the reclamation of the Struma valley. 
Moreover, it is notable that he was not able to complete either the latter nor the other schemes 
that had begun before 1928. The problem was of a twin nature- poor planning and a lack of 
funds. Only after WWII would these projects take full shape.
Table 1
Average Daily Cost of the Asia Minor War* 
in million drachmae
Year Daily Cost
1919 2,8
1920 3,5
1921 6,8
1922 8,0
1923 6,5
‘These estimates were made by British embassy in Athens. By extrapolation the total cost in pounds was 
approximately £140,000,000.
Compiled from, History of the Greek Nation. Vol. IE, p.300.
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Venizelos' performance - considering his initial grandiose vision- was indeed poor. The 
historiography has failed to assess in an objective manner his overall contribution to the public 
works programme. At the one extreme, it is argued that the interwar infrastructure projects was 
the sole creation of Venizelos. This is wrong for as has been shown above, though he was the 
first to visualize a grandiose public works program, it turned out that a large part of what was 
actually carried out started before his 1928-1932 term in office. At the other extreme, it is 
maintained that all he did was to continue what his predecessors had started. But this as well is a 
misinterpretation of the facts because it fails to recognize that Venizelos was the one who back in 
1919 provided the inspiration for what was to follow.4
Chapter 1
The 'Rebellious' Opening: Venizelos Versus Hambros
Chronological Summary
June 20, 1928: Hambros withdraws its offer for an overdraft(s).
June 1928: Seligman makes an offer for a temporary overdraft for the road scheme
and the Vardar valley which has better terms than those offered by 
Hambros Bank.
July 4, 1928: Elections are held and Venizelos becomes Prime Minister. During his first
days in power he declares that he will break the Hambros monopoly in 
Greece.
Mid July, 1928: Venizelos decides that the government should raise a comprehensive long
term bond loan which will cover the larger part of the required expenditures 
for the Vardar valley and all the new projects to begin (i.e. the road 
construction, Struma valley). The Prime Minister promises to the 
American firm Seligman that it will raise the total sum of this bond loan (ii.e. 
£15,000,000).
Venizelos upon returning to power in early July 1928, vowed that under his leadership the 
government would become more assertive in its dealings with foreign capital. The new Premier 
was highly critical of his predecessors handling of Greece's external economic relations.1 He 
accused them of having settled the French war debt on unfavourable terms, and for conferring on 
Hambros the privilege of becoming the Greek state's ‘exclusive’ supplier of foreign loan capital. 
Clearly, Venizelos spoke as if a ‘closed relation' had been established between previous 
governments and the bank prior to his return to power.2 But, this was not the case. Out of a total
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of £27,200,000 provided by the international capital market between September 1922 and July 
1928, only £11,000,000 had been raised by Hambros and its associates. The remainder had 
been procured from twelve other sources.3 However, the Premier was accurate in so far as the 
government had depended heavily on the merchant bank for the provision of loan capital through 
public flotations. Notably, 90% of the funds raised in this manner prior to Venizelos return to 
office were issued through Hambros and its ‘American associates’.4
The new Premier maintained that he was determined to diversify the origins of capital inflow 
and rid Greece of Hambros' tutelage.5 It was for this reason, that within a few days of stepping into 
office he rushed into negotiations with J.W. Seligman. This American bank was now offering to 
furnish at once a £2,500,000 short term advance at the same interest rate as Hambros (i.e. 6.5%). 
However, it did not require from the government to provide the 1914 unissued bonds as 
security.6 In addition, Seligman proposed to grant at the end of 1928 a $20,000,000 long-term 
loan for public works at a rate of interest and price of issue identical to the Stabilization Loan.7
Venizelos found appealing the idea of raising a general public works loan on the American 
market with a banker who had no connection with Hambros. He was so enthused that by July he 
convinced Seligman to increase the scope of the issue to $30,000,000. The latter agreed 
although it was uneasy about whether the American market could absorb such a large Greek 
flotation in one issue.8 The amounts that had been floated up to then for the Greek government 
in the U.S.A. had been substantially smaller. Notably, $11,000,000 for the First Refugee Loan of 
1924 raised by Speyer & Co., and $17,000,000 for the Stabilization Loan of 1928 floated by 
Speyer & Co. and the National City Bank.
The fact that Venizelos appeared to be on the verge of striking a deal with Seligman 
perturbed Hambros. The latter had not lost interest in Greek finance. Infact, shortly before the 
coalition government fell it declared itself willing to reopen negotiations any time, and to 
undertake part or all of the financing for infrastructure development. A matter which particularly 
annoyed Hambros was that it might loose the opportunity of financing the road scheme in which it 
already had a vested interest. It was obvious that if Venizelos raised a general purpose loan with 
Seligman the roads scheme would be included.9
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The preference shown towards Seligman, brought Venizelos into direct confrontation with 
the strongest element of the Greek financial establishment- the National Bank of Greece. In 
particular, what the N.B.G. feared most, was the possibility that if the government made a deal with 
Seligman, it would be inclined to assign the reclamation of the Struma and Thessaly valleys to 
Monks- Ulen. For by an unfortunate coincidence, this firm had presented Seligman as its financial 
backer in the bid held in February 1928. The National Bank of Greece wanted the two schemes to 
be awarded to the other American contestant, namely The Foundation Co.10 Indeed, the N.B.G. 
as a member of the Hellenic Construction Co., stood to make a direct profit in the event that these 
projects were awarded to this firm.
Under the circumstances, for the first time since 1925, the Bank of Athens, the country's 
second largest commercial bank was on center stage. Notably, J. Eliasco (the general manager of 
the Bank of Athens) -in his function as 'informal' representative of Seligman in Greece- was the 
key figure in the negotiations held between Venizelos and this American banker. The National 
Bank of Greece although it was excluded from the negotiations, kept a close eye on them and 
undertook to inform Hambros of any interesting development. Venizelos deliberately refrained 
from asking Hambros to make a new offer as he wanted to decrease Greece's dependence on the 
bank in particular and British capital in general.
In response, Hambros tried to deter the government from signing a contract with Seligman 
and encouraged it to make a deal with The National City Bank. The latter was at the moment on 
good terms with Hambros and had already agreed to raise the American tranche of a Hambros 
public works loan should it materialize. In mid July 1928 Hambros informed the government that if 
it continued discussions with Seligman it would be in danger of provoking the wrath of the 
‘powerful’ National City Bank. Hambros maintained that the government could ill afford such a 
development as the N.C.B. happened to be the fiscal agent of the Greek government in the 
U.S.A.. It tried to touch a sensitive spot by reminding the Greeks that the National City Bank had 
worked hard in Congress circles campaigning in favour of the credits for the refugees. Hambros 
even insinuated that if the public works loan went to Seligman the National City Bank might 
retaliate by pressing Congress not to ratify the refugee credits. In addition, Hambros claimed that 
the image of the Greek government would suffer a blow in the eyes of the American market if it
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switched from a stronger (i.e. The National City Bank) to a ’weaker' group (i.e. Seligman). Last, 
Hambros maintained that Seligman would not be able to "make any offer of finance to the Greek 
government compatible with the standard of credit which they have been trying to maintain".11
Venizelos ignored Hambros warnings. If anything they were self defeating; they increased 
the Premier's desire to make an even larger deal with Seligman. Indeed, at the end of July, 
Venizelos decided that a $30,000,000 loan would be 'insufficient' and that it would be necessary 
for Seligman to present a firm offer for an issue of bonds totalling $75,000,000 (circa 
£15,500,000). This amount was considered sufficient to cover most of the road scheme and 
three of the land development projects; i.e. the reclamation of the Vardar, Struma, and Thessaly 
valleys. Seligman prepared an offer which was at once accepted by Venizelos.12 However, this 
agreement was only by word of mouth for Venizelos refused to make any commitment in 
writing.13 In the meanwhile, on August 13 1928, Charles Hambro wrote to Kaklamanos, the 
Greek Ambassador in Britain, stating that the bank wanted to make a new offer.14 The 
government responded by requesting details. In early September 1928, representatives of 
Hambros, Speyer and the National City Bank visited Athens and made a joint offer to the 
government for a £15,000,0000 syndicated flotation. However, they left Athens empty-handed, 
although purportedly they offered terms which were as good as those of Seligman.15 
Unexpectedly, one month later Venizelos decided to split the $75,000,000 loan between 
Hambros and Seligman. Why the change of mind?
It has been suggested that Venizelos had in earnest wanted to raise a ban exclusively with 
Seligman, but that he was unable to do so for foreign policy considerations. Namely, it is argued 
that because in late September Venizelos made a rapprochement with Italy -by signing a bilateral 
Treaty of friendship- he wanted to placate Britain.16 This argument is unconvincing. It is the case 
that at the time, Britain encouraged the conclusion of such bilateral agreements in the Eastern 
Mediterranean because they helped to maintain the balance of power.17 In our opinion, this 
change was solely of an economic nature. In order to be more specific regarding the economic 
considerations behind Venizelos policy shift it is necessary, first, to explain in full the reasons why 
he was so anti-Hambros when he stepped into office. It is clear that the new Premier's verbal 
attack against Hambros reflected also his negative views about the N.B.G. which was Hambro's ally
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in Greece. Venizelos upon stepping into office declared war against the National Bank on the 
grounds that the compensation it received from the state, when it lost prematurely its privilege to 
print money, was excessive. Ironically, by antagonizing the N.B.G. on this issue, Venizelos found 
himself at odds with the League of Nations. Although the Premier had a strong case, the League 
construed this whole affair as a direct attack on stabilization as the compensation granted to the 
N.B.G. had been settled within the framework of the Geneva Protocol of September 1928. From 
the point of view of this dissertation, what is of special interest is that Venizelos apparently had 
become less hostile toward the N.B.G. on this subject by October 1928 -i.e., the point 
whereupon he decided to grant half of the financing of the public works schemes to Hambros.18 
This cannot be a coincidence. The material suggests that Venizelos' was pressurized by the 
Treasury and the League to accept conditions created by the stabilization plan. Greece's formal 
supervisors also considered that his handling of public work financing might undermine the 
League's stabilization plan for the creation of a central bank. Finlayson was particularly vocal in his 
criticism. He argued that Venizelos should have consulted the Bank of Greece regarding this 
subject. He also pointed out that Eliasco (the manager of the Bank of Athens) who was notorious 
for his "opposition to the Bank of Greece and the whole idea of stabilizing the drachma" should 
not have been allowed to participate in the negotiations with Seligman.19 Thus, the flirtation with 
Seligman brought Venizelos into direct conflict with the central bank and Greece's formal 
supervisors. As a result he had no option other than to split the financing of the public work 
schemes.
To sum up, Venizelos' early dislike of Hambros must not be viewed only within the context 
of foreign affairs. Consideration should also be given to Venizelos' antithesis towards the N.B.G. 
It must be underlined at this point that the game played out between conflicting foreign business 
interests was no simple affair. Alliances were made inside Greece with internal financial interests. 
Thus, the animosity between Hambros and Seligman, was reflected at the domestic level in the 
antagonism between the N.B.G. and the Bank of Athens. It is possible to speak of two opposing 
groups (Hambros plus the N.B.G versus Seligman and the Bank of Athens) locked in warfare. To 
complicate things even further, foreign 'institutional' control, although it did not identify openly 
with foreign business interests, was in general lines more friendly towards Hambros. Seen in this
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light, Venizelos 'flirtation' with Seligman acquires a special significance and the question of why 
and how did Hambros reappear on the scene as Victor' in October 1928 can no longer pose as an 
enigma.
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Chapter 2
The First Public Works Loan
2.1. The Loan
In mid October 1928 C. Hambro and R. Erlanger arrived in Athens and presented once 
again the offer they had made one month earlier to raise, jointly with the National City Bank and 
Speyers & Co a £15,000,000 bond loan. (Half of the loan capital to be issued in London by 
Hambros Bank and Erlangers, and half to be floated in New York by The National City Bank and 
Speyers & Co.). As mentioned above this time Venizelos did not dismiss the Hambros group 
proposal. Instead, he agreed to assign to the merchant bank and its associates the flotation of 
50% of the long term loan capital necessary for his public works programme. The Premier refused 
to allow them to provide more than £7,500,000 on the grounds that in July 1928 he had promised 
W.Seligman & Co. that it would raise in full the loan capital required for infrastructure 
development.1
Charles Hambro was pleased with Venizelos' decision. But, in view of the fact that he had 
not persuaded the Prime Minister to allot to his group the full amount, he announced that he 
would float his share (i.e. the £7,500,000) exclusively in London together with Erlangers. 
Speyers and the National City Bank were treated in an offhand way by Charles Hambro. He 
notified them of his intention to put them out of the picture 15 days after he informed the 
government that no part of the Hambros tranche would be issued in the U.S.A. To save face, 
Hambro explained to Speyer and The National City Bank that he was forced to exclude them as he 
could not agree with their ‘unreasonable’ expectation that the price of issue in the U.S.A. be 
10.5% points below that of the stabilization issue.2 Whereupon Speyers and the N.C.B. 
approached Venizelos directly and asked to participate with Seligman in the New York issue.3 
Venizelos refused stating that Seligman has been originally promised the whole issue.4
It must be remarked at this point, that Seligman resented the fact that Hambros had 
managed to grab half of the loan capital, but, despite its anger, Seligman adjusted to the new 
status quo at once and agreed to share the 'pie' with its British competitor.5 From October 1928
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onwards, Charles Hambro was in full control and it was he who set the rules regarding the 
financing of the public work schemes. A good indication of this, is the fact that by the time he left 
for London on November 8 1928 he convinced the Premier to drop altogether the idea of a short 
term advance and instead to concentrate on the £15,000,000 long-term loan which would be 
floated in several tranches. The British banker offered to float a first tranche of £3,000,000 in 
December 1928 while Seligman would raise a second tranche in the spring of 1929.
Let it be reminded at this point that the idea of combined short term advance (to be granted 
immediately) and a long-term loan (to be given at a later date) had been first proposed by Hambros 
back in the early spring of 1928! As seen above, at that time the merchant bank had warned the 
government that if it resorted to the flotation of a long-term loan for public works before the spring 
of 1929 it would damage Greece's standing in the international capital market due to the issue of 
the Stabilization Loan.
How can this volte face by Hambros be explained? By late 1928, the Financial Committee of 
the League had warned that it would be against the granting of an advance because it did not 
want to see Greece's floating debt enlarged. In addition, Hambros felt pressed to issue part of the 
long-term loan before the Christmas of 1928 because it feared that the 'large' German loan that 
was planned for early 1929 would exhaust the market and preclude it from absorbing a Greek 
loan.6 But, though Hambros did not openly admit it, two more factors were responsible for its 
eagerness to float a tranche at once. On the one hand, it feared that the government might once 
again change its mind. On the other, such a flotation would increase Hambros bargaining power 
vis a vis the government with regard to the P.A.P. railway company it had taken over with the 
Hellenic Trust. (See: Book I, Section III, Phase Three) This incident aptly portrays that C. Hambro 
being a typical merchant banker had as his priority to safeguard and enhance his position in 
Greece and not to protect 'stabilization'. The final details concerning the exact price of issue and 
the rate of interest of the tranche to be floated in December were settled after Charles Hambro 
departed from Athens. ‘ fn the past, Erlangers was no more than a 'sleeping' partner and appeared 
nowhere in the correspondence, whereas the National Bank of Greece acted as an intermediary 
between Hambros and the Prime Minister. Characteristically, C. Hambro wrote to the N.B.G.:
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"In everything to do with Greek Government or Municipal affairs we are associated 
with Erlangers, we [are] leading the business in every case, and they are not allowed 
to enter into any agreement with either of these parties without our consent... but 
with reference to Greek affairs on the London market, they have no position, except 
as coming along behind Hambros...”.7
Within days of his arrival in London Charles Hambro made a firm offer of the terms under 
which the Bank would be willing to float the £3,000,000 public works bonds. As was the case with 
the Stabilization Loan of January 1928, the redemption period would be 40 years and the nominal 
rate of interest some 6%. However, he proposed to buy the bonds from the government at 83,5, 
and to sell them to the public at 89. The respective figures for the Stabilization Loan had been 
85,5 and 91. (That is, the issue price demanded for this new flotation would be 2 points lower).8 
Previously Hambros had led the government to believe that the post-stabilization loans for the 
infrastructure projects would have terms equal to those of the Stabilization Loan. Indeed, this 
'promise' had been misleading for it rested on two alternative but not mutually exclusive 
assumptions regarding the post-stabilization 'era' which could not be taken for granted. First, that 
a dramatic improvement in the state of Greek finances would materialize. Secondly, that there 
would be a rise in the average issue price of the loans floated in the international capital market. 
Without these two preconditions, it is obvious that any new bonds offered for flotation would have 
to be offered to the public at a lower price than the stabilization bonds. League Loans were in a 
'class of their own'.
Neither of the two preconditions materialized and as a result, Venizelos realized that the 
issue price would be 'lower*. However, he had no intention of allowing Hambros to make a profit 
higher than what it had attained from the Stabilization Loan. For this reason he demanded that 
the spread be narrowed by 0.5% so that the government could sell the bonds at 84 and not 
83.5%.9 Hambros Bank complied with Venizelos' request. In the last analysis a 5% commission 
was by the standard of the day a rather good deal.10 But, this was not the only modification to be 
made at the insistence of Venizelos. By the time the final draft of the contract was prepared in 
early December 1928, Hambros had to agree to increase the size of the first tranche from 
£3,000,000 to £4,000,000.11 Hambros had also to accommodate Venizelos' last minute demand 
to augment the total capital to be raised for public works from £15,000,000 to £22,000,000, 
thereby including finance for the reclamation of the Thessaly valley.12 With reference to this last 
point it must be underlined that Hambros in no way encouraged Venizelos to increase the target' 
figure set for public work financing.13 Further, Venizelos asked that a small part of the proceeds
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of the loan be used for the support of the Agricultural Bank of Greece.14 Hambros initially 
objected to this request.15 But, it finally gave in because Drossopoulos, the governor of the 
N.B.G. insisted that otherwise the contract for the loan might not be ratified by the National 
Assembly as the question of the agricultural credits was vital for the government and 
Parliament.16
Probably, the most interesting feature concerning the preparatory discussions for this loan 
is that Hambro did not request i.F.C. supervision. Instead, he insisted that the repayment of the 
loan should be placed under the supervision of the Bank of Greece. It is notable, that no such 
precedents existed. Indeed, it was the first time that an underwriter of Greek loans encouraged 
the government to enter the world capital market without the backing of the I.F.C. Interestingly, 
Venizelos was not in favour of such a shift in policy. However, he was swayed into playing along 
with Hambro's wish for the latter insisted that it was a most important step forward in the 
development of Greece in general and Greek government credit in particular.17
Actually, the real motivation for Hambro's policy shift was not to improve the 
creditworthiness of the Greek government. Instead, it aimed to establish a useful precedent, in 
order to make it easier to raise in the future loan capital in the City for Greek industry, the P.A.P. 
railways, and municipal infrastructure works. Hambro was well aware that such bonds stood no 
chance of being placed under I.F.C. supervision, as they would be non-governmental bonds. 
Thus, it presumed that if the First Public Works Loan did not enjoy the prerogative of being 
supervised by the I.F.C., then later when non government bonds when floated they would not 
appear to the British public as inferior ‘paper’.18 One final comment regarding the mode of 
repayment of the loan. The state revenues pledged as security for the loan were as usual more 
than ample. At about £5,000,000 they were 25% over the nominal value of the loan and 20 times 
over the size of its annual service.19
Hambros was eager and pressed for the flotation to take place before the 15th of December
1928. On December 10 1928, Law 3686 was passed, authorizing the government to conclude 
the £4,000,000 public works loan and to raise over a period of five years a total of £22,000,000 
for infrastructure development.20 The next day, on December the 11th, the loan contract was 
signed.21 No protracted debate was held in Parliament. In part, the lack of reaction was 
associated with the balance struck between American and British financial interests. Furthermore, 
the National Assembly was preoccupied with other sensitive issues, such as the need to modify
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the body of Parliamentary Regulations and the mode of election of the Senators.22 On
December 12th the President of the Republic ratified the contract-23
On the 11th of December Hambros had opened for public subscription. But there was little
interest. As a result on the 13th the National Bank of Greece received the following telegram:
"Public have not subscribed for loan which will consequently be large(ly) left with 
underwriters [stop] can you get minister also Bank Greece also to authorize to buy 
after issue for their account up to £500,000.-in order to prevent bonds going to 
appreciable discount which will damage credit [stop]"24
The Bank of Greece placed at Hambro's disposal £300,000 for the above purpose 25 C. 
Hambros was optimistic and on December 14, in a letter to Drossopoulos noted that if the 
government assisted in "maintaining the price of the loan over the New Year until such time as we 
can place it in firm hands" the bonds of the loan would do well.26 Although the Bank of Greece 
and the N.B.G. bought a large amount of bonds, the loan did not do well. It started off standing at 
a 2.5% discount and by March it had reached 3 3/8. In the end, 75% of the bonds remained with 
the underwriters 27 It must be remarked that this flotation adversely affected the poststabilization 
inflow of foreign capital.
2.2. Why the Lack of Interest in the Loan on the Part of the Public?
The disastrous flotation of the loan inevitably provoked a deterioration in the already fragile 
relationship between the Prime Minister and Hambros. Each side accused the other for the failure 
of the loan and neither wanted to carry responsibility for the outcome. Venizelos on his part 
regretted he had given in to Hambros demand to have the loan floated immediately.28 He 
claimed, both in private conversations as well as in the National Assembly, that Hambros was 
responsible for the failure' of the loan, because it had been in too great a hurry and had issued it 
at an inopportune moment. In addition, the loan had been raised without the supervision of the 
I.F.C..29 The second point of the Greek Premier was rather naive and presumed that the I.F.C. 
would have accepted the loan had it been requested to do so. However, although Hambros Bank 
had a large stake in the Societe de Regie -which collected the revenues of the state monopolies 
under I.F.C. control- it is unlikely that the Commission would have undertaken to supervise a non 
League loan.
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Hambros rejected the accusation that they were responsible for the 'depreciation' of the 
loan. They informed Venizelos that the loan failed not because of the absence of I.F.C. 
supervision, but for the reason that the government had among other things insisted that it be for 
£4,000,000, whereas Hambros wanted to issue only £3,000,000. In addition, by cutting the 
spread of the loan by 0.5% it supposedly became financially impossible for Hambros Bank to 
engage in extensive promotion. Also, the government demanded that the issue price be 89, 
while Hambros had advised 88; Moreover, the legal decree issued for the loan (Law 3686) by 
stipulating that the total foreign borrowing requirements for the public works programme would 
amount to £22,000,000, harmed Greek credit as it let the international markets know there would 
be a continuous stream of new issues.30
Indeed, Hambros had been faced with a fait accompli in that the government had not given 
prior notification that it planned to include a clause in the decree for the loan pertaining to the total 
borrowing requirements of the state.31 However, the other arguments were no more than a poor 
excuse. From the available evidence it is clear that Hambros had made miscalculations and it had 
not objected to the various alterations forced upon it' by the government. For instance, though it 
is true that Hambros initially suggested that the loan amount to only £3,000,000, mid way during 
the negotiations it actually suggested that the loan be increased to £3,500,000 and later 
accepted to raise it to £4,000,000.
In our opinion, a more balanced view of the failure of the flotation was provided by 
Finlayson. Although he had close connections with Hambros, Finalyson noted that the merchant 
bank had not spent enough time prior to the loan to prepare the terrain for the flotation. An all- 
important omission as it was the first public issue after the drachma stabilization. He also thought 
the timing of the flotation was poor. The public felt some anxiety as King George was taken ill and 
the market was nervous on account of the uncertainty of the German reparation settlement. In 
addition, the foreign advisor at the Bank of Greece correctly underscored the fact that the Greek 
government had just made two moves which shocked the market and foreign investors. First, 
Venizelos announced that the interest rate on the exchangeable bonds would be lowered from 
8% to 6% 32 (These were the only bonds actually issued in Greece quoted on the London stock 
exchange. This move discouraged subscribers). Second, ten days before the flotation of the
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loan the minister of communications rekindled the "interminable" conflict between the 
government and The Power & Traction Co.33 Thereby, he "...definitely antagonized the biggest 
group of investors in this country, and caused them to retire from any subscription in the ban 
which they otherwise would have undertaken."34
Finlayson's criticism of the loan, 'objective' as it may have been, largely reflected his 
disapproval of the fact that the Bank of Greece had not been consulted on this matter. One 
further adverse consequence of the loan was that once again an opportunity was provided for 
Greece's financial supervisors to make negative comments on the government's foreign 
borrowing prospects. According to an official of the Bank of England "... although this and the 
other Greek loans appear to be very well secured, we fear it is an undoubted fact that they are not 
popular with the public..."35 Moreover, Niemeyer noted that "I do not think there is a doubt that 
in the immediate future they [i.e. the bonds] are likely to go worse than better"36
Seen from another and more narrow angle, this loan testifies to the improved status of 
Greece. Compared to the previous infrastructure loans and the other loans raised 
contemporaneously on the key international bourses the proposed real interest rate and price of 
issue were not so onerous. (See Table 1a & 1b) But, perhaps this also explains the failure of the 
flotation; together of course with the poor handling of the issue Hambros and the government's 
inherent antagonism towards foreign and in particular British interests.
Table 1a
Comparison of Interest Rates of Infrastructure Loans
T itle
(A)
Real Interest Rate 
of Loan
(B)
C ontem poraneous 
Discount Rate1
D iffe rence
be tw e en
A&B
Athens Water Loan 9.4% 3.99% 5.5
Belgian Railway Loan 8.7% 3.99% 4.7
1st Public Works Loan 7.1% 4.5 % 2.6
Swedish School Loan 7.1% 3.2 % 3.9
2nd Public Works Loan 7.1% 2.5 % 4.6
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Table 1b
Comparison of Prices of Issue of Infrastructure Loans
T itle
(A )
Issue Price of 
Loan2
(B)
C ontem poraneous 
Aver. Issue Price3
D iffe re n ce
b e tw e en
A&B
Athens Water Loan 85 92.2 7.2
Belgian Railway Loan 92 92.2 0.2
1st Public Works Loan 89 94.8 5.8
Swedish School Loan 84 92.1 8.1
2nd Public Works Loan 87 95.2 8.2
1By contemporaneous discount rate we mean the average discount rate in London and New York at the time 
the ban was floated. For 1931 only the London rate is taken into consideratbn.
2For the bans that were raised through public flotation we have stated the prbe at which they were sob to 
the public.
3By contemporaneous issue prbe we mean the average issue price of the loans floated at the time in New 
York and London. We have not included British government or Commonwealth loans. The figure for 1931 
refers only to the bans floated in London.
Sources: The data for Tables 1a & 1b have been compiled from: A. Angelopoubs, The fiscal consequences 
of Greece's foreign borrowing”, in the EniQeupqmq Koivcovuajq kc u  Aryjdoiaq Ou<ovopua)q, (Athens, 1934), 
pp.174,176. Also from, Economic Yearbook for 1932. (Athens, 1933), pp.512-528. Also, Hambros Bank, 
Market Reports and Price lists throughout 1931.
To recapitulate. The First Public Works Loan was unique in a number of ways. It was the 
only Greek government loan to be exclusively issued by Hambros. Also, and contrarily to what 
had been the case in the past, this loan had a multiple purpose. Its proceeds were spent on three 
different projects and contributed towards the setting up of the Agricultural Bank of Greece. (For 
the yield of this issue and how it was actually spent see Book II, Section I, Chapter 2, Table 6) In 
addition, this was the first infrastructure loan to be raised through 'indirect' public subscription. In 
the last analysis, the foremost feature of the First Public Works Loan was the negative impact it 
had on Greece's creditworthiness.
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Seligman.... The Hambro offer has never been submitted to me; certain of its terms were read aloud 
to me on two different occasions; these terms changed in the interval showing that Hambro had been 
allowed to improve upon the proposition first submitted and none of these terms were as favourable 
to the State as ours. Up to the very eve of the announcement made to me through Mr. Eliasco, the 
Minister of Finance gave me to understand that with the final concessions requested of and granted 
by my firm our offer was better than Hambro's”. Unfortunately we cannot check whether this last 
comment regarding Hambros terms was accurate and for this reason we do not include it in the text. 
Source: B.M./VA, Fie 332, Stephens to Venizelos, November 5,1928.
6. Hambros was also eager to avoid the Christmas holiday blues. See: 
U.S .A./NAT/MA5/S.D./M443/31/868.51 Economic matters: Skinner to Secretary of State, February 14,
1929. Also, N.B.G./H A ,  X Loans, A' Public Loans, File 142, J.H. Hambro to Drossopoulos, November 
22,1928. For Venizelos' initial resistance to the idea of a tranche see below reference 29.
7. N.G.B7H A , XXII Banks, Foreign Banks, File 68, N.B.G. and correspondence with Hambros: C.Hambro 
to Drossopoulos, June 7 1928.
8. By issue price is meant the rate at which it intended to buy the bonds from the government. By 
spread we mean the commission charged by the underwriter plus stamp duty. Also note that the 
earliest redemption period was also 10 years as was the case with the Stabilization Loan. For firm 
offer which was ready by November 131928. Source: N.B.G./H A ,  X Loans, A' Public Loans, Fie 142, 
Public Works loan: Hambro to Venizelos (via N.B.G.), November 13, 1928. The draft contract 
prepared by Hambros was sent to Drossopoulos on November 22. Also, same file: Hambro to 
Drossopoulos, November 22 1928, and Drossopoulos to Hambros,November 29,1928.
9. Venizelos asked that the government be allowed to participate in half of the profit to be made if the 
loan was eventually issued at a price over 89. Drossopoulos on the 19th of November communicated 
to Hambros Bank the two modifications demanded by Venizelos, and suggested that it accept them 
at once without further negotiations. Source: N.B.G./HA, X Loans, A' Public Loans, File 142,Public 
works loan: Venizelos to Drossopoulos, November 17, 1928. Also, same file: Drossopoulos to 
Hambros Bank, November 19,1928; and Drossopoulos to Hambros Bank November 20,1928.
10. For the twenties it was estimated that in the American capital market the average spread was 4.13% 
for European issues. Source: Madden, et al, op.dt., pp.226-229.
11. At first Hambros stated on its own accord, in the third week of November that it would be willing to 
increase the tranche to £3,500,000 if the government in return agreed to supply it with £300,000 prior 
to the flotation of the loan. Hambros wanted this capital in order to support the price of Greek bonds 
on the bourse and thus make it feasible for the flotation to take place at 89%. The government 
agreed to this point. However, on December 3 Venizelos asked for the amount to increase to 
£4,000,000. Apparently, Hambros accepted this request without raising an objection on December 8
1928. Source: N.B.G./HA, X Loans, A’ Public Loans, File 142, Public Works loan: Hambros Bank to 
Drossopoulos, November 191928, and Hambros to N.B.G., December 8,1928.
12. Supposedly however the Thessaly works had already been included when he had asked for 
£15,000,000 in the first place. Also, in between on November 24 Venizelos had asked that the total 
amount for public works be raised from £15,000,000 to £20,000,000. Source: N.B.G./H A., X Loans, A' 
Public Loans, File 142, Public works loan: Drossopoulos to Hambros Bank, November 24,1928. On 
December 3 he asked that the amount be raised to £22.000.000. Source:N.B.G./H.A., X Loans, A' 
Public Loans 1928, Fie 142, Public Works loan: Drossopoulos to Hambros, December 3,1928.
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13. When Venizelos in November 1928, first asked for permission to surpass the £22,000,000 target' 
figure Hambros commented that: the question of increasing the size of the public works loans was a 
matter which, was in the exclusive discretion of the government, definitely did not concern the 
Bankers, and would "be eventually decided by the state of the revenues available at the time when 
further issues are contemplated". Source: N.B.G./H.A., X Loans, A'Public Loans, File 142, Public 
works loan: Hambros Bank to N.B.G., November 26,1928.
14. Venizelos also expected the English and Greek texts of the contract to be of equal importance. But 
this request was not accepted by Hambros. For Venizelos proposed modifications same source as 
reference 12 above.
15. N.B.G./H.A., X Loans, A' Public Loans, File 142, Public works loan: Hambros to N.B.G., December 4,
1928.
16. Drossopoulos also underlined the fact that since the "...agricultural credits will [i.e.would] continue 
operating through National Bank there is [i.e. would be] a full guarantee that object aimed will be 
effected with full security and retribution of capital thus diverted”. Source: N.B.G/HA, X Loans, A' 
Public Loans, File 142, Public works loan: Drossopoulos to Hambros Bank, December 5, 1928; 
Hambros to N.B.G., December 6,1928.
17. B.M./V.A., File 332, C.Hambro to Venizelos November 1,1928. From this letter it construes that as 
late as November 1 Venizelos had not yet been convinced by Hambro's argument. That Venizelos in 
principle was all in favour of using the I.F.C. as a supervisor of Greek government loans is 
corroborated also by the fact that on November 3,1928 Finlayson informed Niemeyer that "Venizelos 
asked that new exchangeable bonds be placed under I.F.C.supervision". Therefore, it construes that 
if Venizelos wanted to introduce the novelty of establishing I.F.C. supervision over internal loans,he 
all the more would not be against supervision over foreign loans, source: F0371/ 12918/C56271, 
Finlayson to Niemeyer, November 3,1928.
18. USA/NAT/MA5/S.D./M443/31/ 868.50, Economic matters: Skinner to Secretary of State, February 14,
1929. Also let it be noted that when Venizelos in the early autumn of 1928 had asked the I.F.C. to 
supervise the new series of the exchangeable bonds the British Treasury had declared that the I.F.C. 
should not undertake further responsibility for the service of any new external or internal loans. The 
'excuse' being that after stabilization Greece was in a position to secure on her own good terms for 
her loans. Source: FO371/12919/C9013 Roussin to Niemeyer November 3 1928. Also, 
FO371/13651/C2020, Minutes of December 251928.
19. N.B.G./H.A., X Loans, A' Public loans, File 142, Public Works loan: Prospectus of the First Public 
Works Loan.
20. According to this new law (which had been presented to the National Assembly in a draft form on 
December 3 1928), the government would raise over a five year period £2,000,000 for the refugees. 
Technically in the event that the government desired to raise more than £22,000,000 for the public 
works program and £2,000,000 for the settlement of the refugees, it would be obliged to offer more 
state revenues as security. Source: N.B.G./H.A., X Loans, Public Loans, File 142, Public works loan: 
Translation of the Project Law for the contracting of [a] loan for the drainage works, roadworks and 
the reinforcement of agricultural credit.
21. It was signed by the minister of Finance and the governor of the Bank of Greece. The governor of the 
N.B.G. also signed on behalf of Hambros and Erlangers.
22. EQviKdqKfpuKaq, op.dt., Vol. 9, Session of December 101928, pp.366-378,
23. This ratification took place on the basis of Law 3686 which had been voted by parliament. See: G.G., 
First issue, Folio 262, December 12 1928.
24. N.B.G./H.A., X Loans, A' Public Loans, File 142, Public Works loan: Hambros to N.B.G., December 13, 
1928.
25. N.B.G./H.A., X Loans, Public Loans, File 142, Public Works loan: N.B.G. to Hambros, December 20, 
1928.
26. N.B.G./H A , X Loans, Public Loans, File 142, Public Works loan: Hambros to Drossopoulos, December 
141928.
27. We do not know how much actually the N.B.G. or other Greek institutions spent on buying bonds of 
this loan. However, on December 6, Drossopoulos declared to Hambros Bank that it would like to be 
included in the list of underwriters for an amount totalling £200,000. He also informed Hambros that 
the Banque d' Orient was interested in underwriting for £300,000. Source: N.B.G./H.A., X Loans, A' 
Public Loans, File 142, Public Works loan: N.B.G. to Hambros Bank, December 6,1928. In the end, all 
we know for sure is that the National Bank of Greece subscribed for at least £40,000. Source: 
N.B.G./H.A., X Loans, A' Public Loans, File 142, Public Works loan: Hambros Bank to N.B.G, 
December 11,1928.
28. FO371/13651/C63204, Finlayson to Niemeyer, January 241929.
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29. The Greek Prime Minister maintained that he should have stood up to Hambros demand that the loan 
be floated at once. Indeed, when Venizelos first opened discussions with Hambros in October 1928, 
he maintained that the ideal solution would be for Hambros to provide jointly with Seligman a 
£3,000,000 advance. Source: G.P.D., Second Assembly, First Session, Vol.B., Minutes of Session 73, 
February 121929, p.579.
30. Hambros asked Drossopoulos to point out to Venizelos that "it is not always the best policy of a 
Government to make the last penny out of their banking friends abroad, and it is sometimes wiser and 
less expensive to let the public and the bankers make a certain amount of profit. This I know you 
understand from your own point of view, but I think it is sometimes a little bit forgotten in Government 
circles. The facilities under which the Loan was underwritten show that if it had been issued at the 
price at which it was given to the underwriters, i.e. 87.5%, it would have been a success”. Source: 
N.B.G./H.A., XXII, Banks, Foreign Banks, File 68, N.B.G and correspondence with Hambros: C. 
Hambro to Drossopoulos, December 14,1928.
31. Drossopoulos wrote to Hambros about the intention to increase the target sum to £22,000,000 the
same day the draft law was presented to the National Assembly. N.B.G/HA, X Loans, Public loans,
File 142, Public Works loan: Drossopoulos to Hambros, December 3,1928.
32. For the criticism voiced in Greece against this measure, see: E6vik6c KfipuKaq, Vol.9, Session of 
November 16 1928, pp.252-259.
33. F0371/ 13651/C64751, Letter of Finlayson to Niemeyer, January 24, 1929. Also for the reaction 
against Power & Traction in the National Assembly, see: EdviKdq KrjpuKaq, Vol.9, Session of 
December 7,1928, pp.344-349.
34. N.B.G./H.A., XXII, Banks, Foreign Banks, File 68, N.B.G. and correspondence with Hambros: 
C.Hambro to Drossopoulos, December 14,1928.
35. B.E./C.B.P 323, vol 1: Mullens to Deputy Chief Cashier, February 8,1929.
36. B.E./C.B.P. 323, vol 1: Niemeyer to Finlayson, February 9,1929.
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Chapter 3
The Interval Between the Two Public Work Loans
3.1. The Seligman Loan that Never Was
The government reopened negotiations with Seligman in December 1928.1 Although the 
£3,360,000 net product of the Hambro loan would be sufficient to carry the needs of the 
infrastructure plan for one whole year, Venizelos was in a hurry to sign an agreement with the 
house because he wanted to placate Seligman (cum the Bank of Athens), and to avoid creating 
the impression both in and outside Greece that his government was under strict British tutelage. 
A contract was signed on January 25 1929 with J.W.Seligman for the £11,000,000 that had been 
allotted to it. These being difficult times for foreign issues in New York, it was agreed that the 
bonds would be offered to the public at 6 points below the prevailing market price of the 
Stabilization Loan in the U.S.2 A first tranche of $20-30,000,000 (approximately £4-6,000,000 
was to be floated in 18 months.3 The loan contract was ratified by the National Assembly on 
March 1 1929.4 The aforementioned details are however of strictly academic interest as this 
agreement was never actually effected. Seligman cancelled the loan contract in the early spring 
of 1929 because the I.F.C. refused to supervise the loan. (As had been the case with the Athens 
water loan in 1925, the Commission was presented by the government with a request to 
undertake supervision after the contract had been signed and ratified!) The I.F.C. declared that it 
was against assuming new responsibilities in Greece and that in the future it would accept no new 
loans (regardless of nationality) in order to safeguard the smooth repayment of the loans already 
under its control.5 However, it must be noted that this decision of the I.F.C. was dictated by the 
British Treasury which was anxious to hold Greece as a financial preserve of Britain and block the 
penetration of American capital.6 Interestingly, this stance of the Treasury came into conflict with 
the proposals made at the time, by certain members of the British cabinet for the establishment of 
free trade and the eradication of commercial and financial barriers in Europe.
The Venizelos government was disappointed with the stance of the I.F.C. and it informed 
Skinner, the American minister in Athens, that it wanted the U.S.A. to put pressure on the British 
to drop their selfish attitude.7 In February 1929, Skinner duly suggested to the State Department
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and the U.S. Treasury that an American delegate be appointed "to sit upon the Commission 
either with powers concurrent with those of the other delegates, or with authority only to concern 
himself with American interests".8 But, the answer of the Department of State was that the 
American government did not have a right to meddle into the private affairs of the I.F.C. The 
Treasury in concurrence stated that: "In so far as this Department is concerned there does not 
appear at the time to be any need for the appointment to the Commission of a representative of 
the U.S."9 Thus, in the end, the U.S.A. government took no action and the I.F.C. did not alter its 
decision. The Seligman loan agreement of January 1929 was the last attempt made by American 
capital to float independently of Hambros bonds for the Greek government. In a sense it may be 
argued that Hambros' failure' with the First Public Works Loan scared off American capital from 
Greece. However, to be more precise and accurate we must note that ex post, given the October 
1929 Wall Street Crash -even if Seligman had raised the first tranche of its allotted share- it is not 
likely that it would have carried out its obligation to supply the other tranches -i.e. the full amount it 
had promised.
3.2. The Advances
By May 1930, as a result of the disappointment it suffered with the flotation of the First 
Public Works Loan and the poor state of the international capital market, Hambros had shifted its 
orientation away from foreign flotations. Thus, although it had no desire to loose its dominance 
over Greek foreign borrowing, its vociferous appetite for Greek loans was curbed. Hambros' 
altered perception became manifest in two ways. First, in the hope that the situation might 
improve, the bank favoured the granting of short term advances. Second, it was no longer willing 
to lend on its own account large amounts to the government. Thus, when the government 
approached Hambros in April 1930 with the request to issue immediately a second tranche of 
£8,000,000, the bank's response was that it could not undertake a new Greek flotation for twelve 
months. Instead, it made the proposal to provide short term funding together with its American 
associates, and the National Bank of Greece. The government accepted this proposition and 
three annual advances of a total value of £3,940,000 were granted. Two of them were raised in 
May 1930. One advance was given by Hambros and it amounted to £1,500,000; another roughly
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equal in size was provided by Speyers and the New York City Bank.10 (For how this advance was 
employed see Appendix 6) Shortly before the first two advances were furnished the National 
Assembly passed Law 4571 which effectively cancelled law 3686. Thus, the amount to be 
floated for infrastructure development was lowered from £22,000,000 to £14,000,000. Hambros 
had voiced a string of complaints against Law 3686. Indeed, the timing and provisions of Law 
4571, indicate that the merchant bank demanded the change as a prerequisite for the granting of 
the two advances.11
The third advance was supplied by the National Bank of Greece during the months of 
December 1930 and January 1931, and it amounted to £900,000.12 (Again see Appendix 6 for 
how it was spent). The provision of these advances, the fact that the third was totally furnished by 
a Greek bank, and the cancellation of the Seligman loan contract in the spring of 1929 attest to 
the unsettled state of the world capital markets. The government was once again effectively 
‘excluded’ from the international financial centers -i.e. the City and New York. It is by no 
coincidence, that in 1930 Greece turned once again to the ‘peripheral’ market of Sweden for a 
small private loan- just as it did during 1926 when the British and U.S.A. war debt embargoes were 
in effect.
3.3. The Swedish School Loan
In July 1930, the government signed with Krueger & Toll a loan contract for £1,000,000.13 
It was raised for a single and specific project - the construction of a nationwide network of 
schools.14 Furthermore, it was privately placed.15 Thus, the government did not live up to 
Venizelos' initial expectation that from 1928 onwards infrastructure development would be 
financed solely through tranches of general purpose public works loans raised via 
indirect public flotations.
The Swedish loan was reminiscent of the method of financing of infrastructure works prior 
to stabilization. But, it had some differences. First, that Krueger & Toll, unlike Ulen & Co. and the 
Societe Commerciale de Belgique, had no involvement regarding the construction of the project. 
Krueger, the son of a rich Swedish matchmaker was not interested in undertaking construction 
projects, but in providing loans to foreign governments in return for securing match monopolies.
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Greece had already granted Its match monopoly in 1926 to a Swedish firm related to Krueger.16 
Another difference was that no one specific contractor was given the assignment. Also it was 
clear from the start that foreign capital would finance only part of the 'scheme'. Apparently this 
loan was put to good use and it covered approximately 1/6 of the cost of the 3,167 state schools 
that were built by Greek engineering firms during Venizelos' term in office.17
The price of issue (84), and the nominal rate of interest (6%), of this loan were identical with 
those of the First Public Works Loan. Infact, with a real rate of interest of 7.1% it was the most 
‘advantageous’ of the infrastructure loans to be issued through ‘private’ channels. Compared to 
the other two infrastructure loans of this category, it had a lower real rate of interest and a smaller 
spread over the contemporaneous discount rate in Britain and New York. (See: Book II, Section 
III, Chapter 2).
Though there is no direct evidence, it appears that Greece's supervisors were not satisfied 
with this Swedish loan. They continued to press on the government the need for moderation 
regarding its foreign borrowing.18 Internal critism of the loan was vocal. In the last week of June 
an animated debate took place in the National Assembly between Kafandaris (the minister of 
finance under the coalition) and Venizelos. The position of Kafandaris was that the Greek 
government should have depended exclusively on the budget surpluses and not raised foreign 
loan capital in order to finance the school buildings project. Such arguments of course, stood on 
thin air. For these surpluses were more fictional than real. Venizelos however, remained adamant 
in his conviction that the aim to attract foreign capital was entirely praise worthy provided that the 
bans were for productive purposes and not to cover budget deficits.
The banking establishment also was critical of the loan. The National Bank of Greece 
opposed the Swedish loan out of spite because the government had rejected its offer to finance 
this project on its own. Reportedly, the government did not assign the financing of this scheme 
to the N.B.G for it was not willing to award the construction of the new schools to those technical 
firms that were under the protection of this bank. Interestingly, Diomedes in June 1930 argued in 
public that internal loans should as a rule be preferred as they did not involve large binding 
obligations on the state nor an export of wealth.19 (Indeed, domestic borrowing might have put 
less long term pressure on the balance of payments and the stability of the drachma. It is not clear
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why the Bank of Greece made this statement in favour of the conclusion of internal loans for 
public works at this stage. Was it in order to assist the autonomous expansion of the banking 
establishment in the realm of infrastructure development or was the Bank of Greece slowly 
becoming afraid that the Greek state was overborrowing? It is not possible to determine which was 
the case. But, if the second factor was paramount it can be argued that the central bank was 
beginning to espouse the view of the League of Nations that Greece had embarked on a careless 
foreign borrowing policy.
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R eferences
1. Reportedly the Bank of Athens was to participate in this loan. But the exact allotment it was to be 
given is not known. A convention was to be signed for this purpose. But, it was not publicized. We 
know of its existence from a reference in the Banque D’ Athenes, Bulletin Economique et Financier, 
Number 78, February 1929.
2. The spread of the loan would be 5 points- though theoretically U.S.A. issues were more expensive. 
By spread meaning the difference between the price of purchase and the price at which the bonds 
would be offered to the public. As was the case with the agreement made with Hambros, it was 
specified that if the spread was larger than 5 units the difference would be divided equally between 
the government and Seligman.
3. This first tranche was to have a 6% nominal rate of interest. Provision was also made for the
granting of a $7,500,000 advance shortly after the ratification of the contract. For the advance the 
bankers commission charged would amount to 1%. The interest rate would be no less than 5.5%, but 
also 1% above the FRB discount rates- this was the formula used by Hambros for its advances as
well. After one year the interest charged would be 1.5% higher.
4. See Law 4025 of March 1,1929 m the: G.G., First issue, Folio 133, April 2,1929.
5. The I.F.C. said it wanted to wind itself as soon as possible, but this statement cannot be taken at
face value. Source: U.S.A./NAT./MA5/S.D./M443/32/868.50 Economic matters: Seligman to Shaw 
February 16,1929; Skinner to the Secretary of State, March 29,1929.
6. It was by no coincidence that the Treasury was supported by Finlayson who wrote a long
memorandum for the Greek government in which in a biased manner he exposed why the Seligman 
deal would be bad for Greek credit. Source: B.M./V.A., File 66: document titled: 'Comments on the 
Seligman Contract* written by H.C. Finlayson, February 9 1929. For the fact that the governments of 
the other two members of the I.F.C. (i.e France and Italy) declared that their decision not to allow the 
Commission to supervise the loan was based entirely upon the English refusal, see: 
U.S.A./NAT./MA5/S.D./M443/31/ 868.51 Economic Matters: Skinner to the Secretary of State, 
November 1,1929. Also, U.S A/NATVMA5/S.D./M443/32/ 868.50 Economic Matters: Memo of Shaw 
of a conversation held with the Greek minister on March 16,1929; Skinner to the Secretary of State, 
March 19,1929; and Fletcher to the Secretary of State, March 23,1929.
7. For the fact that the Greek government believed that only if the U.S.A. government intervened the 
British would drop their selfish attitude, see: U.S.A./NAT/MA5/S.D./M443/31/868.51 Economic 
Matters: Skinner to the Secretary of State November 1,1929.
8. U.S.A./NAT/MA5/S.D./M443/31/868.51 Economic Matters: Skinner to Secretary of State, February 7, 
8,1929. (The quotation is taken from the second document).
9. U.S.A./NAT/MA5/S.D./M443/32/868.50 Economic Matters: Memo prepared by the division of Near 
Eastern Affairs, on the subject of the Seligman loan, May 2,1929.
10. The Hambrosadvance was granted on May 3,1930, and the American on May 6 1930. The latter 
amounted to (7,500,000 (i.e. the equivalent to £1,540,000). It was agreed that both advances would 
be repaid from the proceeds of the second tranche of the public works loan. The English group gave 
the advance at an interest rate of 5 3/4%, whereas the American group charged 51/2% and an issue 
price of 99.73%. Source: F0371/14387 C5709, July 151930, Roussin to Henders, July 41930.
11. For the pressure Hambros put on the government to pass this new law in order to limit the latter's 
foreign borrowing capacity, see: M.F.A./H.A., File A/14 1931, Kaklamanos to Minister of Finance, 
March 2 1931. This new law specified that the additional tranches could not be burdened with 
issuing costs suipassina the amount of 5%. Also with this law the right of the government to issue 
an additional £2,000,000 for the refugees was abrogated. For Law 4571, see: G.G., First issue, Folio 
124, April 26,1930.
12. £600,000 was given on December 30, 1930, and £300.000 was given on January 1931. However, 
simultaneously with the Second Public Works Loan, it concluded a new advance for $7,500,000 from 
the New York City Bank. For the details pertaining to the new advance, see: N.B.G./H.A., X Loans, A' 
Public Loans, File 143, Second Public Works Loan: Bank of Greece to Harcourt Ross, April 2,1931.
13. The proceeds of the loan were granted in August of the same year. FO371/14387/C5709. I.F.C. to 
Henderson, July 4,1930.
14. The provider of the loan undertook not to put the bonds into circulation on the market, but it did retain 
the nght of transferring them to a bank after 2 years. Source: FO 371/14387 C50709, Minutes of July 
201930.
15. This loan was guaranteed against the school fee revenues, and the schools to be built. The 
ownership of the schools would remain into the hands of the government upon the redemption of the 
loan. However, FO 371/14387 C5709, I.F.C. to Henderson, July 4, 1930 notes that the loan was 
guaranteed against the surplus I.F.C. revenues.
16. For similar loans granted to Austria and Hungary, see: Berend and Ranki, op.cit., pp.219,225.
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17. In large part this school building program was financed from the funds of the local government. 
Daphnes, Vol.2, op.cit., p.84. For venizelos' policy of increasing the number of primary schools and 
creating technical schools, see: B.Jelavich, History of the Balkans. Twentieth Century, (Cambridge, 
1983), Vol.2., p.175.
18. B.M./V.A., Fie 332, Niemeyer to Venizelos, September 61928.
19. Also reportedly the government declared that it would use the N.B.G offer for a loan with regard to the 
construction of sewages. I.e. in this instance it appears that the government was willing to make use 
of the technical firms with which the N.B.G. was associated. Source: nXouToq, June 26 1930. Also 
note that this newspaper supported the N.B.G offer. For the domestic opposition to the loan, also 
see: FO371/14387/C50801, Minutes of July 29 1930.
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Chapter 4
A New Project Begins: The Drainage of the Struma Vailey
Chronological Summary
February 11, 1928: 
February 15, 1928:
November 13, 1928: 
December 8, 1928: 
February 1929: 
1937:
October 20, 1928:
June 1928:
Tender announced for the drainage of the Struma and Thessaly valleys.
The tender is extended so as to include the irrigation of the Struma and 
Thessaly valleys.
Coalition cabinet announces that the reclamation of the Struma valley 
would be assigned to the American firm Monks-Ulen.
Contract signed by Venizelos with Monks Ulen for the drainage of the 
Struma valley.
Contract is submitted to the National Assembly for approval.
Contract is ratified.
The works begin.
The state takes over the completion of the works.
4.1. The Problem Posed
The plain of Struma lies in Eastern Macedonia. It is transversed by the Struma river which 
originates near Sofia in Bulgaria and enters Greece through the gorge of Ruppel. This river 
carried a substantial amount of silt and for much of the year flooded large areas of the Struma 
valley, the lower part of which, known as the Phillipi marsh, was frequently entirely inundated. The 
total area of the Struma valley is 1,560,000 stremmas, and prior to the works only 660,000 
stremmas were cultivated.1
By 1928 it was acknowledged that the reclamation of the Struma plain could no longer be 
deferred. In addition to the pressure to expand the country's cultivable frontiers and to enhance 
economic development in Macedonia, this region was noted for its high incidence of malaria.2 
Moreover, the catastrophic annual floods of the Struma river had exasperated the local peasants 
who were basically refugees.3
This was the only infrastructure scheme to actually begin under Venizelos. At the time, it 
was estimated that around 900,000 stremmas would be made available for cultivation. 
Economically important, the project was plagued by problems similar to those that beset the 
reclamation of the Vardar valley. These were the insufficient flow of foreign finance and the stow
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pace of the works. Also, as was the case with the Vardar valley scheme information is lacking 
regarding its total cost.
4.2. The Preliminaries
Venizelos was known for not accepting blindly his predecessors commitments, in point of 
fact, when he stepped into office in July 1928, he honoured the coalition's decisions regarding 
land reclamation only in part and to the extent that it suited him. He accepted the decision of the 
coalition to award the Struma valley project to a U.S. firm.4 However, this did not imply that Monks- 
Ulen would be the contractor. (For the decision of the coalition to assign the scheme to Monks- 
Ulen see Book II, Section II, Chapter 1, 1.2.) Venizelos made two related alterations. First, he 
announced that the reclamation of Thessaly and Epirus would have to be delayed. Second, he 
decided to separate the issues of construction and finance for the reclamation schemes. As 
already stated, Venizelos planned to raise one large loan for public works. The logic behind this 
move was that the government would be able to attain better financial terms if it negotiated directly 
with foreign financial houses rather than through the intermediation of contractors for each public 
works loan. A note which exists in the Venizelos archives is revealing. It states:
"If the government concludes a loan separately from the technical works then it will 
be in a position to force the interested concerned American contractors to improve 
substantially their terms for the land drainage projects because on the one hand 
they will not be burdened with banking obligations, and on the other knowing that 
they are in danger of loosing the undertaking of these works (in view of the fact that 
there exist Austrian and German firms which have the necessary machinery for which 
the state will not pay, and are thus in a position to undertake the works at a 
remuneration [i.e. general expenses and fee] of less than 19%)H.5
It is not known if the government was approached by any Austrian or German firms.
Nevertheless, despite being committed to the appointment of an American firm, Venizelos did
not hesitate to put pressure on the two American contestants (i.e Monks-Ulen and The
Foundation Co.) to improve their terms. He did so partly for political and diplomatic reasons.
Christomanos, the minister of communications insisted (as his predecessor Metaxas had done)
that preference should be given to Boot.6 While the British Foreign Office made repeated
appeals to Venizelos to assign the project to Boot.7 Indeed, Mackillop of the British Legation
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asked that the British lay a new embargo on loans to the Greek government in the event that 
"Boot remained empty handed".8 Monks-Ulen countered this renewed 'competition' by lowering 
its commission from around 27% to 22% of the cost of the works. (Reportedly The Foundation 
Co. did not bulge from its original offer).9 This move on the part of Monks-Ulen provoked the 
British contractor to retaliate in two ways. First, Boot reduced the remuneration it demanded to 
18.5%. Second, Boot persuaded Seligman, the financial backer of Monks-Ulen, to handle the 
finance for its scheme. Stephens of Seligman wrote to C.Boot that "We are of course prepared to 
include in such a loan [i.e. a large public works loan] the financing of any construction contract 
entered into at this time between your firm and the Hellenic government".10 Boot's original 
financial backers would undertake on behalf of Seligman the London portion of the large loan.11 
Apparently Seligman was forced -presumably either by the government of by Monks-Ulen- to 
retract and confine the offer made to Boot only to the Epirus project and not the reclamation of 
the Struma valley.12 In the beginning of September 1928, Venizelos assigned the Struma 
project to Monks-Ulen at a rate of remuneration of 21.63%. The Premier expressed anger at the 
British intervention, while admitting that the coalition government had been short-sighted in 
limiting competition for the project only to American firms.13 The contract was signed on October 
20 1928.14 It was presented for approval to the National Assembly three days later. In sum, the 
terms posed for this cost-plus agency contract were far more advantageous for the government 
compared to the previous agreements that had been made for public work schemes. Notably, 
instead of being calculated on a percentage basis, the fee was fixed at $1,700,000. This amount 
was equivalent to 10% of the estimated cost of the works. As Table 1 below documents, in the 
three years that had intervened since the first land reclamation project began the government had 
come some way.
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Table 1
The Contracts:
The Vardar Valley Versus the Struma Plain Areas in which there were Basic Differences
Vardar Valley Struma Plains
1. Public adjucation
Not obligatory procedure for the purchase or Obligatory procedure for purchase or hire of all
hire of all machinery, equipment,etc.. machinery equipment, etc..
2. General expenses as a % of the cost of the works
17% 11.63%
3. Fee
IT.55% of the cost of the works $1,700,000*
4. Guarantee
$50,000 $400,000
5. Arbitrator of last resort appointed by:
Minister of public works of Switzerland Supreme Court of Greece
6. Financing of the scheme
Contractor under obligation to secure Contractor under no obligation to secure loan
necessary financing capital for the government.
7. Concession
Concession granted No concession granted
*This was a fixed fee.
The parliamentary committees set up did not take long to prepare a report and the contract 
was ratified on November 13 1928 without practically any modifications.15 However, dissent was 
expressed in the Assembly. The arguments were of familiar tone. It was argued that the study for 
the project should have been assigned to Greek engineers;16 that a fixed cost agreement 
should have been made and that the reward given to the contractor should have been lower. 
However, this last point was unfair criticism. It should be recalled that at the time the standard 
remuneration for Greek contractors was 10% for general expenses plus a 10% fee.17
It was also pointed out that since approximately half of the work would be subcontracted, 
the contractor should not have received a commission for this work.18 Surprisingly, nothing was 
directly said in favour of Boot. It was as if by silent consent all agreed that the government had no 
choice but to allocate the project to a U.S. firm. However, Boot was not left totally out of the 
picture. A little over a year after it assigned the Struma reclamation scheme to the American firm
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Monks-Ulen, the Venizelos government concluded a contract with H.Boot & Sons. It differed 
from the previous land improvement schemes. The contractor was charged with the task of 
preparing studies for the reclamation and irrigation work and for hydroelectrical schemes in 
Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete. The government guaranteed that the contract for the project(s) 
would be allocated to Boot in the event that the work began 10 years after the studies were 
completed. Again the contract was of an agency-cost plus-type. The fee and general expenses 
were fixed at 19% of the total cost. This was a taw figure for 1929, but by the time the reclamation 
of the Thessaly valley actually started - i.e. in 1937-the going rate was lower.19 (See Book II, 
Section I, Chapter 1, Table 12).
4.3. The Implementation of the Project
This was a large project and its object was to render practically all of the Struma plain 
cultivable. For this purpose the works entailed the construction of anti-flood works, the regulation 
of the course of the Struma river and various streams plus the drainage of the Boutkovon and 
Achines lakes, the Phillipi marshes, and water bgged areas. This scheme had an estimated cost 
of $21,000,000 (as opposed to $26,000,000 for the Vardar valley scheme) and was to be 
completed by 1934.20 The work was wrought with technical difficulties- particularly the 
canalization of the Struma river - and alternative solutions were found. For example, barrages to 
prevent the silt from flowing downriver should have been built near the Struma's spring in 
Bulgaria. However, due to the animosity between Greece and its neighbour the contractor 
constructed barrages at the highest point of the river upon entering Greece.21
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Table 2
Reclaimed Lands: the Goals and the Record 
(in stremmas)
P ro jec t Goal 1932 1941 1 95 2
Vardar Valley
a. area drained
b.t area protected from floods & improved
c.irrigated land
502.000
801.000
81,000 350.000
500.000
950.000
400.000
800.000
Struma Valley
a. land drained
b., area protected from floods&improved
c. irrigated land
576,775
983,225
776,000
? 390.000
480.000
140.000
455.000
825.000
600.000
Compiled from: A.G. Dolianitis, The Drainage of the Swamps. Lakes and Lagoons of the Country. (Athens), 
p.15. Also, John Monks & Sons, and Ulen & Co., Reclamation Works of Serres and Drama plains. (Athens, 
1932), p.19.
Table 3
Amounts Spent on the Land Improvement Schemes up to 1937
Year
Vardar Valley Struma Valley
Public Work 
Loans 
$
State Budget 
d rs .
Public Work 
Loans 
$
State Budget 
d rs .
1925 36,000
1926 664,000
1927 770,000
1928 778,000
1929 5,802,000 2,310,500
1930 1,125,000 2,422,000
1931 2,175,160 48,978,000 3,227,020 55,000,000
1932 172,978,000 144,621,500
1933 120,000,000 141,350,500
1934 114,500,000 140,000,000
1935 63,500,000 221,500,000
1936 91,000,000 278,500,000
1937 18,000,000 25,000,000
Tota l 11,000,160 628,956,0001 7,959,520 1,005,971,5002
1The total amount is equivalent to $ 5,395,657. 
2The total amount is equivalent to $ 8,888,735.
Source: A.G. Dolianitis, The Drainage of the Swamps. Lakes and Lagoons of the Country. (Athens). Table 
18, p.55
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Earthworks began in February 1929, and construction reached its most intensive phase in 
193122 Thereafter work slowed down as a result of the abrupt cessation of the flow of foreign 
finance 23 Between 1929 and 1931 around $8,900,000 was spent on the scheme. This made 
for an average annual expenditure of $2,900,000. For the remaining 6 years (i.e.between 1932 
and 1937) during which work continued fitfully, the average annual expenditure in drachmae was 
equivalent to roughly $1,300,000. (See Table 3 below). While hard evidence is lacking, it 
appears that the contractor had completed approximately 1/3 of the land drainage, about 40% of 
the flood protection and land improvement aspect of the scheme but had done nothing in the 
way of setting up an irrigation network before the work was handed over to the newly founded 
National Fund for the Hydraulic Works of Macedonia in 1937. The scheme was more or less 
completed by 1951. Given the long duration of the works and the fact that by 1938 the amount 
spent was equivalent to 80% of the original estimates (which had not included irrigation) it is 
obvious that the total cost were substantially higher than what had been anticipated. Up to 1938 
less than half the amount (i.e. 47%) was covered by the two public work loans, and thus the 
contribution of the state budget was more substantial than what was the case with the Vardar 
valley project. (See above Tables 2, and 3).
4.4. Land Reclamation in Perspective
In early 1932 in view of the drying up of the inflow of foreign capital the government was 
trapped. It required $4,874,000 annually to service the two public works loans and a further 
$1,325,000 for the maintenance of the works. This was a heavy burden 24 In addition if it were to 
complete the two reclamation schemes, it was estimated that it would have to incur an extra debt 
of $48-$50,000,000 (i.e. approximately £13,5-£14,000,000).25
Thus, the government came under pressure to reassess its strategy. The foreign and 
Greek experts consulted,26 unanimously agreed that it was technically impossible to suspend 
construction and that work would have to continue -albeit at a slower pace 27 Finlayson advised 
that if the reclaimed lands did not start generating income prior to the full completion of the works 
the loans raised could in a narrow financial sense no longer be classified as productive. He also
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suggested that an autonomous body -similar to the R.S.C.- and headed by a foreign expert 
should be placed in charge of overseeing the progress of the works.28 But, the state wanted to 
rid itself of foreign control not create new agencies of supervision. The Venizelos government in 
1932 planned to set up a a Greek company to supervise the exploitation of the new lands to be 
handed over by foreign contractors in Macedonia.29 But the National Assembly did not agree and 
nothing was done for four years.30 Thus, those areas that were drained lay unexploited. In part 
this was because the government could not decide upon a settlement policy. Whether to aim at 
settling the maximum amount of peasants on the reclaimed lands for social and economic reasons 
or whether to aim at attaining the highest possible yield from these lands through the employment 
of the most modern and scientific methods of cultivation?31 Finally in 1937, under the Metaxas 
dictatorship, the Special Fund for the Hydraulic Works of Macedonia undertook the continuation 
of the works, maintenance, exploitation of the reclaimed lands. We do not know exact details but 
it seems that the contractors departed without raising any major objections 32
In conclusion, throughout the twenties the reclamation works in Macedonia had been seen 
by the politicians and the state as a panacea which would enable the country to become self- 
sufficient in cereals 33 But, Greece unlike Italy did not win its 'battle of grain' In the thirties.34 The 
projects it began were not completed. The bitter truth was that even if they had been completed, 
the yield would have been inadequate 35 In 1932 it was estimated that if all the areas to be 
reclaimed in Macedonia were devoted to growing wheat they would economize on importing 
120,000 tons of wheat per annum, whereas the average annual volume of wheat imports was 
564,500 tons 36
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Chapter 5
The Second Public Works Loan
5.1. Basic Features
As was the case with the First Public Works Loan of December 1928, the Second Public 
Works Loan of March 1931 which marked the termination of foreign borrowing by the Greek state 
prior to WWII, was at £4,600,000 the largest infrastructure loan of the period. Existing scholarship 
has given scant reference to this loan in inspite its significance. As was the case with the First 
Public Works Loan of December 1928, loan it was raised by public flotation and was not spent on 
one exclusive project. (For a description of how the proceeds of this loan were allocated see: 
Book II, Section I, Chapter 2, Table 6) In addition, it was the only non League loan to have an 
international syndicated character. However, the degree of internationalism of this loan must not 
be exaggerated. It did not signify the demise of British tutelage nor of the domin* ance of 
Hambros. On the contrary Hambros headed the syndicate.
By 1931, the government had come some way from the days when it relied on the 
contractors to raise the necessary capital for infrastructure projects but in essence it continued to 
remain a weak partner in the world financial market. Clearly the international environment in the 
early thirties was not supportive of foreign loans. One could argue that Greece did surprisingly 
well. However, let it be underlined at this point that the government would not have done much 
better, even if the environment was different, because formal external supervision (i.e. the 
League of Nations, the Bank of England, etc.) and the private bankers (Hambros) were 
concerned about overborrowing.
5.2. The International Syndicate
Before looking into the details of the loan it should be noted that the active participation of 
Diomedes in the negotiations reflected the growing 'domestic' influence of the recently founded 
central bank.1 As has already been mentioned, (see Book II, Section III, Chapter 3,3.1.) in April 
1930, i.e about 16 months after the flotation of the First Public Works Loan, the Venizelos cabinet 
sounded out Hambros as to whether it would ‘approve’ to raise an additional £8,000,000.
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Hambros was skeptical and responded that in one year it could float a loan that would not 
exceed £8,000,000 (meaning of course that it could very well be less).2 Thus, the Second 
Public Works Loan provided in May 1931 amounted to 'only' 57% of the requested funds.
Ironically, it was not Greece's strength but rather Hambros' reluctance to undertake the 
issue on its own that is responsible for the international character of the Second Public Works 
Loan. Whereas in 1928 Hambros had been keen on issuing the £4,000,000 public works ban 
completely on its own, in 1931 due to the unsettled condition of the financial market, it strove to 
assign as large as possible an amount to other banks. Apparently, Hambros by this point had 
become more interested in direct investments than in Greek government loans. Indicative of this 
change of attitude was the fact that Hambros let it be understood that it would organize the 
flotation of the Second Public Works Loan only if the government would immediately grant a new 
concession for the P.A.P. railways.3
The loan was raised simultaneously in six European countries; Britain, Holland, Switzerland, 
Sweden, Italy and Greece. Eight banks were involved, Hambros Bank, Erlangers Ltd., 
Mendelsohn & Co., Nederlandsche Handel* Maatschapjj, Credit Suisse, Stockholms Enskilda 
Bank, Banca Commerciale Italiana and the National Bank of Greece. (See Table 1) Only the two 
Dutch bankers were newcomers in the Greek arena. The others had already participated in the 
flotation of the League Stabilization Loan. Inspite of the impressive list of countries and banks 
this loan was a highly concentrated affair. Hambros and the National Bank of Greece issued 66% 
of the loan capital (44% and 22% respectively). The N.B.G. participation in this last pre-1932 
flotation was a measure of the limited access to the international capital market enjoyed by the 
government. Indeed, a pattern of symmetry was played out: the National Bank had also been 
asked to contribute to the Refugee Loan of 1924 which was the first issue of the period. As head 
of the syndicate, Hambros was in charge of allocating quotas.4 It attempted without success to 
secure the participation of American capital. Speyer, National City Bank, and Seligmans were 
approached. However, each of these bankers explained that the U.S.A. market had 'shutdown' 
as regards overseas long-dated paper, and was thus not yet in a position to absorb a large Greek 
issue. Instead they counterproposed that they undertake a new issue of one year Treasury 
bonds amounting to $7,500,000. But Athens was not interested.5
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Table 1
Underwriters of the Second Public Works Loan
Hambros Bank and Erlangers 
National Bank of Greece 
Stockholms Enskilda Bank 
Credit Suisse
Banca Commerciale Italiana
Mendelsohn & Co. and Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappjj
£2,000,000 
£1,000,000 
£ 500,000 
£ 400,000 
£ 400,000 
£ 300,000
Tota l £4,600,000
Compiled from: G. Haritakis, Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1932. (Athens, 1933), p.525.
It may be argued that the diverse European character of the new loan (i.e. the participation 
of the smaller capital markets such as: Sweden, Switzerland, Holland, and Italy) was due more to 
Hambro's failure to secure American participation than to any real improvement of the status of the 
Greek government in the international financial market. In a nutshell, there was a 'contraction' in 
the world market. Only a few markets remained open and only a few borrowers were accepted.
Venizelos had entertained the hope that French capital would show an interest in this 
loan,6 and was not deterred by the fact that in France flotations were in general more expensive.7 
What mattered most to the Prime Minister was to rid Greece from the overwhelming dependence 
on Britain. In a gesture of conciliation towards France, Venizelos in the autumn of 1930, arranged 
that the construction of a large housing project for the refugees in Athens be assigned to the 
French firm Compagnie Immobiliere du Boulevard Haussman and not to a British consortium 
Holland, Hannen & Lubits inspite of the fact that the latter was associated with Hambros and had 
offered better terms. Hambros was angered by this decision and it threatened that if the project 
went through with the French it would not help the government raise a Second Public Works 
Loan.8 But, this move proved ineffective. The French government was at the moment in an 
awkward position regarding foreign flotations because of the need to defend the franc. It was 
made clear to Athens that no loan could be floated on the Paris bourse unless the government 
acquiesced to take steps in the direction of fulfilling its payments on the Ottoman debt and 
meeting its financial obligations regarding the purchase of the Salonika Monastir line from the 
Ottoman railways. Keen as he may have been for a French participation, Venizelos was not 
prepared to tie the flotation of this loan to these unrelated issues.9
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5.3. Hambros Terms and the Flotation of the Loan
In order to secure a successful flotation of a Second Public Works Loan, Hambros instead 
of agreeing to provide the £8,000,000 requested, arranged for a flotation amounting to only 
£4,600,000. With this move a wide margin of safety was established for the 'investor* in the 
bonds of the two public works loans. The annual service for the two public works loans at a 'mere' 
£575,530 was more than adequately covered. The income of the government revenues 
pledged for the public works flotations amounted to £5,340,610 in 1930.10 In addition, Hambro 
took two further measures. He demanded that the proceeds of the loan be exclusively spent on 
infrastructure development and insisted that the price at which the bonds were offered to the 
public should be no higher than 87. (The price at which the bonds of the First Public Works Loan 
had been offered to the public had been 89 and the contemporaneous average price of issue in 
London for foreign government flotations was 95.2. Table 1a & 1b -in Book II, Section III, Chapter 
2- portrays that the Second Public Works Loan was a worse deal and that Greece's credit standing 
in the international capital market had fallen). Diomedes announced that he was not happy with 
this low issue price. Norman informed him that it could not be raised and that he doubted whether 
at that time the Treasury would allow any foreign government to raise a loan. This was rather 
hypocritical and stood on thin ground for shortly after the flotation of this loan the Chilean 
government raised £7,000,000 in the City.11
The loan was floated on March 23 1931.12 With the exception of the N.B.G. which decided 
not to go ahead with a public subscription, all the other members of the syndicate offered the 
bonds to the public at 87.13 The amount which the government received -after paying for the 
bankers commission, stamp duty and other expenses- was 82.14 At five points the spread was 
equal to that of the First Public Works Loan. Inspite the low issue price, the ample securities 
provided and the fact that shortly before the flotation a support syndicate was set up which spent 
£200,000 on buying Greek bonds in the City, the public did not rush to subscribe.15 The British 
underwriters were forced to take up 85% of the bonds they issued.16 Notably, in the City the 
bonds right from the beginning stood steadily at a discount of 2%.17
The failure of the market to absorb the flotation was commented upon in London.18 At 
home, Diomedes was labelled by the press as the enslaverer of Greece. It was suggested, once
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again, that the infrastructure projects ought to be financed from the budget surplus and not 
foreign borrowing. Only the EAeOdepov Bfipa, a staunch supporter of Venizelos, did not criticize 
the loan.19 The warnings that the government should curtail its demand for foreign borrowing 
were misplaced as the international capital market was no longer interested in Greece. Inspite of 
Venizelos' pleas to foreign financiers and the League of Nations, no more money was raised for 
Greek infrastructure development either in Britain or elsewhere.20 Infact, only three months later 
Hambros effectively placed an embargo on Greek loans. In a letter to Diomedes on June 171931 
Charles Hambro wrote:
"As you know, we are adverse to allowing any direct Greek government bond to be 
placed or quoted on the London market for at least two years as we are strongly of 
the opinion that it would be most detrimental to Greek credit for such an event to 
occur."21
Charles Hambro was obviously exercised by the problems of the moment. Thus, what is of 
utmost significance from the point of view of historical research and this dissertation in particular is 
that the London market became closed to the Greek government prior to the abandonment of the 
gold standard by Britain. In terms of establishing the causes for the 'drying up' of foreign capital 
inflow into Greece this cut off date is of importance. It does not allow us to agree with the popular 
interpretation that Greece was a passive victim of the world crisis i.e. a totally exogenous 
parameter. However, it must be remarked that according to the R.I.I.A. in 1930 the partial 
embargo placed by the British government on new issues 'was intensified' in 1931. But, it is not 
stated when exactly during the year this came into effect (i.e. whether it occurred before or after 
Britain went off the gold standard) 22
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CONCLUSION
1. From ad hoc Practice to ad hoc 'Theorizing'
The contemporary Greek academic community and the corps of engineers were vocal in 
their criticism of the terms under which foreign contractors undertook the building of Greece's 
physical infrastructure. Some, carried away by extreme anti-western sentiments, made foolish 
comments. For example, one source argued that the foreigners avoided using qualified Greek 
experts in order to hide their lack of expertise!1
At the time, there was a 'ragbag' of issues brought up from which it is possible to discern the 
following common theme: the contracts should have been of a fixed cost type and the 
government should have attained a higher degree of control over the technical aspects of the 
schemes.2 Of special interest to the scholar is the fact that two sensitive topics, which have 
occupied a central position in the international economic development literature of the postwar 
years, were raised. The first was the limited extent to which there was a transfer of technology and 
dissemination of 'know how*. It was maintained that the contractors should have been obliged to 
educate and employ more local talent than what was the case. Secondly, the local Intelligentsia 
claimed that the technology applied was too capital intensive and not suited to Greece's resource 
endowment. They blamed the cost-plus nature of the agency contracts as being responsible for 
this failing*. Under this system, the contractor had a strong pecuniary incentive to prefer 
machines over labour. For, the higher the cost of construction, the higher was its remuneration. 
In addition, the contractor as a commercial intermediary made a direct profit from the purchasing or 
leasing of large and expensive equipment for the works.3 It is indicative that only 19% of the 
cubic yards of earth moved for the reclamation of the Vardar valley was done by labour (the 
remaining 81% being dug and transported by colossal machinery).
On the face of it, contemporary critics were correct. There was a waste of resources 
considering that unemployment in Greece at the time was high. However, what appears to have 
been the case (at least with the land reclamation schemes) was that there was a paradoxical labour 
shortage.4 For, though "labour rates were low, and earthworks could be done cheaply by labour,
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using local carts to transport the spoil from the borrow pits to the embankments", the problem was 
that labour was not always "forthcoming”. As a top engineer of The Foundation Co. noted:
"During the periods of ploughing and of harvesting, labour was difficult to obtain 
even when high wages were offered; and this difficulty increased each year as more 
and more land was put under plough".5
Table 1
Number of Workers Employed for the Public Work Schemes at the Peak 
of the Construction Phase1
P ro jec t Number of
w orkers
Athens water scheme2
Vardar valley reclamation 4,300
Struma valley reclamation 3,400
Road works 15,000
1This list is not complete and it covers only the years of peak activity in these schemes.
2Unfortunately for the Athens water scheme, which was the only project to maintain a momentum throughout 
the twenties we do not have figures for the number of workers it employed. The only information we have is 
that the maintenance company which was set up by the contractor and the Bank of Athens by 1934 had 
some 1,000 employees. (See: Book II, Section I, Chapter 1).
Compiled from: information presented on the public work projects throughout Book II.
The capital intensive techniques employed, in combination with the slow pace of the works 
(due to the inadequate flow of funds) did not allow the state to 'solve' the unemployment problem 
of Greece through the building of new infrastructure projects. Unfortunately, reliable 
unemployment figures do not exist for the period under study. However, it is possible to 
construe indirectly that the workers employed for these schemes did not prove to be a panacea.6 
They reached a total number of roughly 25,000 only during their peak construction phases which 
rarely lasted for more than one year. (See Table 1 above).
2 . Unfinished Business or the Vicious Circle o f Underdevelopment
The previous chapters have demonstrated that foreign portfolio investment in infrastructure 
took place under difficult circumstances. The planning, financing and construction of schemes 
were riddled with 'structural weaknesses'. A point of fundamental importance is that the state 
carried a large part of the responsibility for the high cost and waste involved in infrastructure
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development. It would be a mistake to view it simply as a passive victim of foreign exploitation. 
Pointedly, the state before and after stabilization, failed to gain the blind trust of Greece's official 
supervisors and major institutional investors.
Regarding the exogenous parameters it is obvious that Greece stabilized too late in order to 
produce the expected results (i.e. a large and easy flow of foreign finance). A notable 
characteristic of poststabilization borrowing being its Anglocentric nature. Not one penny was 
raised on the American exchanges and Hambros increased its stronghold over Greece. If ever 
Greece was a vassal of Britain, this was when it occurred.
Following stabilization foreign portfolio investment in public works was no success story. A 
fact which has been overlooked in the literature is that after stabilization the inflow of foreign 
capital for infrastructure development was difficult to secure and it came to a total halt in the spring 
of 1931-i.e. about eight months before Britain went off the gold standard and one year before the 
Greek state defaulted on its foreign loans.7 Indeed, in terms of cause and effect it is apparent that 
the default was the dependent variable. Greece defaulted after it became obvious that there 
would be no new loans and not vice versa. Foreign investors had already become reluctant to 
flood Greece with the capital she demanded. (However, it must be noted that once the default 
took place it became practicably impossible for the state to raise foreign loan capital).
Seen from this perspective one can argue that even if the world crisis had not occurred, 
foreign portfolio investment in Greek infrastructure would have been problematic in two respects. 
The supply of funds would have been inadequate to complete the schemes being built. In 
addition, the state was too 'backward' to employ in an efficient manner the capital placed at its 
disposal for public works. Foreign portfolio investment as played out in the Greek context 
enhanced the dependent status of the country in the world community. Ironically, the framework 
of agency contracts (as opposed to foreign direct investments) had been followed in the hope 
that it would diminish the country's external dependence. As described, these loans in the short­
term facilitated political consolidation, but they were vested with extensive foreign control. In 
addition the foreign debt was bloated. Loans that were meant to be 'productive', were later 
transformed into loans that were not self-liquidating. What a tragic symptom of 
underdevelopment!
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One final question: Did the borrower (i.e the Greek state and the country at large) benefit 
overall from foreign portfolio investment in public works? In strict financial terms these expensive 
bans posed a low real burden on the state. Between May 1932 and April 1941 Greece paid only 
part of the annual interest due. Thereafter, for twenty years it suspended interest payments as 
well as capital re-payments. When the servicing of the debt was resumed in January 1963 a 
resheduling agreement was signed which lowered the interest rate charged by one half.8 The 
one advantage of the prolonged default was that the real capital value of the principal was much 
reduced and that ex ante expensive (high cost) bans ended up having a bw real burden on the 
economy. Seen from the wider perspective of economic development, the borrower did not 
profit from this type of portfolio investment because of the substantial waste involved in the 
construction of the projects.
In the last analysis it seems to be the case that Greece was caught in a vicious circle. Its 
underdevelopment impeded it from absorbing and expbiting in an efficient way the flow of 
foreign capital for infrastructure works. However, it is also the case that the sudden stoppage of 
the flow of foreign funds helped to perpetuate its economic backwardness and dependence.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION TO THE THESIS
Foreign portfolio investment in the twenties contributed to the institutional modernization 
of Greece: a central bank was established, the refugee settlement programme created an 
independent ‘market-oriented’ peasant class and the country’s physical infrastructure was * 
expanded. However, this should not disguise the fact that foreign finance did not have a 
fundamental impact on the course of economic development. The reasons for the failure of the 
unprecedented post-1922 foreign capital inflow to trigger a take-off for the backward and small 
Greek economy are diverse and complicated. The tactical blunders made by the state regarding 
the allocation of funds, the absence of long-run development planning, the greed of foreign 
investors and the abrupt halt of the flow in capital in 1931 were among the major factors 
responsible for this ‘poor’ performance.
The cost of foreign capital inflow in terms of national sovereignity was high. The truth is that 
throughout the period, the state remained an inept and weak player in the world of international 
finance. As a consequence, foreign portfolio investment in the public sector was vested with 
elements of external control and financial power was often exercised for diplomatic ends. In 
addition, it did not constitute a 'pure' capital transfer from abroad, as Greek banks participated in 
foreign loan issues (for foreign financiers were often unwilling to take risks on their own) and 
Greek nationals purchased a large part of the bonds floated overseas.
Throughout, the thesis has uncovered the complex institutional framework through which 
foreign funds flowed. Foreign finance was based on an elaborate power structure involving 
numerous alliances and intrigues among domestic and international actors. It has been shown 
that neither the state nor The foreign factor* were homogeneous. The latter was characterized by 
national rivalries; France resented the rise of British influence in the sphere of international 
monetary affairs and Britain tried to block the penetration of American business interests in 
Greece. (Book II, pp.240-245,335-341). In addition , the 'foreign factor* operated at two distinct
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levels: the international capital market and formal supervision. Nevertheless, the two levels were 
tightly intertwined. Overall, formal supervision was everpresent. On the one hand, the I.F.C. and 
the League interfered with the working of the market providing the guidelines within which the 
bankers and contractors would function. On the other hand, they used their power to facilitate or 
block Greece's access to the markets. (A recurrent theme throughout the thesis being the 
imposition of embargoes and the repeated refusal of the I.F.C. to supervise loans which were not 
raised under the auspices of the League of Nations.). To complicate matters even further, there 
were internal factions among the various official bodies. The conflicts of ‘interest’ that developed 
between the I.F.C. and the League of Nations have been charted. In addition, it has been shown 
that the Foreign Office, the Bank of England and the British Treasury often disagreed although 
they appeared to work together. Moreover, foreign business competitors coalesced with rival 
local interests. The battle between the Hambros -N.B.G. group and the Ulen- Bank of Athens 
consortium has been described in detail. Therefore it is not possible to speak of 'A foreign factor*, 
although one country, Britain, established a hegemonic position in Greece. It is worth repeating 
that Hambros almost monopolized the flow of foreign funds, that the I.F.C was an outpost of the 
British Treasury on Greek soil, and that the League stabilization scheme was inspired by the Bank 
of England. It has been demonstrated that the rise of British hegemony was related to a 
combination of factors among which the more important were the post WWI loss of French interest 
in Greek investments and the internal weaknesses of the Greek state.
Book I reveals that though the state was vulnerable vis-a-vis the Powers, it was not a passive 
pawn of foreign interests. The aggessive tactics used by Norman to establish a foothold in 
Greece have been delineated. Domestic resistances to the new realities introduced by League 
supervision have been described. Let us remind the reader that Athens initially did not want to 
espouse ‘monetary orthodoxy' and the free convertibility of the drachma. Moreover, pegging was 
prefered to legal stabilization and central banking was seen as an anomaly. Pointedly, the state 
toyed with the League bans cum schemes up to the final hour and accepted them as a solution of 
last resort. Book I also uncovers the double standards and code of behavior of financial 
‘imperialism’. Notably, Britain was certainly unable (and probably unwilling) to adjust the archaic 
institution of international supervision (i.e. the I.F.C.) to the new framework brought about by the
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operation of the gold exchange standard in Greece. (See: pp.178-184). This is in stark contrast 
to the insistence upon radical reforms within Greece. Finally, in the conclusion to Book I we saw 
that Greece was not a unique case. If anything the elusive stability of the Greek experiment 
demonstrates that the mechanism which was set up after WWI to enhance the supremacy of the 
pound sterling imposed heavy costs on the weaker nations.
Throughout Book II the peripheral status of Greece in the world capital market has been 
underscored. It has been shown that the independent access of the state to the markets was 
limited (by independent, meaning the ability to raise loans without the support of the League of 
Nations and the I.F.C.). The unsuccesful efforts to escape from the domination of Hambros have 
been described. Overall an indecisive state has emerged; often chauvinistic, military and social 
considerations impeded it from adopting strict economic criteria regarding infrastructure 
development.
In more than one way this has been a story of mutual prejudices, suspicions and frustrations 
compounded by the existence of a communication 'gap'. Foreign entrepreneurs and Greeks 
differed in their perception regarding the management of concessions and rationalization in 
industry. A strong divide also emerged between the Greek authorities and formal supervision on 
a number of policy issues such as: the recompensation of war victims, the country’s legitimate 
minimum defence requirements, the optimum level of monetary circulation and foreign borrowing 
for public works. This has also been a story of ‘failed dreams’. At the end of the day, the 
government was displeased because foreign finance did not suffice to complete its public works 
‘programme’. Foreign supervisors were disappointed because the state resorted loo  freely’ to 
the international capital market. Finally, the foreign bondholders suffered the blow of the 1932 
default. The bitter memories lingered on for many years. The Greek people’s mistrust towards 
the west was inflamed and it would take Greece more than thirty years to gain once again the trust 
of the world capital markets.
Finally, a central theme of the thesis has been that Greece experienced missed 
opportunities in both a chronological and structural sense. What is important is that accident and 
exogenous factors were not the sole or original causes of this phenomenon. Book I showed that 
the state was unable, and certainly unwilling, to settle its war debts and adjust to the principles of
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'sound finance' at an earlier date. In Book II it was demonstrated that foreign capital flows suffered 
from a problem of absorption in that there was waste. The final chapters of Book I and Book II have 
uncovered that due to the cultural variable and the misguided policies of the state the flow of » 
funds and foreign direct investments would have been 'anaemic' even if the world crisis had not 
occurred. Also, it has been demonstrated that domestic political and economic considerations 
influenced in an important way state policy towards foreign capital. If there is a moral to be drawn 
it is that a linear causation analysis is not appropriate and that endogenous parameters are at least 
as important as 'The foreign factor* in explaining the dependent formation of Greece. This has 
never been a popular notion.
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APPENDIX 1
Table 1
State Expenditure and Foreign Borrowing 
(in million £)
Year
(A)
State
Expenditure
(B)
Nominal Value of 
Foreign Loans
(B) 
as a % of
(A)
1922 20,3 . •
1923 16,7 1,7 10
1924 22,3 12,3 55
1925 21,8 6,4 30
1926 22,5 1 4.4 1
1927 20,8 - I
1928 25,2 11.5 45.6 I
1929 48,8 2,5 5 11930 29,6 1 3 I1931 31,1 4,6 15 1
1932 19 - |
Total 1922-1932 255,6 41 16 I
Compiled from: G. Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1932. (Athens, 1933), pp.493-528. 
Also, G. Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook for 1939. (Athens, 1940), Part II, p.170.
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Table 2a
(in million £)
Year (A)Exports
(B)
Remittances*
(C)
Nominal Value 
of Loans
(C) 
as a % of
(A)+(B)
1922 14,9 4.9 . .
1923 18,5 6.7 1.7 7
1924 13,2 8.6 12,3 56.5
1925 14,5 7.4 6.4 29
1926 14 7.3 1 5
1927 16,4 6.9 - -
1928 16,9 6.4 11.5 49
1929 18,5 7,8 2,5 9.5
1930 15,9 8,3 1 5
1931 11,9 7,1 4,6 24.2
1932 10 2.8 - -
Total 1922-1932 164,7 74,2 41 17
*The figures for the remmitances are presented in gold pounds-the divergence between gold and paper 
pounds becomes noticable after 1930.
Compiled from: G. Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1932. (Athens, 1933), pp.493-528. 
Also G. Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook for 1939. (Athens, 1940), Part II, p.39; Also, B.G./T.A., File 23: 
League of Nations, Financial Committee, Report to the Council on Greece. Extraordinary Session held in 
London, June 6-14th, 1933.
Table 2b
Foreign Capital Inflow and the Trade Gap 
(in million £)
Year (A) Trade Gap
(B)
Nominal Value of 
Foreign Loans
(B) I 
as a % of 1
(A) 1
1922 4,1 - I
1923 11,8 1,7 14.5 I
1924 19,3 12,3 64
1925 18,1 6,4 35
1926 11,7 1 8.5
1927 17,8 - -
1928 17,6 11,5 65
1929 16,8 2,5 15
1930 12,1 1 8
1931 12,9 4,6 35.5
1932 6,5 - -
Total 1922-1932 148,7 41 |
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1929. (Athens, 1930), p.199. Also, G. 
Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1932. (Athens, 1933), pp.493-528. Also, G.Haritakis 
fed.). Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1939. (Athens. 1940), Part I, p.39.
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Table 3
Foreign loan inflow and annual service of the foreign debt* 1922-1932 
(in thousand drs.)
Year Inflow Service Net flow I
1922-1923 2,665,000 725,000 1,940,000
1923-1924 250,000 1,563,000 -1,313,000
1924-1925 650,000 1,769,000 -1,119,000
1925-1926 2,005,000 1,933,000 -72,000
1926-1927 2,202,000 2,456,000 -254,000
1927-1928 60,000 2,237,000 -2,177,000
1928-1929 1,219,000 3,194,000 -1,975,000
1929-1930 8,779,000 3,355,000 -5,424,000
1930-1931 125,000 3,725,000 -3,600,000
1931-1932 200,000 3,653,000 -3,453,000
Grand Total 
1922-1932 18,155,000 24,610,000 -6,455,000
*The figures include foreign borrowing of the private and public sectors. 
Source: G. Hristopoulos (ed.), History of the Greek Nation. Vol.IE, p.337.
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Table 4
Greece's External Private and Public Debt in 1932 
(in million U.S. $)
1. Loans
i. Long-term Loans
Public foreign debt 371,8
Loans for communication works 3.4
Harbour and shipping loan 2,4
Industrial loans 15,9 21,7
Total Iona-term 393.5
ii. Medium-term loans
Loans to mortgage banks 16,4
iii. Short-term Loans
Foreign public debt 11.0
Loans to banks 15,0
Loans to merchants 28,2
Loans to monopolies 7.5 50,7
Total short-term £LZ
Total Loans 471,6
I I .  Investments In Greece by Foreigners
Foreign enterprises 18,2
Participation of foreigners in Greek enterprises 15,1
Total 33.3
Miscellaneous, not statistically determined 10,0
G r a n d  T o t a l 514,9*
'This figure amounted roughly to £125,000,000.
Source: B.G./T.A., File 23: League of Nations, Financial Committee, Report to the Council on Greece, 
Extraordinary Session held in London, June 6-14th 1933.
Table 4a
Breakdown of Foreign Public Debt in 1932
Foreign public loans 
Foreign loans of public bodies*
Foreign loans to banks
Foreign bans to merchants and industry
Foreign investments in Greece in foreign enterprises 
Participation of foreigners in Greek enterprises
Miscellaneous
74%
6%
3%
8.5%
3.5%
3%
2%
Total 100%
*By public bodies we mean non central government institutions such as municipalities, port funds, the 
national mortgage bank, and the monopolies.
Compiled from data in Table 4 above.
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APPENDIX 2
The Budget (1900-1927): Tables 1a, 1b, 1c
Table 1a
Year
(1)
Ordinary 
Revenues 
(in mil. drs.)
( II)
Total Expences 
(in mil. drs.)
( I I I)
Balance
( I I I )
as a % of
(■)
1900 103 110 -7 7
1901 108.5 114 -6.5 6
1902 108.5 124.5 -16 15
1903 109 116 -7 6.4
1904 110 116 -6 5.4
1905 111 116 -5 4.5
1906 121 121.5 -0.5 0.4
1907 123 132 -9 7
1908 118 134 -16 13.5
1909 117 137 -20 17
1910 129.5 140.5 -11 8.5
1911 138 181 -43 31
1912 127 208 -81 64
1913 141 261 -120 85
1914 208 482 -274 132
1915 212 376 -164 78
1916 216 215 -1 0.5
1917 370 317 -53 14.3
1918 365.5 1,446 -1,080.5 295.5
1919 481 1,354 -873 181.5
1920 633 1,687 -1,054 166.5
1921 850 2,258 -1,408 165.6
1922 1,710 3,383 -1,673 97.8
1923 3,284 4,950 -1,666 50.7
1924 4,721 5,510 -789 16.7
1925 5,564 6,843 -1,279 30
1926 7,025 8,710 -1,685 24
1927 8,807 7,771 +1,036 12
Source: G. Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1929. (Athens, 1930), pp.274-275.
Table 1b
Government Expenditure and Cost of Living Index 
1920-100
Year GovernmentExpenditure
Cost 
of Living
1920 100 100
1921 134 113
1922 270 181
1923 519 336
1924 746 351
1925 878 403
1926 1109 465
1927 1391 511
Compiled from: G. Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1929. (Athens, 1930), pp.32,274-275.
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Table 1c
Military Expenditure 
Allocation of Budget Expenditure to the Military (army, navy)
1914 37.9%
1920-21 51%
1921-22 56%
1922-23 59%
1923-24 39%
1924-25 31%
1925-26 29%
1926-27 28%
1927-28 3%*
ac
‘This figure has been derived by extrapolation.
Compiled from: B.G./T.A., Document 98/72 'Memorandum prepared by Touderos on June 14 1926;. Also 
from: P.Dertilis, La Reconstruction Financiers de la Grece et la Societe des Nations. (Paris, 1929), p.46.
Monetary Circulation: Table 2
Table 2
Total Circulation of Banknotes Prior to Stabilization
Year (thousand drs.) Index 1918s 100
1918 1,304,268 100
1919 1,412,220 108
1920 1,508,366 116
1921 2,161,183 166
1922 3,149,446 242
1923 4,681,200 359
1924 4,865,924 373
1925 5,339,249 409
1926 4,864,640 373
1927 4,966,258 380
Source: Compiled from Bank of Greece, The First Fifty Years of the Bank of Greecel 928-1978. (Athens, 
1978), p.28; and also, X. Zolotas, Monetary and Exchange Phenomena in Greece. 1910-1927. (Athens, 
1928), Vol.A, p.225.
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The Exchange Rate: Tables 3a, 3b
Table 3a
Average Annual Price of Foreign Exchange 
(selling price in drs.)
Year £ Sterling U.S.A.$ I
1914 25,2 5-1 I1918 24,7 5.8
1919 24,5 5,5 1
1920 34,2 9.5
1921 70,9 18,3
1922 166,5 37,1
1923 296,7 64
1924 247,3 56
1925 312,7 64,7
1926 386,5 79,5
1927 368,5 79,5
1928 372,9 76,6
1929 375 77
1930 375 77
1931 352,8 77,4
1932 472,9 133,7
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.), The Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1930. (Athens, 1931), p.251; also, 
G.Haritakis (ed), The Economic Yearbook for 1939. (Athens, 1940), Part II, p.202.
Table 3b
Index of Annual Fluctuations in the Price of the £ sterling 
(Assuming that the Annual Average Price -  100)
Year Maximum Price Minimum Price
1914 100.3 99.6
1918 101.2 99.6
1919 103.6 91
1920 138 89.8
1921 141 66.2
1922 246.2 58.2
1923 147 52.3
1924 120.6 81.6
1925 125.4 78.1
1926 117 81.7
1927 104.5 96.6
1928 100.6 98.3
Source: same as Table 3a.
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APPENDIX 3
Table 1
Structural Disequilibrium of the External Sector 
(Balance of Payments) during the Stabilization Phase (1929-1932)1 
(Figures for 1929-1930 in Thousand Gold Sterling, 
1931-1932 in Thousand Gold Francs - Current Prices)2
1929 1930 1931 1932 |
Imports 35400 28935 588377 341861
Exports 18717 15782 280166 183334
Trade balance -16683 -13153 -308211 -158527
Net invisibles total3: +7355 +5027 +190475 +98855
i. Emigrant remittances(+) 7815 8359 177100 72520
ii. Shipping(+) 955 31250 31250 22776
iii. Interest and profits of Greek capital 
abroad(+) 4682 3795 138075 50788
iv. Interest and profits on foreign capital in 
Greece(-) 500 650 18950 22779
v. Service of National debt(-) 4600 4776 124000 30598
Current balance -9328 -8126 -117736 -59672
Capital movements net4: +9328 +8126 +248523 +59672
Balancing item not given not given -130787 not given
''Reliable data do not exist for 1928.
Apparently because the Bank of Greece reported all foreign exchange transactions in terms of gold 
sterling(1929-1931) and then in gold francs from 1932 onwards "it made sense” for the official statistics to 
present the remaining data relating to the balance of payments in a "similar manner".
®Of which(+inflow and - outflow.
including changes in foreign exchange reserves and balances from bilateral clearing trade agreements 
Balancing item
Source: Freris, The Greek Economy in the Twentieth Century. (London, 1986), p.83. The author has based 
the information provided in this table from "completely reworked and cross checked data from the Economic 
Yearbooks of Greece for 1931 and 1938.
Table 2
The Trade Gap during the Stabilization Phase: 1928-1932 
Exports as a % of the Value of Imports
1928 51
1929 52
1930 57
I 1931 48
I 1932 58
Compiled from: G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1939. (Athens, 1940), Part II, p.15.
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Table 3
Budget Supluses during the Term of Free Convertibility 
(in drs.)
Fiscal Years
1928-1929 1,130,200,000
1929-1930 404,200,000
1930-1931 701,500,000
1931-1932* 432,600,000
*The figure for 1931-1932 is the provisional figure given by the League of Nations in 1933.
Source:B.G./T.A., File 23: League of Nations, Financial Committee, Report to the Council on Greece, 
Extraordinary Session held in London, June 6-14th 1933.
Table 4
Foreign Exchange Reserves Estimated 
as a % of the Value of Greece's Annual Imports (1928-1932)
1928 34 or the equivalent to four months of imports
1929 23.4 or the equivalent to almost three months of imports
1930 28.5 or the equivalent to three and a half months of imports
1931 13.7 or the equivalent to one and a half months of imports
1932 11.4 or the equivalent to one and a half months of imports
Compiled from: Table 3 and G.Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1939. (Athens,1940), Part 
II, pp.15,200.
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APPENDIX 4
Table 1
Composition of Deposits of the National Bank of Greece 
(in million drs.)
Year SightDeposits
Saving
Deposits
Time Saving 
Deposits Total
1920 0,500 138 565 1,191
1925 1,421 256 956 2,634
1928 3,522 994 762 5,278
1930 3,691 1,712 1,460 6,864
1934 4,555 2,794 2,445 9,794
1938 5,605 2,853 2,344 10,803
Source: E.P. Stassinopoulos, The History of the National Bank of Greece 1841-1966. Athens, 1968, 
pp.134-135 also, G. Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1938. (Athens 1939)
Table 2
Sectoral Breakdown of Loans Granted to Greek Industry 
By March 1940
Industries National Bank of Greece^1)
Hellenic and 1 
General Trust Ltd. 1
Chemical 35 % 3.1 %
Textiles 24 % 11.8 %
Food 17 % 22.0 %
Miscellaneus 24 %
Total amount 
which industry owed to £9,308,521 <2> £362,530<3> |
<1>The National Bank did not segregate loans bv category of borrower in the statistics it provided for the 
annual reports. Thus, the only information we have for the amount it had lent to Greek industry before World 
War II is from a report prepared by Industrial Credit Department of the National Department which stated that 
on March 31, 1940, the total capital of the National Bank tied up in Greet industry amounted to
5,045,770,000 drs. or 19,308,521. Thus, the amount of capital which Greek industry owed to the National 
Bank was about 25 times the amount owed to the Hellenic and General Trust Ltd.
WMarch 31, 1940 
^January 31, 1940
Source: Anastassopoulos, op.cit, Vol. 3, p. 1581. Also, NBG/H.A., XXII Banks, IE Banking Institutions 
File 38: Hellenic and General Trust Ltd, Balance Sheet of Jan.31,1940.
415
Table 3
Growth of Output in Selected Branches or Greek Industry 
1928-1938
I Year ElectricityThoue.
khv
Cement
Thoue.
tons
Alcohol
Thoue.
tons
Wine
Thous.
tons
Cotton spinning 
Thous. meters
Cotton weaving I 
Thous. meters 1
1928 60 145 11.5 17 7.9 16 |
1930 100 180 11 13 9.6 22
1932 120 196 12 9 10 23
1934 140 248 13 10 14 29
1936 170 276 11.4 8 15 27
1938 230 308 17 15 15.7 27.7
Compiled from: G. Haritakis (ed.), Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1939. (Athens, 1940), pp.188-265.
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APPENDIX 5
Description of Works Assigned to Foundation Co. as Stipulated in the Contract and 
their Materialization in Reality
Schedule A
I. Survey, preparation of plans and estimates.
II. Drainage of lakes Ardzan, Amatovo. Estimated area to be reclaimed -  100,000 stremmas. 
Estimated cost -  $600,000; and estimated time of completion -  26 months after the ratification 
of the contract1. It is not possible to ascertain exactly how much this part of the project 
actually cost. It was completed on October 31 19301 Less than half of the drained land proved 
cultivable.
Schedule B
I . Drainage of the Yenidge swamp. It was to be completed by October 1932. In actual fact it was 
completed in December 1937. As a result 70,000 stremmas of land were offered for 
cultivation.2
II. River training works:
A. The Axios, Gallikos, and Aliakmon rivers to be trained inorder to prevent flooding.
B. The railway bridges over the above rivers and the road bridge over the Loudias river to 
be strengthened. Also the river waters to be trained through the bridges.
It was estimated that with these anti flooding river training works, together with the 
drainage of the Yenidge swamp 540,000 stremmas would be reclaimed, and 600,000 
stremmas would be protected from periodical floodings. It was estimated that these 
works would cost $15,750,000 and would be completed by 19321. But, in actual fact, 
the river training works were completed in the 1940's at an unkown total cost
Schedule C
I. New Channel for the Axios river
About 3 klms from the Monastir railway bridge the Axios to be diverted into its old channel and 
to discharge at the gulf opposite the Great Kabournou. t was estimated that with this project
80,000 stremmas would be protected from flooding. The estimated cost was $10,220,000 and 
it was estimated that it would be completed by 19321. But, actually it began after 19321 Its 
cost is not known.
1 Because the estimates in the contract are different from those made by the government sources at later 
dates compare the above figures with those of Table 10.
2See: N.B.G./H.A., File 10, J.W. Doty to the Hellenic Construction Co. December 28 1938.
Compiled from the contract, Schedules: A,B.C. It should be noted that at the time the contract was signed it
was assumed that all the land made available would be cultivable. However, a few years later this was not
recognized as being the case.
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APPENDIX 6
The $7,500,000 Speyer Advance
Nominal Capital $7,500,000
Net Produce $7,479,750
Utilization of Net Produce
National road scheme $2,854,115
i. Vardar valley reclamation $ 870,000
ii. Reclamation of Serres-Drama plains $ 481,000
v. Study prepared by H.Boot& Sons $ 32,838
v. Towards the dowry of the newly founded Agricultural Bank of Greece $ 3,250,975
vi. Blocked Funds*
$ 260,820
Total
$ 7.479.750
The £900,000 Advance Provided by the National Bank of Greece
I) The £600,000 Tranche
Nominal Capital £600,000
Net Produce £600,000
Utilization of Net Produce
National road scheme £304,796
i. Vardar valley reclamation £ 92,505
ii. Reclamation of Serres-Drama plains £161,448
v. Study prepared by H.Boot& Sons £ 6,750
v. Interest for one year retained by the Bank £ 34,500
Total £600.000
II) The £300,000 Tranche
Nominal Capital £300,000
Net Produce £300,000
Utilization of Net Produce
National road scheme £106,000
i. Vardar valley reclamation £ 70,000
ii. Reclamation of Serres-Drama plains £100,000
v. Study prepared by H.Boot& Sons £ 6,750
v. Interest for one year retained by the Bank £ 17,250
Total £300.000
‘Deposit blocked for the stamp duty for the eventual obligations of the 5% 1914 loan.
Source: The above information has been obtained from: G.L.H.A./D.A.: File 37, Document 28, titled:: 
'Capitaux disposes hors du budget'undated.
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